The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
PAMELA SAMUDOSKY, JOHN
SAMUDOSKY,
2:23-CV-00827-CCW
Plaintiffs,
v.
ALLSTATE PROPERTY AND CASUALTY
INSURANCE COMPANY, ALLSTATE
FIRE AND CASUALTY INSURANCE
COMPANY, and ALLSTATE INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs’ Complaint. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will DENY Plaintiffs’ Motion to
Remand and GRANT Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
I. Procedural Background
On April 5, 2023, Plaintiffs John Samudosky and Pamela Samudosky1 filed a complaint in
the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County2 against Defendants Allstate Property and
Casualty Insurance Company, Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance Company, and Allstate
Insurance Company (collectively “Allstate”). ECF No. 1 ¶ 1. The Samudoskys are citizens of
Pennsylvania. ECF No. 1-2 ¶ 2. Allstate is a group of corporations, all of which are organized
1 Gregory W. Smith and Patricia A. Smith were originally Plaintiffs in the case, but were voluntarily dismissed by the
parties. See ECF No. 27.
2 Captioned Gregory W. Smith, et al. v. Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company, et al., No. GD-23-004532.
under the laws of the State of Illinois with their headquarters located in the same state. ECF Nos.
1-2 ¶¶ 3–7, 3 at 1.
This dispute arises from Allstate’s practice of applying a “non-stacked” label to the
declarations pages of single-vehicle insurance policies for Uninsured Motorist and Underinsured
Motorist (“UM/UIM”) coverage. ECF No. 1-2 ¶¶ 47–49. Under Pennsylvania law, insureds can
increase the amount of their UM/UIM benefits by combining, or “stacking,” the insurance limits
for each vehicle under one or more policies. 75 Pa. C. S. § 1738(a). There are two types of
stacking: intra-policy stacking and inter-policy stacking. Intra-policy stacking allows insureds to
stack the limits of UM/UIM coverage of multiple vehicles on one policy. Inter-policy stacking
allows insureds to stack the UM/UIM coverage of multiple vehicles across different policies.
Insureds can waive their right to stacking by signing a waiver-of-stacking form.
The Samudoskys purchased two insurance policies from Allstate. ECF No. 1-2 ¶¶ 37–38.
The first policy insures two private passenger automobiles and carries UM/UIM coverage of
$250,000 per person/$500,000 per accident.3 ECF No. 1-2 ¶ 38, 1-2 at 56. The second policy
insures one motorcycle and carries UM/UIM coverage of $250,000 per person/$500,000 per
accident. ECF No. 1-2 ¶ 37, 1-2 at 54. The Samudoskys have not signed a waiver-of-stacking
form. ECF No. 1-2 ¶ 43.
Both parties agree that the Samudoskys cannot engage in intra-policy stacking for the
motorcycle policy.4 ECF Nos. 1-2 ¶¶ 53–54, 8 at 9. Allstate has therefore designated the UM/UIM
coverage for this policy as “non-stacked.” ECF No. 1-2 at 54. The Samudoskys challenge this
3 Under this policy, both parties agree that Plaintiffs may engage in intra-policy stacking by combining the UM/UIM
coverage for the two vehicles on the policy. Allstate has designated the UM/UIM coverage for this policy as “stacked.”
Plaintiffs do not dispute this designation.
4 Single-item insurance policies cannot have intra-stacking benefits because there is only one vehicle and nothing else
within the policy on which to stack. Because there is only one vehicle—the motorcycle—on this policy, the parties
agree that there can be no intra-policy stacking.
designation as “improper, incorrect and unlawful” because, while they cannot stack within this
policy, they may still engage in inter-policy stacking and combine UM/UIM coverage across their
two separate policies. ECF No. 1-2 ¶ 55.
On September 28, 2022, an attorney for the Samudoskys sent a letter to Allstate, asking
them to remove the “unstacked” designation from the motorcycle policy claiming it was
“misleading and deceptive.” ECF No. 1-2 at 46. On November 11, 2022, counsel for Allstate
responded explaining that the “non-stacked” designation is used for single-item insurance policies
to reflect that intra-policy stacking is unavailable. ECF No. 1-2 at 50. Allstate contends that the
declarations page of insurance policies, where these “non-stacked” designations appear, are
intended to reflect the contents of a single insurance policy—not how multiple insurance policies
interact with each other. Id. Allstate further affirmed in its November 11 letter that, if the
Samudoskys’ insurance policies and Pennsylvania law remain the same, “Allstate will afford
[Plaintiffs] inter-policy UM/UIM stacking across their auto and motorcycle policies if they are in
an accident for which UM/UIM coverage is triggered.” Id. To date, the Samudoskys have not
been in an accident that triggered UM/UIM coverage, they have not claimed UM/UIM insurance
benefits, nor have they been denied such benefits. See generally ECF No. 1-2.
The Samudoskys’ Complaint appears to assert one claim, for “fraud and deceit” by Allstate,
and they seek the following declaratory and injunctive relief: (1) a declaratory judgment that it is
“improper, incorrect and unlawful” for Allstate to put a “non-stacked” designation on single-item
insurance policies where no waiver-of-stacking form has been signed, and (2) a preliminary
injunction enjoining Allstate from continuing to label such policies as “non-stacked.” ECF No. 1-
2 ¶¶ 52–64, 1-2 at 28.
On May 16, 2023, Allstate removed the case to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a)
based on diversity jurisdiction. ECF No. 1 at 1. Following removal, on May 23, 2023, Allstate
filed a Motion to Dismiss the Samudoskys’ Complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and
for failure to state a claim. ECF No. 7. On June 2, 2023, the Samudoskys filed a Motion to
Remand the case to state court. ECF No. 16. The Court will address both the Samudoskys’ Motion
to Remand and Allstate’s Motion to Dismiss below.
II. Legal Standard
A. Motion to Remand
A district court should grant a motion to remand “any time before final judgment,” where
“it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C § 1447(c).
Jurisdiction is evaluated “according to the plaintiff’s pleading at the time of the petition for
removal.” Abels v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 F.2d 26, 29 (3d Cir. 1985). District courts
should strictly construe removal statutes and resolve all doubts in favor of remand. Boyer v. Snap-
on Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 111 (3d Cir. 1990). Defendants have the burden of establishing
removal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Sikirica v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 214, 219 (3d Cir. 2005).
B. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1)
Under Rule 12(b)(1), a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction may be “either a facial or a
factual attack.” Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 346 (3d Cir. 2016). A facial attack “contests
the sufficiency of the pleadings,” while a factual attack “concerns the actual failure of a plaintiff’s
claims to comport factually with jurisdictional prerequisites.” Const. Party of Pa. v. Aichele, 757
F.3d 347, 358 (3d Cir. 2014). A facial challenge contests subject matter jurisdiction without
contesting the facts alleged in the complaint. Davis, 824 F.3d at 346. Importantly, “[i]n reviewing
a facial attack, ‘the court must only consider the allegations of the complaint and documents
referenced therein and attached thereto, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.’” Const. Party,
757 F.3d at 358. Here, because Allstate does not contest the facts alleged in the Samudoskys’
Complaint, notably the existence of the UM/UIM insurance coverage and the availability of inter-
policy stacking, Allstate’s Motion to Dismiss is a facial attack and the Court will consider the
Complaint and documents referenced therein and attached thereto, in the light most favorable to
the Samudoskys.
III. Legal Analysis
The Samudoskys assert that the case must be remanded to state court because Allstate
cannot meet the amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction. ECF No. 16 ¶ 19.
Alternatively, the Samudoskys ask the Court to exercise discretion to remand because the case
only involves state-law issues. ECF Nos. 16 ¶ 20, 18 at 8. Allstate responds that the relevant
insurance policy limits satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement, and that discretionary
remand is not warranted. ECF No. 23 at 4, 11–13. Allstate, however, contends that the case must
be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because the Samudoskys do not have standing
to sue as they have not shown an injury-in-fact. ECF No. 8 at 12–14. The Court agrees with
Allstate that the requirements for diversity jurisdiction are met, that remand is not appropriate, and
that the Samudoskys lack standing to sue.
A. Diversity Jurisdiction Exists and Remand is not Appropriate
A defendant may remove “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district
courts of the United States have original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). One such basis for
removal is diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a). Diversity jurisdiction exists in cases
between citizens of different states where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a)(1).
Here, the parties agree that there is complete diversity of citizenship. ECF Nos. 1-2 ¶¶ 2–
7; 18 at 7. The Samudoskys contend, however, that the amount-in-controversy requirement is not
satisfied because “money is not in controversy.” ECF No. 18 at 7. Because the Samudoskys seek
declaratory and injunctive relief, the Court will look to the “value of the object of the litigation.”
Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Com’n, 432 U.S. 333, 347 (1977). Here, the object
of the litigation is the UM/UIM insurance coverage, which totals $250,000 per person/$500,000
per accident for the two private passenger automobile policy and $250,000 per person/$500,000
per accident for the one motorcycle policy—stacked together, the policies would total well above
$75,000. Therefore, the amount-in-controversy requirement is satisfied, and this Court has
diversity jurisdiction over the matter.
In the alternative, the Samudoskys argue that even if the Court has diversity jurisdiction, it
should exercise its discretion to remand the case under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2201(a). They assert that, because state-law issues predominate, state courts are the appropriate
forum to resolve such issues. The Court, however, will exercise its discretion under the
Declaratory Judgment Act to retain jurisdiction. Under the DJA, “[i]n a case of actual controversy
within its jurisdiction . . . any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate
pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such
declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (emphasis
added). Therefore, district courts have “discretion in determining whether and when to entertain
an action under the [DJA], even when the suit otherwise satisfies subject matter jurisdictional
prerequisites.” Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 282 (1995). A court’s decision to grant
or decline jurisdiction is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Reifer v. Westport Ins. Corp., 751 F.3d
129, 138 (3d Cir. 2014).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that “considerations of
practicality and wise judicial administration” govern this analysis. Reifer, 751 F.3d at 139 (quoting
Wilton, 515 U.S. at 288). Therefore, district courts must meaningfully consider a non-exhaustive
list of eight factors when determining whether to exercise DJA jurisdiction. Reifer, 751 F.3d at
146. These factors include:
(1) The likelihood that a federal court declaration will resolve the uncertainty of obligation
which gave rise to the controversy,
(2) The convenience of the parties,
(3) The public interest in settlement of the uncertainty of obligation,
(4) The availability and relative convenience of other remedies,
(5) A general policy of restraint when the same issues are pending in a state court,
(6) Avoidance of duplicative litigation,
(7) Prevention of the use of the declaratory action as a method of procedural fencing or as a
means to provide another forum in a race for res judicata, and
(8) (in the insurance context), an inherent conflict of interest between an insurer’s duty to
defend in a state court and its attempt to characterize that suit in federal court as falling
within the scope of a policy exclusion.
Id. The Third Circuit has further emphasized that “the absence of pending parallel state
proceedings militates significantly in favor of exercising jurisdiction…” Id. at 144. But the
presence of close or unsettled questions of state law suggests courts should be hesitant in exercising
jurisdiction. State Auto Ins. Companies v. Summy, 234 F.3d 131, 135 (3d Cir. 2000). Here, the
absence of pending parallel litigation “militates significantly in favor” of the Court exercising
jurisdiction. ECF Nos. 23 at 12, 24 at 8. The remaining Reifer factors are either neutral or weigh
in favor of exercising jurisdiction.
The first factor weighs slightly in favor of jurisdiction because the Court’s decision will
resolve the parties’ dispute. The third factor also weighs slightly in favor of jurisdiction because
there is no novel state-law issue at stake nor is there an actual case or controversy present. The
parties’ dispute does not implicate close or unsettled areas of Pennsylvania state law—both parties
agree that the Samudoskys are legally entitled to inter-policy stacking of their UM/UIM benefits.
ECF No. 1-2 at 50. Instead, the dispute centers around how Allstate labels its UM/UIM benefits
in insurance contracts. See Conroy v. Travelers Home & Marine Ins. Co., No. 15-743, 2015 WL
4633772, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 2015) (Kelly, M.J.) (“[T]he absence of Pennsylvania precedent
that contemplates the specific facts at issue here does not render Pennsylvania law undefined or
unsettled.”). Such a dispute does not involve a novel state-law issue. Furthermore, there is
minimal public interest in resolving the dispute as there is no actual case or controversy present.
See infra Part B.
The remaining factors are neutral or inapplicable. The second factor is neutral as there is
no inconvenience to the parties to litigate in federal court because both the state court and this
Court are located in Allegheny County. The fourth factor is neutral as the Pennsylvania
Declaratory Judgment Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7541, provides the same remedies as the federal DJA.
See Allstate Fire & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Archer, No. 1:17-cv-331, 2018 WL 2538859, at *3, fn. 1
(W.D. Pa. June 4, 2018) (Hornak, C.J., then-J.) (finding the fourth factor neutral because the parties
could obtain the same declaratory relief under Pennsylvania’s Declaratory Judgment Act). The
seventh factor is also neutral as there is no suggestion that Allstate’s choice to remove was mere
procedural fencing or forum shopping. The fifth, sixth, and eighth factors are irrelevant as there
is no pending parallel litigation. See Dayton v. Automobile Ins. Co., No. 3:20-1833, 2021 WL
5163221, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 5, 2021) (finding the seventh factor neutral where there was no
suggestion that the defendants had an improper motive for removing the case, and the fifth, sixth,
and eighth factors were inapplicable absent pending state litigation). Therefore, based on the
absence of parallel state proceedings and the Reifer factors, the Court will exercise jurisdiction
over this action and deny Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand.
B. The Court Will Dismiss the Action for Lack of Article III Standing
The Court now turns to Allstate’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
ECF No. 7. Allstate asserts that the Samudoskys lack standing to sue because they have not alleged
an injury-in-fact. ECF No. 8 at 12–14. In response, the Samudoskys state that Allstate’s labeling
practices will lead to confusion and a possible denial of stacked insurance benefits to them and
similarly situated Pennsylvanians. ECF No. 20 at 8. The Court agrees with Allstate that the
Samudoskys have failed to allege an injury-in-fact, and thus lack standing to sue.
The standing doctrine, in Article III, section 2 of the Constitution, limits the judicial power
of the United States to “Cases” and “Controversies.” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S.
149, 157 (2014). Thus, federal courts may “resolve only ‘a real controversy with real impacts on
real persons.’” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2203 (2021) (quoting Am. Legion
v. Am. Humanist Assn., 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2103 (2019)). A “real controversy” exists where the
plaintiff (1) has suffered an “injury in fact,” (2) that is “fairly traceable” to the defendant’s
challenged conduct, and (3) is “likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo,
Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016). If any of these elements is missing, then there is no case
or controversy, and the court lacks jurisdiction over the matter. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 560–62 (1992). The party invoking the court’s jurisdiction bears the burden of
establishing standing. Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 338. When a party challenges standing on the basis of
the pleadings, courts “accept as true all material allegations in the complaint” and “construe the
complaint in favor of the complaining party.” Yaw v. Delaware River Basin Commission, 49 F.4th
302, 310 (3d Cir. 2022).
A statutory right to sue, by itself, does not satisfy Article III standing. Spokeo, Inc. v.
Robins, 578 U.S. at 339. Therefore, cases brought under the DJA must still meet Article III
standing requirements. Although declaratory judgments are “often forward-looking,” they are still
“limited to cases and controversies in the constitutional sense.” Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Cnty. of
Delaware, Pa., 968 F.3d 264, 269 (3d Cir. 2020).
An injury-in-fact is the “first and foremost of standing’s three elements.” Spokeo, 578 U.S.
at 338 (cleaned up). It is intended to distinguish those plaintiffs with a “direct stake in the outcome
of a litigation” from those with only “a mere interest in the problem.” Ellison v. American Board
of Orthopaedic Surgery, 11 F.4th 200, 205 (3d Cir. 2021). To satisfy this element, “a plaintiff
must show that he or she suffered ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and
particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 339
(quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560).
A concrete injury is “real rather than abstract,” and a particularized injury “affects the
plaintiff in a personal and individual way.” Ellison, 11 F.4th at 205. An actual injury is one that
is “presently or actually occurring.” Sherwin-Williams Co., 968 F.3d at 269. An imminent injury
must be “certainly impending” or have a “substantial risk” of occurring. Thorne v. Pep Boys
Manny Moe & Jack, Inc., 980 F.3d 879, 893 (3d Cir. 2020). Mere allegations of “possible future
injury are insufficient.” Ellison, 11 F.4th at 205 (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S.
398, 409 (2013)). Similarly, there is no “risk of harm” where an injury would occur only if a series
of highly speculative events occurred. Thorne, 980 F.3d at 893–94 (finding no “risk of real f harm”
where the purported harm—purchasing unregistered tires—would only lead to a concrete injury if
the unregistered tires were recalled, the manufacturer was unable to contact the plaintiff regarding
the recall, the plaintiff continued to drive with the recalled tires, and the defective tires caused an
accident).
Here, the Samudoskys have not suffered a concrete injury. They have not claimed
UM/UIM insurance benefits, nor have they been denied such benefits. See generally ECF No. 1-
2. The Samudoskys’ purported injury is also neither “impending” nor “imminent.” Allstate’s
labeling practices will harm the Samudoskys only if a series of highly speculative events occur:
the Samudoskys must be in a car accident, in which an uninsured or underinsured motorist is at
fault, they must claim stacked UM/UIM benefits, and Allstate must deny those benefits. Allstate’s
written assurance that the Samudoskys are entitled to inter-policy stacking makes the likelihood
of these events occurring even more remote. ECF No. 1-2 at 50. Absent a concrete injury, the
Samudoskys do not have a “direct stake in the outcome,” and are instead “mere[ly] interest[ed]”
in Allstate’s labeling practices. Therefore, the Samudoskys have not suffered an injury-in-fact,
and this action presents no case or controversy for this Court to decide. Accordingly, the Court
will dismiss for lack of standing.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand
is DENIED and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss without prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1) is GRANTED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Christy Criswell Wiegand
CHRISTY CRISWELL WIEGAND
United States District Judge
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