CHIARAVALLE v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RONALD CHIARAVALLE, JR., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 22-1564

)

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, )

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 26th day of October, 2023, upon consideration of the parties’

cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court, upon review of the Commissioner of

Social Security’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s claim for disability insurance benefits

under Subchapter II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq., and his claim for

supplemental security income benefits under Subchapter XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381

et seq., finds that the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and,

accordingly, affirms. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148,

1153-54 (2019); Jesurum v. Secretary of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs, 48 F.3d

114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988)).

See also Berry v. Sullivan, 738 F. Supp. 942, 944 (W.D. Pa. 1990) (if supported by

substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed, as a federal court may

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neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse, merely because it would have decided the claim

differently) (citing Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981)).1

1 Plaintiff, Ronald Chiaravalle, Jr., appeals the administrative law judge (“ALJ”)’s

denial of disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. He claims the

ALJ erred for two reasons: (1) the ALJ’s crafted residual functional capacity (“RFC”) is not

supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ did not provide adequate explanations

for the postural and manipulative limitations; and (2) the ALJ’s assessment of the vocational

evidence presented at the hearing is not supported by substantial evidence because it rests

on an inaccurate RFC and does not provide jobs existing in significant numbers in the

national economy. (Doc. No. 13). Naturally, the Commissioner disagrees and urges this

Court to affirm the ALJ’s decision. (Doc No. 16). For the following reasons, the Court

will affirm the ALJ’s decision.

Plaintiff argues first that the ALJ’s RFC finding is not supported by adequate

explanation as to the following limitations:

• Frequent stooping, kneeling, and crouching;

• Crawling occasionally;

• Occasional reaching with the left upper extremity, occasionally in all directions;

• Avoiding more than occasional exposure to vibration;

• Engaging in frequent reaching, handling, fingering, and feeling with the right upper

extremity.

(R. 20-21; Doc No. 13 at 12). Plaintiff posits that “occasional” is defined as very little to

one-third of the time and “frequent” is one-third to two-thirds of the time and that the record

evidence does not support these limitations. (Doc. No. 13 at 12-14 (citing SSR 83-10)).

Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to account for record evidence of his three

left shoulder surgeries, removal of hardware, extensive treatment for the infections that

developed in his left shoulder, and his testimony that his left arm and shoulder are stiff and

that he cannot reach in front of himself or overhead at all with his left arm. (Doc. No. 13

at 13). Plaintiff further states that the ALJ overlooked the symptoms and impairment due

to his right elbow epicondylitis and his experiences with numbness in his right upper

extremity. (Id. at 13-14). Plaintiff also points out that the ALJ overlooked his lumbar

spine severe impairment and lumbar radiculopathy that began after an accident with a tractor.

(Id. at 7). In sum, Plaintiff contends that this record evidence is inconsistent with the ALJ’s

RFC findings regarding his postural and handling limitations.

At the outset, the Court notes that a claimant’s RFC is the most that an individual

can do despite his or her limitations. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 404.1545(a),

416.927(d)(2), 416.945(a). The claimant’s RFC is solely determined by the ALJ. See id.

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at §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 404.1546(c), 416.927(d)(2), 416.946(c). Of course, the RFC need

not include every limitation alleged by the claimant. See Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d

546, 554 (3d Cir. 2005). Indeed, the ALJ formulates the claimant’s RFC by weighing the

evidence as a whole, including medical records, medical source opinions, a claimant’s

subjective complaints, and descriptions of his or her own limitations. See 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1529, 404.1545, 416.929, 416.945. “When making credibility findings, the ALJ must

indicate which evidence he rejects and which he relies upon as the basis for his findings.”

Salles v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 229 Fed. Appx. 140, 146 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Schaudeck v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 181 F.3d 429, 433 (3d Cir. 1999)). The claimant’s “allegations of

pain and other subjective symptoms must be supported by objective medical evidence.”

Salles, 229 Fed. Appx. at 146 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529). Moreover, “[l]imitations that

are medically supported but are also contradicted by other evidence in the record may or

may not be found credible—the ALJ can choose to credit portions of the existing

evidence[.]” Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 554.

In this case, after reviewing all the relevant evidence, the ALJ properly determined

that Plaintiff required certain postural and handling limitations. (R. 20-27). In making

these findings, the ALJ acted within his discretion in discrediting Plaintiff’s testimony,

noting, “the claimant’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected

to cause the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity,

persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the

medical evidence and other evidence in the record[.]” (R. 21). In support of this finding,

the ALJ noted that the record “demonstrate[d] surgical intervention along with generally

normal physical examinations.” (R. 22). The ALJ considered and explained the many

tests and findings regarding Plaintiff’s lumbar spondylosis/radiculopathy and stenosis of the

lumbar spine. (R. 22-23). Also discussed was Plaintiff’s physical therapy examinations

following surgery on his left shoulder to repair a massive rotator cuff tear and subsequent

surgeries on his left shoulder. (R. 23-24). The ALJ, therefore, thoroughly considered the

objective medical evidence in evaluating Plaintiff’s testimony and in formulating the RFC.

Moreover, the ALJ’s RFC finding was supported by the medical opinions of record;

the ALJ evaluated and found generally persuasive the opinions of state agency consultants

Drs. Bertolino and Warner. (R. 26-27). The ALJ found these opinions generally

persuasive because they “generally account[ed] for the claimant’s rotator cuff repair, left

shoulder pain, and limited range of motion . . . [and they were] generally consistent with

limitations caused by the claimant’s degenerative disc disease[.]” (R. 26). These doctors

both opined that Plaintiff was limited in left front and/or laterally along with overhead

reaching. (Exs. 1A/8, 2A/8, 5A/14, 6A/14). Both Drs. Bertolino and Warner noted in

their findings that Plaintiff could frequently stoop, kneel, and crouch; occasionally crawl;

had unlimited ability to handle, finger, and feel; and they both recommended that Plaintiff

avoid concentrated exposure to vibration. (Exs. 1A/8-9, 2A/8-9, 5A/15-16, 6A/15-16). It

follows that the ALJ adopted Drs. Bertolino’s and Warner’s postural and handling

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limitations after finding these opinions generally persuasive and rejecting the Plaintiff’s

testimony. The Court further notes that the ALJ’s RFC finding as to the handling

limitations (i.e.. the limitation that Plaintiff can engage in frequent reaching, handling,

fingering, and feeling with the right upper extremity) is supported by Plaintiff’s own

Function Report, where he himself did not check the box showing that his conditions affected

the use of his hands. (R. 368).

Accordingly, the ALJ acted within his discretion in formulating Plaintiff’s RFC and

included all “credibly established limitations.” Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 554 (emphasis in

original). Additionally, Plaintiff does not point to any treating or consulting opinions

contrary to the ALJ’s RFC finding. Rather, Plaintiff relies on MRIs, records of his back

treatment, and his own subjective complaints of pain and numbness in support of his

argument. (Doc. No. 13 at 12-13). The Court declines to accept Plaintiff’s offer to

reweigh the evidence. Berry v. Sullivan, 738 F. Supp. 942, 944 (W.D. Pa. 1990) (citing

Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981)) (stating “[t]he court may neither reweigh

the evidence, nor may we reverse the Secretary merely because we would have decided the

claim differently.”). For all of these reasons, Plaintiff’s first issue on appeal is without

merit.

For Plaintiff’s second argument, he argues that the ALJ elicited the testimony of the

vocational expert (“VE”) pursuant to a hypothetical question that mirrored the alleged

incomplete/inaccurate RFC determination. (Doc. No. 13 at 14-17). This argument can be

“boil[ed] down to [an] attack[] on the RFC assessment itself.” Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 554

n.8. The Court found no error or insufficiency of evidence in the ALJ’s RFC

determination; accordingly, this argument also fails.

Further, Plaintiff argues that the jobs identified by the VE as ones he could perform

do not constitute a significant number of available jobs in the national economy. However,

this argument rests on the flawed assumption that the ALJ adopted the limitation that

Plaintiff had complete inability to use his left upper extremity for reaching in any direction.

(Doc. No. 13 at 16). At the hearing, the ALJ posed a number of questions to the VE,

including an added limitation that Plaintiff could not use his left arm for reaching. (R. 64-

65). In response, the VE testified that this would reduce the number of security guard

positions available, and would eliminate the furniture rental clerk and gate guard positions,

but would allow for performance of a survey worker position. (R. 65-66). Plaintiff argues

that the reduced number of security guard positions and the positions available for survey

worker are not enough to meet the significant numbers in the national economy standard.

(Doc. No. 13 at 16).

The Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument because it is inapplicable. The ALJ did not

adopt the RFC limitation that Plaintiff could not reach his left arm, but instead found that

Plaintiff was capable of occasionally reaching with his left upper extremity. (R. 21).

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Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. No. 12) is DENIED, and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc. No. 14) is GRANTED.

s/Alan N. Bloch

United States District Judge

ecf: Counsel of record

Accordingly, the ALJ identified three jobs that Plaintiff could perform, furniture rental clerk,

gate guard, and security guard, consistent with the VE’s testimony as to a hypothetical

individual with the limitations ultimately included in the RFC. (R. 28). These jobs

combined to provide over 150,000 jobs available nationwide. (Id.). As Defendant

correctly notes, this is more than sufficient to constitute “work which exists in significant

numbers.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); (Doc. No. 16 at 30) (citing see Young v. Astrue, 519

F. Appx. 769, 772 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding 20,000 jobs nationally sufficient to support a

finding that work exists in significant numbers)). For this and the foregoing reasons, the

Court will affirm the underlying decision.

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