ZIEGLER v. KIJAKAZI

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

THERESA ZIEGLER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 22-748

)

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, )

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 21st day of September, 2023, upon consideration of the parties’

cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court, upon review of the Commissioner of

Social Security’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s claim for disability insurance benefits

(“DIB”) and supplemental security income (“SSI”) benefits under Subchapters II and XVI

of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq., finds that the Commissioner’s findings

are supported by substantial evidence and, accordingly, affirms. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);

Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1153-54 (2019); Jesurum v. Secretary of U.S. Dep’t

of Health & Human Servs, 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Brown v. Bowen, 845

F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988)). See also Berry v. Sullivan, 738 F. Supp. 942, 944 (W.D.

Pa. 1990) (if supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s decision must be

affirmed, as a federal court may neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse, merely because

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it would have decided the claim differently) (citing Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d

Cir. 1981)).1

1 Plaintiff raises several arguments on appeal. She contends that the Administrative

Law Judge (“ALJ”) did not properly follow the March 15, 2021 remand order by failing to

fully explain the basis for Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), specifically the

RFC’s light work limitation and sit/stand option. (Doc No. 13 at 7-10). She further

asserts that the ALJ erred by rejecting the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr.

Richard Egan. (Id.) After careful review, the Court disagrees and finds that substantial

evidence supports the decision of the ALJ.

This case comes before the Court after several remands. Plaintiff first applied for

DIB and SSI benefits on May 21, 2013, alleging that she was totally disabled beginning on

January 1, 2009, and ending on June 30, 2010. (Doc. No. 13 at 1). Her claims were

initially denied on June 20, 2013. (Id.). Thereafter, on August 7, 2013, she filed a written

request for a hearing and her case was heard by an ALJ on January 15, 2015. (Id.). The

ALJ denied Plaintiff’s request on February 20, 2015, and Plaintiff appealed to this Court

after the Appeals Council (“AC”) denied review. (R. 16-32, 106). On March 17, 2017,

the Honorable Donetta Ambrose remanded pursuant to a stipulation for voluntary remand

between the parties. (Doc. No. 13 at 1; R. 552-53). Thereafter, ALJ Joanna Papazekos

held a second hearing on April 1, 2019, and issued a second unfavorable decision dated May

3, 2019. (R. 502-15). Plaintiff again appealed to this Court, and Judge Ambrose

remanded the case on March 15, 2021, with instructions for the ALJ to explain her finding

of “light work” and address the ambiguity surrounding the weight given to Dr. Egan’s

opinion. (R. 1115-23). The ALJ held a third hearing in this case on January 4, 2022, and

issued a third unfavorable decision on January 19, 2022. (R. 1067-81). Before the Court

here is Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment concerning appeal of this third unfavorable

decision and Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment. (Doc. Nos. 12, 14).

Central to this appeal therefore is the Court’s March 15, 2021 remand order. This

order instructed the ALJ to explain Plaintiff’s RFC, specifically the “light work” limitation,

and to address the ambiguity surrounding the standard used to evaluate Dr. Egan’s opinion.

(R. 1115-23). In the remand order, Judge Ambrose explained that substantial evidence did

not support the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff be limited to light work because the ALJ only

considered Plaintiff’s statement to Dr. Egan on two occasions that she walks her dogs for

exercise up to 6-7 times per week. (R. 1120). Judge Ambrose explained that without

further analysis of how this evidence supported a light work limitation, the ALJ’s analysis

was insufficient, especially in light of Dr. Egan’s contrary opinion. (R. 1120-21).

Additionally, Judge Ambrose explained that it was unclear whether the ALJ applied the

appropriate standard for evaluating medical opinion evidence as the former standard, 20

C.F.R. § 404.1527, applied to this case because Plaintiff filed her claim in 2013. (R. 1121).

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The ALJ had used language more consistent with the new standards, i.e. “persuasive,”

instead of language pertaining to the “weight given.” (Id.).

Being mindful of this Court’s previous instructions and the ALJ’s carefully reasoned

third unfavorable decision, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s first argument that the ALJ did not

follow Judge Ambrose’s remand order by failing to explain Plaintiff’s “light work”

limitation in her RFC. Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed to explain with reference to

medical evidence of record how Plaintiff could perform “light work” with the sit/stand

option allowing the Plaintiff to “change positions from upright to seated approximately every

hour.” (Doc. No. 13 at 8; R. 1076). Defendant naturally disagrees and points to the ALJ’s

explanation for the light work designation with postural limitations and a sit/stand option.

(Doc. No. 15 at 10-13). Defendant points to many pages of the record that support this

finding, including Plaintiff’s report that she exercised seven times a week during the relevant

period and Plaintiff’s denials of back pain, joint pain, swelling, weakness, stiffness, and

arthritis. (Id. at 10).

“Light work” is defined by the Social Security Administration as:

involv[ing] lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or

carrying of objects weighting up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight

lifted may be very little, a job is in this category when it requires a good

deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with

some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. To be considered capable

of performing a full or wide range of light work, you must have the ability

to do substantially all of these activities. If someone can do light work, we

determine that he or she can also do sedentary work, unless there are

additional limiting factors such as loss of fine dexterity or inability to sit for

long periods of time.

20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b). Light exertional work “generally requires the ability to stand and

carry weight for approximately six hours of an eight hour day.” Jesurum v. Secretary of

the United States Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995) (citations

omitted).

The Court agrees with Defendant and finds that the ALJ sufficiently explained

Plaintiff’s light work limitation and therefore followed the Court’s remand order.

Specifically, the ALJ explained the light work limitation by analyzing the treatment records

and examination findings of Dr. Egan, who provided the only medical opinion regarding

Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity during the relevant time period. (R. 1078-79; 496-

501). Dr. Egan’s records noted Plaintiff’s admission that she was exercising 6 to 7 days a

week by walking her dog, which the ALJ explained placed her residual functional capacity

above the sedentary level. (R. 1079; Exh. 1F/26, 31, 37, 42, 46, 50, 55). Dr. Egan also

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noted Plaintiff was experiencing some back and wrist pain during the relevant time frame

and the ALJ incorporated this finding, noting the Plaintiff’s pain “reduce[d] her residual

functional capacity from medium to light[.]” (R. 1079). Moreover, the ALJ explained

that Plaintiff’s records consistently noted “negative straight leg raise, the [Plaintiff] moved

well in the examination room, did not demonstrate wasting, poor gait, or the requirement for

an assistance device, and while she was obese she was routinely advised [to] exercise and

lose weight, which she presumably was capable of doing.” (Id. (citing Ex. 1F/4, 31)).

The ALJ also relied on Plaintiff’s self-reported activities in her function report to

explain that Plaintiff was capable of light work. (R. 178-87). Notably, the ALJ explained

that “the claimant’s activities are supportive of light work as she was able to perform

personal care, drive her uncle to appointments, care for a disabled son, cook with a stool,

clean, do laundry, and shop in stores for food and clothing.” (R. 1079 (citing Ex. 4E)).

These activities were further confirmed by Plaintiff’s function report, which she herself filled

out. (R. 178-87).

The ALJ’s consideration of all this evidence supports a finding that Plaintiff is

capable of light work, as defined above. Accordingly, the ALJ sufficiently addressed the

Court’s remand order, and substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision to limit Plaintiff

to light work.

The Court is also unpersuaded by Plaintiff’s second argument that the ALJ did not

follow Judge Ambrose’s remand order by failing to apply the correct standard to Dr. Egan’s

opinion and failing to sufficiently explain why she rejected Dr. Egan’s opinion. The ALJ

followed the Court’s remand order by applying the correct regulations to Dr. Egan’s opinion

and explaining why she afforded the opinion “little weight.” (R. 1078-79). Indeed, the

ALJ expressly indicated that she “considered opinion evidence in accordance with the

requirements of 20 CFR § 404.1527.” (R. 1076). Again, this was the correct regulation

to apply as Plaintiff filed her claim before March 27, 2017. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. In

applying the regulation, an ALJ considers a variety of factors when deciding how much

weight to give a medical opinion, including the examining relationship, treatment

relationship, nature and extent of the treatment relationship, supportability, consistency,

specialization, and other factors that the parties bring to the ALJ’s attention. Id.

However, the ALJ does not need to discuss his or her analysis of all of the listed factors.

Ludrosky v. Berryhill, No. 16-1895, 2018 WL 692094, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 2018)

(citations omitted) (stating “[w]hen assessing the weight to be assigned to a non-treating

source, an ALJ is not required to discuss every factor listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1).”).

The ALJ correctly applied this regulation by discussing the specialization,

supportability, and consistency, factors. The ALJ analyzed the specialization factor by

noting that Dr. Egan was the Plaintiff’s primary care provider with a long-standing treatment

relationship, but that he was not a specialist. (R. 1078). The ALJ further analyzed the

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consistency factor by comparing Dr. Egan’s treatment records to his opinion and noting Dr.

Egan’s “treatment records [were] out of proportion to the limitations he assessed in his

opinion[,]” stating, “Dr. Egan’s treatment records do not support his opinion as he found

generally normal examination findings and treated the claimant conservatively. In

addition, while Dr. Egan’s records contain a long list of problems, most of his office visits

do not contain any complaints about them.” (R. 1078-79). The ALJ then analyzed the

supportability factor and pointed to Plaintiff’s complaints and reports of pain in May, July,

and August 2009 and noted that despite these reports, her conditions required little treatment

or follow-up, and her blood work dramatically improved. (R. 1078). Additionally, the

ALJ noted that in January and February 2010, Plaintiff’s reports of pain and stiffness were

not confirmed by a physical examination from that time which was normal other than non-

specific small and large joint degenerative changes. (R. 1078). Also, during this time,

Plaintiff’s diabetes was uncontrolled, but she did not report symptoms related to it. (R.

1078-79). The ALJ further analyzed supportability by noting that Dr. Egan’s records were

inconsistent with the other evidence of record. (R. 1079). Specifically, the X-rays of

Plaintiff’s lumbar spine showed only mild degenerative joint disease, and the x-rays of her

left wrist showed only mild osteoarthritis. (Id. (citing Exhs. 1F/68, 71). These records

stand in sharp contrast to Dr. Egan’s opinion, which found Plaintiff could walk three blocks

without rest or severe pain, sit for 2 hours at a time, and about four hours in an eight-hour

day, stand for one hour at a time, and stand and walk for less than two hours in an eight-hour

day. (R. 1078). The ALJ also noted Dr. Egan’s finding in regard to Plaintiff only being

able to tolerate a low stress job was also unsupported by the record, which showed that

Plaintiff experienced stress primarily in relation to her husband’s illness and a

contemporaneous mental status examination was normal. (R. 1079 (citing Ex. 1F/35, 38).

Accordingly, the Court finds the ALJ correctly applied 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527.

The Court further rejects Plaintiff’s third argument that the ALJ failed to point to

specific evidence upon which she relied in support of her limitation that Plaintiff “requires

a sit/stand option allowing her to change positions from upright to seated approximately

every hour.” (R. 1076). The ALJ explained this specific sit/stand option sufficiently, as

it is clear from her opinion that she discussed objective evidence, including Plaintiff’s daily

living and activities, and considered the entire record when formulating Plaintiff’s sit/stand

option. (R. 1078-79). It was not required, as the Court’s remand order correctly notes,

for the ALJ to adopt Dr. Egan’s opinion and specific sit/stand duration or for her to expressly

rely on another opinion. (R. 1120). Accordingly, the ALJ was allowed to formulate her

own sit/stand duration so long as there was sufficient explanation for rejecting Dr. Egan’s

conclusions and the claimant’s subjective testimony. See Faircloth v. Colvin, No. 12-1824,

2013 WL 3354546, at *7 (W.D. Pa. July 3, 2013) (citations omitted) (noting “[t]he ALJ must

consider all medical evidence in the record and provide adequate explanations for

disregarding or rejecting evidence, especially when testimony of the claimant’s treating

physician is rejected.”). That is precisely what the ALJ did here; based on all the evidence,

the ALJ formulated a sit/stand option that contained a duration less frequent than (and

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therefore in part more restrictive than) that recommended by Dr. Egan and provided

sufficient explanation for her rejection of Plaintiff’s testimony and Dr. Egan’s conclusions.

(R. 1078-79).

Further, the ALJ’s discussion is sufficient to support her more restrictive sit/stand

option than that opined by Dr. Egan. As the ALJ noted, Dr. Egan recommended that

Plaintiff needed to include periods of walking for 5 minutes every 90 minutes and must be

able to shift positions at will from sitting, standing, or walking. (R. 1078). Plaintiff

herself alleged the need for a more restrictive sit/stand option, noting, “I can not [sic] stand

or walk for more than <10 min[utes] at a time if I do not eat every 3 to 4 hours my blood

sugar drops” with an addition on the side of the form, “without great pain[.]” (T. 178). It

is clear from the opinion that the ALJ considered both Dr. Egan’s recommendation and the

Plaintiff’s report and permissively found each not fully persuasive. Specifically, the ALJ

found Dr. Egan’s recommendation worth only “light weight” with a thorough explanation

for this conclusion, as detailed above, and found Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the

intensity, persistence and other limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent

with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record[.]” (R. 1077). The ALJ then

went on to analyze the entire record, including Plaintiff’s reports that she was exercising 6

to 7 days a week, capable of performing personal care, driving her uncle to appointments,

caring for her disabled son, cooking with a stool, cleaning, doing laundry, and shopping in

stores for food and clothing. (R. 1079). Upon consideration of all the record evidence,

the ALJ formulated the specific sit/stand option and further noted that “Plaintiff’s report that

she needs a stool while cooking is accommodated with the sit/stand option.” (Id.)

The Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ’s explanation of this sit/stand option warrants

remand based on similarity to the case in Fisher v. Berryhill is also unpersuasive. Fisher

concerned an RFC containing “a sit / stand option without breaking task, which allows him

to change positions briefly about every hour for about three to four minutes . . .” No. 16-

1884, 2018 WL 783715, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 2018). Notably, the ALJ failed to include

any explanation as to how he came about making this specific finding and made no reference

to any medical opinions that aided in this finding. Id. That is not the case here. As

explained above, the ALJ fully explained her basis for Plaintiff’s RFC and incorporated

sit/stand option by making reference to Plaintiff’s reports concerning activities, exercise, and

cooking, and she analyzed Dr. Egan’s reports in formulating this RFC. (R. 1078-79).

Given the ALJ’s sufficient explanation for Plaintiff’s sit/stand option, the Court declines

Plaintiff’s invitation to disturb the ALJ’s RFC conclusion because the determination is

supported by substantial evidence.

Accordingly, the Court affirms.

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Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. No. 12) is DENIED, and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc. No. 14) is GRANTED.

s/Alan N. Bloch

United States District Judge

ecf: Counsel of record

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