HALL v. SCI FAYETTE

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MICHAEL HALL, )

)

Plaintiff, ) Civil Action No. 22-1023

) Magistrate Judge Maureen P. Kelly

v. )

) Re: ECF No. 18

SCI FAYETTE et al. )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

KELLY, Magistrate Judge

Plaintiff Michael Hall, an inmate at the State Correctional Institution at Fayette (“SCI –

Fayette”), filed this pro se civil rights action seeking redress for the conditions of his confinement

and the alleged denial of due process related to prison disciplinary proceedings. ECF No. 10.

Plaintiff names as defendants SCI – Fayette, Superintendent Eric Armel, Hearing Examiner

Rudzienski, Security Lt. Wood, Lt. Tyner, CO Rankin, CO Laskey, and CO Cavaliere.

Presently before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss filed on behalf of all Defendants except

CO Laskey and CO Cavaliere.1 ECF No. 18. For the reasons that follow, the Motion to Dismiss

will be granted.2

1 When the initial Complaint was filed, Defendants Laskey and Cavaliere were inadvertently not identified as parties

on the docket of this matter. The docket has been corrected to reflect that Plaintiff named these Defendants as parties

and counsel for Defendants has waived service of the Complaint. A response to the Complaint on behalf of Laskey

and Cavaliere is due by May 30, 2023.

2 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge

to conduct all proceedings in this case, including trial and entry of final judgment, with direct review by the United

States court of Appeals for the Third Circuit if an appeal is filed. ECF Nos. 5 and 20.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 5, 2018, Plaintiff pleaded guilty to burglary offenses and was sentenced to a

period of confinement of four to eight years, with credit for time served of 459 days.3 Plaintiff was

paroled on November 17, 2021, and recommitted as a Technical Parole Violator on February 25,

2022. ECF No. 10 ¶ III, ECF No. 28-1 at 1, ECF No. 19-2 at 1-2. The Parole Board Decision

reflects that in accordance with Pa. C.S. § 6138(d), upon Plaintiff’s satisfactory completion of

certain conditions, re-parole would be granted not later than six months after his recommitment

date.4 Plaintiff was assessed a new Parole Violation “Max Date” of December 27, 2024. ECF No.

28-1 at 1. Plaintiff was later committed to SCI – Fayette. ECF No. 10 ¶ 4.B.

3 See Commonwealth v. Hall, No. CP-67-CR-004258-2017 (CCP York County, Pennsylvania),

https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/Report/CpDocketSheet?docketNumber=CP-67-CR-0004258-

2017&dnh=%2FNas0aTIgC8osSXs5r1qqQ%3D%3D (last checked 3/28/2023).

4 Pursuant to 61 Pa.C.S. § 6138(D):

A technical parole violator recommitted to a State correctional institution or a contracted county jail under

subsection (c) shall be recommitted as follows:

(2) If paroled from a State correctional institution, to any State correctional institution, parole violator

center or contracted county jail designated by the department.

(3) Except as set forth in paragraph (4) or (5), the offender shall be recommitted for one of the following

periods, at which time the offender shall automatically be reparoled without further action by the board:

(i) For the first recommitment under this subsection, a maximum period of six months.

(ii) For the second recommitment under this subsection for the same sentence, a maximum of nine months.

(iii) For the third or subsequent recommitment under this subsection for the same sentence, a maximum of

one year.

(4) The offender may be reparoled by the board prior to expiration of the time period under paragraph (3)

if the board determines that it is in the best interest of the Commonwealth and the offender.

(5) The time limit under paragraph (3) shall not be applicable to an offender who:

(ii) spent more than 90 days in segregated housing due to one or more disciplinary infractions; or

(iii) refused programming or a work assignment.

2

Plaintiff alleges that on April 23, 2022, while housed in SCI -Fayette’s Restricted Housing

Unit, Defendant Corrections Officer Rankin denied Plaintiff his evening meal, threatened to punch

him in the face, and threatened to lodge a misconduct charge. ECF No. 10 ¶ IV B-D. Rankin

followed through and filed a misconduct against Plaintiff for: (1) threatening an employee or their

family with bodily harm; (2) refusing to obey an order; and (3) destroying, altering, or damaging

property. ECF No. 10-1. Plaintiff was found guilty of threatening an employee and refusing to

obey an order. The charge for destroying property was dismissed. ECF No. 10-4. Plaintiff states

that the charges against him were “proven false” through the appeal and grievance processes. ECF

No. 10 ¶ IV B-D, ECF No. 10-11 at 5. Because the commission of a misconduct resulted in

Plaintiff’s continued placement in segregated housing, Plaintiff’s reparole date was rescinded in

accordance with Pennsylvania law, see infra n. 3, and he continues to serve his originally imposed

sentence. Id.; see also, ECF No. 28-1 at 5.

Plaintiff contends that because of Rankin’s false misconduct, he is suffering mental

distress, has lost his job, release date, vehicle, familial and financial support, and has experienced

“illegal detainment” since May 10, 2022. ECF No. 10 ¶ V. Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages

and injunctive relief in the form of a Court order directing prison officials to erase the misconduct

from his record and to immediately release him from custody. Id. ¶ VI. In addition, Plaintiff asks

the Court to issue an order requiring Defendants to provide psychiatric treatment while he remains

in custody and upon his release. Id.

Plaintiff alleges that he filed grievances related to Defendants’ alleged misconduct, but Lt.

Wood has delayed completion of any investigation and has thus stalled Plaintiff’s release and

violated Plaintiff’s due process rights. Id. ¶ VII E.

3

Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint for failure to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted. ECF No. 18. The parties have filed briefs in support

and in opposition to the motion. ECF Nos. 19 and 28.

The motion is ripe for consideration.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

1. Motion to Dismiss

A complaint may be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for “failure

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” “[D]etailed pleading is not generally required.”

Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 786 (3d Cir. 2016). Rather, the rules require “only

‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to

‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Id.

(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To survive a motion to dismiss,

a complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” by providing facts which

“permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct….” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009).

In assessing the sufficiency of a complaint, the court must accept as true all material

allegations in the complaint and all reasonable factual inferences must be viewed in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff. Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202, 205 (3d Cir. 2008). The court, however,

need not accept bald assertions or inferences drawn by the plaintiff if they are unsupported by the

facts set forth in the complaint. See Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126,

143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)).

Nor must the court accept legal conclusions set forth as factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at

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555. Thus, the United States Supreme Court has held that a complaint is properly dismissed under

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) where the factual content does not allow the court “to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also

Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding that, under Twombly,

“labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” do not

suffice. The complaint therefore “must allege facts suggestive of [the proscribed] conduct” and

that are sufficient “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the

necessary element[s of his claim].”). Id. at 233, 234.

In support and in opposition to the pending Motion to Dismiss, the parties present Parole

Board documents. Plaintiff also submits grievances and appeal documents that he asserts support

his claims. When ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court must “generally

consider only the allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public

record, and documents that form the basis of a claim.” Lum v. Bank of Am., 361 F.3d 217, 222

n.3 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir.

1997)). Thus, the court may consider “an undisputedly authentic document that a defendant

attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based on the document.”

Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). The

Court will consider the parties’ documentary evidence to the extent there is no dispute over

authenticity and the exhibit forms the basis of Plaintiff’s claims.

2. Pro Se Pleadings and Filings

Plaintiff is proceeding pro se. Pro se pleadings and filings, “however inartfully pleaded,”

must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” Haines v.

5

Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). If the court can reasonably read pleadings to state a valid claim

on which the litigant could prevail, it should do so despite failure to cite proper legal authority,

confusion of legal theories, poor syntax, and sentence construction, or litigant’s unfamiliarity with

pleading requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); U.S. ex rel. Montgomery v.

Brierley, 414 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969) (A “petition prepared by a prisoner ... may be inartfully

drawn and should … be read ‘with a measure of tolerance’”); Freeman v. Dep’t. of Corr., 949 F.2d

360 (10th Cir. 1991). Under our liberal pleading rules, a district court should construe all

allegations in a complaint in favor of the complainant. Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83 (3d Cir. 1997)

(overruled on other grounds); see also Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996) (discussing

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) standard); Markowitz v. Ne. Land Co., 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1990)

(same).

Even so, there are limits to the court’s procedural flexibility — “pro se litigants still must

allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim .... they cannot flout procedural rules

— they must abide by the same rules that apply to all other litigants.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina,

Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). Accordingly, because Plaintiff is a pro

se litigant, this Court will consider the facts and make inferences where it is appropriate.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Personal Involvement

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against “every person who,” under color of state

law, “subjects, or causes to be subjected,” another person to a deprivation of a federally protected

right. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, to prevail on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that a defendant

was “personally involved” in the alleged deprivation of rights. Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347,

6

353 (3d Cir. 2005). Individual liability can be imposed only if the state actor played an “affirmative

part” in the alleged misconduct and “cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat

superior.” Id. (quoting Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1998)). Without any

specific allegations that a defendant played a role in depriving the plaintiff of a constitutional right,

dismissal is appropriate. See, e.g., Mearin v. Swartz, 951 F. Supp. 2d 776, 781-82 (W.D. Pa. 2013)

(dismissing claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) because the plaintiffs had failed to set forth sufficient

facts to establish that certain defendants had played an affirmative part in the alleged Eighth

Amendment violation).

As applied to supervisory defendants, a plaintiff must allege facts that show the violation

occurred at his or her personal direction or “actual knowledge and acquiescence.” Rode, 845 F.2d

at 1207-08; see also Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257 (3d

Cir. 2003). Alternatively, “supervisors can be liable if they ‘established and maintained a policy,

practice, or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm.’” Santiago v. Warminster

Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 129 n.5 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cty. Juv. Det.

Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004)).

The Amended Complaint identifies Armel, Tyner, Rudzienski, and Wood as Defendants

and alleges that “all parties named either investigated or allowed [Rankin’s] behavior” and, as to

Wood, that he failed to timely complete his investigation. ECF No. 10 at 2-4, 7-8. Defendants

assert that dismissal is warranted because Plaintiff does not allege their personal involvement in

the violation of his civil rights. ECF No. 19 at 5. In response, Plaintiff argues that: (1) the alleged

violations “occurred under the direct supervision” of Defendants Armel and Tyner, (2) the

disciplinary misconduct charge was improperly adjudicated by Rudzienski, and (3) his grievances

7

and misconduct appeals were not timely investigated by Wood. ECF No. 28 at 1. Thus, Plaintiff

argues, “[a]ll defendants, while not physically involved in the initial altercation, and following

incidents of abuse, they did ignore and further the abuse and violations outline[d] in my complaint

which have resulted in my illegal incarceration since May 10, 2022.” Id.

The Court agrees that as to Armel, Tyner, and Wood, dismissal is properly entered based

on the lack of allegations plausibly pointing to their involvement in the alleged misconduct.

Plaintiff relies on the mere fact that Armel and Tyner were supervisors or had supervisory

authority. These allegations, standing alone, cannot support liability under § 1983. Rode, 845 F.2d

at 1207-08. As to Wood, his involvement in an after-the-fact investigation of a grievance is not

enough to establish the necessary personal involvement in any alleged wrongdoing. See, e.g.,

Mincy v. Chmielsewski, 508 F. App’x. 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2013) (“an officer’s review of, or failure

to investigate, an inmate’s grievances generally does not satisfy the requisite personal

involvement”); Brooks v. Beard, 167 F. App’x 923, 925 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[a]lthough the complaint

alleges that [defendants] responded inappropriately to [plaintiff’s] later-filed grievances …, these

allegations do not establish [defendants’] involvement ….”).

Plaintiff’s allegations about Rudzienski assert personal involvement in the alleged

deprivation of Plaintiff’s due process rights. Through Plaintiff’s Misconduct Hearing Appeal, he

complains that Rudzienski failed to permit him to call witnesses to refute allegedly false charges.

ECF No. 10-5. In consideration of Plaintiff’s pro se status, the inclusion of his appeal document

with his Amended Complaint is sufficient to set forth Rudzienski’s involvement in the alleged

denial of his rights. See, e.g., Holden v. Wetzel, No. 18-237, 2021 WL 1090638, at *16 (W.D. Pa.

Mar. 22, 2021) (allegations of arbitrary denial of witnesses that resulted in “atypical and significant

8

hardship” sufficiently state personal involvement for purposes of § 1983 claim). As addressed in

relation to Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim, Plaintiff does not state a due process claim

against Rudzienski upon which relief may be granted. But Plaintiff’s allegations that Rudzienski

refused to permit him to call witnesses sufficiently alleges her personal involvement and dismissal

on this basis is not properly entered.

B. Eleventh Amendment

Defendants argue in the alternative that the Eleventh Amendment requires dismissal of all

claims against SCI – Fayette, Armel, Rudzienski, Wood, and Tyner.5 ECF No. 19 at 7-8.

The Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not

be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the

United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S.

CONST. amend. XI. “Although this case involves a suit brought by a citizen against his own state,

the Eleventh Amendment has long been interpreted to prohibit such suits as well.” Lavia v.

Pennsylvania, Dep’t of Corr., 224 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2000). SCI – Fayette is a facility of the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and, as such, it is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity

unless waived or otherwise abrogated, which has not occurred here. Id.

In an official-capacity suit against individual defendants, as here, the entity of which the

defendant is an agent is the real party in interest. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985).

As a result, claims against state officials in their official capacities for damages are treated as suits

against the state and are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Christ the King Manor, Inc. v. Sec’y

U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 730 F.3d 291, 318 (3d Cir. 2013); Nelson v. Com. of Pa.

5 In his Complaint, Plaintiff asserts claims against Defendants Armel, Rudzienski, Wood, and Tyner in their official

capacity only. ECF No. 10 at 2-3.

9

Dept of Pub. Welfare, 244 F. Supp. 2d 382, 391 (E.D. Pa. 2002). Thus, Armel, Tyner, Rudzienski,

and Wood enjoy immunity as to Plaintiff’s claims for damages.

Eleventh Amendment immunity is not absolute. Three exceptions to sovereign immunity

exist: (1) abrogation by an act of congress; (2) waiver by state consent to suit; (3) suits against

individual state officials for prospective relief to remedy an ongoing violation. M.A. ex rel. E.S.

v. State–Operated Sch. Dist. Of City of Newark, 344 F.3d 335, 344–45 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing MCI

Telecomm Corp. v. Bell Atl. Pennsylvania, 271 F.3d 491, 503 (3d Cir. 2001)). The Commonwealth

has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, and Congress has not abrogated immunity

with respect to Plaintiff’s claims. Lavia, at 195-96.

As related to alleged ongoing violations, Plaintiff seeks prospective injunctive relief in the

form of a court order “eras[ing]” his misconduct from his institution record and ordering his

immediate release. ECF No. 10 ¶ VI. This claim is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477

(1994), and therefore Plaintiff does not state a claim for prospective relief to remedy an ongoing

violation within an exception to the Eleventh Amendment. See Ingram v. SCI Smithfield, No.

2:21-CV-359, 2022 WL 1126072, at *5–6 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 2022), report and recommendation

adopted, 2022 WL 669213 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 7, 2022), aff’d, No. 22-1541, 2023 WL 110588 (3d

Cir. Jan. 5, 2023).

[T]he Supreme Court has held that a prisoner in state custody cannot use a § 1983

action to challenge “the fact or duration of his confinement.” Preiser v. Rodriguez,

411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973); see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 554 (1974);

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994); Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641,

648 (1997). Instead, the prisoner must seek federal habeas corpus relief (or

appropriate state relief). Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005). These

Supreme Court decisions stand for the proposition that prisoners may “use only

habeas corpus (or similar state) remedies when they seek to invalidate the duration

of their confinement—either directly through an injunction compelling speedier

release or indirectly through a judicial determination that necessarily implies the

10

unlawfulness of the State’s custody.” Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 81. As explained by

the Supreme Court in Wilkinson:

“a state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred (absent prior

invalidation)—no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable

relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct

leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)—if success in

that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of

confinement or its duration.”

Id. at 81-82.

Thus, Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief is not cognizable in this § 1983 action.

Id.; see, e.g., Butler, 613 F. App’x at 123 (district court properly concluded that if

the plaintiff sought an injunction invalidating or altering the sentence imposed by

the Parole Board “he could not do so via a § 1983 civil suit.”).

As such, Plaintiff has no cognizable claim for injunctive relief against any

defendant sued in his or her official capacity.

Id. As in Ingram, Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief in the form of an order for his release is not

cognizable in this § 1983 action. Therefore, his claims for prospective injunctive relief against

Defendants in their official capacity are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and will be dismissed

with prejudice since amendment would be futile.

C. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process – Disciplinary Hearing

Plaintiff broadly alleges the violation of his due process rights. ECF No. 10 at 3. Through

grievance and appeal documents attached to the Complaint, Plaintiff’s claim is supplemented to

add that in adjudicating his prison disciplinary hearing, Rudzienski denied Plaintiff’s requests to

view video evidence of the incident and to call witnesses to contradict Rankin’s version of events.

ECF No. 10-5 at 1-2. In response to the pending Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff contends that his due

process rights also were violated by Defendants Armel because he upheld the “ruling of guilt.”

11

ECF No. 28 at 4. Plaintiff explains that Rudzienski’s finding of guilt resulted in “segregation time

and parole revocation.” ECF No. 10 ¶ IV.B.

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim because Plaintiff was

afforded the required due process protections in a multilevel disciplinary proceeding and because

Plaintiff has no protected liberty interest in parole. The Court agrees.

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty,

or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV. In Fantone v. Latini, 780 F.3d

184 (3d Cir. 2015), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that discipline by

prison officials that results in RHU confinement and the rescission of a parole date does not

implicate a constitutionally protected liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. This ruling

applies equally to prisoners who can establish that they have been cleared of the underlying

misconduct charges on administrative appeal. Id. at 190.

First, a prisoner’s liberty interests are “limited to freedom from restraint that imposes

‘atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.’”

Id. at 188 (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481 (1995). “Discipline by prison officials in

response to a wide range of misconduct falls within the expected perimeters of the sentence

imposed by a court of law.” Id. Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint and exhibits establish that his

confinement in the RHU was limited to 15, 45, or, at most, 65 days. ECF No. 10-4, ECF No. 10-5

at 3, ECF No. 28 at 4. In addition, Plaintiff was not disqualified for future parole consideration.

There are no allegations that the conditions of Plaintiff’s confinement in the RHU were extreme

as to pose an atypical or significant hardship and thus no liberty interest was implicated.

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Second, “Pennsylvania law provides that the Parole Board may at any time rescind an order

granting parole until it is executed – i.e., the inmate is released on parole.” Fantone, 780 F.3d at

190 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, even if misconduct allegations cause

the Parole Board to rescind parole, Plaintiff’s liberty interests are not infringed.6 See also Saleem

v. Brugart, No. 20-1610, 2022 WL 17336208, at *3-4 (3d Cir. Nov. 30, 2022) (disciplinary

confinement that deprived inmate of ability to attend mandatory programming and affected parole

resulting in extended sentence does not state a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation).

Because Plaintiff’s due process claim related to his disciplinary proceedings is not based

on a protected liberty interest, he fails to state a claim for the violation of his Fourteenth

Amendment due process rights and the Motion to Dismiss will be granted. Dismissal will be with

prejudice, as amendment would be futile.

D. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process – Grievances

Plaintiff also fails to allege a Fourteenth Amendment claim against any Defendant for the

alleged improper processing of his grievances. It is well-established that inmates have no

constitutional right to an effective grievance system. See, e.g., Pittman v. Corbett, No. 14-231,

2014 WL 783498, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 27, 2014) (“[T]o the extent plaintiff’s claims are based on

the defendant’s denials of grievances and/or inadequacies in and dissatisfaction with the grievance

process, he has not stated a constitutional claim.”); Robinson v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., No. 10-

7165, 2014 WL 2452132, at *7 (E.D. Pa. June 2, 2014) (dismissing a plaintiff’s due process claims

based on dissatisfaction with the grievance process because an inmate does not have a

6 The Notice of Parole Board Decision set forth Plaintiff’s administrative remedies to challenge the decision to rescind

automatic reparole and informed Plaintiff of his right to do so with the assistance of counsel from the Public Defender’s

Office. ECF No. 28-1. Plaintiff does not allege whether he appealed in accordance with the remedies provided.

13

constitutionally protected right to a grievance procedure); Robinson v. Varner, No. 12-6359, 2012

WL 6628108, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 19, 2012) (“[P]laintiff cannot state a constitutional claim based

on his dissatisfaction with the grievance process.”).

“[B]ecause a prisoner has no free-standing constitutional right to an effective grievance

process [citation omitted], [a prisoner] cannot maintain a constitutional claim ... based upon [the

prisoner’s] perception that [the recipient of the grievances] ignored and/or failed to properly

investigate his grievances.” Woods v. First Corr. Med. Inc., 446 F. App’x. 400, 403 (3d Cir. 2011).

Accordingly, any claims based on the handling of Plaintiff’s grievances by Defendant Wood – and

any claim against any other Defendant for their general involvement in the grievance process –

will be dismissed. Dismissal of this claim also will be with prejudice, as it is apparent that

amendment would be futile.

E. Eighth Amendment Claims

Plaintiff alleges the violation of his rights arising out of Rankin’s denial of Plaintiff’s

evening meal on April 23, 2022, repeated threats of bodily harm and abusive language, and the

denial of a shower on April 26, 2022, by CO Cavaliere and CO Rankin, and again on May 3, 2022,

by CO Maier, who is not a defendant in this action. ECF No. 10 VII.C, ECF No. 10-7, ECF No.

10-10. Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims under the Eighth Amendment because the

alleged conduct, if true, does not state a claim for relief. ECF No. 19 at 11-15. Plaintiff broadly

responds that his civil rights have been violated, but he does not address any asserted pleading

insufficiency.

The Eighth Amendment mandates that “prison officials must ensure that inmates receive

adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must ‘take reasonable measures to

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guarantee the safety of the inmates[.]’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting

Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)). To state an Eighth Amendment conditions of

confinement claim, a plaintiff must allege both that he has been denied “the minimal civilized

measure of life’s necessities” and that this was done while the defendants had a “sufficiently

culpable state of mind.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.

Thus, conditions cited by an inmate must be “objectively, sufficiently serious [and] must

result in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Id. (internal citation and

quotation omitted). Only “extreme deprivations” are sufficient to make out a conditions of

confinement claim. Hudson v. McMillen, 503 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1992). A plaintiff must prove that the

deprivation is sufficiently serious when viewed within the context of “[c]ontemporary standards

of decency.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36 (1993).

As to Plaintiff’s claim related to CO Rankin’s refusal to provide Plaintiff dinner April 23,

2022, a single missed meal does not state an Eighth Amendment claim for denial of food. Instead,

“only a substantial deprivation of food to a prisoner” states a viable Eighth Amendment claim.

Lindsey v. O’Connor, 327 F. App’x. 319, 321 (3d Cir. 2009). Plaintiff’s allegations of two missed

showers also fail to state a claim for relief. See Brandt v. Wenerowicz, 698 F. App’x 673, 675

(denial of showers for 28 days absent allegations of ill effects does not rise to the level of a

constitutional violation); Laurensau v. Romarowics, 528 F. App’x 136, 139-40 (3d Cir. 2013)

(citing Davenport v. DeRobertis, 844 F.2d 1310, 1316 (7th Cir. 1988) (limiting inmates to one

shower a week does not violate the Eighth Amendment)).

Plaintiff’s allegations of threats fair no better. “It is well settled, … ‘that verbal harassment

of a prisoner, although deplorable, does not violate the Eighth Amendment.’” Hensley v.

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McCaulley, No. 3:21-CV-184, 2023 WL 2167805, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 2023), report and

recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 2163659 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 22, 2023) (citing Robinson v. Taylor,

204 F. App’x. 155, 156 (3d Cir. 2006), Lindsey, 327 F. App’x. at 321 (“Verbal harassment of a

prisoner, although distasteful, does not violate the Eighth Amendment.”); Booth v. King, 228 F.

App’x. 167, 172 (3d Cir. 2007) (“Absent any allegation of physical harm, the defendants’ verbal

threats do not amount to a constitutional violation.”); DeFranco v. Miller, 2021 WL 6498250, at

*6 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 6037580 (W.D. Pa.

Dec. 21, 2021) (collecting cases for the proposition that “verbal threats or taunts, without more,

are not sufficiently adverse to violate the Constitution.”).

Plaintiff’s allegations related to the issuance of a false misconduct also do not “rise to the

level of deprivation needed to constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth

Amendment.” Ingram v. Donate, No. 1:08-CV-0407, 2008 WL 2780648, at *3 (M.D. Pa. July 16,

2008) (citing Booth v. Pence, 354 F. Supp. 2d 553, 559 (E.D. Pa. 2005), aff’d, 141 F. App’x 66

(3d Cir. 2005).

Finally, as discussed in relation to the Eleventh Amendment bar to Plaintiff’s claims,

prisoners may not bring claims for “illegal incarceration” absent proof that “a conviction or

sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a

state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s

issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Walke v. Cullen, 491 F. App’x 273, 276 (3d Cir. 2012)

(quoting Heck, 512 U.S. 486-87). Because Plaintiff has not alleged (nor can he) that he has been

incarcerated beyond his maximum sentence, his claim is barred by Heck and must be dismissed.

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In summary, Plaintiff’s allegations do not state a claim to relief under the Eighth

Amendment that is plausible on its face. Because Plaintiff may be in the possession of other facts

that support his claim, the Court will grant the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment

claim without prejudice.

F. First Amendment Claim

Plaintiff alleges that after reporting Rankin’s conduct related to the meal and the issuance

of a false misconduct, Rankin and his coworkers have harassed and abused him by denying him

two showers, telling his cellmate they were “going to end up spraying” Plaintiff, and ordering

Plaintiff to turn on his light. ECF Nos. 10-7, 10-8, 10-10.

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims under the First Amendment as insufficient

to state a claim for relief. ECF No. 19 at 16 – 20. Plaintiff does not respond to Defendants’

arguments and appears to limit his claims to the denial of due process under the Fourteenth

Amendment. ECF 28 at 6. Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court will broadly construe

certain of the allegations in his Complaint and the attached exhibits as seeking to assert a First

Amendment retaliation claim.

“To state a First Amendment retaliation claim, a prisoner plaintiff must allege (1) that the

conduct which led to the alleged retaliation was constitutionally protected; (2) that he suffered

some adverse action at the hands of the prison officials; and (3) a causal link between the [protected

conduct] and the adverse action [in that the] conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the

decision to take that action.” Burton v. Giroux, 794 F. App’x 196, 198 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting

Oliver v. Roquet, 858 F.3d 180, 190 (3d Cir. 2017) (quotation marks omitted)). Defendants agree

that lodging grievances is constitutionally protected activity. ECF No. 19 at 18. But, according to

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Defendants, Plaintiff does not adequately allege a causal link to protected activity or allege that he

suffered an adverse action sufficient to deter a person of ordinary fitness from exercising his

constitutional rights. Id.

As related to the misconduct charge, Plaintiff does not allege any facts supporting the

required causal connection between constitutionally protected activity and CO Rankin’s decision

to submit the misconduct form. Plaintiff concedes the misconduct arose when Plaintiff was caught

by Rankin with a “fishing line” used to pass contraband to other inmates in the RHU and then took

time to “untangl[e]” the line before giving it to Rankin. ECF No. 10-2. Rankin then refused

Plaintiff his meal, and after a verbal altercation that included Plaintiff taunting Rankin’s manhood

and cursing at him, Rankin told him he would issue a misconduct. Id. Under these circumstances,

Plaintiff does not allege facts supporting an inference that the misconduct was issued in retaliation

for constitutionally protected activity.

The loss of two showers in one week, an alleged threat made to Plaintiff’s cellmate, and an

order to turn on a light also cannot support an inference that any Defendant took adverse action

against him that is sufficient to deter a person of ordinary fitness from exercising his constitutional

rights. Instead, more serious conduct is required to make out a retaliation claim under Section

1983. Compare Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001) (inmate presented evidence of

adverse retaliatory conduct where he showed “that he was denied parole, transferred to a distant

prison where his family could not visit him regularly, and penalized financially” when his prison

employment pay grade was reduced to the lowest possible level) and Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d

220, 225-26 (3d Cir. 2000) (inmate sufficiently alleged adverse retaliatory conduct, where he

claimed he was placed in administrative segregation and confined to his cell for all but five hours

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per week, which severely limited his access to the commissary, recreation, rehabilitative programs,

and legal research materials and assistance), with Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 (3d

Cir. 2011) (a misconduct charge against a prisoner – which was later dismissed – for filing a false

report was not sufficiently adverse to serve as the basis of a retaliation action) and Jones v.

Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 325-26 (5th Cir. 1999) (change in prisoner’s employment, which limited

his access to the prison law library to five hours per week, was not adverse for purposes of a

retaliation claim).

The adverse action alleged by Plaintiff, like the causal connection related to the

misconduct, fails to state a claim for First Amendment retaliation against any Defendant. The

Motion to Dismiss will be granted. However, it does not appear that amendment would be futile.

Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim is granted without

prejudice to further amendment to correct the identified pleading deficiencies.

G. Leave to Amend

“When a plaintiff does not seek leave to amend a deficient complaint after a defendant

moves to dismiss it, the court must inform the plaintiff that he has leave to amend within a set

period of time, unless amendment would be inequitable or futile.” Grayson v. Mayview State

Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). For the reasons set forth in this Memorandum Opinion,

Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claims, all official capacity claims

against Defendants, and Plaintiff’s claims related to “illegal incarceration” are dismissed with

prejudice. If Plaintiff can rectify the deficiencies identified in the Memorandum Opinion related

to his First Amendment and Eighth Amendment claims, he is granted thirty days to file an

Amended Complaint. Any Amended Complaint must encompass all remaining claims and parties

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in one stand-alone document and must set forth specific allegations against every named

defendant.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Motion to Dismiss is properly granted. An appropriate Order

will issue.

yw ony ef

LOAM LEM IM Lay

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE DGE

Dated: April 10, 2023

ce: All counsel of record by Notice of Electronic Filing

Michael Hall

QG 7407 -

SCI FAYETTE

50 Overlook Drive

LaBelle, PA 15450

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