right of self-representation is not a license excusing compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law
How later courts described this case
- right of self-representation is not a license excusing compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MICHAEL CONIKER and RESOURCE, )
SOLUTIONS, LLC, )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) Civil No. 22-1184
)
BISHOP JEFFREY MONFORTON, RANDY )
CHRISTENSEN, JOSEPH EDWARD HUDAK, )
ESQ., KYLE BROWN, PNC BANK, THE )
PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE, STATE )
TROOPER PADASAK, THE MEADOWS )
PSYCHIATRIC CENTER, USA FBI, FBI )
AGENT SCOTT FRANCIS, BELLEVUE )
POLICE CHIEF MATTHEW SENTNER, )
STEUBENVILLE POLICE CHIEF )
WILLIAM A. MCCAFFERTY, and )
ANDREW HREZO. )
)
Defendants. )
OPINION and ORDER
Michael Coniker, proceeding pro se, commenced this action on August 17, 2022, by
filing a Complaint. ECF No. 1. On August 24, 2022, Mr. Coniker filed an Amended Complaint.
ECF No. 9. On September 13, 2022, the Court dismissed the Amended Complaint and granted
leave to file a second amended complaint consistent with the Opinion dismissing the Amended
Complaint. ECF No. 13. On October 31, 2022, Plaintiffs filed a six-page second Amended
Complaint against fourteen Defendants. ECF No. 21. All but two of the Defendants filed
Motions to Dismiss the second Amended Complaint. ECF Nos. 24, 6, 32, 33, 35, 38, 43, and 55.
Plaintiffs were given until January 30, 2023 to respond to the Motions to Dismiss. On January
30, 2023, Plaintiffs filed two pleadings, but they do not provide a legal response to the Motions
to Dismiss. ECF Nos. 68 & 69. In Document 69, Mr. Coniker requested an extension of time to
respond to the Motions to Dismiss, which was granted. ECF No. 73. Plaintiffs were given until
February 12, 2023, within which to file Responses to the Motions to Dismiss. As no responses
were filed by the deadline, the Court will resolve the pending Motions to Dismiss.
I. Resource Solutions, Inc. as an Unrepresented Plaintiff in this Matter
As a preliminary matter, the Court addresses Resource Solutions, LLC’s status in this
case. Both Mr. Coniker and Resources Solutions purport to represent themselves. While Mr.
Coniker is permitted to represent himself in federal court, Resource Solutions, a corporation,
must be represented in court by an attorney. Simbraw, Inc. v. United States, 367 F.2d 373, 373-
74 (3d Cir. 1966) (per curiam). It “has been the law for the better part of two centuries ... that a
corporation may appear in the federal courts only through licensed counsel.” United States v.
Cocivera, 104 F.3d 566, 572 (3d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Thus,
Resource Solutions cannot represent itself. The Court will take no further action in this case
related to Resource Solutions, LLC since it is not represented by a licensed attorney. Resource
Solutions, LLC is hereby dismissed from this action until a licensed attorney enters an
appearance on its behalf. Moreover, there are no allegations in the second Amended Complaint
indicating that Resource Solutions was involved in any of the alleged conduct. At best, the
second Amended Complaint alleges that Resource Solutions was injured when money was
caused to be removed from Resource Solutions’ bank account, based on an alleged family court
order connected to Mr. Coniker.
II. Mr. Coniker’s Outstanding Motions
Next, prior to the Response deadline, Michael Coniker filed two Motions. ECF Nos. 68
& 74. To the extent that motions were filed in opposition to the Motions to Dismiss, the Court
will resolve these Motions now. First, Mr. Coniker filed a “Motion for appointment of a
Technicality Proof Reader” to assist Mr. Coniker. ECF No. 68. Mr. Coniker is not entitled to
the appointment of persons to assist with his lawsuit, though he may hire such persons himself.
Therefore, the Motion is DENIED. Next, is a “Motion to Publicly Expose certain conduct,” in
which Mr. Coniker requests that the Court order a “Michael Coniker Led Public View Sting.”
ECF No. 74. There is no basis in the law, or upon the alleged facts of this case, to grant such a
request, and therefore the Motion is DENIED.
III. Relevant Background
Mr. Coniker has sued Bishop Jeffrey Monforton, the Diocese of Steubenville, Randy
Christensen, Joseph Edward Hudak, Esq., Kyle Brown, PNC Bank, the Pennsylvania State
Police, State Trooper Padasak, The Meadows Psychiatric Center, USA FBI, FBI Agent Scott
Francis, Bellevue Police Chief Matthew Sentner, Steubenville Police Chief William A.
McCafferty, and Andrew Hrezo.
Second Amended Complaint Allegations
Mr. Coniker lists his causes of action as: Freedom of religious beliefs and expressions,
freedom of unjust confinement, freedom of thought expression, excessive bail, due process, feel
safe in home and in belongings, and honest treatment by law enforcement and health care
system. ECF No. 21, at 4. In the section entitled, “Amount in Controversy,” Mr. Coniker claims
that “$8,000,700.00 dollars are owed to Plaintiff as a basic reclamation of huge damages done to
the family life of Michael Coniker and his biological children of God and Marie Annette Coniker
prior to the calculated damages and compounded violations of rights the Jerry and Gwen Coniker
family unjustly judged on March 17, 2012 and April 2nd, 2012.” ECF No.21, at 5. The
“Statement of the Claim,” states, “Andrew Hrezo and Bishop Jeffrey Monforton are involved in
independent attacks against Michel Coniker and the truth regarding the formal inquisition the
Diocese of Steubenville opened in the year 2007. That Coniker legacy matter went rogue and
illegal on April 2nd, 2012. Andrew Hrezo also hired a lawyer to argue the [grossly unjust] Order
of Court issued by Judge Donald R. Walko, Jr., (AC Family Court) was obsolete; then days later
that order was used to wrongfully remove thousands of dollars from Plaintiff’s Resource
Solutions bank account.” ECF no. 21, at 5.
IV. Standard of Review
When reviewing a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), the court must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the
complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Eid v. Thompson, 740 F.3d 118, 122 (3d Cir.
2014) (quoting Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir.2008)). “To survive a
motion to dismiss a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); see also Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142,
147 (3d Cir. 2014). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Factual allegations of a
complaint must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555.
Plaintiff’s allegations must be accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable
to plaintiff when determining if the complaint should be dismissed. Trzaska v. L'Oreal USA,
Inc., 865 F.3d 155, 162 (3d Cir. 2017), as amended (Aug. 22, 2017). Pro se pleadings, “however
inartfully pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). If the court can reasonably read
pleadings to state a valid claim on which the litigant could prevail, it should do so despite failure
to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction,
or litigant’s unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364
(1982). Nonetheless, a court need not credit bald assertions, unwarranted inferences, or legal
conclusions cast in the form of factual averments. Morse v. Lower Merion School District, 132
F.3d 902, 906, n. 8 (3d Cir.1997).
When a court grants a motion to dismiss, the court “must permit a curative amendment
unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile.” Great Western Mining & Mineral Co.
v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 174 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotations omitted). An
amendment is inequitable where there is “undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, [or] unfair
prejudice.” Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). Amendment is
futile “where an amended complaint ‘would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.’ ” M.U. v. Downingtown High Sch. E., 103 F. Supp. 3d 612, 631 (E.D. Pa. 2015)
(quoting Great Western Mining & Mineral Co., 615 F.3d at 175).
IV. Discussion
As indicated above, the second Amended Complaint is nearly devoid of factual
averments and further Mr. Coniker fails to connect the few factual allegations he asserts to a
cause of action or to a Defendant’s alleged misconduct. This lack of specificity has prompted
several of the Defendants to seek dismissal of the second Amended Complaint on the basis that it
fails to state a claim. Several Defendants specifically highlight that the second Amended
Complaint fails to name any Defendant, except for Bishop Monforton and Andrew Hrezo. The
state and federal law enforcement Defendants also seek dismissal on the basis that they are
immune from suit. All Defendants argue against permitting leave to amend.1
A. Failure to Assert a Viable Claim
The second Amended Complaint is nearly identical to the dismissed first Amended
Complaint. As with the first Amended Complaint, the Court cannot identify any well-plead
cause of action upon which relief can be granted. Nor has Mr. Coniker set forth a present set of
facts that support a cause of action against any Defendant.
First, as the basis for federal court jurisdiction, Mr. Coniker identifies both “federal
question,” and “diversity of citizenship.” His causes of action (freedom of religious beliefs and
expressions, freedom of thought expression, and due process) appear to implicate the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution. However, diversity jurisdiction does not exist
because there are Defendants who are citizens of the same state as Plaintiff; namely,
Pennsylvania. “Complete diversity requires that, in cases with multiple plaintiffs or multiple
1 One Defendant argues that he was not properly served. To resolve that issue would require further briefing and the
potential introduction of evidence that said Defendant was or was not properly served. Therefore, the Court declines
to address this argument. Similarly, a subset of Defendants are arguing that the Court should dismiss this action with
prejudice based on Mr. Coniker filing his second Amended Complaint two days late. The Court also declines to
dismiss this action because the pro se plaintiff filed his amended complaint two days late.
defendants, no plaintiff be a citizen of the same state as any defendant.” Zambelli Fireworks
Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412, 419 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah
Svcs. Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 553 (2005) and Kaufman v. Allstate N.J. Insur. Co., 561 F.3d 144, 148
(3d Cir.2009)). Mr. Coniker is a citizen of Pennsylvania. He identifies several Defendants as
citizens of Ohio, nearly all other Defendants are citizens of Pennsylvania, which leads to the
conclusion that diversity jurisdiction does not exist in this case.
Mr. Coniker named causes of action are: Freedom of religious beliefs and expressions,
freedom of unjust confinement, freedom of thought expression, excessive bail, due process, feel
safe in home and in belongings, and honest treatment by law enforcement and health care
system. As detailed below, the Court is unable to discern a viable cause of action based on the
sparse alleged facts, and in addition several of the named causes of action must be dismissed for
failure to state a claim. Mr. Coniker provides no supporting factual allegations to support any of
the named claims. The dates he provides in connection with his claims, 2007 and 2012, are
likely beyond any applicable statute of limitations. Mr. Coniker also provides no additional
factual information related to his alleged excessive bail violation claim. He does not state who
imposed excessive bail in violation of the 8th Amendment, when the violation occurred, and
under what circumstances. As such said claim is dismissed.
Turning to the allegations in the second Amended Complaint, the Court is unable to
isolate a valid claim on the face of the second Amended Complaint. Mr. Coniker identifies only
two of the fourteen Defendants in his second Amended Complaint. He does not sufficiently
allege what conduct the three Defendants engaged in and how he was harmed thereby. The
second Amended Complaint therefore fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In
addition, the second Amended Complaint, which closely mirrors the dismissed first Amended
Complaint, fails to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
With respect to the Defendants not discussed in the body of the second Amended
Complaint2, Mr. Coniker has not alleged any facts to show that any of them took any action upon
which a plausible cause of action may be based. Therefore, said Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted will be granted.
With respect to the two Defendants discussed in the second Amended Complaint,
Andrew Hrezo and Bishop Monforton, all Mr. Coniker alleges is that these two Defendants “are
involved in independent attacks against Michael Coniker,” without any specificity as to what
they allegedly did, how they attacked Mr. Coniker, when the attacks occurred, or how Mr.
Coniker was injured as a result of the attacks. Despite the allegations that Hrezo and Monforton
attacked Mr. Coniker in some manner, the Court is unable to draw any reasonable inference that
these Defendants are liable for misconduct towards Mr. Coniker. Iqbal, 556 U.S.at 678.
This is Mr. Coniker’s third attempt at stating his cause of actions. Only he knows what
claims he wants to bring and against whom. "Filing a Complaint pro se does not exempt a
plaintiff from pleading essential elements of his claim, nor does it excuse ignorance or lack of
attention to the ordinary rules of civil procedure." Jones v. Omni Bank, 1998 WL 761869, * 5
(E.D.Pa. 1998), citing McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113, 113 S.Ct. 1980 (1993). See
also Martinez-McBean v. Government of Virgin Islands, 562 F.2d 908, 912 (3d Cir. 1977) (right
of self-representation is not a license excusing compliance with relevant rules of procedural and
substantive law). Because the above allegations do not state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, Bishop Monforton’s Motion to Dismiss will be granted. Andrew Hrezo does not
2 Defendants McCafferty, Sentner, the Meadows Psychiatric Center, Christensen, Brown, PNC Bank, the
Pennsylvania State Police, Trooper Padasak, Hudak, the FBI, and Scott Francis,
appear to have been properly served, nonetheless, because there is no valid or supportable claim
asserted against him, the second Amended Complaint will be dismissed as asserted against
Hrezo. Defendant Hudak did not file a responsive pleading to the second Amended Complaint,
but, as with Hrezo, because there is no valid or supportable claim asserted against Hudak, the
second Amended Complaint against Hudak will be dismissed.
B. Immunity
The law enforcement Defendants, Chief Sentner, Chief McCafferty, Trooper Padasak, the
Pennsylvania State Police, the FBI, and FBI Agent Francis, all move for dismissal based on one
form of immunity or another. As to Chief McCafferty, Chief Sentner, Trooper Padasak, the FBI
and FBI Agent Francis, the second Amended Complaint fails to allege any claim against any of
these Defendants. The legal principles set forth by the law enforcement Defendants persuasively
argue that immunity should apply as to any actual and viable causes of action asserted against
any of them. There are no actual and viable causes of action asserted against any of the llaw
enforcement Defendants. Therefore, the Court hesitates to bestow immunity in circumstances
where there are no allegations directed at any of the law enforcement Defendants, much less any
discernible allegations of misconduct directed towards them. With respect to the Pennsylvania
State Police, it is clear that, as an agency of the Commonwealth, it is entitled to immunity, in all
cases, from potential constitutional claims. Laskaris v. Thornburgh, 661 F.2d 23 (3d Cir. 1981);
Spuck v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole, 2012 WL 2974766, *3 (W.D. Pa. 2012); 42
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521(b). Accordingly, the Court will grant the Pennsylvania State Police’s
Motion to Dismiss based on the agency’s immunity from suit. The remaining Defendants’
Motions to Dismiss based on immunity will be denied without prejudice. However, as discussed
above, all law enforcement Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss will be granted as there are no
claims asserted against said Defendants.
C. Leave to Amend
Finally, the Court must consider whether to grant leave to amend the complaint before
dismissal. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). “[L]eave must
be granted in the absence of undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, unfair prejudice, or futility
of amendment.” Id. Here, in light of Mr. Coniker’s three nearly identical complaints filed in
this action, his decision not to file a substantive response to the Motions to Dismiss, his practice
of filing motions unrelated to the second Amended Complaint, the lack of factual allegations
asserting any cause of action against any named Defendant, and the fact that it is highly likely
that the statute of limitations has run on any claim that dates to 2007 or 2012, granting Mr.
Coniker leave to amend the second Amended Complaint would be futile.
D. Other Matters
In dismissing the first Amended Complaint, the Court considered whether Mr. Coniker
was attempting to raise claims that had been dismissed with prejudice Civil No. 22-185. ECF
No. 13, at 1-2. Mr. Coniker identified Civil No. 22-185 as a related case to the present action.
This Court stated: “A comparison of the instant Amended Complaint with the Complaint filed at
Civil Action No. 22-185, shows that the instant action is sufficiently distinguishable from the
prior action such that the present action is not an attempt to revive claims dismissed with
prejudice in the prior action.” ECF No.13, 2. Accordingly, the Court now concludes that the
present action is not related to Civil No. 22-185. The Clerk of Court will be directed to remove
the designation that the instant action is related to Civil No. 22-185.
V. Conclusion
The second Amended Complaint does not specify the conduct, actions, or incidents on
which any alleged claim against any individual Defendant is based. While the second Amended
Complaint contains factual allegations, it does not contain factual allegations sufficient “to raise
a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. In short, the second
Amended Complaint does not “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 570). Therefore, all Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss will be granted for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. The Court also finds that the second Amended
Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relieve can be granted as to Defendants Andrew
Hrezo and Joseph Hudak, Jr. The Motion to Dismiss filed by the Pennsylvania State Police will
also be granted because the Commonwealth Agency has Eleventh Amendment immunity from
suit. Accordingly, the second Amended Complaint will be dismissed, with prejudice, as to all
Defendants.
Accordingly, the following order is hereby entered.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 23rd day of February 2023, for the reasons set forth above, it is hereby
ORDERED as follows:
A. Michael Coniker’s “Motion for appointment of a Technicality Proof Reader”
(ECF No. 68) and “Motion to Publicly Expose certain conduct,” (ECF No. 74), are DENIED.
B. The following Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss are granted because the second
Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted:
1. Steubenville Police Chief William A. McCafferty’s Motion Dismiss (ECF No. 24)
is GRANTED.
2. Bellevue Police Chief Matthew Sentner’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 26) is
GRANTED.
3. UHS of Pennsylvania, Inc. d/b/a The Meadows Psychiatric Center’s Motion to
Dismiss (ECF No. 33) is GRANTED.
4. Randy Christensen’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 32) is GRANTED.
5. Bishop Jeffrey Monforton Diocese of Steubenville (ECF No. 35) is GRANTED.
6. PNC Bank’s and Kyle Brown’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 38) is GRANTED.
7. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and Special Agent Scott Francis’s Motion to
Dismiss (ECF No. 43) is GRANTED.
8. The Pennsylvania State Police and State Trooper Padasak’s Motion to Dismiss
(ECF No. 55) is GRANTED.
D. The Pennsylvania State Police Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 55) is GRANTED
because the second Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
and also because the Police Agency is immune from suit.
E. It is ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ second Amended Complaint is hereby
DISMISSED with prejudice. Leave to amend is not granted as such would be futile.
F, IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Resources Solutions, LLC is dismissed from
this action so long as it does not have a licensed attorney to represent it.
G. Finally, it is ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is directed to remove the related
case, Civil Action No. 22-185, from this action, as this case is not related to that action.
This action is hereby closed and dismissed with prejudice.
Metrbyp. y Alma
Marilyn J. Horan
United States District Court Judge
ce: Michael Coniker, pro se
556 Union Avenue Ext.
Pittsburgh, PA 15229
12