The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
FLECIA ANN HARVEY, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 22-1711
)
RAMIN FASHANDI and )
HOLLY FASHANDI, )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Presently before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Flecia Ann Harvey’s Motion to Proceed In
Forma Pauperis filed on December 2, 2022, (Docket No. 1), along with a proposed Complaint,
which was lodged pending disposition of the IFP Motion. (Docket No. 1-1). After reviewing
Plaintiff’s IFP Motion, the Court finds that she is without sufficient funds to pay the required filing
fee. Thus, Plaintiff will be granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
Turning to Plaintiff’s Complaint, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) gives the Court the authority
to screen and dismiss a complaint if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii); Brown v. Sage, 941 F.3d 655, 659 (3d Cir. 2019). In
analyzing whether a complaint fails to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the Court
applies the same standard governing motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). See Heffley v. Steele, 826 F. App’x 227, 230 (3d Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).
To that end, to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the
well-pleaded factual content in the complaint must allow “the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009), and also “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted). When analyzing a motion to dismiss, the
factual allegations should be separated from allegations that merely recite the legal elements of the
claim. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). The well-pleaded facts are
accepted as true, but legal conclusions may be disregarded. Id. at 210-11. Next, a determination
is made as to “whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff
has a ‘plausible claim for relief.’ ” Id. at 211 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). This “plausibility”
determination is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Given that Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court liberally construes her Complaint and
employs less stringent standards than when judging the work product of an attorney. Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, there are limits to the Court’s procedural flexibility -
“pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim . . . they
cannot flout procedural rules - they must abide by the same rules that apply to all other litigants.”
Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citations omitted).
Plaintiff’s Complaint is difficult, if not impossible, to decipher. (See Docket No. 1-1).
Plaintiff alleges that the Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1708 and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 (Id. at 1). The section of the Complaint entitled “Facts”
is blank; however, Plaintiff describes her claim on the Civil Cover Sheet accompanying the
Complaint as follows: her neighbor stole her mailbox with her mail in it; her neighbor and his wife
have harassed her and they murdered her cat; they placed a scarecrow facing the windows of her
1 On the Civil Cover Sheet accompanying the Complaint, Plaintiff lists 18 U.S.C. § 1708 and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 as the “civil statutes” under which she is filing the action. (See Docket No. 1-2). As discussed
herein, § 1708 is not a civil statute, but rather a federal criminal statute.
house; they sprayed her grass with weed killer and then she got the chemical on herself when she
cut the grass; and her neighbors generally have been harassing her since she moved in to her home
in 2019. (See Docket Nos. 1-1; 1-2). In the “Relief” section of the Complaint, Plaintiff requests
that the Court help her “live in peace in [her] home” and “get justice for the money we put out for
lawyers, surveyors, doctors, and for the pain and suffering we have and may have in the future,”
as well as compensation for euthanizing her cat, taking security measures and installing a new
mailbox. (Docket No. 1-1 at 1).
Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a pleading must contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
Although cognizant that Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court nonetheless notes that her
Complaint does not come close to complying with this requirement. As noted, Plaintiff’s
Complaint is difficult to interpret given that she lists two defendants but fails to specify in any
discernable manner what her claim or claims is as against each of them. Again, the section of the
Complaint entitled “Facts” is blank.
Furthermore, Plaintiff’s citation of 18 U.S.C. § 1708 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 as the statutes under which she is filing suit is insufficient to state a claim for relief. (See
Docket Nos. 1-1; 1-2). First, Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against
someone because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin, (see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2), which
does not appear to have any relevance to the description of Plaintiff’s cause of action set forth on
the Civil Cover Sheet. Next, § 1708 is a federal criminal statute which criminalizes theft or receipt
of stolen mail matter. As a private citizen, Plaintiff is unable to prosecute this federal criminal
charge directly or via a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Christopherson v. Polyconcept, N. Am.,
Civ. No. 20-545, 2021 WL 4776889, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 2021) (citing El v. People’s
Emergency Ctr., Civ. No. 19-690, 2021 WL 2823042, at *3 (E.D. Pa. July 7, 2021) (dismissing
federal criminal claims because a plaintiff “has no private right of action to bring claims under the
criminal code”)); Jackson v. Bolandi, Civ. No. 18-17484, 2020 WL 255974, at *7 (D.N.J. Jan. 17,
2020) (dismissing § 1983 claim premised on alleged violations of federal criminal statutes) (citing
Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997) (“In order to seek redress through § 1983,
however, a plaintiff must assert the violation of a federal right, not merely a violation of federal
law.”) (emphasis in original)); In re Edwards, Civ. Nos. 18-CV-4776 and 18-CV-4777, 2018 WL
6062354, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 20, 2018) (observing that 18 U.S.C. § 1708 does not provide a basis
for civil liability).
In sum, the Court is unable to discern what type of claim Plaintiff purports to assert. As
currently pled, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may
be granted, and therefore the Complaint will be dismissed without prejudice to Plaintiff filing an
Amended Complaint to the extent that she is able to state a plausible claim for relief. See e.g.,
Duglas v. Kamper, Civ. No. 19-3010, 2019 WL 3230931, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 17, 2019) (after
granting in forma pauperis status, the Court “must review the pleadings and dismiss the matter if
it determines that the action is frivolous, malicious, or fails to set forth a proper basis for this
Court’s subject matter jurisdiction.” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Spell v. Allegheny Cty.
Admin., Civ. No. 14-1403, 2015 WL 1321695, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 2015) (permitting
amendment by pro se plaintiff where “the facts alleged [in the complaint] are simply too vague,
and the theories of liability too poorly articulated” for the Court “to determine whether allowing
[her] to amend . . . would be futile”).
Accordingly, in view of the foregoing, the Court enters the following Order:
AND NOW, this 21st day of December, 2022, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
(1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Docket No. 1) is
GRANTED;
(2) Plaintiff’s Complaint (Docket No. 1-1) is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to
amendment by Plaintiff to the extent that she is able to state a plausible claim for relief;
and,
(3) To the extent Plaintiff wishes to file an Amended Complaint, she must do so by January
6, 2023. If Plaintiff fails to file an Amended Complaint by January 6, 2023, the case
will be closed.
s/ W. Scott Hardy
W. Scott Hardy
United States District Judge
cc: Flecia Ann Harvey (via U.S. mail)
6395 Saltsburg Road
Pittsburgh, PA 15235