VUYANICH v. SMITHTON BOROUGH

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TIMOTHY E. VUYANICH, et al,

Plaintiffs, Civil Action No. 2:19-cy-1342

Vv. Hon. William S. Stickman IV

SMITHTON BOROUGH, et ai,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

WILLIAM S. STICKMAN IV, United States District Judge

Plaintiffs Timothy E. Vuyanich and Carol L. Vuyanich brought this action asserting claims

against several Defendants, public and private, relating to the involuntary clean-up of vehicles and

other personal property from their land.! (ECF No. 1). The parties are engaged in discovery,

which closes on November 23, 2022. (ECF No. 84). Pending before the Court are the Motions

for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by Smithton Borough, Chief Michael R. Natale (“Chief

Natale’) and Patrolman Ralph R. Marsico, Jr. (“Patrolman Marsico”) (collectively “the Smithton

Defendants”) as well as South Huntingdon Township and Supervisors Eddie Troup (“Troup”),

Matthew Jennewine (“Jennewine”) and Richard Gates (“Gates”) (collectively, “the South

Huntingdon Defendants”). (ECF Nos. 79 and 85). Both sets of Defendants argue that Plaintiff

Timothy Vuyanich’s conviction for Public Nuisance, in violation of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6504, at CP-

65-CR-0003869-2018 in the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania,

' The facts underlying Plaintiffs’ Complaint have been summarized previously by the Court at

ECF No. 47 on pages one through four. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit also

summarized the relevant facts in its July 27, 2021 Opinion at ECF No. 55-1 on pages four through

eight. Those factual recitations are incorporated herein.

collaterally estops Plaintiffs from pursuing the claims asserted in this action. Additionally, they

contend that Plaintiffs have not set forth plausible claims at Counts I through IV that the cleanup

violated their rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to

the United States Constitution.? After careful consideration of the parties’ pleadings, the Court

disagrees. It will deny Defendants’ motions, and allow the case to continue through discovery.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) (“Rule 12(c)”), once the pleadings are

closed, but within such time as to not delay trial, a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.

A party may use a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) as a vehicle for raising

2 Count I, “Violation of Plaintiffs’ Procedural Due Process Rights Under the Fourteenth

Amendment of the 1787 United States Constitution,” is directed at Smithton Borough, South

Huntington Township, and Chief Natale. (ECF No. 1, pp. 23-28). Count IL “Violation of

Plaintiffs’ right to not be subject to Unreasonable Searches and Seizures Under the Fourth

Amendment of the 1787 United States Constitution,” is directed at Smithton Borough, Chief

Natale, and Patrolman Marsico. (/d., pp. 29-34). Count III, “Violation of Plaintiffs’ Right to be

Provided Just Compensation for the Taking of their Property for a Public Use Under the Fifth

Amendment of the 1787 United States Constitution,” is directed at Smithton Borough. (d., pp.

34-38). Count IV, “Violation of Plaintiffs’ right to not be subject to Unreasonable Searches and

Seizures Under the Fourth Amendment of the 1787 United States Constitution,” is directed at

Smithton Borough, Chief Natale, South Huntington Township and Supervisors Troup, Jennewine,

and Gates. Ud., pp. 38-41).

Counts V and VI are not directed against any of the remaining Defendants — either the

Smithton Defendants or the South Huntington Defendants. Count V, “Conversion of Plaintiffs’

Personal Property Items,” was directed at Dale H. Cooper, Marsh Auto Salvage, Inc., Harry F.

Thompson’s Garage, Inc., Jarvis Auto & Truck Salvage, and R&R Auto Recycling. (/d., pp. 42-

43). Count VI, “Trespass Upon Land,” was directed against Dale H. Cooper, Marsh Auto Salvage,

Inc., Jarvis Auto & Truck Salvage, and R&R Auto Recycling. (/d., pp. 43-44). Default judgment

was entered against Marsh Auto Salvage, Inc. and R&R Auto Recycling on January 2, 2022, for

their failure to plead or otherwise defend. (ECF No. 28). Default judgment was entered against

Dale H. Cooper on January 22, 2020, for his failure to plead or otherwise defend. (ECF No. 45).

Jarvis Auto & Truck Salvage was terminated as party on February 15, 2022, after the Court granted

its Motion to Dismiss. (ECF Nos. 70-72). Harry F. Thompson’s Garage, Inc. was terminated as

a party on April 25, 2022, after the Court granted its Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (ECF

Nos. 90 and 91).

several of the defenses enumerated in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b) (“Rule 12b”).

Turbe v. Gov't of Virgin Islands, 938 F.2d 427, 428 (3d Cir. 1991). The standard of review is

identical to that of a motion to dismiss under Rule12(b)(6).? Turbe. The only difference is that,

on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a court reviews not only the complaint, but also the

answer and written instruments attached to the pleadings, matters of public record, and

“undisputedly authentic” documents if a plaintiff's claims are based on such documents. See

Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196-97 (3d Cir. 1993);

see also Mele y. Fed. Reserve Bank of N_Y., 359 F.3d 251, 256 n.5 (3d Cir. 2004) (providing that

a court may consider (1) exhibits attached to the complaint, (2) matters of public record, and (3)

all documents that are integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint, even if they are not

attached thereto, without converting the motion into one for summary judgment). However,

because a Rule 12(c) “motion calls for an assessment of the merits of the case at an embryonic

stage, a court must view the facts contained in the pleadings in the light most favorable to the

nonmovant and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom” in the nonmovant’s favor. R.G. Fin.

Corp. v. Vergara-Nunez, 446 F.3d 178, 182 (1st Cir. 2006).

> A plaintiff must allege sufficient facts that, if accepted as true, state a claim for relief plausible

on its face. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The “plausibility” standard required for a complaint to survive a motion

to dismiss is not akin to a “probability” requirement but asks for more than sheer “possibility.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In other words, the complaint’s factual

allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption

that all the allegations are true even if doubtful in fact. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Facial

plausibility is present when a plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the

reasonable inference that a defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Even if the complaint’s well-pleaded facts lead to a plausible inference, that inference alone will

not entitle a plaintiff to relief. Jd. at 682. The complaint must support the inference with facts to

plausibly justify that inferential leap. Jd.

When a Rule 12(c) motion is not used to raise Rule 12(b) defenses, judgment on the

pleadings under Rule 12(c) is not appropriate “‘unless the movant clearly establishes that no

material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”

CoreStates Bank, N.A. v. Huls Am., Inc., 176 F.3d 187, 193 Gd Cir. 1999) (quoting Kruzits v.

Okuma Mach. Tool, Inc., 40 F.3d 52, 54 Gd Cir. 1994)). Motions under Rule 12(c), that are not

used to raise certain 12(b) defenses, require a determination on the merits of the case and “should

be granted only where it is clear that the merits of the controversy can be fairly and fully decided

in such a summary manner.” Jn re Dreyfus Mut. Funds Fee Litig., 428 F. Supp. 2d 357, 358 (W.D.

Pa. 2006).

IL. ANALYSIS

A. Collateral Estoppel

The Smithton Defendants and the South Huntingdon Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’

action is precluded by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Specifically, they contend that Timothy

Vuyanich’s conviction for Public Nuisance at CP-65-0003869-2018 prevents the Court from

examining the claims raised in the Complaint. Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, “prevents

parties from litigating again the same issues when a court of competent jurisdiction has already

adjudicated the issue on its merits, and a final judgment has been entered as to those parties and

their privies.” Witkowski v. Welch, 173 F.3d 192, 198 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Schroeder v.

Acceleration Life Ins. Co., 972 F.2d 41, 45 (3d Cir. 1992)). Collateral estoppel promotes judicial

efficiency, fairness, and spares “parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits.” Allen v.

McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980) Gnternal citations omitted).

Whether an issue is collaterally estopped is dependent on four requirements: (1) the issue

decided in the prior adjudication must be identical with the one presented in the later action; (2)

there must have been a final judgment on the merits; (3) the party against whom collateral estoppel

is asserted must have been a party or in privity with the party to the prior adjudication; and (4) the

party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted must have had a full and fair opportunity to

litigate the issue in question in the prior adjudication. Witkowski, 173 F.3d at 198 (citations

omitted).

There are—at this stage—a number of issues with respect to the Smithton Defendants’ and

the South Huntingdon Defendants’ invocation of collateral estoppel that preclude the Court from

finding the doctrine applicable.

First, the claims Plaintiffs assert in this matter do not appear to present identical issues as

those that were adjudicated in Timothy Vuyanich’s criminal case at CP-65-0003869-2018. That

criminal prosecution looked only to the narrow statutory provisions of Pennsylvania statutes

governing Public Nuisance (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6504), Abandoning a Vehicle on Public or Private

Property (75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3712(b)), and Discarding Icebox in Place Accessible to Children (18

Pa.C.S.A. § 6502(a)). On May 29, 2020, Timothy Vuyanich was convicted of Public Nuisance,

which was graded a second degree misdemeanor. (ECF No. 79-5). The Public Nuisance statute

provides as follows:

Whoever erects, sets up, establishes, maintains, keeps or continues, or causes to be

erected, set up, established, maintained, kept or continued, any public or common

nuisance is guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree. Where the nuisance is

in existence at the time of the conviction and sentence, the court, in its discretion,

may direct either the defendant or the sheriff of the county at the expense of the

defendant to abate the same.

18 Pa. C.S. § 6504.

In comparison to the claims at issue in this case (see ECF No. 1, pp. 23-44), the question

of whether Timothy Vuyanich was guilty of violating the Public Nuisance statute is far narrower

in scope. The only readily apparent overlap is that both cases arose from issues relating to the

personal property stored on the property and its ultimate removal. But even the overlap vis-a-vis

the cleanup of the property is called into question for the collateral estoppel analysis based on the

timeline of the allegedly actionable conduct in this case. Specifically, while the Public Nuisance

statute provides that a court may, at time of conviction or sentence, order the nuisance to be abated

by the defendant or the county sheriff, that is not what is pled to have happened in this case.

(emphasis added). Rather, Plaintiffs allege that the cleanup of their property began on July 9,

2019-—ten months before Timothy Vuyanich’s criminal conviction—and that conviction “does not

erase the tortious manner in which Plaintiffs’ personal items were removed”. (ECF No. 1, ¥ 91;

ECF No. 87, p. 27). And, no sheriff was ever involved in abating the nuisance.

Second, one of the central questions in determining whether collateral estoppel should

apply is if Plaintiffs had a full and fair opportunity to present their claims in prior litigation. Carol

Vuyanich was not involved in Timothy Vuyanich’s criminal case. Thus, it cannot be said that she

ever had a full and fair opportunity to present her claims. As to Timothy Vuyanich, the Court has

no information before it upon which it could even begin to conclude that during his criminal case,

he voiced his position and confronted the witnesses, evidence, and arguments offered by each of

the Defendants involved in this matter. In some instances, “[a] finding in a prior criminal

proceeding may estop an individual from litigating the same issue in a subsequent civil

proceeding.” James v. Heritage Valley Fed. Credit Union, 197 F. App’x 102, 105 (3d Cir. 2006)

(citing Emich Motors Corp. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558, 568-69 (1951) (“such estoppel

extends only to the questions ‘distinctly put in issue and directly determined’ in the criminal

prosecution.” (citation omitted)). But that is not the case here. Material issues of fact regarding

what occurred prior to and during the criminal prosecution of Timothy Vuyanich remain to be

resolved.

The Court has “broad discretion to determine when [collateral estoppel] should be applied.”

Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 651 (1979). Viewing the information before it and

the inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the Court cannot find

that collateral estoppel applies.

B) Judgment in favor of Defendants is not warranted on Plaintiffs’ due

process, taking, and illegal search claims — Counts I through IV.

Count I, Plaintiffs’ due process claim, is directed at Smithton Borough, South Huntington

Township, and Chief Natale. (ECF No. 1, pp. 23-28). One of Plaintiffs’ illegal search claims,

Count II, is directed at Smithton Borough, Chief Natale, and Patrolman Marsico, while the other

illegal search claim, Count IV, is directed at Smithton Borough, Chief Natale, South Huntington

Township and Supervisors Troup, Jennewine, and Gates. (/d., pp. 29-34, 38-41). Count III, the

taking claim, is only directed at Smithton Borough. (/d., pp. 34-38).4

In seeking judgment in their favor at Count I, the South Huntingdon Defendants argue that

“Tals a result of the public nuisance conviction, the Vuyaniches’ procedural due process claim

against South Huntingdon Township fails because nuisances are not constitutionally protected

property.” (ECF No. 86, p. 13). They also contend that Plaintiffs’ illegal search claim at Count

IV fails as a result of Timothy Vuyanich’s conviction at CP-65-0003869-2018. (Ud., pp. 15-16).

More specifically, they argue that the determination that the property was a public nuisance served

Plaintiffs’ claims are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a cause of action against

any person who, acting under the color of state law, deprives another of his or her federal rights,

and, under certain circumstances, the municipal employer and/or supervisor of such a person. To

obtain relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must make a two-prong showing: (1) that s/he suffered a

violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States; and, (2) that the

alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See Karns v.

Shanahan, 879 F.3d 504, 520 (3d Cir. 2018) (citations omitted).

as a deprivation of Plaintiffs’ privacy interests in the property and privileged any entry onto the

property, including any search.

The Smithton Defendants raise the same arguments as to Counts I, II and IV against them.

(See ECF No. 80, p. 10) (“The state court judgment of conviction precludes Plaintiffs from

pursuing their claims as it establishes that they had no predicate possessory right or interest in the

allegedly valuable property, which right or interest in the allegedly valuable property, which right

or interest is essential to their claims in Counts I, II and II.”); (See also id., p. 14) “Similarly,

Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure claim requires a showing of a “possessory

interest” in the property which is the subject of the seizure, as well as “some meaningful

interference” with that interest.’’); (“The conclusive finding of a nuisance is also fatal to Plaintiff's

Fifth Amendment takings claims as there is no “taking” deserving of compensation where property

is seized or destroyed to abate a nuisance.”)). Alternatively, they argue that: (1) Plaintiffs’

Fourteenth Amendment due process claims fail because “Plaintiffs received notice of a charge that

they were maintaining a nuisance on their property,” and they received twenty days’ notice that

the nuisance would be removed (/d., p. 14); (2) Plaintiff's procedural due process claims fail

because they received an adequate post-deprivation remedy Ud., pp. 15-16); and (3) Plaintiffs’

illegal search claims fail because “the ‘seizure’ of items pursuant to a court order was reasonable

as a matter of law.” Ud., pp. 17-18).

The Court’s examination of the pleadings does not lead it to the conclusion—at this point—

that Plaintiffs are unable, as a matter of law, to prevail on their claims. Material issues of fact

remain to be resolved that preclude the Court from entering judgment in favor of Defendants as to

Counts I through TV. The merits of Plaintiffs’ claims simply cannot be fairly and fully decided on

the pleadings alone.

As an initial matter, as discussed above, the Complaint pleads that the allegedly actionable

conduct occurred between July and October 2019. (ECF No. 1, 133). This was months before

Timothy Vuyanich’s conviction for Public Nuisance on May 29, 2020. Yet, Defendants rely on

that conviction as the determination, as a matter of law, that the Vuyaniches’ property was a

nuisance and could be legally abated by public authorities. (ECF No. 80, p. 12) (quoting 18

Pa.C.S.A. § 6504; “the court, in its discretion, may direct either the defendant or the sheriff of the

county at the expense of the defendant to abate the [public nuisance]”). The Court is simply

unwilling to entertain such an argument and enter judgment in favor of Defendants without the

benefit of a more fully developed record. Furthermore, the Court finds a material factual dispute

exists about what happened at the June 18, 2019, status conference in the Westmoreland County

Court of Common Pleas and whether it afforded Plaintiffs sufficient due process. Also, the parties

vehemently dispute whether unreasonable and warrantless searches of Plaintiffs’ property

occurred, and the extent of the various Defendants’ involvement. Plaintiffs argue that personal

property was seized (and then destroyed, appropriated, or sold) that was not within the scope of

the nuisance. And, the record is simply insufficient for the Court to make any determination

regarding post-deprivation due process for Plaintiffs as to their seized property.

For these reasons, the Court concludes that judgment is not warranted on Counts I through

IV. Plaintiffs have sufficiently set forth violations of rights secured by the Constitution and laws

of the United States. The parties are free to explore the contours of Plaintiffs’ claims during

discovery and reassert their positions at the summary judgment stage.

1. Plaintiffs have adequately pled Monell claims against Smithton Borough

and South Huntington Township.

A municipal entity, such as Smithton Borough and South Huntington Township, cannot be

held liable pursuant to § 1983 under the theory of respondeat superior. Monell y. Dep’t of Social

Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). “[I]t is when execution of a [municipality's]

policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be

said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible

under § 1983.” Jd. at 694. Municipal entities may only be held liable under § 1983 on (1) an

express municipal policy, such as an ordinance, regulation, or policy statement, see id., (2) a

“widespread practice, that although not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is

‘so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage’ with the force of law,” see City

of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988) (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398

U.S. 144, 167-68 (1970)), or (3) the decision of a person with “final policymaking authority.” See

Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 123; see also Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481-83 (1986).

A municipality may be held liable under § 1983 only when the enforcement of the municipal policy

or practice was the “moving force” behind the violation of a plaintiffs federal protected right. Bd.

of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 400 (1997); City of Canton, Ohio

Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-89 (1989).

The Court’s review of Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment due process claim reveals that it

is predicated on South Huntington’s designation of Smithton Borough (and, by extension, Chief

Natale) as its final policymaker for bringing charges concerning the property’s condition. (ECF

No. 1, J§ 28, 30-31, 152-54). There are sufficient allegations that Chief Natale reported to and

acted on behalf of Smithton Borough with regard to the Property’s condition. Ud., {§ 41, 47-48,

50-52, 54-56, 65, 72, 89, 94-98, 103-04, 106-07, 116-21, 123, 132). When Plaintiffs’ allegations

are viewed in the light most favorable to them, they state a plausible claim that Smithton Borough

and Chief Natale, exercising South Huntingdon’s final policymaking authority over charges

regarding the property’s condition, violated Plaintiffs’ procedural due process rights. The Court

10

concurs with Plaintiffs that their “chain of legal policymaking authority and proximate causation,”

adequately states a Fourteenth Amendment Monell claim against both municipalities. Nothing in

the pleadings submitted to the Court can lead it to definitely conclude that Defendants are not

liable for the misconduct alleged. It will not grant judgment in favor of the Borough of Smithton

and South Huntingdon Township. A more fully developed record will allow the Court to better

evaluate the Fourteenth Amendment Mone// claims against Smithton Borough and South

Huntingdon Township should the parties reassert their challenges to Plaintiffs’ claims at the

summary judgment stage.

As to Plaintiffs’ Monell claim against South Huntingdon Township for violating their

Fourth Amendment rights, the Court finds that it is sufficient to proceed to discovery. It will not

grant judgment in favor of South Huntingdon Township. Plaintiffs allege that the Supervisors

(who had final policymaking authority) entered their property on September 27, 2019, without a

warrant and without Plaintiff's permission to search and inspect their personal effects. (ECF No.

1, FF 123, 125-30, 248). Based on the information in the pleadings, the Court finds that there is a

material dispute between the parties as to whether the Supervisors actually had permission to enter

the property. Discovery will ultimately reveal the merits of this particular claim.

2. The Supervisors, Chief Natale and Patrolman Marsico will not be

terminated as parties.

Sufficient information exists in the pleadings to allow the claims against the Supervisors,

Chief Natale and Patrolman Marsico to proceed through discovery. Plaintiffs have alleged

sufficient personal involvement by each of these Defendants. (See ECF No. 1, §§ 47-48, 51-52,

55-56, 65, 72, 89 94-98, 102-11, 116-22, 123, 125-31, 132-33). More precise evidence as to the

contours of their involvement in the alleged constitutional violations will be obtained through

11

discovery. At the summary judgment stage, these Defendants can reassert their arguments as to

why judgment should be entered in their favor.

Lastly, the Court will leave to another day the question of whether Chief Natale and

Patrolman Marsico are entitled to qualified immunity.> They have the burden of establishing their

entitlement to qualified immunity, see Peroza-Benitez v. Smith, 994 F.3d 157, 165 Gd Cir. 2021),

and the record before the Court does not allow it to conclusively determine whether or not they

violated any of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, and whether those rights were clearly established.

The Court requires the development of an evidentiary record before conclusively determining as a

matter of law whether or not these law enforcement officers can be shielded by qualified immunity.

Til. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court will deny the motions of the Smithton Defendants

and the South Huntingdon Defendants by Order of Court to follow. The pleadings must be

reviewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs. Many factual disputes exist that warrant further

development through discovery. Plaintiffs will need to provide facts to substantiate the allegations

in their Complaint if they hope to prevail.

BY THE COURT:

DUA €& BACT

WILLIAM S. STICKMAN IV

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: _ 5-25-22

> Qualified immunity shields government officials, including police officers, from liability for civil

damages so long as “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818

(1982); see also District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018). To determine whether

qualified immunity applies in this case, the Court must conduct a two-part inquiry, considering (1)

whether Chief Natale and/or Patrolman Marsico violated a constitutional right and (2) whether that

right was clearly established. See El v. City of Pittsburgh, 975 F.3d 327, 334 Gd Cir. 2020); see

also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (affording courts discretion to decide which

step of the qualified immunity analysis to address first).

12