EATON v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

STEPHANIE LYNN EATON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 20-273-E

)

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, )

)

Defendant. )

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 23rd day of March, 2022, upon consideration of the parties’

cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court, upon review of the Commissioner of Social

Security’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s claim for disability insurance benefits under

Subchapter II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq., finds that the Commissioner’s

findings are supported by substantial evidence and, accordingly, affirms.1 See 42 U.S.C. §

405(g); Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1153-54 (2019); Jesurum v. Secretary of U.S. Dep’t

of Health & Human Servs, 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d

1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988)). See also Berry v. Sullivan, 738 F. Supp. 942, 944 (W.D. Pa. 1990)

(if supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed, as a federal

1 Defendant asks the Court to tax costs against Plaintiff but does not advance an argument

in support of that request. Accordingly, the Court will award no costs. See Pa. Dep’t of Pub.

Welfare v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 101 F.3d 939, 945 (3d Cir. 1996).

court may neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse, merely because it would have decided the

claim differently) (citing Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981)).2

2 For the most part, Plaintiff is simply asking the Court to reweigh the evidence and find

that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred in formulating her residual functional capacity

(“RFC”) and in crafting the hypothetical question to the vocational expert. However, if

supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed, as a federal

court may neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse, merely because it would have decided the

claim differently. See Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g)); Monsour Med. Ctr. v. Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 1190-91 (3d Cir. 1986); Berry, 738 F.

Supp. at 944 (citing Cotter, 642 F.2d at 705). The Court finds here that substantial evidence

does support the ALJ’s decision and, therefore, it will affirm.

Plaintiff argues that the July 25, 2019 medical source opinion of Sarah Colson, CRNP, a

treating nurse practitioner (R. 1415-17), should have been found by the ALJ to be more

persuasive. As Plaintiff points out, for cases such as this one, filed on or after March 27, 2017,

the Social Security Administration has promulgated new regulations in regard to the

consideration of opinion evidence. Compare 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 with 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c.

One of the changes is that the regulations have eliminated the “treating physician rule.”

Compare 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2) (applying to cases prior to the amendment of the

regulations) with 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a) (applying to later cases). See also 82 Fed. Reg.

5844-01, at 5853 (Jan. 18, 2017). While the medical source’s treating relationship with the

claimant is still a valid and important consideration, “the two most important factors for

determining the persuasiveness of medical opinions are consistency and supportability.” 82 Fed.

Reg. at 5853. See also § 404.1520c(b) and (c). Although Plaintiff suggests that the ALJ failed

adequately to discuss these factors, for the most part she is simply inviting the Court to look at

certain record evidence and find on its own that it does not support the ALJ’s determination as to

the persuasiveness of Ms. Colson’s opinion.

Despite Plaintiff’s allegations to the contrary, the ALJ properly considered and discussed

CRNP Colson’s opinion and explained the reasons why she found it to be unpersuasive. She

extensively discussed the objective medical evidence, including clinical findings, examination

results, and medical imaging results; Plaintiff’s treatment history, including surgeries, physical

therapy, and medications; and Plaintiff’s activities of daily living, including a part-time job that

required Plaintiff to perform duties of greater exertion than to what the RFC limited her. (R. 20-

23). She contrasted this evidence with Ms. Colson’s opined functional limitations. The ALJ

further acknowledged that Ms. Colson was a treating source but noted that the basis Ms. Colson

gave for her opinion – Chiari malformation and cervical disc herniation – were not the cause of

Plaintiff’s primary complaint of back pain. (R. 22-23). This analysis properly complied with the

directives of Sections 404.1520c, and Plaintiff herself acknowledges that these were proper

factors to consider. (Doc. No. 16 at p. 13).

Plaintiff further asserts that the ALJ relied too heavily on the November 28, 2017 opinion

of state reviewing agent James Butcofski, M.D., who found that Plaintiff was capable of

performing a limited range of light work. (R. 66-71). As a general matter, even under the

regulations governing cases filed prior to March 27, 2017, while an ALJ was required to consider

the treating relationship between a claimant and an opining doctor, when the medical opinion of

a treating source conflicted with that of a non-treating, or even a non-examining physician, “the

ALJ may choose whom to credit.” Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2000). See also

Dula v. Barnhart, 129 Fed. Appx. 715, 718-19 (3d Cir. 2005). In certain cases, the ALJ was

justified in giving more weight to the non-examining professional’s opinion. See Salerno v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 152 Fed. Appx. 208 (3d Cir. 2005).

The primary reason given by Plaintiff that the state reviewing agent’s opinion should

have been found to be less persuasive is that it was “stale.” As Plaintiff admits, the fact that an

opinion was rendered before other evidence became available does not mean the ALJ was

prohibited from affording it substantial weight. See Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d

356, 361 (3d Cir. 2011) (“The Social Security regulations impose no limit on how much time

may pass between a report and the ALJ's decision in reliance on it.”). Plaintiff argues, though,

that the opinion was no longer sufficiently current because it was issued prior to the fusion

surgery for her sacroiliac joint disfunction. The Court is not persuaded.

Although Plaintiff portrays this surgery as a game changing event, the record does not

demonstrate any significantly changed conditions from the date on which Dr. Butcofski’s

opinion was rendered. Indeed, Dr. Butcofski specifically relied on MRI imaging evidence that

remained unchanged from before and after he offered his opinion. (R. 352-53, 529-30).

Moreover, the evidence shows that Plaintiff improved after fusion surgery. (R. 975, 990). It is

noteworthy that the opinion that Plaintiff argues should have been found more persuasive, that of

CRNP Colson, makes no mention of Plaintiff’s sacroiliac joint disfunction, nor does it indicate

that her opinion only dated back to the date of Plaintiff’s surgery. (R. 1415-17). More

importantly, while there is, of course, evidence to which the state reviewing agent had no access,

the ALJ was aware of and considered and discussed this evidence in evaluating the opinions.

Indeed, she was clearly aware of Plaintiff’s sacroiliac joint disfunction, listing it as a severe

impairment and discussing evidence of Plaintiff’s treatment for this condition. (R. 17, 20-21).

Regardless, although the ALJ considered Dr. Butcofski’s opinion and found it to be

persuasive, she did not adopt it wholesale. While the RFC crafted by the ALJ was similar to Dr.

Butcofski’s opinion, it differed in several ways and was formulated based, not just on that

opinion, but on the evidence as a whole. This is precisely what an ALJ is supposed to do. See

Titterington v. Barnhart, 174 Fed. Appx. 6, 11 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Surveying the medical evidence

to craft an RFC is part of an ALJ’s duties.”); Mays v. Barnhart, 78 Fed. Appx. 808, 813 (3d Cir.

2003). All of this constitutes substantial evidence in support of the ALJ’s findings, especially in

light of the United States Supreme Court’s reminder that the threshold for meeting the substantial

evidence standard “is not high.” Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154. While Plaintiff offers an alternative

analysis of the evidence, the Court emphasizes that “[t]he presence of evidence in the record that

supports a contrary conclusion does not undermine the [ALJ’s] decision so long as the record

provides substantial support for that decision.” Malloy v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 306 Fed. Appx.

761, 764 (3d Cir. 2009).

Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (document No. 15) is DENIED and that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(document No. 19) is GRANTED as stated herein.

s/Alan N. Bloch

United States District Judge

ecf: Counsel of record

Accordingly, for all of the reasons set forth herein, the Court finds that substantial

evidence supports the ALJ’s decision and therefore affirms.