GRIMES v. KIJAKAZI

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CHEYENNE GRIMES, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 20-1367

)

KILOLO KIJAKAZI,1 )

Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 28th day of February, 2022, upon consideration of the parties’

cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court, upon review of the Commissioner of Social

Security’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s claim for disability insurance benefits under

Subchapter II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq., and for supplemental security

income benefits under Subchapter XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq., finds that the

Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and, accordingly, affirms.2 See

42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1153-54 (2019); Jesurum v. Secretary

of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs, 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Brown v.

1 Kilolo Kijakazi is substituted as the defendant in this matter, replacing former

Commissioner Andrew Saul pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d) and 42 U.S.C. §

405(g). The Clerk is directed to amend the docket to reflect this change.

2 Defendant asks the Court to tax costs against Plaintiff but does not advance an argument

in support of that request. Accordingly, the Court will award no costs. See Pa. Dep’t of Pub.

Welfare v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 101 F.3d 939, 945 (3d Cir. 1996).

Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988)). See also Berry v. Sullivan, 738 F. Supp. 942, 944

(W.D. Pa. 1990) (if supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s decision must be

affirmed, as a federal court may neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse, merely because it

would have decided the claim differently) (citing Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir.

1981)).3

3 Plaintiff argues that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) did not adequately support

her findings in regard to Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) because the ALJ did not

account for all of Plaintiff’s symptoms. The Court disagrees and finds the ALJ’s decision to be

supported by the record. Specifically, the Court finds that the ALJ adequately discussed the

basis for her RFC findings and that her reasons are supported by substantial evidence.

RFC is defined as the most that an individual is still able to do despite the limitations

caused by that individual’s impairments. See Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 40 (3d Cir.

2001). See also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1). Not only must an ALJ consider all

relevant evidence in determining an individual’s RFC, the RFC finding “must ‘be accompanied

by a clear and satisfactory explication of the basis on which it rests.’” Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 41

(quoting Cotter, 642 F.2d at 704). “‘[A]n examiner’s findings should be as comprehensive and

analytical as feasible and, where appropriate, should include a statement of subordinate factual

foundations on which ultimate factual conclusions are based, so that a reviewing court may know

the basis for the decision.’” Id. (quoting Cotter, 642 F.2d at 705). See also SSR 96-8p, 1996

WL 374184 (S.S.A.), at *7 (“The RFC assessment must include a narrative discussion describing

how the evidence supports each conclusion, citing specific medical facts (e.g., laboratory

findings) and nonmedical evidence (e.g., daily activities, observations).”).

Plaintiff here argues that the ALJ’s RFC findings failed to meet these standards. Plaintiff

asserts, for example, that the ALJ failed adequately to explain why the RFC permitted Plaintiff to

have “frequent” interaction with supervisors although the opinion of state psychological

consultant Susan Turner, Psy.D. – an opinion which the ALJ found “very persuasive” (R. 24) –

provided that Plaintiff had “moderate” limitations in this area. However, as Defendant points

out, there is nothing inherently inconsistent with the ALJ’s findings and those of Dr. Turner.

The ALJ very thoroughly considered Dr. Turner’s opinion in its entirety in determining

Plaintiff’s RFC, including Dr. Turner’s statements that Plaintiff would not require special

supervision to sustain a routine; was able to maintain socially appropriate behavior, ask simple

questions, and accept instruction; and was able to get along with others. (R. 24, 101-02). Taking

Dr. Turner’s opinion as a whole, the Court agrees that a reference to moderate limitations in

regard to Plaintiff’s ability to accept instruction and respond appropriately to criticism from

supervisors (which the ALJ did expressly acknowledge) did not render that opinion inconsistent

with the RFC as found by the ALJ. It is further important to note that the ALJ did not simply

adopt Dr. Turner’s opinion wholesale, but rather considered it in the context of all of the

evidence, including the objective medical evidence, course of treatment, and Plaintiff’s activities

of daily living, in determining the proper RFC. Consideration of such factors was patently

appropriate and warranted. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c), 416.920c(c).

Plaintiff further argues that the RFC findings were inadequate because they did not

account for restrictions caused by irritable bowel syndrome (“IBS”), asserting that while this

condition may have been stable, Plaintiff was not symptom free. However, a plaintiff need not

be entirely symptom free to be found not disabled under the Act. See Andreolli v. Comm'r of

Soc. Sec., No. 07-1632, 2008 WL 5210682, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2008) (citing Welch v.

Heckler, 808 F.2d 264, 270 (3d Cir. 1986)). The issue is not whether Plaintiff had been

diagnosed with IBS or some other bowel-related condition, but what functional limitations the

condition caused. See Walker v. Barnhart, 172 Fed. Appx. 423, 426 (3d Cir. 2006). Other than

making some speculative statements that IBS may affect the amount of bathroom time needed or

the ability to leave the house, Plaintiff does not indicate what specific additional functional

limitations should have been included in the RFC. Indeed, the ALJ directly addressed this

condition, noting that treatment was not ongoing, that the condition was stable, and that what

treatment had been provided, including the prescription of Miralax and Dicyclomine, had led to

improvement. The ALJ further observed that the record contained no evidence that IBS caused

more than minimal limitations in Plaintiff’s ability to work. (R. 18). Plaintiff points to nothing

in the record that would shed doubt on this finding or that would establish any specific functional

limitations.

Plaintiff argues as well that the ALJ’s failure to find that the use of a cane should have

been part of Plaintiff’s RFC was in error. However, for the use of an assistive device to be

included in the RFC, the record would have to show that the use was medically necessary as well

as the circumstances under which the device was required. Here, at best, Plaintiff alleges the

occasional use of a cane, but provides no evidence that such use was pursuant to a prescription or

that any doctor had opined that the cane was medically necessary. In similar cases, courts have

found no basis for including the use of an assistive device in a claimant’s RFC. See Drowell v.

Berryhill, Civ. No. 17-795, 2018 WL 3574890, at *2 (W.D. Pa. July 25, 2018) (citing Houze v,

Barnhart, 53 Fed. Appx. 218 (2002)) (finding that the ALJ did not err in failing to account for

claimant’s use of a cane in crafting the RFC where there were multiple references to the fact that

claimant used a cane but no evidence of its medical necessity); Van Horn v. Saul, 4:19-cv-414,

2019 WL 5444830, at *11 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2019). Cf. SSR 96-9p, 1996 WL 374185 (S.S.A.),

at *7 (applying this same standard in regard to sedentary work). In any event, the ALJ discussed

the evidence regarding Plaintiff’s gait and mobility at some length and explained why she found

that Plaintiff’s gait and mobility limitations caused no more than minimal vocationally relevant

limitations, citing to specific record evidence including objective medical evidence. (R. 18).

Plaintiff’s remaining contentions essentially involve allegations that the ALJ did not

account for certain specific symptoms caused by Plaintiff’s multiple sclerosis (“MS”) and mental

health impairments, such as fatigue and disassociation. However, the ALJ clearly considered,

discussed, and accounted for Plaintiff’s MS and mental health conditions in formulating the

RFC. In fact, the ALJ very specifically discussed how she factored these conditions into her

findings. Other than by way of speculation, Plaintiff does not identify what additional functional

limitations would be needed to account for specific symptoms such as disassociation and fatigue.

Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. No. 16) is DENIED and that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.

No. 18) is GRANTED as stated herein.

s/Alan N. Bloch

United States District Judge

ecf: Counsel of record

The ALJ was aware of and acknowledged Plaintiff’s reported lack of energy in the course of

discussing the MS. (R. 22). The Court further notes that what evidence there may have been as

to the effects of Plaintiff’s fatigue and disassociation were based primarily on Plaintiff’s own

subjective complaints. While such claims were certainly relevant, the ALJ was not under an

obligation to simply accept what she said without question. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(4),

416.929(c)(4); Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 363 (3d Cir. 2011). The record

has a whole simply does not demonstrate any additional specific limitations that needed to be

included in Plaintiff’s RFC.

The Court emphasizes that, if supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s

decision must be affirmed, as a federal court may neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse,

merely because it would have decided the claim differently. See Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d

358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)); Monsour Med. Ctr. v. Heckler, 806 F.2d

1185, 1190-91 (3d Cir. 1986); Berry, 738 F. Supp. at 944 (citing Cotter, 642 F.2d at 705). The

ALJ adequately addressed the record evidence in formulating the RFC and finding that Plaintiff

was not disabled. The Court will not disturb this finding.

Accordingly, for all of the reasons set forth herein, the Court finds that substantial

evidence supports the ALJ’s decision and therefore affirms.