immunity extends to “communications which are issued in the regular course of judicial proceedings and which are pertinent and material to the redress or relief sought”
How later courts described this case
- immunity extends to “communications which are issued in the regular course of judicial proceedings and which are pertinent and material to the redress or relief sought”
- these things notwithstanding, the doctrine is very narrowly applied, “only [in the most] exceptional circumstances”
- “All communications pertinent to any stage of a judicial proceeding are accorded an absolute privilege which cannot be destroyed by abuse.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MATTHEW SEROTA, )
)
Plaintiff, ) Civil Action No. 21-462
)
v. ) Judge Cathy Bissoon
)
SARAH L. JANOSIK, )
)
Defendant. )
ORDER
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 10) will be granted.
This is a diversity action, alleging defamation. The purportedly libelous letter,
dated May 27, 2020 (“the May 27th Letter”), was directed to a court-appointed receiver
(“the Receiver”) in a pending state action, Concerned Owners of Homes in London Towne
Homeowners Association v. London Towne Homeowners Association, et al., GD-19-004563
(Ct. Comm. Pls. of Allegheny County, lead consolidated case) (Ward, Christine, J., presiding).
The state action was initiated in March 2019, with the express intent of establishing a
receivership. See Pet. to Appoint Receiver, Doc. 1 in state action (available online through the
County’s public docket website).
The Plaintiff here, Mr. Serota, was addressed in the state petition. See id. at ¶¶ 6, 17 &
30 (alleging, among other things, that the HOA executive board acted “in order to benefit
[Mr.] Serota”). Mr. Serota petitioned to intervene in the state action, in July 2019, and his
request promptly was granted. See Doc. 8 in state action.
The May 27th Letter was, by its own terms, in response to a May 18, 2020 letter,
addressed to Judge Ward regarding the litigation. See May 27th Letter (filed under Doc. 1-1
in this case, at pgs. 40 through 43 of 45). The May 18th letter, signed by nine members of the
HOA, complained regarding the Receiver’s handling of his duties. See Doc. 10-7.
Defendant asserts, and Plaintiff fails to dispute, that one of the May 18th signatories was
Mr. Serota’s spouse, Jennifer Paros. See Def.’s Br. (Doc. 11) at 4; see also May 27th Letter
(“[t]he listed names on the [May 18th] letter sent to Judge Ward [included Mr. Serota’s] wife,
Jen[nifer] Paros”).1
The contents of the May 27th Letter were directed to matters litigated in the state action.
The May 18th letter was transmitted to Judge Ward, and it noted that “[a] copy of [the] letter
ha[d] also been sent to the Receiver[,] as a final urgent plea . . . that he [would] voluntarily
undertake [his] necessary fiduciary duties without further delay or . . . judicial intervention.”
Doc. 10-7 at 3. The May 27th Letter was transmitted to the Receiver, in direct response to the
May 18th letter, and closed by asking that he “include th[e] letter with any response to Judge
Ward.” Doc. 1-1 at pg. 42 of 45.
That the May 18th letter − improvidently, in this Court’s view − was transmitted as
correspondence to the judge, rather than being filed on the docket, does not control. Nor should
the May 27th signatories’ having followed suit. Had the letters been filed as motion(s)/
response(s) on the docket, litigation privilege undoubtedly would have attached. See Binder v.
Triangle Pubs., Inc., 275 A.2d 53, 56 (Pa. 1971) (“All communications pertinent to any stage of
a judicial proceeding are accorded an absolute privilege which cannot be destroyed by abuse.”).
That the signatories chose a disfavored route in seeking relief is unfortunate, but it is not legally
1 This fact aside, all of the information herein derives from public-record sources, of which the
Court takes judicial notice. Although Defendant contemplates, and Plaintiff purports to resist,
a conversion to summary judgment, discovery is unnecessary for the purposes of the Court’s
analyses (nor could anything uncovered through discovery modify its conclusions).
determinative. Compare Post v. Mendel, 507 A.2d 351, 355 (Pa. 1986) (immunity extends to
“communications which are issued in the regular course of judicial proceedings and which are
pertinent and material to the redress or relief sought”) with May 18th letter (directed to Judge
Ward, and urging the Receiver to fulfill his fiduciary duties without further delay or judicial
intervention) and May 27th Letter (responding to the contents of the May 18th letter,
and requesting that the transmission be forwarded to Judge Ward along with the Receiver’s
response).2
Defendant is immune, and Plaintiff’s case must be dismissed. And although no specific
abstention doctrine is on point (and the Court expressly declines to rely on any), this result is
consistent with principles of sound judicial administration.
Plaintiff and Defendant, among many, are deeply entrenched in years-long, consolidated
state court proceedings regarding their overarching HOA disputes.3 Plaintiff’s accusations of
defamation (albeit, in a slightly different context) have been placed before Judge Ward −
and things decidedly have not gone Plaintiff’s way. See Def.’s Supp. Br. (Doc. 22) at ¶¶ 5-7
(noting Judge Ward’s recent dismissal, with prejudice, of Mr. Serota’s consolidated action,
alleging defamation in connection with an HOA meeting in August 2019).4 Allowing Plaintiff to
2 Although Plaintiff argues that the transmission of undocketed correspondence is outside
“the regular course of judicial proceedings,” his position is specious. The availability of
immunity cannot properly turn on the fact that the authors of May 18th letter (including
Plaintiff’s own spouse) did not know better than to send a letter, as opposed to requesting relief
through a filing on the docket. Even less so should immunity lapse merely because Defendant
and her co-signatories followed course.
3 To be clear, Defendant Sarah Janosik purportedly signed the May 27th Letter, collectively,
“Mike & Sarah Janosik.” Doc. 1-1 at pg. 43 of 45. Mike Janosik is a named party in the
consolidated state action.
4 The parties’ cross-Motions to supplement (Docs. 22 & 23) are GRANTED. Their Motions
aside, the Court may take judicial notice of the filings before Judge Ward, and her rulings.
proceed through separate, parallel state and federal proceedings – under the banner of diversity
jurisdiction – raises significant concerns regarding comity between the state and federal
tribunals, not to mention forum-shopping.5
The preclusive doctrine that would apply, if any, is Colorado-River abstention.
Although the present scenario implicates many of the principles underlying the doctrine,
it is narrowly drawn and cannot be applied in this case. Compare Ryan v. Johnson, 115 F.3d
193, 195-96 (3d Cir. 1997) (the doctrine is one of “wise judicial administration,” intended to
foster “conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation”;
and factors favoring its application include “the inconvenience of the federal forum,”
“the desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation” and “the order in which jurisdiction was
obtained by the concurrent forums”) with id. (these things notwithstanding, the doctrine is very
narrowly applied, “only [in the most] exceptional circumstances”).
In any event, the Court has reached the merits of Plaintiff’s claims, and has found them
lacking. This result seems fortunate, given the many offenses to judicial administration (not to
mention, principles of comity and the prevention of forum-shopping) that would result from dual
litigation. And while the Court would endure such a result if so constrained, the meritoriousness
of Defendant’s Motion avoids it.
Consistent with the foregoing, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 10) is GRANTED,
and this case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Because the analyses herein are dispositive
5 The Court also finds curious Mr. Serota’s decision to file four lawsuits in this Court,
against the many May 27th signatories, stating materially identical facts and claims.
Compare Compl., here, with those in Civil Action Nos. 21-684, 21-685 & 21-686. By now,
nearly all signatories have been named as defendants, albeit through multiple different lawsuits.
This surely has made defense more challenging, and seems particularly odd, given that Plaintiff’s
strategy has resulted in him paying four filing fees (of $402) instead of one.
of the materially-similar motions to dismiss in Plaintiff’s sundry additional lawsuits,
those motions likewise will be summarily granted, and the analyses herein incorporated by
reference.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
December 28, 2021 s\Cathy Bissoon
Cathy Bissoon
United States District Judge
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