WILLIAMS v. WETZEL

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

PITTSBURGH DIVISION

)

RASHAD WILLIAMS,

)

)

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 2: 20-cv-0663

)

)

v. Chief United States Magistrate Judge

)

Cynthia Reed Eddy

)

JOHN WETZEL, MICHAEL OPPMAN,

)

SANDRA CALLAWAY, RHONDA

)

HOUSE, MARK CAPOZZA, KERI

)

MOORE, DORINA VARNER, SCI

)

FAYETTE, and JOHN/JANE DOES,

)

Director of SPC; JOHN/JANE DOES,

)

Lts. Central Office; TRICIA SILBAUGH,

)

Current Mail Room Supervisor; and

)

DARLENE LINDERMAN, Former

)

Mailroom Supervisor;

)

)

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

Pending before the Court are two motions to dismiss: The Partial Motion to Dismiss or,

in the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Callaway, Capozza,

House, Moore, Oppman, SCI-Fayette, Varner, and Wetzel (ECF No. 39), to which Williams has

1 In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), Plaintiff and the named and

served Defendants have voluntarily consented to have a United States Magistrate Judge conduct

proceedings in this case, including trial and the entry of a final judgment. See ECF Nos. 25, 50,

and 65. While unserved defendants generally must also consent for a magistrate judge to

exercise jurisdiction based on “consent of the parties” under that statute, see Williams v. King,

875 F.3d 500 (9th Cir. 2017), this Court is unaware of any decision holding that consent is

necessary from defendants who are both unserved and unidentified. Courts disregard such

defendants in other contexts, including contexts affecting jurisdiction. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §

1441(b)(1) (providing that for removal based on diversity of citizenship, “the citizenship of

defendants sued under fictitious names shall be disregarded”); Fat T, Inc. v. Aloha Tower

Assocs. Piers 7, 8 & 9, 172 F.R.D. 411, 414–15 (D. Haw. 1996) (reaching the same conclusion

for diversity jurisdiction over cases first filed in federal court). The Court therefore concludes

that consent of the unserved Doe defendants in this case, specifically John/Jane Doe, Director of

SPC; John/Jane Does, Lts. Central Office, is unnecessary to proceed under § 636(c).

filed a response in opposition. (ECF No. 47), and the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants

Linderman and Silbaugh (ECF No. 66), to which Williams has not responded although he was

granted an extension until October 29, 2021, in which to do so. (ECF No. 71).

After carefully considering the motion and briefs, given the standards governing motions

to dismiss set forth by the Supreme Court of the United States in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 668 (2009), and as explained in

United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit precedent, see., e.g., Connelly v. Lane

Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 790 (3d Cir. 2016), 2 and for the following reasons, the motion will

be granted in part and denied in part.

I. Factual and Procedural History

Plaintiff, Rashad Williams (Williams),3 is a Pennsylvania state prisoner confined at SCI-

Fayette. The case was initiated on April 21, 2020, when Williams submitted his Complaint to

the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. (ECF No. 1). The

Complaint was received without the filing fee or a motion for leave to proceed in forma

pauperis (IFP motion). On May 4, 2020, Williams filed an IFP motion and, the next day, the

2 Additionally, a pro se pleading is held to a less stringent standard than more formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner,

404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). As a result, a pro se complaint under § 1983 must be construed

liberally, Hunterson v. DiSabato, 308 F.3d 236, 243 (3d Cir. 2002), so “as to do substantial

justice.” Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 299, 234 (3d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).

3 Plaintiff is identified in the caption of the Complaint as “Rashad Williams.” The caption

also indicates that Williams’ inmate number at the time of the incidents complained of in the

Complaint was JU1628, but that his current inmate number is QC3320. The name on the return

envelope is “Rashad/Melvin Williams.” And while Plaintiff signed his brief in opposition to

Defendants’ motion to dismiss as “Rashad/M. Williams,” he refers to himself in the caption and

in the body of the response as “Rashad Williams.” Defendants in their filings refer to the

plaintiff as “Rashad Melvin.” See ECF 40 at 1. The PA DOC inmate locator reflects that the

inmate number QC3320 is assigned to Melvin Williams, that the prisoner’s “true name” is

Rashad Williams, and that the prisoner is also known as Rashad Milliams, Lamel Williams,

Melvin Lamar Williams, Rashad L. Williams, and Rashad Melisa Williams.

case was transferred to the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania

as the Complaint concerns events that occurred at SCI-Fayette, which is located within the

Western District of Pennsylvania. (ECF No. 11). On May 18, 2020, this Court granted

Williams’s IFP motion and the Complaint was formally filed. (ECF No. 20).

Williams brings his claims under (i) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the violation of his rights

under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution contending that

Defendants violated his rights “by knowingly depriving spiritual based books which provided

Religious instruction to practice upon the ORTHODOXY precepts of Islam” and (ii) under the

Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person Act (RLUIPA), contending that Defendants

have substantially burdened his practice of religion by not forwarding to him the religious books

he ordered. Named as defendants are the Secretary of Pennsylvania Department of Corrections

(DOC) John Wetzel; SCI-Fayette; Superintendent Mark Capozza; Michael Oppman, Business

Manager; Sandra Callaway, Inmate Accounting Office; Darlene Linderman, former Mail Room

Supervisor; Tricia Silbaugh, current Mail Room Supervisor; Dorina Varner, Chief Grievance

Officer; Rhonda House, Grievance Coordinator; Kerri Moore, Assistant Grievance Officer; and

John/Jane Doe, Director of SPC, and John/Jane Doe Lts. Central Office.

For purpose of this Memorandum Opinion only, the facts are simple. Williams alleges

that on May 23, 2019, he ordered various “religious/Islamic books” from the Islamic Book

Store (“IBS”). The SCI-Fayette inmate accounting office deducted $62.90 from his inmate

account for pre-payment of the books. Three weeks later, IBS notified Williams that the books

he ordered were out of stock; Williams then submitted a different selection of books. When

Williams had not received the books he had ordered, he wrote IBS and was informed that the

books had been sent on August 5, 2019, to the DOC Security Processing Center in Bellefonte,

PA. According to the Complaint, Williams wrote several requests to various DOC staff

members inquiring into the location of his ordered books, including sending two “missives” to

the Security Processing Center asking about the books.

On September 12, 2019, he was informed by Defendant Oppman that the books had not

arrived yet at SCI-Fayette. On November 15, 2019, Williams “put Mr. Wetzel on notice about

not receiving his misplaced, re-routed or theft of his religious books.” Complaint, ¶ 9.

Defendant Wetzel responded by directing Williams to use the DOC grievance procedure. On

November 21, 2019, Williams filed a grievance about his missing books, which grievance went

through the administrative review process and was denied upon final review on February 28,

2020. Id. at ¶ 21. Williams initiated this lawsuit approximately 2 months after receiving the

final denial of his grievance.

Defendants Callaway, Capozza, House, Moore, Oppman, SCI-Fayette, Varner, and

Wetzel filed the instant Partial Motion to Dismiss Complaint For Failure to State a Claim Or, In

The Alternative, For Summary Judgment, with a brief in support and attached 23 pages of

exhibits in lieu of filing an Answer. (ECF No. 39). The Court declines to convert the motion

into a summary judgment motion and will only consider the Complaint in connection with

Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment

will be denied without prejudice to Defendants renewing their request for summary judgment

after the parties have completed discovery. Plaintiff has responded to the motion (ECF No. 47)

and the motion is ripe for consideration.

Defendants Linderman and Silbaugh were substituted for the John/Jane Doe Defendants,

and these two defendants filed a motion to dismiss in lieu of filing an Answer. (ECF No. 66).

Although being ordered to respond to the motion (ECF No. 68), and being granted an extension

of time to do so (ECF No. 71), Williams has failed to respond. Consequently, the Court will

rule on this motion without the benefit of a response from Williams.

II. Discussion

Defendants assert several theories on which they argue that a partial motion to dismiss is

warranted. First, Defendants argue that Williams has failed to establish the requisite personal

involvement of Defendants Wetzel, the Grievance Coordinators, Callaway, Silbaugh and

Linderman. Next, Defendants argue that Williams’s claims against the DOC Defendants in

their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and that SCI Fayette should be

dismissed pursuant to Eleventh Amendment immunity. And last, Defendants argue that

Williams lacks standing to assert a claim under RLUIPA. The Court will address each of these

arguments in turn.

A. Claims Brought Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Title 42, United States Code, section 1983 provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or

usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of

the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation

of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,

shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other

proper proceeding for redress.

1. Lack of Personal Involvement as for Defendants Wetzel, House, Varner,

Moore, Calloway, Linderman, and Silbaugh

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has explained that there are

two theories of supervisory liability in a § 1983 action: (1) supervisors can be liable in their

official capacity if they established and maintained a policy, practice, or custom which directly

caused constitutional harm; or, (2) they can be liable personally if they participated in violating

the plaintiff’s rights, directed others to violate them, or, as persons in charge, had knowledge of

and acquiesced in their subordinates’ violations. Santiago v. Warmister Twp., 629 F.3d 121,

128-29 n.4 (3d Cir. 2010).

First, as to Defendant Wetzel, the Secretary of the Department of Corrections, the

Complaint is void of any factual allegation that Defendant Wetzel established or maintained a

policy, practice, or custom which directly caused constitutional harm to Williams or that

Defendant Wetzel participated in violating Williams’s rights or had knowledge or acquiesced in

his subordinates’ alleged violations. As a result, the Court agrees with Defendants that

Williams’s contention of Wetzel’s personal involvement in any purported constitutional

deprivation is not “plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at

570). For these reasons, the motion to dismiss Williams’s claims against Defendant Wetzel will

be granted and Defendant Wetzel will be dismissed with prejudice as amendment would be

futile.

Defendants next assert that Williams has insufficiently alleged the personal involvement

of Defendants House, Varner, and Moore in any purported constitutional deprivation. These

three defendants are Grievance Coordinators and it is clear from the allegations of the

Complaint that Williams is seeking to hold these defendants liable solely based on their role in

the inmate grievance process. Involvement in the grievance process, however, does not

necessarily establish the actual knowledge necessary for personal involvement for a § 1983

claim. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207-08 (3d Cir. 1988). Accordingly, the

motion to dismiss Williams’s claims against Defendants House, Varner, and Moore will be

granted and these defendants will be dismissed with prejudice as amendment would be futile.

As to Defendant Callaway, the Complaint reflects that she is in the Inmate Accounting

Officer at SCI-Fayette and that $62.90 had been deducted by the Accounting Office from

Williams’s inmate account for the purchase of his religious books. There is no allegation that

the deduction was improper. In fact, the Complaint is void of any factual allegation that

Defendant Callaway had any involvement or any actual knowledge of the deduction being made

or of the constitutional violations alleged. Thus, the motion to dismiss Williams’s claims

against Defendant Callaway will be granted and she will be dismissed with prejudice as

amendment would be futile.

As to Defendant Silbaugh, the Mailroom Supervisor, the only allegation in the

Complaint is that she responded by letter or other correspondence that “if they (i.e. the

Plaintiff’s books) came here (SCI-Fayette’s Mailroom) (Plaintiff) would have gotten them.”

This sole allegation is not sufficient to establish personal involvement. The Complaint is void

of any allegation tending to show Silbaugh’s personal involvement, whether as a supervisor or

otherwise, in any alleged constitutional violation of Williams’s rights. Thus, the motion to

dismiss Williams’s claims against Defendant Silbaugh will be granted and she will be dismissed

with prejudice as amendment would be futile.

And as for Defendant Linderman, it appears Williams has named this defendant on the

basis of her role as former mailroom supervisor at SCI-Fayette. However, the Complaint is void

of any factual allegations indicating that Linderman had any personal involvement, whether as a

supervisor or otherwise, in any alleged constitutional violation of Williams’s rights. Therefore,

the motion to dismiss Williams’s claims against Defendant Linderman will be granted and she

will be dismissed with prejudice as amendment would be futile.

2. Official Capacity Claims4

Defendants seek to have all § 1983 claims against them in their official capacities

dismissed because they are entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment to the United

States Constitution.

The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against a state in federal court. Pennhurst State

School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). Eleventh Amendment immunity also

extends to agencies, instrumentalities, or arms of the state. Mt. Healthy City Board of Education

v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977). “Unless a State has waived its Eleventh Amendment

immunity or Congress has overridden it . . . a State cannot be sued directly in its own name

regardless of the relief sought.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n. 14 (1985) (citing

Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978). A state agency’s immunity extends to individual

defendants sued in their official capacities.

There are exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity, such as when a state waives its

immunity and consents to suit in federal court, or where Congress has specifically abrogated the

state's Eleventh Amendment immunity in legislation or a particular statute. See College Savings

Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999). No such

exceptions to immunity apply. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has not consented to suit in

federal court, see 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521(b); Laskaris v. Thornburgh, 66 F.3d 23, 25 (3d Cir.

1981), and Congress has not abrogated the States’ immunity from section 1983 claims. Quern

v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979).

At all times relevant to this lawsuit, each of the Defendants were employees or officials

employed by the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections. As a result, the Court agrees with

4 The Court notes that Defendants do not challenge Plaintiff’s claims against the

defendants in their individual capacities for violating his First and Fourteenth Amendment

rights.

Defendants and finds that to the extent that Williams has named Defendants in their official

capacities, such claims will be dismissed with prejudice as amendment would be futile as such

claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Braun v. State Corr. Inst. at Somerset,

No. 2:13-cv-1102, 2010 WL 10398, *5–6 (W.D.Pa. June 20, 2010) (“a section 1983 action

against a state official in his official capacity is not a suit against the person but it is a suit

against itself and as such, the action is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”).

3. SCI-Fayette

Similarly, Defendants argue that Defendant SCI-Fayette is also entitled to Eleventh

Amendment immunity. The Court agrees with this argument.

The DOC, which administers all state correctional institutions including SCI–Fayette, is

an agency or arm of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Thus, the DOC and its respective

institutions are entitled to the same Eleventh Amendment immunity that the Commonwealth

enjoys. See Steele v. Pennsylvania, 2009 WL 614800, at *8 (W.D.Pa. Mar. 6, 2009). Moreover,

SCI-Fayette is not a “person” against whom a civil rights action may be brought under Section

1983. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, (1989).

Accordingly, Williams’s claims against SCI-Fayette will be dismissed with prejudice as

amendment would be futile.

B. Claims Brought Under The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person Act

Defendants’ last argument is that Williams fails to state a claim under The Religious

Land Use and Institutionalized Person Act (RLUIPA). “Congress passed RLUIPA to grant

heightened protection to prisoners from burdens imposed by the government.” Washington v.

Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 276 (3d Cir. 2007). Section 3 of RLUIPA governs religious exercise by

institutionalized persons and provides:

No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a

person residing in or confined to an institution . . . even if the burden results from

a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that

imposition of the burden on that person – (1) is in furtherance of a compelling

government interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that

compelling government interest.

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). Under RLUIPA, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that his

religious exercise has been burdened by a prison institution’s policy or official practice and that

the burden is substantial. Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 257 (2015); Washington, 497 F.3d at

277-78. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has found that under RLUIPA, “[a] substantial

burden exists where: “1) a follower is forced to choose between following the precepts of his

religion and forfeiting benefits otherwise generally available to other inmates versus

abandoning one of the precepts of his religion in order to receive a benefit; OR 2) the

government puts substantial pressure on an adherent to substantially modify his behavior and to

violate his beliefs.” Washington, 497 F.3d at 280.

At the outset, the Court notes that RLUIPA does not permit actions against state officials

in their individual capacities. Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 154 (3d Cir. 2012). Moreover,

RLUIPA does not authorize money damages against state officials acting in their official

capacities absent a valid abrogation by Congress or consent of the State. Kentucky v. Graham,

473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985). Congress did not validly abrogate or purport to abrogate the States’

sovereign immunity claims under RLUIPA, Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277 (2011), nor has

Pennsylvania waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Scott v. Beard, 252 F. App’x 491

(3d Cir. 2007) (holding that “RLUIPA claim for money damages against defendant in his

official capacity - as claim essentially against state itself - is barred by the Eleventh

Amendment”) (citing Laskaris v. Thornburgh, 661 F.2d 23, 25-26 (3d Cir. 1981) (citing

Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974)).

In light of the foregoing, money damages are not permitted under RLUIPA against the

Defendants in either their individual or official capacities, this leaves only Williams’s request

for injunctive relief, in which he requests that “Pennsylvania, Department of Corrections,

Security Processing Center, process, expedite, and deliver Plaintiff’s Religious books.”

Complaint, at 15.

Taking the allegations of the Complaint as true and liberally construing them in

Williams’s favor, the Court finds that Williams’s contention that Defendants violated RLUIPA

is not “plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The Complaint is void of any allegations

that Defendants acted pursuant to any DOC policy or regulation, much less a policy that places

“substantial burdens” on his religious exercise. The Complaint is also void of any factual

allegations that Defendants’ alleged conduct forced Williams to choose between following the

precepts of his religion and forfeiting the benefits otherwise generally available to other inmates

versus abandoning one of the precepts religion in order to receive a benefit. Nor is there any

allegation that Williams was substantially pressured to modify his behavior and violate his

beliefs. See Washington v. Grace, 445 F. App’x 611 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding that “damage and

destruction to [plaintiff’s] religious literature that he describes does not violate RLUIPA

because [plaintiff] has not shown that these actions ‘substantial[ly] burden[ed] his religious

practice.”). For these reasons, Williams’s RLUIPA claims will be dismissed with prejudice as

amendment would be futile.

III. Conclusion

For all these reasons, Defendants’ motions to dismiss or in the alternative motion for

summary judgment will be denied in part and granted in part as follows:

1. The motion for summary judgment will be denied without prejudice to

Defendants raising the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies after discovery.

2. Defendants Wetzel, House, Varner, Moore, Callaway, Silbaugh, and Linderman

will be dismissed with prejudice for lack of personal involvement;

3. All § 1983 claims against Defendants in their official capacities will be

dismissed with prejudice as barred by the Eleventh Amendment;

4. All § 1983 claims against SCI-Fayette will be dismissed with prejudice as barred

by the Eleventh Amendment and SCI-Fayette is not a “person” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and

5. All claims brought under The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person

Act will be dismissed with prejudice.

Dated: November 8, 2021 /s Cynthia Reed Eddy

Cynthia Reed Eddy

Chief United States Magistrate Judge

cc: RASHAD WILLIAMS

QC-3320

SCI-Fayette

SPECIAL MAIL-OPEN ONLY IN PRESENCE OF PLAINTIFF

50 Overlook Drive

LaBelle, PA 15450

Phillip E. Raymond

PA Office of Attorney General

(via ECF electronic notification)