The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
KATHY L. ZAWELENSKY, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 20-1425
)
KILOLO KIJAKAZI,1 )
Acting Commissioner of Social Security, )
)
Defendant. )
O R D E R
AND NOW, this 22nd day of September, 2021, upon consideration of the parties’
cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court, upon review of the Commissioner of Social
Security’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s claim for disability insurance benefits under
Subchapter II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq., finds that the Commissioner’s
findings are supported by substantial evidence and, accordingly, affirms.2 See 42 U.S.C. §
405(g); Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1153-54 (2019); Jesurum v. Secretary of U.S. Dep’t
of Health & Human Servs, 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d
1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988)). See also Berry v. Sullivan, 738 F. Supp. 942, 944 (W.D. Pa. 1990)
1 Kilolo Kijakazi is substituted as the defendant in this matter, replacing former
Commissioner Andrew Saul pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d) and 42 U.S.C. §
405(g). The Clerk is directed to amend the docket to reflect this change.
2 Defendant asks the Court to tax costs against Plaintiff but does not advance an argument
in support of that request. Accordingly, the Court will award no costs. See Pa. Dep’t of Pub.
Welfare v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 101 F.3d 939, 945 (3d Cir. 1996).
(if supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed, as a federal
court may neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse, merely because it would have decided the
claim differently) (citing Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981)).3
3 Plaintiff argues that the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) formulated by the
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) failed to account for all of her work-related limitations and,
therefore, that it was not supported by substantial evidence. The Court disagrees and finds that
substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC determination and her decision that Plaintiff is not
disabled.
Plaintiff asserts that the RFC in this matter is incomplete because it failed to incorporate
several limitations caused by her blepharospasms that she believes were established by the
record, including the need for additional off-task time due to her need to manually keep her eyes
open, and restrictions regarding workplace obstacles, daytime driving, text size, and tasks
requiring depth perception. However, these limitations are based entirely on her own subjective
statements about her symptoms which, as the ALJ discussed, are not supported by the objective
medical evidence. (R. 18-20). As the ALJ pointed out, records from both Aaron Sobol, M.D.,
Plaintiff’s ophthalmologist, and Johns Hopkins Medicine, with whom Plaintiff also treated,
showed generally successful treatment of Plaintiff’s condition with botulinum toxin injections,
oral medication, and eye drops. (R. 18, 257, 320, 328, 332, 340, 348, 354, 361, 365, 372, 376,
380, 389, 442, 448, 453, 471-72, 509). In fact, the most recent records documented particularly
significant improvement in Plaintiff’s symptoms. (R. 509). The records also, as the ALJ
discussed, demonstrated consistently stable visual acuity. (R. 19). None of the medical records
suggested the need for restrictions regarding obstacles, text size, daytime driving, or depth
perception, and none provided any basis for finding that Plaintiff would need additional time to
complete tasks. The ALJ did include a number of limitations in the RFC to account for
Plaintiff’s blepharospasms and discussed with sufficient specificity the record support for these
findings, which included the opinions of Dr. Sobol (R.251) and of the state reviewing agent (R.
57-65). She also noted that Plaintiff had asserted that her condition is worsening, but also that
her doctors have indicated that more frequent injections are an option to the extent that the
duration of relief Plaintiff experienced did not improve. (R. 18, 19, 512, 519).
To the extent that Plaintiff contends that her own testimony was sufficient to require that
these additional limitations be included in the RFC, the Court notes that the ALJ thoroughly
considered Plaintiff’s testimony, but found that her statements concerning the intensity,
persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms were not entirely consistent with the medical
evidence and other record evidence. (R. 18). She discussed the reasons for this finding at great
length. Where an ALJ has articulated reasons supporting a credibility determination, that
determination is afforded significant deference. See Horodenski v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 215
Fed. Appx. 183, 188-89 (3d Cir. 2007); Reefer v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376, 380 (3d Cir. 2003).
The Court finds that such deference is warranted in this case. Indeed, the ALJ did not ignore any
of the limitations to which Plaintiff testified, but merely made a finding, supported by substantial
evidence, that this testimony was not fully consistent with the record evidence.
Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (document No. 11) is DENIED and that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(document No. 14) is GRANTED.
s/Alan N. Bloch
United States District Judge
ecf: Counsel of record
Plaintiff, in essence, is not really contending that the ALJ considered improper or
inaccurate evidence in making the findings in this case, but rather that the evidence should be
read to support her conclusion that she suffered from additional functional limitations. However,
if supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed, as a federal
court may neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse, merely because it would have decided the
claim differently. See Monsour Med. Ctr. v. Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 1190-91 (3d Cir. 1986);
Berry, 738 F. Supp. at 944 (citing Cotter, 642 F.2d at 705). “The presence of evidence in the
record that supports a contrary conclusion does not undermine the [ALJ’s] decision so long as
the record provides substantial support for that decision.” Malloy v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 306
Fed. Appx. 761, 764 (3d Cir. 2009). Here, more than substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
determination, as she herself discussed at length.
Accordingly, for all of the reasons set forth herein, the Court finds that substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s decision and therefore affirms.