“The state court exhaustion requirement is mandated by statute under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and has developed through decisional law . . . as to claims brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.”
How later courts described this case
- “The state court exhaustion requirement is mandated by statute under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and has developed through decisional law . . . as to claims brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
PITTSBURGH DIVISION
ELLEN RAPOSA on behalf of LAUREN ) Civil Action No. 2: 21-cv-1049
RAPOSA, )
) Chief United States Magistrate Judge
Petitioner, ) Cynthia Reed Eddy
)
v. )
)
STACY KEILMAN – CEO TORRANCE )
STATE HOSPITAL, )
)
Respondent. )
NOTICE OF DEFICIENCIES
On Friday, August 6, 2021, after the close of business, the Clerk of Court received and
lodged a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 submitted by Ellen
Raposa (Ellen) on behalf of Lauren (Lauren) Raposa, a pretrial detainee currently confined at
Torrance State Hospital. The Petition is sparse in details. It reflects that in MJ-05003-CR-
0002349-2021, “[a]fter being found competent, the judge ordered Section 304: Court-ordered
Involuntary Treatment Not to Exceed 90 days with Forced Medical Treatment.” Pet. at ¶ 3. The
grounds for relief are:
[Lauren] was found competent on 7/21/2021 at her competency hearing.
She has served over 90 days without charge.
Her bail has been paid.
Her treatment at Torrance State hospital has put her life in danger as she has
epilepsy and is not receiving care.
Petition at ¶ 13 (quoted verbatim). The Petition was not accompanied by the filing fee or a
motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The requisite filing fee was paid on Tuesday,
August 10, 2021 (ECF No. 2) and the Petition was filed. (ECF No. 3).
A review of the public dockets reveals that Lauren has been charged with defiant trespass
in two (2) separate criminal matters pending in a Magisterial District Court of Allegheny County.
See Commonwealth v. Raposa, Docket Nos. MJ-05003-CR-0001576-2021 and MJ-05003-CR-
0002349-2021. The public docket sheets reflect that Lauren had a preliminary arraignment in
MJ-05003-CR-0001576-2021 on March 27, 2021, and a preliminary arraignment in MJ-05003-
CR-0002349-2021 on May 5, 2021. The public docket at MJ-05003-CR-0001576-2021 reflects
that on March 27, 2021, a monetary bail of $5,000.00 was set and that on March 30, 2021, bail
was modified to ROR. The public docket at MJ-05003-CR-0002349-2021 reflects that on May
5, 2021, a monetary bail was set at $50,000.00, that on May 19, 2021, at the request of a public
defender, bail was reduced to $500.00, and that on July 30, 2021, the surety, Ellen Raposa,
posted the surety amount of $50.00. A preliminary hearing is scheduled in both cases in
Pittsburgh Municipal Court on November 18, 2021, at 8:45 a.m.1
Habeas Rule 4 requires the Court to examine a petition prior to ordering an answer and, if
it appears “that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss
the petition and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 4, applicable
through Rule 1(b). Upon conducting this examination, the undersigned must advise Ellen that
there are a problems with her filing which may prevent habeas corpus jurisdiction vesting in this
Court.
First, “[i]t is well established, . . . , that before a court can consider the merits of a legal
claim, the person seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of the court must establish the requisite
1 The Petition reflects that a “Motion for Immediate Release” was filed by Linda Tashbook
and a “preliminary hearing moved up to 8/17/2021.” That information is not reflected on either
public docket that the Court reviewed.
standing to sue.” Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 154 (1990). “Where standing is lacking,
the federal courts lack the power to grant habeas relief.” Zettlemoyer v. Horn, 53 F.3d 24, 26 (3d
Cir. 1995). The Court has an obligation to raise the issue of standing sua sponte. Desi’s Pizza,
Inc. v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 321 F.3d 411, 420 (3d Cir. 2003).
The habeas corpus statutes allow a “next friend” or person “acting in behalf” of a
prisoner to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Title 28, United
States Code, § 2242 provides in relevant part: “Application for a writ of habeas corpus shall be
in writing signed and verified by the person for whose relief it is intended or by someone acting
in his behalf.” “‘Next friend’ standing is by no means granted automatically to whomever seeks
to pursue an action on behalf of another.” Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163. “[O]ne necessary
condition for ‘next friend’ standing in federal court is a showing by the proposed ‘next friend’
that the real party in interest is unable to litigate his own cause due to mental incapacity, lack of
access to court, or other similar disability.” Id. at 165. The burden is on the “next friend” to
“establish the propriety of his status and thereby justify the jurisdiction of the court.” Id. at 163.
“A federal court is powerless to create its own jurisdiction by embellishing otherwise deficient
allegations of standing.” Id. at 155-56.
Here, the Petition filed by Ellen does not show that she has standing to proceed as next
friend of Lauren. Nothing contained in the Petition demonstrates that Lauren “is unable to
litigate [her] own cause due to mental incapacity, lack of access to court, or other similar
disability.” Id. at 165.
Next, assuming that Ellen has standing to proceed as next friend of Lauren, because of
certain statutory provisions, it is important that the Court make a threshold determination of
whether the instant case is a habeas corpus action or a civil rights action. The Court cannot
discern from the Petition whether Ellen is challenging the very fact or duration of Lauren’s
confinement at Torrance State Hospital, in which case her sole remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 474, 500 (1973). Or whether she is challenging a condition of
confinement, i.e., the medical treatment, or lack thereof, Lauren is receiving, in which case a
civil rights action is appropriate. Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 52 (3d Cir. 2002). While the
relief sought in the Petition is “immediate release of Lauren Raposa,” among the grounds listed
for relief are that Lauren’s “treatment at Torrance State hospital has put her life in danger as she
has epilepsy and is not receiving care. Dr. Mathew Lang claims to be a board certified
neurologist but is not after checking with the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology.”
Pet. at ¶ 13. This type of claim appears to be a claim raising a constitutional violation
concerning Lauren’s conditions of confinement, which is not cognizable in a petition for writ of
habeas corpus. Should Ellen wish to pursue such a claim, then she must do so by way of a civil
rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In that case, she should initiate new proceedings
by filing a civil rights complaint with the Court and tendering to the "Clerk, U.S. District Court"
the statutory filing fee in the amount of $350.00, plus a $52.00 administrative fee, for a total of
$402.00 or file a properly completed application to proceed in forma pauperis.
Third, again assuming that Ellen has standing to proceed as next friend of Lauren, to the
extent that Ellen has stated a cognizable habeas claim, § 2241 provides federal courts with
jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus before a state court judgment is rendered, but only in
very limited circumstances. “[T]hat jurisdiction must be exercised sparingly in order to prevent
in the ordinary circumstances ‘pre-trial habeas interference by federal courts in the normal
functioning of state criminal processes’.” Duran v. Thomas, 393 F. App’x 3 (3d Cir. 2010)
(quoting Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 45-46 (3d Cir. 1975)).
Section 2241 provides in relevant part: “The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a
prisoner unless . . . [h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Importantly, state pre-trial detainees who seek federal
habeas relief must first exhaust their state-court remedies. Schandelmeier v. Cunningham, 819
F.2d 52, 53 (3d Cir. 1986) (“The state court exhaustion requirement is mandated by statute under
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and has developed through decisional law . . . as to claims brought under 28
U.S.C. § 2241.”) (citing Braden v. Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 490-91);
Moore, 515 F.2d at 442 (no distinction between § 2254 and § 2241 “insofar as the exhaustion
requirement is concerned”). The exhaustion requirement is “grounded in principles of comity; in
a federal system, the States should have the first opportunity to address and correct alleged
violations of state prisoner's federal rights.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991).
Where state-court remedies are unexhausted, “principles of federalism and comity require
district courts to abstain from enjoining pending state criminal proceedings absent extraordinary
circumstances.” Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Three criteria must be satisfied before
Younger abstention is appropriate: “(1) there are ongoing state proceedings that are judicial in
nature; (2) the state proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings
afford an adequate opportunity to raise the federal claims.” Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666,
670 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Addiction Specialists, Inc. v. Twp. of Hampton, 411 F.3d 399, 408
(3d Cir. 2005)). Here, it appears that all three Younger criteria have been met.
If Ellen intends to proceed with this habeas case, she must file by August 31, 2021, an
amended § 2241 petition, which (1) demonstrates that she has standing to proceed as next friend
of Lauren and (2) demonstrates why Younger abstention is not appropriate. If Ellen fails to file
an amended § 2241 petition by August 31, 2021, the undersigned will proceed on the original
petition (ECF No. 3) and will recommend dismissal of the petition for the reasons set forth in this
Notice.
So ORDERED this 12th day of August, 2021.
s/ Cynthia Reed Eddy
Cynthia Reed Eddy
Chief United States Magistrate Judge
cc: ELLEN RAPOSA
107 Wyndmere Dr.
Cranberry Twp, PA 16066
(via U.S. First Class Mail)