BOGLE v. JD TECHNOLOGIES, INC.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

PITTSBURGH

ROBERT BOGLE, )

)

) 2:21-CV-00319-MJH

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

JD TECHNOLOGIES, INC.1, RADIATOR )

)

SPECIALTY COMPANY, INC.,

Defendants,

OPINION

Presently before the Court is Defendant, JDS Technologies, Inc.’s, Motion for

Reconsideration (ECF No. 34) of this Court’s July 16, 2021 Opinion and Order (ECF Nos. 32

and 33) with regard to the denial of Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 8 and 11)

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). The matter is now ripe for consideration.

After consideration of JDS’s Motion for Reconsideration (ECF No. 34), Supplemental

Declaration (ECF No. 34-1), Plaintiff’s Response (ECF No. 36), and for the following reasons,

the Motion for Reconsideration will be granted. This Court’s July 16, 2021 Opinion and Order,

relative only to JDS’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), will be vacated for

reconsideration.

Upon reconsideration of JDS’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2)

(ECF No. 11) and the respective briefs and responses of the parties (ECF Nos. 12, 24, 26 and 29-

30), and for the following reasons, JDS’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2)

1 The case caption in the Complaint (ECF No. 1) references “JD Technologies, Inc.”

However, as the name “JDS Technologies, Inc.” appears in the Complaint’s averments (ECF No.

1 at ¶ 3) and the parties’ filings, this appears to be no more than a scrivener’s error.

will be granted. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against JDS will be subject to dismissal both on

personal jurisdiction grounds as well as under the Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) grounds as stated in

this Court’s July 16, 2021 Opinion and Order (ECF Nos. 32 and 33). In addition to the leave to

amend granted to Plaintiff by this Court’s July 16, 2021 Order with regard to the claims

dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), Plaintiff will be granted leave to file an amended

complaint to address the present jurisdictional defects against JDS. Alternatively, Plaintiff will

be granted leave to move to transfer to another jurisdiction.

I. Motion for Reconsideration

On July 16, 2021, this Court entered an Opinion and Order which, inter alia, denied

JDS’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) on the basis that this Court could

maintain general jurisdiction over both Defendants. (ECF Nos. 32 and 33). The Court based its

decision on the submissions by Plaintiff that JDS had consented to jurisdiction by virtue of its

registration under Pennsylvania’s foreign business registration statute (42 Pa.C.S. § 5301(a)(2)).

(ECF No. 32 at pp. 3-6).

In its Motion to Dismiss, JDS submitted a declaration, wherein it asserted that JDS is a

company organized and existing under the laws of Tennessee with its principal place of business

located in Tennessee. (ECF No. 12 at p. 21, ¶¶ 4-5). In their respective declaration, RSC and JDS

each denied that it was registered to do business in Pennsylvania or that it maintained a

registered office in Pennsylvania. (ECF Nos. 9-1 and 12 at p. 22, ¶¶ 8-9 (misnumbered)). JDS

also asserted that it does not own, lease, rent, possess, operate, or otherwise have an interest in

any real property within Pennsylvania, nor does it maintain any inventory or equipment in

Pennsylvania. (ECF No. 12 at p. 22, ¶10 (misnumbered)). JDS maintained it does not have any

employees, does not maintain any corporate records, and does not have any offices, warehouses,

or plants located in Pennsylvania. (ECF No. 12 at p. 22, ¶¶ 11-13 (misnumbered)).

Mr. Bogle submitted documents that, contrary to RSC’s and JDS’s declarations, both

were registered as foreign businesses in Pennsylvania. (ECF Nos. 24-6 and 24-7). In particular,

Mr. Bogle submitted a registration page from the Pennsylvania Department of State indicating

that JDS was registered in Pennsylvania and that it had an address in Newtown, Pennsylvania.

(ECF No. 24-7). In RSC’s response, RSC conceded that its prior representation regarding

registration in Pennsylvania was in error. (ECF No. 25 at p. 2). In JDS’s response, JDS did not

dispute or refute Mr. Bogle’s submissions that it was also registered to do business in

Pennsylvania. (ECF No. 26). JDS’s reply brief also joined RSC’s reply brief, wherein RSC

conceded the business registration issue. Id.

On reconsideration, JDS contends that it did not reply to Plaintiff’s assertions, regarding

business registration, because it did not believe it needed to do so. (ECF No. 34 at ¶ 5). JDS

now asserts that the company cited by Plaintiff, while bearing the same name, has no relationship

to the Tennessee company. (ECF No. 34-1 at ¶¶ 5). In response to the motion for

reconsideration, Plaintiff does not address JDS’s factual assertions denying any relationship to

the JDS entity that was presented in Plaintiff’s briefing. Plaintiff’s opposition to reconsideration

appears based only upon the late timing of the corrected information. (ECF No. 36 at p. 10).

On a motion for reconsideration, the party seeking to have a judgment altered or amended

must demonstrate either: (1) a change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence not

previously before the court; or (3) “the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent

manifest injustice.” Allaham v. Naddaf, 635 Fed. Appx. 32, 35–36 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting U.S.

ex rel. Schumann v. Astrazeneca Pharm. L.P., 769 F.3d 837, 848-49 (3d Cir. 2014)); see also

Max's Seafood Café by Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999).

Here, JDS implicates the third basis for an appropriate motion to reconsider—i.e. the

asserted need to correct clear error. Upon this Court’s review of the parties’ declarations and

submissions, this Court applied incorrect facts when it analyzed JDS’s personal jurisdiction

arguments. While JDS could have remedied this error in its Reply Brief (ECF No. 26), the

interests of justice demand that this Court properly analyze an objection to personal jurisdiction

with the correct facts and information. Therefore, the Court will grant JDS’s Motion for

Reconsideration and proceed to reconsider JDS’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(2).

II. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2)

A. Relevant Background

Mr. Bogle filed the instant action arising from injuries he allegedly sustained from a

rubber strap designed, manufactured, assembled, sold, and distributed by Defendants, JDS

Technologies Inc. (JDS) and Radiator Specialty Company, Inc (RSC). (ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 4,9).

JDS is a corporation with a principal place of business in Oneida, Tennessee. Id. at ¶ 3. Mr.

Bogle avers that JDS has engaged in continuous and systematic business within Pennsylvania

and with sufficient “contacts” within Pennsylvania to confer jurisdiction. Id. at ¶¶ 5, 10. He

also alleges that Pennsylvania has jurisdiction over JDS because it has sold and distributed

and/or placed its product, the “Hold-Zit” strap, to the general public and into the chain of

commerce in Pennsylvania. Id. at ¶¶ 6, 11.

JDS submitted a declaration where it asserts that it is a company organized and existing

under the laws of the State of Tennessee with its principal place of business located in

Tennessee. (ECF No. 12 at p. 21, ¶¶ 4-5). From JDS’s inspection of provided photographs, it

asserts that it manufactured the subject strap in the State of Tennessee and shipped it to RSC in

North Carolina. (ECF No. 12 at p. 21, ¶6). RSC and JDS also maintain that the Complaint does

not include information on how the subject strap reached Pennsylvania or how, where, or when

Mr. Bogle came to possess the strap. (ECF Nos. 9-1 at Id. at ¶ 7 and 12 at p. 22, ¶9). In its

declaration, JDS denied that it is registered to do business in Pennsylvania or that it maintains a

registered office in Pennsylvania. (ECF No. 12 at p. 22, ¶¶ 8-9 (misnumbered)). JDS asserts

that it does not own, lease, rent, possess, operate, or otherwise have an interest in any real

property within Pennsylvania, nor does it maintain any inventory or equipment in Pennsylvania.

(ECF No. 12 at p. 22, ¶10 (misnumbered)). JDS maintains it does not have any employees, does

not maintain any corporate records, and does not have any offices, warehouses, or plants located

in Pennsylvania. (ECF Nos. 9-1 at Id. at ¶¶ 11-13 and 12 at p. 22, ¶¶ 11-13 (misnumbered)).

B. Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) permits a party to move for dismissal of a

pleading for lack of personal jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). Whether personal jurisdiction

may be exercised over an out-of-state defendant is a question of law for the court. Vetrotex

Certainteed Corp. v. Consolidated Fiber Glass Products Co., 75 F.3d 147, 150 (3d Cir. 1996).

The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction. O'Connor v. Sandy Lane

Hotel Co., Ltd., 496 F.3d 312, 316 (3d Cir. 2007). A federal court may exercise personal

jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant to the extent permissible under the law of the forum

state. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A). Personal jurisdiction may be either general or specific, and both

the quality and quantity of the necessary contacts differs according to which sort of jurisdiction

applies. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 412, 104 S.Ct. 1868,

80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984).

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), a party may move to dismiss an action

for lack of personal jurisdiction. Once a challenge to personal jurisdiction has been raised, the

plaintiff bears the burden of establishing “jurisdictional facts through sworn affidavits or other

competent evidence.” Patterson v. F.B.I., 893 F.2d 595, 604 (3d Cir. 1990). The plaintiff must

show “either that the cause of action arose from the defendant's forum-related activities (specific

jurisdiction) or that the defendant has ‘continuous and systematic’ contacts with the forum state

(general jurisdiction).” Mellon Bank (East) PSFS, N.A. v. DiVeronica Bros., Inc., 983 F.2d 551,

554 (3d Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). When the district court does not hold an evidentiary

hearing as to personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff must “establish a prima facie case of personal

jurisdiction,” and the Court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint. See Miller Yacht

Sales, Inc. v. Smith, 384 F.3d 93, 97 (3d Cir. 2007); Carteret Sav. Bank, F.A. v. Shushan, 954

F.2d 141, 142 n.1 (3d Cir. 1992) (“[C]ourts reviewing a motion to dismiss a case for lack of in

personam jurisdiction must accept all of the plaintiff's allegations as true and construe disputed

facts in favor of the plaintiff.”).

C. Discussion

1. General Jurisdiction

JDS contends that this Court cannot exercise general jurisdiction because it is not

headquartered or incorporated in Pennsylvania; it is not registered to do business in

Pennsylvania; it has no property in Pennsylvania; and it does not test, design, or manufacture

products in Pennsylvania. Therefore, JDS maintains that it is not “at home” in Pennsylvania

and, therefore, cannot be subjected to general jurisdiction by this Court. In his Complaint, Mr.

Bogle avers that general jurisdiction is proper because JDS “engaged in continuous and

systematic business within the Commonwealth and with sufficient ‘contacts’ within the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to confer jurisdiction upon JDS.” (ECF No.1 at ¶ 5).

General jurisdiction may be asserted over a defendant even when the cause of action has

no relation to the defendant's contacts with the forum if the defendant's “ ‘affiliations with the

[s]tate are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum

[s]tate.’ ” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 128 (2014) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires

Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 920 (2011)).

Here, Mr. Bogle bears the burden to establish facts that would support that JDS is “at

home” in Pennsylvania. However, Mr. Bogle has not offered any competent evidence to refute

JDS’s assertion that it is a company organized and existing under the laws of the State of

Tennessee and with its principal place of business in Tennessee. As noted in the reconsideration

discussion above, Mr. Bogle had offered exhibits indicating that JDS had an office in

Pennsylvania and had registered to do business in Pennsylvania. On reconsideration, JDS

submitted a supplemental declaration that the exhibits offered by Mr. Bogle reflected a different

company that happened to be also known as JDS. Mr. Bogle has not offered any evidence to

contradict JDS’s supplemental declaration. Instead, Mr. Bogle’s allegations regarding general

jurisdiction are conclusory and unsupported by any competent evidence. Therefore, Mr. Bogle

has not met his burden that JDS has continuous and/or systematic contacts that would render it

“at home” in Pennsylvania. Thus, this Court does not have general jurisdiction over JDS.

2. Specific Jurisdiction

JDS also argues that this Court cannot exercise specific jurisdiction because Mr. Bogle

has not come forward with record evidence that : (i) JDS purposefully directed its activities

toward Pennsylvania; (ii) his product-liability claims arise out of JDS’s activities in

Pennsylvania; and (iii) the exercise of specific jurisdiction would be reasonable under the

circumstances. In response, Mr. Bogle contends that JDS and RSC placed the subject strap in

the “stream of commerce” and that the same is evidenced by the strap’s availability through

nationwide internet sales.2 Mr. Bogle further contends that discovery could reveal that JDS and

RSC engaged in a joint enterprise regarding the manufacture, marketing, and national sale of the

subject strap. JDS argues, via its incorporation of RSC’s reply brief, that the Third Circuit has

rejected the “stream of commerce” theory and that the use of internet sales websites does not

demonstrate that JDS made purposeful contact with the Western District of Pennsylvania. JDS

further maintains that Mr. Bogle fails to produce any evidence that JDS had any of the requisite

contacts with Pennsylvania to confer specific jurisdiction.

In analyzing whether specific personal jurisdiction exists, this Court must determine

“whether, under the Due Process Clause, the defendant has ‘certain minimum contacts with ...

[Pennsylvania] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair

play and substantial justice.’ ” O'Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d 312, 317 (3d Cir.

2007) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95

(1945)).

The specific jurisdiction analysis “focuses on the relationship among the defendant, the

forum, and the litigation.” Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284, 134 S.Ct. 1115, 188 L.Ed.2d 12

(2014). The Third Circuit has elaborated a three-part test to determine whether specific

jurisdiction exists. First, “the defendant must have ‘purposefully directed [its] activities’ at the

2 Notably, in his affidavit, Mr. Bogle asserts that he did not purchase the subject strap on

the internet, but rather through a “brick and mortar” store in Pennsylvania. (ECF No. 24-5 at ¶

4).

forum.” O'Connor, 496 F.3d at 317 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472

(1985)). Second, “the litigation must ‘arise out of or relate to’ at least one of those activities.” Id.

(quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414, 104 S.Ct. 1868,

80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984)). Third, and finally, “if the prior two requirements are met, a court may

consider whether the exercise of jurisdiction otherwise ‘comport[s] with “fair play and

substantial justice.” ’ ” Id. (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476, 105 S.Ct. 2174 (quoting Int'l

Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945))). Thus, the Court will

begin its inquiry into whether JDS “purposely directed [its] activities” in Pennsylvania and how

those align with Mr. Bogle’s specific jurisdiction arguments.

First, Mr. Bogle contends that JDS directed its activities through a stream of commerce

argument, namely that JDS manufactured the subject strap in Tennessee and that RSC allegedly

distributed the product from North Carolina to a consumer in Pennsylvania. The Third Circuit

has rejected said rationale to confer specific jurisdiction. See Shuker v. Smith & Nephew, PLC,

885 F.3d 760, 780 (3d Cir. 2018) (“We perceive no merit in the Shukers' stream-of-commerce

theory of personal jurisdiction.”). Therefore, a stream of commerce theory alone would not

support this Court conferring specific jurisdiction.

Next, Mr. Bogle proffers the subject strap’s availability, to consumers in Pennsylvania

through nationwide internet sales through third party websites like Amazon, demonstrates that

Defendants directed activities to this forum. Third Circuit precedent requires “some act by

which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the

forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Id. (quoting Asahi Metal

Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 108, 109, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 94 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987)).

And “ ‘what is necessary is a deliberate targeting of the forum,’ ... so efforts ‘to exploit a national

market’ that ‘necessarily included Pennsylvania’ are insufficient.” Id. (quoting O'Connor, 496

F.3d at 317 and D'Jamoos, 566 F.3d at 104).

“ ‘[T]he mere operation of a commercially interactive website’ does not confer

jurisdiction wherever that website may be accessed.” Kim v. Korean Air Lines Co., – F. Supp. 3d

–, 2021 WL 129083, at *4 (D.N.J. Jan. 14, 2021) (quoting Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A.,

318 F. 3d 446, 454 (3d Cir. 2003)). “Rather, there must be evidence that the defendant

‘purposefully availed’ itself of conducting activity in the forum state, by directly targeting its

web site to the state, knowingly interacting with residents of the forum state via his web site, or

through sufficient other related contacts.” Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F. 3d 446,

454 (3d Cir. 2003). In other words, “the likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be

constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial

activity that an entity conducts over the Internet.” Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F.

Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997). Under this sliding scale, the Court must “examine ‘the level

of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs on the website’

” and determine whether such activity established sufficient minimum contacts to confer

jurisdiction. Ackourey v. Sonellas Custom Tailors, 573 F. App'x 208, 211-12 (3d Cir. 2014)

(quoting Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124).

With reference specifically to third party websites like Amazon, this Court has stated that

“[w]hile the commercially interactive nature of Defendants' website and its use of the Amazon

site place Defendants' actions towards the more interactive end of the Zippo spectrum, Plaintiff

has not met its burden of showing that Defendants made purposeful contact with the Western

District of Pennsylvania.” Guidecraft, Inc. v. OJCommerce, LLC, No. 2:18-cv-01247, 2019 WL

2373440 (W.D. Pa. May 20, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:18-cv1247, 2019

WL 2371645, at (W.D. Pa. June 5, 2019 2019 WL 2373440, at *5. The Court explained that

businesses using Amazon “glean customers thousands of miles away” but that “such reach does

not meet the definition of purposeful availment[.]’” Id. Thus, the Court rejected the plaintiff's

argument on personal jurisdiction that “boil[ed] down to the expectation that Defendants should

be subject to jurisdiction anywhere in the United States where customers can access and

purchase from[…] Amazon.” Id. Likewise, in Flipside Wallets LLC v. Brafman Grp. Inc., No.

19-cv5356, 2020 WL 1330742 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 2020), the court noted that Amazon

completed, filled, and shipped all orders, and that even if the defendant “knew or should have

known that its [products] would end up in Pennsylvania through Amazon sales, that expectation

is insufficient to establish specific jurisdiction.” Id. (internal quotations omitted; citation

omitted). Here, Mr. Bogle avers nothing beyond conclusory statements and speculation that JDS

purposely directed any commercial activity to Pennsylvania through internet sales. Accordingly,

internet sales by third party websites, such as Amazon, is insufficient for the conferral of specific

jurisdiction against JDS.

In addition to internet sales, Mr. Bogle argues that this Court has specific jurisdiction by

virtue of JDS’s alleged use of “multiple intermediaries to sell [its] products to consumers

throughout the United States, including, of course, throughout Pennsylvania.” (ECF No. 24)

However, unilateral acts of third-party intermediaries are insufficient to confer jurisdiction.

Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 417 (1984); see also Johnson

Controls, Inc. v. Irving Rubber & Metal Co., 920 F. Supp. 612, 617 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (“Unilateral

acts of the plaintiff or a third party are not sufficient in and of themselves to establish specific

jurisdiction because they do not satisfy the purposeful availment requirement”). Here, an inquiry

into how the product reached Pennsylvania through the acts of a third party has no bearing on

whether JDS had sufficient minimum contacts for this Court to confer specific jurisdiction. Mr.

Bogle has produced no competent evidence which connects JDS’s activities with those of the

internet sales companies or the store in which he purchased the subject strap. Likewise, whether

RSC directly distributed the subject strap to Pennsylvania does not sufficiently establish

minimum contacts relative to JDS. Further, Mr. Bogle presents no prima facie basis indicating

that JDS coordinated with RSC in any way to direct the sales of the subject strap to

Pennsylvania.

Finally, Mr. Bogle contends that the United States Supreme Court recent decision in Ford

Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, 141 S. Ct. 1017 (2021) supports his

specific jurisdiction argument. In Ford Motor Co., a state court exercised jurisdiction over the

car manufacturer in a products-liability suit stemming from a car accident that injured a resident

in the state. The manufacturer moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing that the

state court had jurisdiction only if the company's conduct in the state had given rise to the

plaintiff's claims. Ford designed and manufactured the vehicles elsewhere, and originally sold

them outside the forum state. Only later resales and relocations by consumers had brought the

vehicles into the forum state. The Supreme Court held that the connection between the plaintiffs’

claims and the car manufacturer’s activities in the forum state was close enough to support

specific jurisdiction. In particular, Ford Motor Co. involved a global car manufacturer that

markets, sells, and services cars across the United States and overseas, as well as encourages a

resale market for its vehicles. The Supreme Court found that Ford had a “veritable truck load of

contacts” with the forum state. 141 S. Ct. at 1028. Furthermore, Ford conceded that it purposely

directed its activities to the forum state. Id. at 1026, 1028

Here, Mr. Bogle asks the Court to confer jurisdiction based upon the nationwide sales

scheme found in Ford Motor Co. However, Ford Motor Co. is distinguishable from the instant

action. Mr. Bogle provides nothing in his pleadings or submissions that JDS engaged in any

nationwide sales scheme or that Mr. Bogle saw JDS marketing efforts that induced him into

using or purchasing a Hold-Zit strap. Therefore, Ford Motor Co.’s application of specific

jurisdiction analysis does not apply here.

Accordingly, Mr. Bogle’s pleadings and submissions do not support that JDS purposely

directed any activities to Pennsylvania that aid in meeting his specific jurisdiction burden.

Accordingly, JDS’s Motions to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), for lack of personal

jurisdiction, will be granted.

III. Conclusion

After consideration of JDS’s Motion for Reconsideration (ECF No. 34), Supplemental

Declaration (ECF No. 34-1), Plaintiff’s Response (ECF No. 36), and for the foregoing reasons,

the Motion for Reconsideration will be granted. This Court’s July 16, 2021 Opinion and Order

relative only to JDS’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) will be vacated for

reconsideration.

Accordingly, after reconsideration of JDS’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant of Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(b)(2) (ECF No. 11) and the respective briefs and responses of the parties (ECF Nos. 12, 24,

26 and 29-30), JDS’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) will be granted.

Therefore, the claims against JDS will be subject to dismissal both on personal jurisdiction

grounds as well as under the Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) grounds as stated in this Court’s July 16,

2021 Opinion and Order (ECF Nos. 32 and 33). In addition to the leave previously granted to

Plaintiff with regard to the claims dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), Plaintiff will be

granted leave to file an amended complaint to address the present jurisdictional defects against

JDS. Alternatively, Plaintiff will be granted leave to move to transfer to another jurisdiction. A

separate order will follow.

DATED this 6th day of August, 2021.

BY THE COURT:

MARILYN HO x

United States District Judge

14