“ ‘contrary to ... clearly established federal law’ means just that—‘diametrically different, opposite in character or nature, ot mutually opposed.’ ”
How later courts described this case
- “ ‘contrary to ... clearly established federal law’ means just that—‘diametrically different, opposite in character or nature, ot mutually opposed.’ ”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
INT HEU NITESDT ATEDSI STRICCOTU RT
FORT HEW ESTERDNI STRIOCFPT E NNSYLVANIA
JAMEJSO SEPOHW ENS, )
)
Plaintiff ) CasNeo. 1 :20-cv(E-rie0)0 369
)
vs. )
) RICHARD A .LANZILLO
PENNSYLVAPNAIRAO LBEO ARD, ) UNITESDT ATEMSA GISTRATJEU DGE
SUPERINTENDENT MICHA)E L
CLARI<, ) MEMORANDUOMR DERO N
) PETITIOFNO RH ABEASC ORPUS
) RELIEF UNDER28 U .CS..§2 254
Defendants )
)
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I. Background
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charwgithe ddr ivuinndtgeh rie n flueonfac lec oahnosdle veortahtler ra offffiecn sIedps..1., 2 .
Owenwsa ssu bseqdueetnatbilynty eh Rdee sponadsaep natrv oiloel Iad.tp,o.2 r 1.O. n M arc4h,
202O1w,e npsl eadedt otg hdueri ilvutinynd tgeh rie n flueonfac lec oahnoodlt hreerl actheadr ges.
Id.p,.2 3.
Two months later, the Respondent charged Owens with violations of his parole and
scheduled the date of his revocation hearing. Id, p. 31. Owens waived his right to the revocation
hearing and acknowledged his conviction of the new offenses. Id, p. 33, Owens received a six-
month custodial sentence and six-months’ probation for the driving offenses. Id, pp. 23-24, On
June 30, 2020, the Respondent tecommitted Owens as a patole violator, requiring him to setve an
additional nine months of incarceration. Id, pp. 35-36. This extended Owens’ sentence to
September 20, 2021. Id. p. 38.
Owens filed “Administrative Remedies Forms” with the Respondent in July of 2020. See □□□□
pp.41-49. He challenged the Respondent’s calculation of his maximum sentence date, arguing that
he should have received credit for the time he spent in a community correction’s center. Id. p. 42.
On February 17, 2021, the Respondent notified Owens that his case would be remanded for an
evidentiary hearing to determined whether he was eligible for the credit. Id., p. 60. Owens filed the
instant petition for habeas corpus relief on December 29, 2020, which was before he learned of the
Respondent’s decision to hold an evidentiary hearing.
II. Standards of Decision
A prerequisite to the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996 is that the petitioner must have “exhausted the
remedies available in the courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). To satisfy this
requirement, a petitioner must have “fairly presented” the merits of his federal claims during “one
complete round of the established appellate review process.” O'S ullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845
(1999). A federal claim is fairly presented to the state courts where the petitioner has raised “the
same factual and legal basis for the claim to the state courts.” See Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 188, 198-
99 (3d Cir. 2007). A petitioner who has raised an issue on direct appeal is not required to raise it
again in a state post-conviction proceeding. Lambert v. Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506, 513 3d Cir. 1997)
(citations omitted).
Where the federal court reviews a claim that has been adjudicated on the metits by the state
court, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) permits the federal court to grant a petition for habeas corpus only if: (1)
the state court’s adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Coutt of
the United States;” or if (2) the adjudication “resulted in a decision that was based on an
unteasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1)-(2); see also Parker v. Matthews, 567 U.S. 37, 40-44 (2012)
(reiterating that the standard under 2254(d) (1) is highly deferential to state court decisions); Garras □□
See’y Pennsylvania Dept. of Corr, 694 F.3d 394, 400 (3d Cir. 2012). The Supreme Court explained that
“fu}nder the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court attives at
a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law ot if the state
court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Coutt has on a set of materially indistinguishable
facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000); see Wilkerson v. Klem, 412 F.3d 449, 452 Gd
Cir. 2005) (“ ‘contrary to ... clearly established federal law’ means just that—‘diametrically different,
opposite in character or nature, ot mutually opposed.’ ”) (quoting Willams, 529 U.S. at 405). As
concerns “the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state
court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s decisions but
unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.” Id. at 413. The “unreasonable
application” inquiry thus requites the habeas court to “ask whether the state court's application of
clearly established federal law was objectively unteasonable.” Id. at 409. As the Third Circuit has
noted, “an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of such
law and a federal habeas court may not grant relief unless that court determines that a state coutt’s
incorrect or erroneous application of clearly established federal law was also unreasonable.” Werts v.
Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 196 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Withams, 529 US. at 411).
Additionally, any factual determinations made by the state court are presumed to be cottect
and the petitioner bears the burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and convincing evidence.
Simmons v, Beard, 590 F.3d 223, 231 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)); Palmer v. Hendricks,
592 F.3d 386, 392 (3d Cir. 2010) (same). Where the state court decision does not constitute an
“adjudication on the merits,” but the petitioner’s claim is otherwise ripe for habeas review, § 2254
does not apply and instead the federal court applies the pre-AEDPA standard, reviewing pure legal
questions and mixed question of law and fact de novo. See Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 210 Gd Cir.
2001). The state court’s factual determinations, however, are still presumed cortect pursuant to
§ 2254(e)(1).
IV. Discussion
Owens has not propertly exhausted his claim in the state court. As Respondent notes in its
Response, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 includes an exhaustion requirement, and a federal court should not hear
a habeas corpus claim until “the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the
state.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). And a habeas petitioner has the responsibility to demonstrate that
each of his or her claims have been “fairly presented” to the state courts. See Castille v. Peoples, 489
U.S. 346, 349 (1989). Claims that challenge the Respondent’s re-calculation of a parole-violatot’s
maximum sentence date must be presented to the Commonwealth Court and then to the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania before they are considered exhausted in the state courts. See Allah p.
Oberlander, 2020 WL. 5634349, *4 (E.D. Pa. May 20, 2020). The District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania summarized the exhaustion requirement applicable to this case as follows:
To propertly exhaust a claim involving a determination by the Parole
Board, the petitioner must first seek administrative teview with the
Parole Board. See 37 Pa. Code § 73.1(a). Once the Parole Board has
rendered a final decision, the petitioner must seek review in the
Commonwealth Court. See 42 Pa. C.S. A. § 763(a). Unlike appeals
and collateral review of convictions, a petitioner challenging the
Commonwealth Court’s denial of parole relief must seek review in
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in order to satisfy the exhaustion
requirement. See Wilkams v. Wynder, 232 Fed. Appx. 177, 180 (3d Cir.
2007) (“Because Order 218 does not apply to appeals from
Commonwealth Coutt decisions, or decisions in matters involving
challenges to Parole Board actions, the District Court correctly held
that [petitioner] was required to exhaust his available state remedies
by filing a petitioner for allowance of appeal in the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court.’”)
Pagan v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, et al., 2009 WL 210488, *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 2009).
Here, Owens has sought the Respondent’s review of the re-computation of his sentence. See
ECF No. 7-1, pp. 41, 45, 53. And the Respondent has granted him an evidentiary hearing. To
exhaust his state law remedies, Owens must complete the proceedings before the Respondent and, if
dissatisfied with the outcome of those proceedings, appeal the decision to the Commonwealth Coutt
and, if necessaty, to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. See Allah, 202 WL 5634346, at *5. This
Court will not grant habeas review or telief until a petitioner has completed appellate review at the
state level. See O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 842. Therefore, Owens’ claims are premature and will be
dismissed without prejudice. See, ¢.g., Jones v. Shannon, 2014 WL 356559, *1 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2014).
V. Certificate of Appealability
AEDPA codified standards governing the issuance of a certificate of appealability for
appellate review of a district court’s disposition of a habeas petition. It provides that “[uJnless a
circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of
appeals from...the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of
atises out of process issued by a State court[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). It also provides that “[a]
certificate of appealability may issue . . . only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right.” Id, § 2253(c)(2). This Court need not make a certificate of
appealability determination because “[a] district court’s order dismissing, without prejudice, a
petition for federal habeas relief for failure to exhaust state-court remedies is not a final appealable
order, since it explicitly entitles the petitioner to renew habeas proceedings upon completion of
review of his claims in the state court system.” FEDERAL HABEAS MANUAL § 12:30 (citations
omitted). See also Gacho », Butler, 192 F.3d 732, 735-37 (7th Cir. 2015). To the extent a certificate of
appealability determination is required, Petitioner is not entitled to one because jurists of teason □
would not find it debatable whether his claims should be dismissed because he is exhausting his
state-court remedies. Sack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
VI. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, Owen’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus is dismissed,
without prejudice, and no certificate of appealability will issue. An appropriate order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, 2 ay of March, 2020, for the reasons set forth in the Memotandum
filed contemporaneously, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner James Joseph Owens’ claims
for federal habeas corpus relief ate DISMISSED without prejudice and a certificate of appealability
is DENIED as to each claim. The Clerk of Court is directed to mark this case CLOSED as of this
date.
yo 22 ef
RICHARD A. LANZILLO
United States Magistrate Judge