The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
A.M., a minor, by and through )
JAMIE and RON McKALIP, )
his parents and natural guardians, et al., )
)
Plaintiffs, ) Civil Action No. 1:20-cv-290-SPB
v. )
)
PENNSYLVANIA )
INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC )
ASSOCIATION, INC., et al., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the undersigned on an emergency motion for injunctive relief. For
the reasons that follow, the Plaintiffs’ motion will be denied.
I. Background
At the center of this litigation is a rule, recently enacted by the PIAA District 10
Committee, which reduces the number of high school golfers who can compete in the District 10
(hereafter, “D-10”) boys individual golf tournament. The D-10 tournament, which commences
on October 2, 2020, is the competitive forum through which high school golfers attending D-10
schools attempt to earn a berth in the PIAA state golf tournament.
The Plaintiffs in this case are four student athletes who seek admission to the D-10 golf
tournament, their parents, and their respective school districts. A.M. and J.V. are high school
seniors at Conneaut Area Senior High School. The Conneaut School District competes in
Region 3 of the D-10 golf program. L.W. and J.H. are a senior and junior in high school,
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respectively, at Slippery Rock Area High School. The Slippery Rock Area School District
competes in Region 2 of the D-10 golf program.
In recent years, D-10 allowed 8 players from Region 3 and 9 players from Region 2 to
compete in the boys D-10 championship golf tournament. That was the case until September 24,
2020, when the PIAA District-10 Committee enacted a rule reducing the number of eligible
golfers, so that now only four (4) golfers from Region 3 and five (5) golfers from Region 2 can
compete in the D-10 tournament on October 2, 2020.
Each of the Plaintiff student-golfers would like to participate in the D-10 championship
tournament and would have been eligible to do so under the prior eligibility rules. Moreover, as
they began their regular season, and even as they completed that season, they believed, based on
then-applicable rules, that they were eligible to participate. On September 23, 2020, however, the
PIAA changed its rules to reduce the number of male golfers who would be eligible to compete
in the state championship tournament. The D-10 Committee followed suit the following day and
reduced the number of male golfers who would be eligible to participate in the D-10
championship tournament and thereby compete for a berth in the state playoffs. Thus, Plaintiffs
only learned in the past week that the eligibility standards had changed.
This litigation ensued, with the Plaintiffs’ filing, on September 30, 2020, of a petition for
injunctive relief in the Crawford County Court of Common Pleas. Defendants removed the
matter to this Court on October 1, 2020. Plaintiffs’ petition names as Defendants the PIAA, the
PIAA District 10 Committee, and Michael Ferry, the PIAA District 10 Golf Tournament
Director. Although no actual “complaint” has yet been filed, upon agreement of all parties, the
Plaintiffs’ verified motion serves for present purposes both as a motion for injunctive relief under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 and as the operative pleading. Construing the petition in that
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fashion, the Court perceives that Plaintiffs are alleging the violation of their Fourteenth
Amendment right to equal protection under the law, as well as a claim that the Defendants’
actions violated District 10’s “guiding philosophy.” See ECF No. 1-3, ¶¶24, 29.
The Court held a hearing on the same date as the matter was removed. During the
hearing, the Court accepted testimony from Jamie McKalip, Barbra Vaughn, Diana Wolak, and
Kevin Hadley – all of whom are parents to the four student athletes named as Plaintiffs herein.
Plaintiffs also offered testimony from Jarrin Sperry, the Superintendent of the Conneaut Area
School District. From the defense, the Court heard testimony from Robert Lombardini, the
PIAA’s Executive Director, and Peter Iacino, Chair of the PIAA District 10 Committee. Mr.
Lombardini and Mr. Iacino also submitted affidavits for the Court’s consideration. ECF Nos. 4
and 5.
Upon consideration of the testimony and evidence in the case, the Court renders the
following ruling, which constitutes its findings of fact and conclusions of law.
II. Standard of Review
“[T]he grant of injunctive relief is an ‘extraordinary remedy which should be granted
only in limited circumstances.’” Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797,
800 (3d Cir.1989) (quoting Frank’s GMC Truck Ctr., Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 847 F.2d 100,
102 (3d Cir.1988). To prevail, the Plaintiffs must demonstrate that: (1) they are likely to succeed
on the merits of their claims, (2) they are likely to suffer irreparable harm without relief, (3) the
balance of harms favors them, and (4) relief is in the public interest. Issa v. Sch. Dist. of
Lancaster, 847 F.3d 121, 131 (3d Cir. 2017). “All four factors should favor relief before an
injunction will issue.” S & R Corp. v. Jiffy Lube Int'l, Inc., 968 F.2d 371, 374 (3d Cir. 1992)
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(citation omitted). However, before reaching factors three (3) and four (4), the moving party
must first satisfy its burden with respect to factors one (1) and two (2). If a plaintiff fails to
satisfy this burden, this is the end of the inquiry, and a preliminary injunction will not issue.
Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 2017), as amended (June 26, 2017).
III. Analysis
A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
The first factor to consider is whether the movant can demonstrate that their claims have
a likelihood of success on the merits. See, e.g., T.W., v. Southern Columbia Area Sch. District,
2020 WL 5751219, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 2020). To satisfy this showing, the Plaintiffs need
only establish a prima facie case demonstrating a “reasonable probability” of success. Issa v.
Sch. Dist. of Lancaster, 847 F.3d 121, 131 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal quotations omitted). They are
not required to prove that success is “more likely than not.” Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858
F.3d 173, 179 n. 3 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal quotations omitted). Nevertheless, the Plaintiffs bear
the burden of making this showing and here, they have come up short. It is unlikely that the
Plaintiffs can succeed on the merits of their Equal Protection claim.
Equal protection claims, when they do not involve a suspect class or fundamental right,
will be governed by the “rational basis test.” Moreland v. Western Pennsylvania Interscholastic
Athletic League, 572 F.2d 121, 124 (3d Cir. 1978). Both Parties agree that this test applies to the
Plaintiffs’ claim. Under this test, government action will be upheld so long as it “rationally
furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973). The rational basis test is difficult to overcome, as “it has long
been settled that the Equal Protection Clause is offended only by laws that are invidiously
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discriminatory—only by classifications that are wholly arbitrary or capricious.” Id. (Stewart, J.,
concurring). That is, under the rational basis test, “if the justification for the disparate treatment
is neither arbitrary nor capricious, but grounded on some reasonable policy, there is no denial of
equal protection of the laws.” Pfender v. Beard, 2011 WL 680203, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 16,
2011), aff’d sub nom. Pfender v. Sec’y Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr., 443 Fed. Appx. 749 (3d Cir.
2011) (citing Jamieson v. Robinson, 641 F.2d 138, 142 (3d Cir.1981)). Here, the Defendants’
actions were not arbitrary or capricious.
Courts typically resist interfering or second-guessing the decisions of high school athletic
associations, except where the action complained of is one of fraud, or an invasion of some
property or pecuniary right. See, e.g., Dziewa v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n.,
2009 WL 113419, *6 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 2009) (citation omitted). The Plaintiffs acknowledged
that they do not advance any allegations of fraud or assert claims relating to an invasion of a
property or pecuniary interest. Thus, whether or not the PIAA acted arbitrarily or capriciously is
determined by the reasonableness of its actions in reducing the number of student golfers eligible
to participate in the District 10 tournament. Here, the PIAA’s actions were reasonable.
No evidence has been presented that the PIAA’s decision to reduce the number of golfers
eligible for the District 10 tournament was ill conceived, random, haphazard or otherwise rushed.
It was not based on whim or conjecture. Testimony provided by PIAA officials indicated a
methodical and careful chronology of their decision making. The PIAA acknowledged first that
it operated within the guidelines for dealing with the Covid-19 pandemic handed down by the
Governor of Pennsylvania. The PIAA applied these general guidelines—which included social
distancing, masks, and handwashing—to all sports. Then, recognizing the dangers attenuated by
the virus, the PIAA cancelled all spring 2020 interscholastic athletics. Dr. Robert A. Lombardi,
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the Executive Director of the PIAA, testified at the hearing and by affidavit that significant
changes have been made to championship tournaments in many sports, including the elimination
of some altogether. See ECF No. 4, ¶ 22. The PIAA’s medical committee (PIAA Sports
Medicine Advisory Committee) has continued to meet throughout this crisis, most recently on
September 20, 2020. On September 23, 2020, the full Board of Directors of the PIAA met and
decided, based on the medical committee’s recommendation, to curtail certain athletic
competitions throughout the Commonwealth. The decision to reduce the number of eligible
qualifiers was communicated to players and coaches in District 10 the next day.
Mr. Peter P. Iacino, Chair of the PIAA District 10 Committee, testified that the number of
eligible golfers was reduced to satisfy safety protocols the PIAA put in place to minimize the risk
of exposure and spread of the Covid-19 virus. For example, Iacino stated that in order to
minimize congestion of golfers on the course, the “field size” was limited, the traditional “shot
gun start” was jettisoned, and the times between tee-offs were increased. See ECF No. 5, ¶
17(A)(2). The changes brought on by the PIAA’s response to the pandemic meant that the time
to complete the championship rounds was increased to sometime between and 6.5 and 7.5 hours.
Thus, it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to complete the championship with the
original number of eligible golfers within normal time parameters. See id., ¶ 17(B). The
Plaintiffs do not dispute any of this. Thus, the Court can only conclude that the PIAA’s actions,
while no doubt disappointing and disheartening to the promising young linksmen of District 10,
were deliberate, careful, and considered. Thus, the PIAA’s decision to curtail the number of
tournament invitations was not arbitrary or capricious.
A decision is arbitrary and capricious when the decision-makers willfully disregard
evidence or testimony which someone of reasonable intelligence “could not possibly have
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avoided in reaching” their decision. Id. (citation omitted). The PIAA has a reasonable
justification for its decision, to avoid the spread of Covid. And its actions in curtailing the
number of students invited to the championship tournament is reasonably related to that goal.1
Thus, the Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claim.
B. Irreparable Harm
Defendants also argue that the Plaintiffs have not demonstrated “irreparable harm” as a
result of the recent rule change. The Court agrees.
In order to prove irreparable harm, the moving party “must demonstrate potential harm
which cannot be redressed by a legal or an equitable remedy following a trial.” Acierno v. New
Castle County, 40 F.3d 645, 653 (3d Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Critically, numerous courts in this Commonwealth – both federal and state -- have concluded
1 The Plaintiffs’ focus on decisions from the PIAA relating to this season’s high school football competitions is
misplaced. The issue before this Court is the propriety of the actions concerning District 10’s golf tournament.
Other decisions made in other sports are not before the Court, but were made following recommendations by the
medical committee, as here.
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that a student is not “irreparably harmed,” for purposes of injunctive relief, by his or her inability
to compete in interscholastic high school sports, even when the student is barred from
competition for an entire season. See, e.g., Dziewa v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic
Ass'n, Inc., No. CIV.A. 08-5792, 2009 WL 113419, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 2009) (“This Court,
as well as all other federal courts, have previously and consistently held that ineligibility for
participation in interscholastic athletic competitions alone does not constitute irreparable
harm.”); Cruz v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 2000 WL 1781933, *1 (E.D.
Pa. Nov. 20, 2000) (no irreparable harm where student was “limited in his participation in high
school athletics rather than barred from it entirely” and could still practice with his team, dress in
uniform and attend competitions); Sahene v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, No. 99-
902, at 5-6 (W.D. Pa. July 19, 1999) (plaintiff would not suffer irreparable harm if precluded
from competing in interscholastic football for an entire season where he could practice with his
team, coach others, or participate in intermural sports and non-school related athletic events);
Revesz ex rel. Revesz v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 798 A.2d 830, 836 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2002) (“The fact that a student is determined ineligible to play interscholastic sports
for one year does not necessarily translate into a loss of opportunity to attain college
scholarships.”) (citing Adamek v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Association, 57 Pa.
Cmwlth. Ct. 261, 426 A.2d 1206 (1981)).
Although Plaintiffs acknowledge this authority, they seek to distinguish it on the basis
that the eligibility issues in the foregoing decisions were premised on different criteria than the
D-10 rule change at issue here. In this Court’s view, however, the rulings in Dziewa, et al. did
not depend upon the type of distinctions that Plaintiffs seek to draw; therefore any differences in
the reasons underlying the students’ ineligibility in prior cases is immaterial for present purposes.
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Here, the undisputed evidence shows that each of the Plaintiff athletes was able to compete in
PIAA sanctioned golf matches throughout the regular fall 2020 season. The harm they are now
suffering is their inability to compete in the post-season D-10 championship tournament, and –
depending on their performance – possibly the PIAA state championship tournament. The loss
of these opportunities, while no doubt immensely disappointing to the Plaintiffs, does not
constitute the type of harm that is deemed “irreparable” for purposes of obtaining the
extraordinary remedy of injunctive relief. For this reason as well, Plaintiff’s request for
injunctive relief cannot be granted
IV. Conclusion
The changes in the D-10 tournament rules that are at issue in this case have no doubt
wrought genuine disappointment for the student athletes who were adversely affected by the
change, as well as for their families. COVID-19 has affected all of our lives and normal
dealings, and none more than students who have had their world turned upside down. Although
the Court is grieved for the students and all they have lost this year, especially the four fine
golfers who were dealt this blow just a week ago, we all have to deal with the reality that nothing
is the same as it was prior to this pandemic. The Court will and should always err on the side of
safety, which was the basis for the ruling by the PIAA to lower the numbers of golfers in the
tournament. It is not the Court’s job to decide the better course, but to ensure the one taken was
not arbitrary and capricious, or for a wrongful purpose. Although the decision was a painful one
for the Plaintiffs, it was done with a rational basis and passes muster under the law.
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___________________________
Susan Paradise Baxter
United States District Judge
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