ROBINSON v. COACH LEASING, INC.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

No. 2:20-cev-1265

KRISTIAN LAMAR ROBINSON, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

Vv.

COACH LEASING, INC.,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Defendant Coach Leasing, Inc. removed this case to

federal court on August 26, 2020. [ECF 1]. In its notice of

removal, Coach alleged that the Court had subject matter

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, “in as much as the

amount of controversy exceeds the sum of $75,000.00,

exclusive of interests and costs, and is in between citizens

of different states.” [ECF 1, § 15]. Plaintiffs have filed a

motion to remand the case to state court, arguing that the

amount in controversy does not exceed $75,000.00 and

offering a stipulation to that effect. [ECF 12, | 4 (‘The

Plaintiffs stipulate the amount of collective damages in the

matter does not exceed $75,000.”)].

After careful consideration, the Court will grant the

motion to remand.

-1-

“Remand to state court is required if at any time

before final judgment it appears that the district court

lacks subject matter jurisdiction.” Hoffman v.

Nutraceutical Corp., 563 Fed. Appx. 183, 185 (3d Cir.

2014). “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.

They possess only that power authorized by Constitution

and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,

511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “[L]ower federal-court

jurisdiction is further limited to those subjects

encompassed within a statutory grant of jurisdiction.”

Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Jackson, 139 S. Ct. 1743, 1746

(2019). Thus, “the district courts may not exercise

jurisdiction absent a statutory basis.” Id. To that end,

Coach relies on 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), which allows for

federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over “all civil actions

where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value

of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between

… citizens of different States[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).

Initially, the Court agrees with Coach that

Plaintiffs’ post-removal “stipulation” regarding the amount

in controversy “has no legal significance.” Angus v. Shiley

Inc., 989 F.2d 142, 145 (3d Cir. 1993). That is because, as

Coach correctly notes, the “right to remove is to be

determined according to the plaintiffs’ pleading at the time

of the petition for removal, and it is the defendant’s burden

to show the existence of federal jurisdiction.” Van Scyoc v.

Equitrans, L.P., 255 F. Supp. 3d 636, 639 (W.D. Pa. 2015)

(Hornak, J.) (citing Abels v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,

770 F.2d 26, 29 (3d Cir. 1985)). Thus, “a plaintiff following

removal cannot destroy federal jurisdiction simply by

amending a complaint that initially satisfied the monetary

floor.” Angus, 989 F.2d at 145.

That said, the Court still must assess the complaint

to determine if the amount in controversy was, in fact,

satisfied at the time of removal, based on “a reasonable

reading of the value of the rights being litigated.”

Werwinski v. Ford Motor Co., 286 F.3d 661, 666 (3d Cir.

2002). Here, the complaint is silent as to the specific sum

of damages claimed, except that Plaintiffs seek damages

above the local arbitration limits. That, of course, is

because the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure prohibit

a plaintiff from demanding a specific sum in its complaint.

See Pa. R.C.P. 121 (“Any pleading demanding relief for

unliquidated damages shall not claim any specific sum.”).

Given that, the Court looks to 28 U.S.C. §

1446(c)(2)(B), which provides that “where, like here, the

‘State practice … does not permit demand for a specific sum

…’ the ‘removal of the action is proper on the basis of the

amount in controversy … if the district court finds, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in

controversy’ exceeds $75,000.” Allen v. Bloomingdale’s,

Inc., No. 16-772, 2016 WL 4579975, at *2 (D.N.J. July 19,

2016) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (c)(2)(B)).

In support of federal jurisdiction, Coach argues that

a “reasonable reading” of the complaint suggests that the

damages exceed $75,000.00, because Plaintiffs “are both

seeking damages for lost wages, future wage loss, and past

and future medical expenses” and “the Complaint does not

limit its request for a precise monetary amount.” [ECF 17,

p. 5]. The Court disagrees.

To begin with, the fact that there are two Plaintiffs

here is irrelevant. “Each plaintiff must meet the amount in

controversy requirement–claims may not be aggregated

among plaintiffs to meet the statutory minimum.” Golden

ex rel. Golden v. Golden, 382 F.3d 348, 355 (3d Cir. 2004),

abrogated on other grounds by Marshall v. Marshall, 547

U.S. 293, 304 (2006); see also Murphy Murphy & Murphy,

P.C. v. Nationwide, Ins. Co., No. 19-712, 2019 WL 2389663,

at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 5, 2019) (“For this Court’s jurisdiction

to be invoked, each plaintiff’s amount in controversy must

exceed the $75,000 threshold.”).

The question, then, is whether the complaint

reasonably suggests that each Plaintiff has suffered more

than $75,000.00 in injuries. The Court sees nothing that

could reasonably support such an inference. Rather, the

complaint contains largely boilerplate allegations of

amorphous injuries—the likes of which appear in many

personal-injury complaints. Cf. Inaganti v. Columbia Prop.

Harrisburg LLC, No. 10-1651, 2010 WL 2136597, at *5

(E.D. Pa. May 25, 2010) (“The Complaint contains only

general boilerplate allegations that plaintiff suffered a

variety of physical and mental injuries and loss of earning

capacity. While these injuries are seemingly serious,

Plaintiffs identify no precise injury or medical condition.”);

Brown v. Modell’s PA II, Inc., No. 08-1528, 2008 WL

2600253, at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 1, 2008) (“[T]he complaint

was full of boilerplate allegations.”); Marchiori v.

Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc., No. 05-5685, 2006 WL

724445, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 2006) (“[P]laintiff’s

complaint alleged [only] some specific medical injuries.”).

Of particular note, none of the injuries identified by

Plaintiffs appear to be fractures or injuries to critical

organs. Plaintiffs’ allegations also do not suggest any

specific expensive medical treatment, such as major

surgeries. In fact, there is no mention of any specific

medical procedures at all. Rather, Plaintiffs vaguely allege

“pain” or “sprains” in miscellaneous body parts (like an

elbow), a “concussion,” “shortness of breath,” “muscle

strain,” “muscle spasms,” a “contusion” (bruise), “anxiety,”

and “emotional distress.” [ECF 1-1, ¶¶ 13-16]. The

complaint also does not describe the extent to which

Plaintiffs have lost “earning capacity” or wages with any

specificity at all. Plaintiffs’ jobs or occupations are not

listed, so that sort of damage is also impossible to quantify.

Nor does the complaint identify the speed of the vehicle

collision at-issue. And while Plaintiffs seek damages above

the local arbitration limit ($35,000.00), this tells us little.

$35,000.00 is well below $75,000.00, and, unlike under the

removal statute, Plaintiffs’ claims may be aggregated for

purposes of reaching the local arbitration limit.

In sum, then, all that can be reasonably inferred

from the complaint is that Plaintiffs were involved in an

accident that did not result in death or well-defined serious

injury, and that Plaintiffs lost some wages, and spent some

unidentified amount of money on medical bills, as a result.

This strikes the Court as a claim that is highly unlikely to

approach the value of $75,000.00 per plaintiff, at least

without additional facts (about injuries, medical expenses,

etc.) not presently known to Coach or the Court.

Finally, if any doubt remains, the tie is broken here

by the well-settled principle that “[t]he federal removal

statute … is strictly construed, requiring remand if any

doubt exists over whether removal was proper.” Carlyle

Inv. Mgmt. LLC v. Moonmouth Co. SA, 779 F.3d 214, 218

(3d Cir. 2015). Here, there is, at a minimum, serious

reason to doubt that Plaintiffs have each suffered more

than $75,000.00 in damages. Thus, remand is warranted.

An appropriate order follows.

DATE: October 28, 2020

BY THE COURT:

/s/ J. Nicholas Ranjan

United States District Judge