HOOPSICK v. OBERLANDER

INT HEUN ITESDT ATDEISS TRCIOCUTR T

FORT HEW ESTEDRNI STROIFCP TE NNSYLVANIA

JAMESH OOPSIJCRK.,, )

CasNeo1 .: 20-cEvr-i1e8 1

)

Plaintiff )

RICHAAR.LD A NZILLO

)

UNITESDT ATMEASG ISTRATE JUDG

V. )

)

MEMORANDOUPMI NIAONND

DEREFK.O BERLANDeEatRl ,. , )

ORDEORN D EFENDANMTO'TSI ON

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TOD ISMISS

Defendants )

)

[ECNFo3;]

)

I. Background

PlaiJnatmiHeffos o psJirac.nik, n, m iantcea rcaettrh Saett aCetoder recItnisotniatlu tio

aFto r(eSsCtI -),Fi onrietstithapitrsseo ead c titohnCe o iuonrfC t o mmPolne oafFs o rest

CounPteyn,n sylEvCaFNn o1i..aD .e fendfialneattd si mNeoltyoi fRc eem ovIadIl.n.h is

ComplHaoionptsg,ie cnke arvaeltrlhsyDa etfe ndeanngtasig nue ndl arwefutla liinra etsipoonn se

toh iast tetmofip late PrRiaspEoeln i miAnca(ttP iRo)Enc A omplHaoionptss.ie cekk s

compenasnapdtu onriydt aimvaeag neidsn junrcetlfoiirtve hefai lsl evgieodlo afht iiFsoi nr st

Amendmreingth ts.

AccortdoHi onogp sDiecfekn,dK aenvtDi int tamc aonr,r ecotfifiaocStneC arI l- Forest,

threattote enremdih niframot meh ijsoi bnt hper iksiotncfo hrae tnt emtpofit liaePn RgE A

comlpaiEnCtFN. o 1.- a13t .D ittmiannia'ttsit aetlmofi p rHteo opswiaocsvk e rtbuytrn heed

PriRseovni Ceowm mi(tPtR)e.CIe d H.o wevoenMr a,y2 02,0 1H9o,o psiincqkua istr owe hdy

heh ando bte ecna ltlowe odra knw da isn fotrhmDaeitdt tamnaadnnu nidenDteifefinedda nt

hafidr ehdib me caoufhs iPesR EcAo mplIadiW.ni ttr.he speOcbte rtlota hned er,

SuperinotfSe CnId-eFnHotor oepssatil,cl koe gneltsyhh aewt a "sa waorfte hn ea touftr hee

actions against Plaintiff and... upheld the decision of Defendants Kevin Dittman and John Doe,

thereby taking part in the retaliation.” Jd.

Presently pending is Oberlander’s Motion to Dismiss.'! ECF No. 3. For the following

reasons, Oberlander’s motion will be granted.”

I. Standards of Review

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal

sufficiency of the complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). In deciding a

motion to dismiss, the court is not opining on whether the plaintiff will be likely to prevail on the

merits; rather, the plaintiff must only present factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to

relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)

(citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed.

2004)). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S, 662 (2009)). A complaint should only be dismissed

pursuant to Rule 12 (b)(6) if it fails to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (rejecting the traditional 12 (b)(6) standard

established in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). In making this determination, the court

must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint and views them in a light

most favorable to the plaintiff. U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir.

2002).

While a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to

dismiss, a complaint must provide more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

A “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Jd. (citing Papasan v.

| Hoopsick has not filed any response to Oberlander’s motion.

2 The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge to conduct all

proceedings in this case, including the entry of final judgment, as authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 636.

Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Moreover, a court need not accept inferences drawn by a

plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as set forth in the complaint. See California Pub.

Employee Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower

Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the Court accept legal

conclusions disguised as factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan, 478

U.S. at 286). See also McTernan vy. City of York, Pennsylvania, 577 F.3d 521, 531 (3d Cir.

2009) (“The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint

is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”).

Expounding on the Twombly/Iqbal line of cases, the Third Circuit has articulated the

following three-step approach:

First, the court must ‘tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a

claim.’ Second, the court should identify allegations that, ‘because they are no more

than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.’ Finally, ‘where there

are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then

determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.’

Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Santiago v.

Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010)). This determination is “a context-specific

task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

Finally, because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the allegations in the complaint must be

held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner,

404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). Ifthe court can reasonably read a pro se litigant’s pleadings to

state a valid claim upon which relief could be granted, it should do so despite the litigant’s

failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence

construction, or unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364

(1982): United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Bierley, 141 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969) (petition

prepared by a prisoner may be inartfully drawn and should be read “with a measure of

tolerance”).

Ill. Analysis

In order to prevail on a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that a

defendant, acting under color of state law, deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States. Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d

Cir. 1995); Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 430 F.3d 140, 151 (3d Cir. 2005); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Critically, the plaintiff “must show that each and every defendant was ‘personal[ly] involve[d]’

in depriving him of his rights.” Kirk v. Roan, 2006 WL 2645154, at *3 (M.D. Pa. 2006) (quoting

Evancho y. Fischer, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2006)). This means that each defendant must

have played an “affirmative part” in the complained-of misconduct. Igbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (“Ina

§ 1983 suit ... [a]bsent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title

notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.”); Oliver v. Beard, 358 Fed. Appx.

297, 300 (3d Cir. 2009). In the absence of specific allegations that a defendant played a role in

depriving the plaintiff of a constitutional right, dismissal is appropriate. See, e.g., Mearin v.

Swartz, 951 F.Supp.2d 776, 781-82 (W.D. Pa. 2013) (dismissing claims pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6) because the plaintiffs had failed to set forth sufficient facts to establish that certain

defendants had played an affirmative part in the alleged Eighth Amendment violation).

These principles apply with equal force where the defendants are supervising prison

officials. See, e.g., Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that

liability for supervisory officials must still be based on “personal involvement in the alleged

wrongs”); Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[L]iability cannot be predicated

solely on the operation of respondeat superior.”). Although a supervisor cannot encourage

constitutional violations, “a supervising public official has [no] affirmative constitutional duty to

supervise and discipline so as to prevent violations of constitutional rights by his or her

subordinates.” Chinchello v. Fenton, 805 F.2d 126, 133 3d Cir. 1986); Brown v. Grabowski,

922 F.2d 1097, 1120 (3d Cir. 1990). Moreover, it is “well established that the filing of a

grievance is not sufficient to show the actual knowledge necessary for a defendant to be found

personally involved in the alleged unlawful conduct.” Mearin v, Swartz, 951 F.Supp.2d 776, 782

(W.D. Pa, 2013). See also Mincy v. Chmielsewski, 508 Fed. Appx. 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2013) □□□□□

officer’s review of, or failure to investigate, an inmate’s grievances generally does not satisfy the

requisite personal involvement.”’). Rather, a supervisor-defendant may only be liable for

unconstitutional acts undertaken by subordinates if the supervisor either: (1) with deliberate

indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which

directly caused [the] constitutional harm; or (2) participated in violating the plaintiff's rights,

directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in

the subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct. A.M. ex rel. J MK. v. Luzerne Cty. Juvenile Det.

Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004).

In the instant case, Hoopsick’s only factual averment regarding Oberlander is that he

became “aware” of Dittman’s retaliation in the course of “upholding” the denial of Hoopsick’s

subsequent grievance. ECF No. 1-1 at 3. Based on this allegation, it is apparent that Hoopsick is

attempting to hold Oberlander responsible for the unconstitutional action of another individual

based entirely upon his supervisory role in the prison system and his response to a grievance. As

described above, this type of averment is insufficient to establish personal involvement in the

deprivation of a constitutional right. See, e.g., Mincy v. Chmielsewski, 508 Fed. Appx. 99, 104

(3d Cir. 2013) (‘[A]n officer’s review of, or failure to investigate, an inmate’s grievances

generally does not satisfy the requisite personal involvement.”); Kloss v. SCI-Albion, 2018 WL

4609144, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 2018) (allegation that supervisory defendant was “made

aware of several issues of the plaintiff's and... failed to help him” is insufficient to state a claim

for reliefs) participation in an administrative appeal process); Rogers v. United States, 696

F.Supp.2d 472, 488 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (“If a grievance official’s only involvement is investigating

and/or ruling on an inmate’s grievance after the incident giving rise to the grievance has already

occurred, there is no personal involvement on the part of that official.””). Because Hoopsick’s

claims against Oberlander are based entirely upon his participation in the administrative

grievance appeal process, those claims must be dismissed, with prejudice.

TV. — Conclusion

For the reasons stated herein, Oberlander’s Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 3] is hereby

GRANTED. Hoopsick’s claims against Oberlander are dismissed, with prejudice.? The Clerk is

directed to terminate Oberlander from this action.

Ane 6 Lipa

United States Magistrate Judge

Dated: September 29, 2020

3 Because the Court concludes, as a matter of law, that Hoopsick cannot establish a retaliation claim against

Oberlander based on the incident described in the Complaint, any attempt to file a curative amendment would be

futile. See Blackstone v. Richter, 2013 WL 4766761, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 2013) (citing Shelley v. Patrick, 481

Fed. Appx. 34, 36 (3d Cir. 2012)).