WALTON v. COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY, PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

LUKE WALTON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 2:17cv150

) Electronic Filing

COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY )

PENNSYLVANIA, ADA CHRISTOPHER )

AVETTA, ADA SHELLEY ROHRER, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND

ORDER OF COURT

Proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, Luke Walton ("plaintiff") commenced this civil

action against the County of Allegheny, Assistant District Attorney Christopher Avetta ("ADA

Avetta"), and Assistant District Attorney Shelley Rohrer ("ADA Rohrer") asserting that his due

process rights were violated during the process that led to his ultimate acceptance of the

agreement. For the reasons set forth below, plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis will

be granted and his complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted.

Plaintiff avers that ADA Avetta mislead him in May of 2015, when she explained the

terms of a proposed plea agreement. The offers were for 6 to 12 years, 5 to 10 years and 3 to 6

years. Of course, plaintiff expressed a willingness to accept the third proposal of a state sentence

of 3 to 6 years with a recommendation for bootcamp. This understanding was reinforced by

Judge Cashman, Judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. Plaintiff was led to

believe from all that transpired that this meant he would serve a total of 9 months incarceration.

ADA Rohrer then changed the terms of the agreement at the time plaintiff entered his

change of plea on July 22, 2015. The change was the addition of a term of probation after a term

of incarceration at the recommended boot camp program. The term of probation increased the

length of punishment to which plaintiff has been exposed.

Plaintiff was sentenced to a term of 3 to 6 years of incarceration in the Court of Common

Pleas of Allegheny County by Judge Cashman. He was sent to Quehanna Motivational Boot

Camp.

Through this civil rights action plaintiff seeks the removal of the 4 year term of probation.

He also seeks general, special and punitive damages. See generally Complaint (Doc. No. 1-1).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has instructed the district courts

to utilize a two-step analysis to determine whether to direct service of a complaint where the

plaintiff seeks to proceed in forma pauperis. First, the court must determine whether the litigant

is indigent within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Second, the court must determine

whether the complaint is frivolous or malicious under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).2 Roman v. Jeffes,

904 F.2d 192, 194 n.1 (3d Cir. 1990). The court finds plaintiff to be without sufficient funds to

pay the required filing fee. Thus, he will be granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

In Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989), the Supreme Court identified two types of

legally frivolous complaints: (1) those based upon indisputably meritless legal theory, and (2)

those with factual contentions which clearly are baseless. Id. at 327. An example of the first is

where a defendant enjoys immunity from suit, and an example of the second is a claim

describing a factual scenario which is fanciful or delusional. Id. In addition, Congress has

expanded the scope of § 1915 to require that the court be satisfied that the complaint states a

2 This provision is now codified at §1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

claim upon which relief can be granted before it directs service; if it does not, the action shall be

dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

A review of plaintiff’s “complaint” reveals that it seeks to advance claims that are based

on indisputably meritless legal theory or are otherwise based on factual contentions that are

fanciful.

ADA Avetta and ADA Rohrer are entitled to prosecutorial immunity as to the actions

identified in plaintiff's complaint. As a general matter, prosecuting attorneys are absolutely

immune from suits for damages under § 1983 based on activities that are “intimately associated

with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976).

While this immunity does not extend to every act undertaken by a prosecutor, absolute immunity

extends to both “activity taken while in court, such as the presentation of evidence or legal

argument, as well as selected out-of-court behavior ‘intimately associated with the judicial

phases’ of litigation.” Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1463 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Imbler,

424 U.S. at 430). Negotiating the terms of the plea agreement and conducting a change of plea

hearing before the court are routine prosecutorial functions undertaken in a "quasi-judicial" role

and are activities "intimately associated with the judicial phases" of prosecution. As such, they

are activities cloaked with prosecutorial immunity. Consequently, plaintiff's claims against the

assistant prosecutors are based on indisputably meritless legal theory.

Moreover, plaintiff's claims against the County of Allegheny are fanciful. Plaintiff does

not complain of an act done by the County, but instead seeks to undo part of a criminal sentence.

The sentence was imposed by Judge Cashman, who was acting as a Judge for the Court of

Common Pleas of Allegheny County when he imposed the sentence.

Federal suits against the state are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.1 Alabama v. Pugh,

438 U.S. 781, 781-82 (1978). Eleventh Amendment immunity applies to suits against the state

regardless of the relief sought. In re Kish, 212 B.R. 808, 814 (Bkrtcy D. N.J. 1997) ("the

'jurisdictional bar [of the Eleventh Amendment] applies regardless of the relief sought'") (citing

Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100–01 (1984)); see also Cory v.

White, 457 U.S. 85, 90 (1982) ("It would be a novel proposition indeed that the Eleventh

Amendment does not bar a suit to enjoin the state itself simply because no money judgment is

sought.").

Suits against a state agency or a state department are considered to be suits against a state

which are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. In re Kish, 221 B.R. 118, 124-25 (Bkrtcy. D. N.J.

1998) (quoting Geis v. Board of Educ. of Parsippany–Troy Hills, Morris Cnty., 774 F.2d 575,

580 (3d Cir.1985)); accord Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991); Haybarger v. Lawrence

County Adult Probation And Parole, 551 F.3d 193, 198 ("the Eleventh Amendment applies to

suits against subunits of the State") (citing Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 100)). And suits against state

officials for acts taken in their official capacity must be treated as suits against the state. Hafer,

502 U.S. at 25.

"The Commonwealth [of Pennsylvania] vests judicial power in a unified judicial system,

and all courts and agencies of [that system] are part of the Commonwealth government rather

than local entities." Haybarger, 551 F.3d at 198 (citing Benn v. First Judicial Dist. of Pa., 426

F.3d 233, 240-41 (3d Cir. 2005) and Pa. Const. art. V, § 1)). It likewise is settled that

"Pennsylvania's judicial districts . . . are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity." Id.

1 The Eleventh Amendment "enacts a sovereign immunity from suit, rather than a nonwaivable

limit on the federal judiciary's subject-matter jurisdiction." Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of

Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 267 (1997).

Plaintiff seeks relief from a sentence that was imposed by a Judge acting pursuant to his

official duties as an officer of Pennsylvania's judicial system. As such, both the judge and the

Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.

And plaintiff may not superficially seek to substitute another county entity in order to defeat the

broad protections afforded by that immunity. In other words, plaintiff's attempt to state a claim

against Allegheny County is based on factual contentions that are fanciful or is otherwise

predicated on indisputably meritless legal theory. In either event the claims against the County

of Allegheny must be dismissed.

It follows that the complaint does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Accordingly, the following order is appropriate.

ORDER

AND NOW, this 17th day of March, 2020, for the reasons set forth in the memorandum

above, IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis be, and the same

hereby is, GRANTED. The Clerk of Court shall file [1-1] plaintiff's complaint; and,

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's "complaint" be, and the same hereby is,

dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. An order of final

judgment in the form of the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint will follow.

s/David Stewart Cercone

David Stewart Cercone

Senior United States District Judge

cc: Luke Walton

MC-6633

Quehanna Boot Camp

4510 Quehanna Highway

Karthaus, PA 16845

(Via CM/ECF Electronic Mail)

DISMISSED for failure to state a claim.2

s/David Stewart Cercone

David Stewart Cercone

Senior United States District Judge

cc: Whitney Washington

2926 Zephyr Avenue

Apartment 2

Pittsburgh, PA 15204

(Via First Class Mail)

(Via CM/ECF Electronic Mail)

2 As a general matter, a plaintiff is to be granted leave to amend a claim that has been dismissed

when an amendment might be able to cure the deficiencies resulting in the dismissal. Phillips v.

County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 236 (3d Cir. 2008). This principle does not apply, however,

where the record indicates any attempt to do so would be futile. Id. at 236 (citing Grayson v.

Mayview State Hospital, 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002)). Here, it appears that plaintiff's

"claims" are predicated solely on speculation. Consequently, the claims have been dismissed and

the case has been closed. To the extent plaintiff believes that this disposition is in error, he may

file a motion for reconsideration and attach to it his proposed amended complaint. The court will

review any such motion/filing pursuant to the standards governing a motion for leave to amend.

Any motion seeking such relief shall be filed on or before March 6, 2020.