HADZEGA v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MARK KEVIN HADZEGA, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 19-118-E

)

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY )

)

Defendant. )

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 23rd day of December, 2019, upon consideration of the parties’

cross motions for summary judgment, the Court, upon review of the Commissioner of Social

Security’s final decision, denying Plaintiff’s claim for disability insurance benefits under

Subchapter II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq., finds that the Commissioner’s

findings are supported by substantial evidence and, accordingly, affirms. See 42 U.S.C.§ 405(g);

Jesurum v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995);

Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1182 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nom., 507 U.S. 924

(1993); Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988); see also Berry v. Sullivan, 738 F.

Supp. 942, 944 (W.D. Pa. 1990) (if supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s

decision must be affirmed, as a federal court may neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse,

merely because it would have decided the claim differently) (citing Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d

700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981)).1

1 Plaintiff argues that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred: (1) by failing to find

that Plaintiff is disabled, due to his left arm impairment, according to the Medical-Vocational

Guidelines, 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2 (“the Grids”); and (2) by failing to fully

account for Plaintiff’s left knee impairment, resulting in a residual functional capacity (“RFC”)

assessment not supported by substantial evidence. The Court disagrees and finds that substantial

evidence supports the ALJ’s findings as well as his ultimate determination, based on all the

evidence presented, of Plaintiff’s non-disability.

First, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in failing to find him to be disabled pursuant

to Grid Rule 201.14. In his decision, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the RFC to

perform light work with additional limitations, including an inability to lift more than five

pounds with his left arm. (R. 17). Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have found that such

RFC, in essence, limited Plaintiff to sedentary work which, under the Grids (and taking his age

into consideration), would have directed a finding of “disabled” without any need to seek

guidance from a Vocational Expert (“VE”).

The Social Security regulations, however, provide ALJs with clear guidance in how to

evaluate cases where a Plaintiff’s RFC falls between the definitions of “sedentary work” and

“light work” that are set forth in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(a) and (b), including, in particular, where

there is loss of use of an upper extremity. In such cases, the regulations dictate that an ALJ

should properly seek the assistance of a VE to determine whether a sufficient occupational base

remains to satisfy the minimal requirements for a finding of “Not disabled.” See SSR 83-12,

1983 WL 31253, at *4 (1983). In the present case, since the ALJ found that Plaintiff could do

light work with additional limitations (including greater restrictions in the use of his left arm),

the ALJ obtained testimony from a VE, specifically asking him whether jobs exist that would be

compatible with the exact limitations assessed in Plaintiff’s RFC. (R. 60-73). In response, the

VE testified that there were three types of jobs that an individual with Plaintiff’s specific

limitations could perform that exist in substantial numbers in the national economy, and he

confirmed his answers upon significant follow-up questioning by Plaintiff’s attorney and the

ALJ. The Court therefore finds that the ALJ acted precisely in accordance with the regulations

in seeking assistance from a VE in this case. The Court further finds that the VE provided

sufficient testimony at the hearing to support the ALJ’s decision. Accordingly, the Court finds

no merit in Plaintiff’s claim that the ALJ erred in his decision by relying on the VE’s testimony

rather than by simply finding Plaintiff to be disabled pursuant to the Grids.

Second, Plaintiff asserts that the RFC formulated by the ALJ failed to include adequate

limitations related to Plaintiff’s left knee impairment, and that the RFC is therefore not supported

by substantial evidence. A claimant’s RFC is the most that he or she can do despite his or her

limitations. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a). The determination of a claimant’s RFC is solely

within the province of the ALJ. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). In formulating a claimant’s

RFC, the ALJ must weigh the evidence as a whole, including medical records, medical source

opinions, a claimant’s subjective complaints, and descriptions of his or her own limitations. See

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527, 404.1529, 404.1545. In this case, after reviewing the relevant evidence

of record, the ALJ determined that, due to Plaintiff’s impairments, he was capable of performing

work at a light exertional level, with several specific additional limitations. (R. 17).

Upon careful consideration of the ALJ’s decision and the record as a whole, the Court

does not agree with Plaintiff’s claim that, in formulating his RFC, the ALJ failed to provide

Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. No. 7) is DENIED and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No.

9) is GRANTED.

sufficient limitations to address his knee impairment. In his decision, the ALJ found that

Plaintiff’s severe impairments included his past knee surgeries, which consisted of left knee ACL

reconstruction and meniscectomy. (R. 14). The ALJ thoroughly reviewed Plaintiff’s knee

injuries, surgeries and complaints, and summarized his follow-up treatments. The ALJ also

discussed Plaintiff’s activities of daily living, which included snowmobiling and cutting wood.

(R. 20). The ALJ specifically explained that review of the evidence of record reasonably

supports a finding that Plaintiff’s alleged difficulty with standing and walking, as well as pain

allegedly stemming from difficulty with his left leg, is accommodated by the lifting and carrying

requirements of light exertion. (R. 19). Moreover, the ALJ found that, “[w]hen considered as a

whole, the claimant’s longitudinal medical record related to his left knee does not document

functional limitations that would preclude sustaining light exertion or that would otherwise

support the intensity or persistence of his subjective limitations related to his ability to stand or

walk extended periods.” (R. 20). Finally, the ALJ reinforced his conclusions by explaining that

“review of [Plaintiff’s] medical records fails to document a nature or scope of treatment or

objective findings as would support the extent of limitation subjectively alleged,” and that the

record reflects Plaintiff “reporting to medical providers that he engages in a range of activities

that far exceed the extent of daily activities reported during the course of his disability

application process.” (R. 24). The ALJ then reasonably concluded that, although Plaintiff

alleged an inability to work above a sedentary level, “[w]hen considered as a whole, it is

reasonable to find the claimant limited to a range of unskilled, light exertion because of the

combined effects of his impairments, but a more restrictive finding is not supported by the

evidence of record.” (R. 24).

After careful review, the Court finds that the ALJ did not fail to include in his RFC

adequate limitations related to Plaintiff’s left knee impairment. Rather, the Court concludes that,

after reviewing and engaging in significant discussion of the evidence of record, including

medical evidence, opinion evidence, and Plaintiff’s testimony, the ALJ reasonably determined

that limiting Plaintiff to light work, including the corresponding lifting and carrying restrictions,

adequately accommodated Plaintiff’s left knee impairment.

As to any additional arguments mentioned summarily by Plaintiff in his brief, the Court

finds that he has failed to establish how the ALJ’s alleged failure to consider properly any

additional evidence of record constitutes error.

Therefore, the Court finds that the ALJ did not err by relying on VE testimony rather

than simply concluding that Plaintiff is disabled under the Grids. The Court further finds that the

ALJ did not err by failing to provide adequate limitations related to Plaintiff’s left knee

impairment. Accordingly, the Court affirms.

s/ Alan N. Bloch

United States District Judge

ecf: Counsel of record