The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TAYLA MOORE, as Administrator of No. 4:22-CV-00576
the Estate of JAHRELL JENKINS,
Deceased, and as Mother and Legal (Chief Judge Brann)
Guardian of the Minor Children, J.J.
and L.J.,
Plaintiff,
v.
FRED’S WOODSHED, INC. and
FRED HEFFELFINGER, JR.,
a/k/a Fred Brown,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
JUNE 13, 2024
I. BACKGROUND
On April 5, 2024, the Court ordered Plaintiff, Tayla Moore, to show cause as
to why this case should not be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
41(b) for a failure to prosecute by June 4, 2024.1 The Court provided Moore with
the alternative option of filing a motion for entry of default against the Defendants,
Fred’s Woodshed, Inc. and Fred Heffelfinger, Jr., pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 55(a).2 Since then, the Court has received no communication from
Moore. Accordingly, I now dismiss her case with prejudice under Rule 41(b).
II. DISCUSSION
Rule 41(b) “authorizes district courts to involuntarily dismiss an action, with
prejudice, ‘where a plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a
court order ….”3 “Dismissals for failure to prosecute are ‘drastic’ and ‘extreme’
sanctions and ‘should be reserved’ for cases where there has been ‘flagrant bad
faith’ on the part of the plaintiffs.”4 In reaching a decision, the Court is required to
consider six factors identified by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit in Poulis v. State Farm Fire Ins. & Cas. Co.: “(1) the extent of the party’s
personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the [adversary]; (3) a history of
dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in
bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an
analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claims or
defense.”5 No “single Poulis factor is dispositive” and “not all of the Poulis factors
need to be satisfied in order to dismiss” a case.6
2 Id.
3 Beale v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., Civ. A. No. 22-4810, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 229382, at
*2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 27, 2023) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b)).
4 Barger v. Walton, 260 F. App’x 476, 477 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Poulis v. State Farm Fire
Ins. & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 867-68 (3d Cir. 1984)).
5 Id.
6 Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 263 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322
F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2003) and Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992)).
A. Plaintiff’s Personal Responsibility
Since the Court granted the Motion to Withdraw as Attorney on April 4,
2024, Moore has been proceeding pro se. Accordingly, the responsibility for her
failure to respond to the Court’s April 5, 2024 Order is solely her own. As such,
this factor supports dismissal.
B. Prejudice to the Adversary
Ordinarily prejudice to the adversary would support dismissal as this case
has remained dormant for two years. However, the Defendants have never once
appeared. This factor is neutral under these circumstances.
C. History of Dilatoriness
“‘[E]xtensive or repeated delay or delinquency constitutes a history of
dilatoriness ….’”7 The Third Circuit has held “that ‘extensive’ delay can create a
history of dilatoriness.”8 This means that the plaintiff “does nothing ….”9 As a
result, Plaintiff’s behavior supports dismissal under this factor. She has not
advanced this case for approximately two years. This exemplifies a clear history of
dilatoriness.
7 Hildebrand v. Allegheny Cty., 923 F.3d 128, 135 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Adams v. Tr. of the
New Jersey Brewery Employees’ Pension Tr. Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 874 (3d Cir. 1994)).
8 Id. (citing Adams, 29 F.3d at 874).
9 Id. (quoting Adams, 29 F.3d at 875).
D. Willful or Bad Faith Behavior
Next, I must determine whether Plaintiff’s conduct was willful or taken in
bad faith. Nothing in the record before the Court suggests that Moore acted in bad
faith, but her conduct was willful. As discussed above, Moore did not advance this
case for approximately two years. More critically, she failed to respond to the
Court’s April 5, 2024 Show Cause Order that had been mailed to her address on
file. As the Third Circuit has stated, “[a]bsence of reasonable excuses may suggest
that the conduct was willful or in bad faith.”10 Here, Plaintiff has not offered any
excuse, let alone a reasonable one.11 Consequently, this factor supports dismissal.
E. Effectiveness of Other Sanctions
When determining if dismissal under Rule 41(b) is appropriate, the Court is
required to evaluate the effectiveness of other sanctions. I conclude that lesser
sanctions would be completely ineffective. While the Court may impose a
monetary fine, there is no indication that Moore would respond. When faced with a
nonresponsive party, any action short of dismissal would fall on deaf ears. I
therefore conclude that this factor also supports dismissal.
10 Roman v. City of Reading, 121 F. App’x 955, 960 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Ware, 322 F.3d at
224).
11 See e.g., Hynes v. Derry Twp. Sch. Dist., No. 1:21-cv-01736, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45597,
2024 WL 1118975 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 14, 2024) (Kane, J.) (collecting cases). See also Alva v.
Sage, No. 1:23-cv-01203, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 193615, 2023 WL 7111226 (M.D. Pa. Oct.
27, 2023) (Kane, J.).
F. Meritoriousness of the Claim
Finally, the Court is required to evaluate the meritoriousness of Plaintiff’s
claims. As the Defendants have never once appeared and responded to the
allegations, Moore would be able to pursue a default judgment. Thus, this factor
counsels against dismissal.
III. CONCLUSION
After carefully weighing the six Poulis factors, the Court concludes that four
of these factors support dismissing this case with prejudice. Dismissal is therefore
warranted. In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), this case is
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to prosecute; and
2. The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this case.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Matthew W. Brann
Matthew W. Brann
Chief United States District Judge