The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
THOMAS E. WOODS, :
Plaintiff :
: No. 1:23-cv-2029
v. :
: (Judge Rambo)
GEORGE RALSTON, et al., :
Defendants :
MEMORANDUM
This is a prisoner civil rights case filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in
which pro se Plaintiff Thomas E. Woods (“Woods”) alleges violations of his civil
rights by various employees of Huntingdon State Correctional Institution (“SCI-
Huntingdon”) and Rockview State Correctional Institution (“SCI-Rockview”) who
are purportedly engaged in a conspiracy to violate his rights. Following the court’s
dismissal of Woods’s original complaint, the case is presently proceeding on
Woods’s amended complaint. In accordance with the Prison Litigation Reform
Act (“PLRA”), the court has conducted an initial review of Woods’s amended
complaint. For the reasons set forth below, the court will dismiss the complaint
without further leave to amend except to the extent that it states a claim for
deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm against Defendants
Jenkins, Ralston, and Price.
I. BACKGROUND
Woods filed this case on November 21, 2023, and the court received and
docketed his original complaint on December 7, 2023. (Doc. No. 1.) The court
dismissed the complaint without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted on January 30, 2024, and granted Woods leave to file an
amended complaint. (Doc. Nos. 10-11.) After obtaining two extensions of time,
Woods timely filed his amended complaint on April 29, 2024, and the court
received and docketed the amended complaint on May 16, 2024. (Doc. No. 16.)
The amended complaint asserts civil rights claims against forty defendants
who are purportedly engaged in an ongoing conspiracy committed under a
“Buddy-Buddy-System.” (Id. at 1-2.)1 The complaint alleges generally that: (1)
Woods received inadequate medical care to treat an injury he suffered to his
Achilles tendon in 2018; (2) various conditions of his confinement in SCI-
Huntingdon between 2018 and October 2021 violated his constitutional rights; (3)
he received inadequate medical care following a surgery for the Achilles injury on
1 In accordance with the legal standard set forth below, the court accepts the
allegations in the complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences therefrom
in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Kedra v. Schroeter, 876 F.3d 424, 434 (3d
Cir. 2017). Mere conclusory statements, however, are not entitled to the
assumption of truth. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). In addition,
pro se documents are “to be liberally construed.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
106 (1976). Thus, Plaintiff’s complaint, “however inartfully pleaded,” will be held
to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
November 8, 2021; (4) the conditions of his confinement between November 8,
2021 and December 14, 2021 violated his constitutional rights; and (5) following
his transfer to SCI-Rockview on December 14, 2021, the conditions of his
confinement violated his constitutional rights. (See generally id.)
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Screening Standard
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, district courts are required to review
complaints in civil actions in which prisoners seek redress from governmental
entities or officers or employees of governmental entities. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
If the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief, then the district court must dismiss the complaint. Id. § 1915A(b). In
screening complaints, district courts apply the standard governing motions to
dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). To avoid
dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a civil complaint must set out “sufficient factual
matter” to show that its claims are facially plausible. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
When evaluating the plausibility of a complaint, the court is required to
“accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, construe the complaint in
the light favorable to the plaintiff, and ultimately determine whether plaintiff may
be entitled to relief under any reasonable reading of the complaint.” Mayer v.
Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 2010). However, “the tenet that a court must
accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal
conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Additionally, in the specific context of pro se prisoner litigation, a district
court must be mindful that a document filed pro se “is to be liberally construed.”
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. A pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be
held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
B. Section 1983 Civil Rights Claims
Woods has filed his complaint pursuant to Section 1983, which provides, in
pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 imposes civil liability upon any person who,
acting under the color of state law, deprives another individual of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.”
Shuman v. Penn Manor School Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2005. Section
1983 “does not create any new substantive rights but instead provides a remedy for
the violation of a federal constitutional or statutory right.” Id.
III. TIMELINESS
As a threshold matter before discussing the merits of Woods’s amended
complaint, the court will address the issue of timeliness. Although the running of a
statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that ordinarily must be pleaded and
proven by defendants, district courts may dismiss claims as time barred pursuant to
the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 if the untimeliness is clear from the
face of the complaint. See, e.g., Feingold v. Brooks, 791 F. App’x 325, 326 (3d
Cir. 2020).
Section 1983 claims alleging civil rights violations that occurred in
Pennsylvania are subject to Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations for
personal injury actions. Moore v. Walton, 96 F.4th 616, 622 (3d Cir. 2024). Under
the continuing violations doctrine, claims that occurred outside of this two-year
limitations period may be deemed timely if they are part of a continuing practice
that continued into the limitations period. Randall v. City of Phila. Law Dep’t, 919
F.3d 196, 198 (3d Cir. 2019). Under the continuing violations doctrine, “so long as
the last act in the continuing practice falls within the limitations period[,] the court
will grant relief for the earlier related acts that would otherwise be time barred.”
Id. (cleaned up) (citing Cowell v. Palmer Township, 263 F.3d 286, 292 (3d Cir.
2001)).
In this case, Woods filed his original complaint on November 21, 2023.2
(Doc. No. 1.) Thus, any claims based on conduct that occurred before November
21, 2021 are untimely unless they can be deemed timely under the continuing
violations doctrine.
Having reviewed the factual allegations in the amended complaint, the court
will dismiss all claims arising from facts that occurred prior to November 8, 2021
as untimely. Woods asserts various medical care and conditions of confinement
claims occurring before that date, but he does not provide any factual connection
between those facts and facts that occurred within the limitations period beyond
conclusory assertions that they all arose from the “Buddy-Buddy-System.” This is
not sufficient to establish that they are part of a continuing practice such that they
can be deemed timely under the continuing violations doctrine.
As for the claims based on facts that occurred between November 8, 2021,
and November 21, 2021, the court finds that these claims are timely pursuant to the
continuing violations doctrine. Woods alleges that he was given surgery for his
Achilles heel injury on November 8, 2021, and that he received deficient medical
2 The complaint is deemed filed on the date it was submitted to prison officials for
mailing pursuant to the prisoner mailbox rule. See Pabon v. Mahanoy, 654 F.3d
385, 391 n.8 (3d Cir. 2011).
care immediately following the surgery, which continued into the limitations
period. The court accordingly will not dismiss these claims as untimely because
the court liberally construes the allegations to establish a continuing pattern of
conduct beginning with the surgery on November 8, 2021, and continuing into the
limitations period.
The court will additionally dismiss as untimely all claims arising from facts
that occurred after December 14, 2021. In Woods’s original complaint, he did not
allege any facts that occurred after that date. (See generally Doc. No. 1.) The facts
that he now alleges occurred between December 14, 2021 and January 4, 2022
were not included in this case until he filed his amended complaint on April 29,
2024.3 (See Doc. No. 16.) Thus, because the claims are facially outside the
limitations period for a complaint filed on April 29, 2024, they can only be
considered timely if they relate back to the claims asserted in the original
complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c).
Rule 15(c) allows a claim raised in an amended complaint to be treated as if
it were filed on the date of the original complaint if “the amendment asserts a claim
or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out--or
attempted to be set out--in the original pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B); see
3 As noted above, the amended complaint is deemed filed on the date Woods
submitted it for mailing pursuant to the prisoner mailbox rule. See Pabon, 654
F.3d at 391 n.8.
also SEPTA v. Orrstown Fin. Servs. Inc., 12 F.4th 337, 344-45 (3d Cir. 2021).4
“Where an amendment relates back, Rule 15(c) allows a plaintiff to sidestep an
otherwise-applicable statute of limitations, thereby permitting resolution of a claim
on the merits, as opposed to a technicality.” Glover v. FDIC, 698 F.3d 139, 145
(3d Cir. 2012). The relation back doctrine balances “the interests of the defendant
protected by the statute of limitations with the preference expressed in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in general, and Rule 15 in particular, for resolving
disputes on their merits.” Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 560 U.S. 538, 550
(2010).
The “touchstone” of whether claims are sufficiently related for purposes of
the relation back doctrine is “fair notice,” because the doctrine is “premised on the
theory that ‘a party who has been notified of litigation concerning a particular
occurrence has been given all the notice that statutes of limitations were intended
to provide.’” Glover, 698 F.3d at 145 (quoting Baldwin Cty. Welcome Ctr. v.
Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 149 n.3 (1984)). Relation back is accordingly only allowed
if the opposing party has been given ‘fair notice of the general fact situation and
the legal theory upon which the amending party proceeds.” Id. (quoting Bensel v.
Allied Pilots Ass’n, 387 F.3d 298, 310 (3d Cir. 2004)). Amended claims “that
4 Rule 15(c) allows a claim raised in an amended complaint to relate back to the
original complaint in two other situations, neither of which is relevant to the instant
analysis. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c).
restate the original claim with greater particularity or amplify the factual
circumstances surrounding the pertinent conduct, transaction or occurrence in the
preceding pleading fall within Rule 15(c).” Bensel, 387 F.3d at 310. On the other
hand, “amendments ‘that significantly alter the nature of a proceeding by injecting
new and unanticipated claims are treated far more cautiously.’” Glover, 698 F.3d
at 145 (quoting United States v. Hicks, 283 F.3d 380, 388 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
Where the original complaint did not give the defendant fair notice of the claim
that the plaintiff attempts to bring in the amended complaint and the grounds upon
which the claim rests, relation back is not appropriate. Id.
The court finds that the claims based on facts that occurred between
December 14, 2021 and January 4, 2022 do not relate back to the claims that were
asserted in the original complaint. The amended complaint alleges that Woods was
transferred from SCI-Huntingdon to SCI-Rockview on December 14, 2021 and
that the conditions of his confinement and various other aspects of his
incarceration in SCI-Rockview following the transfer violated his constitutional
rights. (See Doc. No. 16 at 59-65.) The amended complaint does not allege any
factual connection between these allegations and the facts that occurred in SCI-
Huntingdon prior to the transfer other than conclusory assertions that the transfer
was caused by the “Buddy-Buddy-System.” (Id. at 59, 64-65.) Accordingly,
because the claims asserted in the amended complaint that are based on facts
occurring after December 14, 2021 do not arise from the same “conduct,
transaction, or occurrence” as the claims asserted in the original complaint, relation
back is inappropriate. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B). The court will dismiss these
claims as untimely. The court’s analysis accordingly proceeds to the merits of
Woods’s amended complaint only as to the alleged facts that occurred between his
surgery on November 8, 2021 and his transfer between prisons on December 14,
2021. (See Doc. 16 at 45-59.) The court will briefly summarize these factual
allegations in the next section.
IV. REMAINING FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
In the relevant portion of the amended complaint, Woods alleges that the
surgery was performed on November 8, 2021, after which he was placed in a cast
from his knee down and given crutches. (Id. at 45.) The complaint alleges that
after his surgery, he was placed in an “extremely squalid” cell that did not have a
desk or shelves and had a broken sink that leaked water on the floor. (Id.) Woods
was then allegedly transferred, on November 24, 2021, to a cell that was at the
back of a housing block, necessitating a walk of approximately “two city streets or
a football field” when he needed to a get a food tray or other items. (Id.)
The amended complaint alleges that on November 27, 2021, Woods
exacerbated his Achilles injury in an unspecified manner while walking from his
cell. (Id. at 47-48.) Defendant Talasky allegedly gave Woods Tylenol for the pain
he was experiencing, despite being aware that Tylenol had not relieved pain he had
experienced in the past. (Id. at 48.) Woods was transferred to a different cell
closer to the front of the housing block on November 29, 2021. (Id. at 49.) The
amended complaint alleges that Wood had not been given a shower in eight days at
this point and that he requested the use of a “medical support” shower. (Id.)
Defendants allegedly denied his request. (Id. at 49-51.) The amended complaint
avers that Woods subsequently fell while using the prison’s standard shower
facilities, causing him to hit his head and lose consciousness and suffer bruising on
his head, neck, and back. (Id. at 51-52.)
On December 1, 2021, Woods was allegedly placed in a “behavioral
modified” cell as punishment for filing grievances against prison officials. (Id. at
52-53.) The walls of the cell were allegedly smeared with human feces. (Id. at
53.) Woods’s crutches were allegedly taken away from him before he moved into
this cell, causing him to have to crawl and hop around the cell. (Id.) Defendant
Price and other correctional officers and medical professionals purportedly
observed this and laughed at Woods. (Id.) Although the amended complaint does
not specify how long Woods was in the “behavioral modified” cell, it appears from
context that he was moved out of the cell on the same day he was placed there,
December 1, 2021. (See id. at 54 (noting that a response to grievance Woods filed
regarding the conditions of his confinement in the cell he was subsequently moved
to addressed the conditions of the cell on December 1, 2021).) Woods was
subsequently moved out of this cell by Defendant Harris and back to the cell at the
rear of the housing block where he was previously placed. (Id.) Woods attempted
to file a grievance against Harris for his cell placement. (Id. at 54.) Harris
purportedly read the grievance and then retaliated against Woods for filing it by
fabricating a report of misconduct by Woods. (Id.)
On November 29, 2021, Woods placed a sick call request to be seen by the
prison’s medical department for pain that he was experiencing from his Achilles
injury and the injuries he suffered from the fall in the shower. (Id. at 54-55.)
Defendant Price and the prison’s medical staff were allegedly aware that Woods
was in pain but refused to see him for six days. (Id. at 55.) Following this six-day
delay, Woods was seen for a sick call on December 6, 2021, by Defendant
Talasky, who allegedly refused to remove sutures from Woods’s surgery, despite
the fact that the surgeon who performed the surgery had directed that the sutures
should be removed two weeks after the surgery. (Id. at 55-56.) Woods was then
taken to see the surgeon the next day, on December 7, 2021, who removed his cast
and sutures. (Id. at 56.) The surgeon determined that Woods may have
exacerbated his Achilles injury. (Id.) On December 8, 2021, Defendants Ralston
and Tess allegedly fabricated a misconduct report against Woods after he was
returned to the prison from his appointment with the surgeon. (Id.)
Woods attended sick call again on December 9, 2021, at which point
Defendant Nalley prescribed him Tylenol and “another medication,” despite
allegedly being “fully aware” that these medications “would not work” because
they had not helped Woods in the past. (Id.)
V. DISCUSSION
A. Merits
The court liberally construes the amended complaint as asserting six claims
based on the events that occurred between November 8, 2021 and December 14,
2021: (1) that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Woods’s serious medical
needs when they provided inadequate medical care following his surgery; (2) that
Woods’s placement in various cells violated his constitutional rights; (3) that
Defendants were deliberately indifferent to a serious risk of harm when they
compelled him to shower without the use of a “medical support” shower and he
subsequently fell in the shower; (4) that Defendants fabricated misconduct reports
against Woods; (5) that Defendants’ actions constituted retaliation for Woods
filing grievances; and (6) that Defendants were engaged in a civil conspiracy. (See
Doc. 16 at 45-59.)
Woods’s retaliation and conspiracy claims plainly fail. To state a claim for
retaliation in violation of the First Amendment, a plaintiff must allege that (1) he
engaged in constitutionally protected conduct; (2) the defendant took retaliatory
action against him that was sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from
exercising his constitutional rights; and (3) there was a causal connection between
the protected conduct and the retaliatory action. Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523,
530 (3d Cir. 2003). To state a claim for civil conspiracy, a plaintiff must allege:
(1) an agreement between two or more defendants to do an unlawful act; (2) an
overt act in furtherance of the agreement; and (3) actual damages to the plaintiff.
Kline v. Security Guards, Inc., 386 F.3d 246, 262 (3d Cir. 2004). Here, the only
allegations of causation to support a retaliation claim and the only allegations of an
agreement to support a conspiracy claim are Woods’s conclusory assertions that
the Defendants were engaged in a “Buddy-Buddy-System.” These conclusory
allegations are not entitled to the assumption of truth and are not sufficient to state
retaliation and conspiracy claims upon which relief may be granted.
Woods’s deliberate indifference to a serious medical need claim will also be
dismissed. To state a claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, a
plaintiff must allege “(i) a serious medical need, and (ii) acts or omissions by
prison officials that indicate deliberate indifference to that need.” Natale v.
Camden Cty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Rouse v.
Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999)). In this case, Woods’s general
allegations that he was in pain are not sufficient to allege a serious medical need.
See, e.g., White v. Harry, No. 1:23-cv-01336, 2024 WL 198896, at *3 (M.D. Pa.
Jan. 18, 2024) (finding that “bare assertion” that plaintiff suffered pain and
superficial bruising was not sufficient to allege serious medical need and collecting
other cases supporting that point). Moreover, even assuming that Woods alleges a
serious medical need, he has not alleged any actions by Defendants that would
amount to deliberate indifference to that need. The amended complaint makes
clear that Woods received medical care for his pain throughout the relevant period;
his assertion of deliberate indifference appears to be nothing more than a
disagreement as to what treatment he should have been provided, which is not
sufficient to allege deliberate indifference. Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v.
Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 (3d Cir. 1987).
The court will likewise dismiss Woods’s claims that his placement in
various cells amounted to unconstitutional conditions of confinement. To state an
Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim, a plaintiff must allege that:
(1) he suffered a “sufficiently serious” deprivation; and (2) the defendants had a
sufficiently culpable state of mind. Clark v. Coupe, 55 F.4th 167, 179 (3d Cir.
2022) (quoting Thomas v. Tice, 948 F.3d 133, 138 (3d Cir. 2020)). The first
element requires allegations that the plaintiff was denied “the minimal civilized
measures of life’s necessities.” Id. (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 299
(1991)). The second element is subjective and requires allegations that defendants
were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff’s
health or safety. Id. (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)).
Here, Woods alleges that his placement in various cells in the prison violated
his constitutional rights, but inmates do not have a constitutional right to placement
in any particular cell, Sheehan v. Beyer, 51 F.3d 1170, 1174 (3d Cir. 1995), and
Woods’s allegations that one cell had a leaky toilet and that another cell was far
away from where he had to walk to get food do not constitute denials of the
“minimal civilized measures of life’s necessities.” Clark, 55 F.4th at 179.
Although Woods’s allegation that he was housed in a cell where human feces was
smeared on the wall may be sufficient to support a conditions of confinement
claim, (see Doc. No. 16 at 53), it appears from the complaint that Woods was
housed in this cell for less than one full day and did not spend any nights sleeping
in the cell. This transitory exposure to the adverse conditions of the cell is not
sufficient to state a conditions of confinement claim upon which relief may be
granted.
Finally, Woods’s claims of falsified misconduct reports will be dismissed.
Woods does not allege that the allegedly falsified misconduct reports resulted in
any disciplinary sanctions or any other adverse consequences against him, and
“mere allegations of falsified evidence or misconduct reports, without more, are
not enough to state a due process claim.” Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 654
(3d Cir. 2002).
The only claim that the court will allow to proceed is Wood’s claim that
prison officials were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm
when they compelled him to use a shower lacking “medical support” after his
surgery and that he subsequently fell while in the shower. This claim sounds in
deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm, which requires
allegations that: (1) the plaintiff was incarcerated under conditions posing a
substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendant was deliberately indifferent to
that risk; and (3) the defendant’s deliberate indifference caused him harm. Bistrian
v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 366 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833),
abrogated in nonrelevant part as recognized by Mack v. Yost, 968 F.3d 311, 319
n.7 (3d Cir. 2020). Here, Woods alleges that: (1) Defendants were aware that
Woods required the use of crutches following his surgery; (2) that they compelled
him to shower in a non-accessible shower without the use of crutches; (3) that he
fell while using the shower; and (4) that he suffered physical injuries from the fall.
The court finds these allegations sufficient to state a deliberate indifference claim
upon which relief may be granted.
The only defendants who were allegedly personally involved in this
deliberate indifference claim are Defendants Jenkins, Ralston, and Price. No other
Defendants are alleged to have compelled Woods to shower in a non-accessible
shower or to have directed others to compel Woods to do so. Accordingly, the
claim will only be allowed to proceed with respect to Defendants Jenkins, Ralston,
and Price.
B. Leave to Amend
Due to the applicable liberal pleading standard, a plaintiff should generally
be granted leave to amend before a court dismisses a claim that is merely deficient.
Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure allow for amendments to be granted liberally in light of
the “principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the
merits.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
However, the court may deny leave to amend where there is “undue delay,
bad faith[,] or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure
deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing
party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of the amendment.”
Id. The court may also deny leave to amend where the proposed amendment
would be futile—that is, where the pleading, “as amended, would fail to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted.” In re NAHC, Inc. Sec. Litig., 306 F.3d
1314, 1332 (3d Cir. 2002) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
The court will deny leave to amend as futile with respect to the dismissed
claims. Woods has had multiple opportunities to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted but has failed to do so with respect to these claims. See Foman,
371 U.S. at 182 (noting that leave to amend may be denied based on a plaintiff’s
“repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed”).
VI. CONCLUSION
The court will dismiss the amended complaint without further leave to
amend except to the extent that Woods alleges deliberate indifference to a
substantial risk of serious harm by Defendants Jenkins, Ralston, and Price. The
court will direct service of process on Jenkins, Ralston, and Price. An appropriate
order follows.
s/ Sylvia H. Rambo
United States District Judge
Dated: June 3, 2024