Opinion

Youmans v. Nickolas

Court: District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
Filed: Jun 3, 2024
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 29.2%

“whenever the challenge ultimately attacks the ‘core of habeas'—the validity of the continued conviction or the fact or length of the sentence—a challenge, however denominated and regardless of the relief sought, must be brought by way of a habeas corpus petition.”

How later courts described this case

“whenever the challenge ultimately attacks the ‘core of habeas'—the validity of the continued conviction or the fact or length of the sentence—a challenge, however denominated and regardless of the relief sought, must be brought by way of a habeas corpus petition.”
applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard to dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)
holding that habeas relief is available to challenge the fact or duration of confinement
explaining that when dismissing a complaint pursuant to § 1915A, “a court employs the motion to dismiss standard set forth under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)’

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

KAITLYN YOUMANS, Civil No. 3:24-cv-898

Plaintiff (Judge Mariani)

v .

WENDY NICKOLAS, et al, .

Defendants □

MEMORANDUM

Presently before the Court is a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

filed by Kaitlyn Youmans (“Youmans’), an inmate confined at the State Correctional

Institution, Muncy, Pennsylvania (“SCl-Muncy”). (Doc. 1). Youmans alleges that she is

falsely imprisoned. Named as Defendants are Superintendent Wendy Nickolas, Records

Supervisor Ms. Lambert, Parole Board Member Deborah Carpenter, and Institutional Parole

Agent Ms. Murray.

The complaint is presently before the Court for preliminary screening pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). For the reasons set forth below, the complaint will be dismissed for

failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

I. Legal Standards

The Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (April 26,

1996), authorizes a district court to review a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner is

proceeding in forma pauperis or seeks redress against a governmental employee or entity.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Court is required to identify

cognizable claims and to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant

who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), 28 U.S.C. § 1915A\(b).

This initial screening is to be done as soon as practicable and need not await service of

process. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).

In dismissing claims under §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A, district courts apply the

standard governing motions to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Smithson v. Koons, Civ. No. 15-01757, 2017 WL

3016165, at *3 (M.D. Pa. June 26, 2017) (stating “[t]he legal standard for dismissing a

complaint for failure to state a claim under § 1915A(b)(1), § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), or §

1997e(c)(1) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”); Mitchell v. Dodrill, 696 F. Supp. 2d 454, 471 (M.D. Pa.

2010) (explaining that when dismissing a complaint pursuant to § 1915A, “a court employs

the motion to dismiss standard set forth under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)’);

Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) standard to dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)).

A complaint must be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), if it

does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Att.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). The

plaintiff must aver “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonapie inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129

S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009).

“Though a complaint ‘does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” DelRio-Mocci v. Connolly Prop.

Inc., 672 F.3d 241, 245 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In other words,

“factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”

Covington v. Int'l Ass’n of Approved Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 118 (3d Cir. 2013)

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). A court “take[s] as true all the factual

allegations in the Complaint and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from those

facts, but . . . disregard[s] legal conclusions and threadbare recitals of the elements of a

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Ethypharm S.A. France v.

Abbott Laboratories, 707 F.3d 223, 231, n.14 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal citations and quotation

marks omitted).

Twombly and Iqbal require [a district court] to take the following three steps to

determine the sufficiency of a complaint: First, the court must take note of the elements a

plaintiff must plead to state a claim. Second, the court should identify allegations that,

because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.

Finally, where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their

veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.

Connelly v. Steel Valley Sch. Dist., 706 F.3d 209, 212 (3d Cir. 2013).

“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere

possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has not show(n] - that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” /qbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (internal citations and quotation marks

omitted). This “plausibility” determination will be a “context-specific task that requires the

reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” /d.

However, even “if a complaint is subject to Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a district court

must permit a curative amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable or

futile.” Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Cir. 2008).

[E]ven when plaintiff does not seek leave to amend his complaint after a

defendant moves to dismiss it, unless the district court finds that amendment

would be inequitable or futile, the court must inform the plaintiff that he or she

has leave to amend the complaint within a set period of time.

Id.

Because Youmans proceeds pro se, her pleading is liberally construed and her

complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations

omitted).

ll. Discussion

Youmans seeks to assert federal constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She

asserts that she is presently incarcerated at SCl-Muncy for the following two state court

criminal cases: Commonwealth v. Youmans, No. CP-54-CR-0001379-2019 (Ct. Com. PI.

Schuylkill Cnty.), and Commonwealth v. Cooper, No. CP-54-CR-0002025-2020 (Ct. Com.

Pl. Schuylkill Cnty.). (Doc. 1, p. 1). Youmans alleges that her sentence is illegal,

Defendants lack authority to detain her, and that she is falsely imprisoned. Youmans

requests declaratory and injunctive relief, monetary damages, and that Defendants “cease

[the] false imprisonment of petitioner.” (/d. at pp. 4, 6).

Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code offers private citizens a cause of

action for violations of federal law by state officials. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute provides,

in pertinent part, as follows:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,

or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within

the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party

injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for

redress...

Id.; see also Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002); Kneipp v. Tedder, 95

F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege “the

violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must

show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state

law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

Youmans’ claims are not cognizable under § 1983. “[HJarm caused by actions

whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid” is not cognizable under

§ 1983, unless the conviction or sentence was “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by

executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a

determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas

corpus.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, at 486-87 (1994); see also Leamer v. Fauver,

288 F.3d 532, 542 (3d Cir. 2002) (“whenever the challenge ultimately attacks the ‘core of

habeas'—the validity of the continued conviction or the fact or length of the sentence—a

challenge, however denominated and regardless of the relief sought, must be brought by

way of a habeas corpus petition.”). Heck applies to claims involving monetary damages as

well as those seeking equitable and declaratory relief. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S.

74, 81-82 (2005).

There are ongoing state court proceedings pending in Schuylkill County at Docket

Numbers CP-54-CR-0001379-2019 and CP-54-CR-0002025-2020.! Youmans is confined

pursuant to the sentencings in those proceedings.? She is presently pursuing relief in her

‘ https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/CaseSearch.

2 In case number CP-54-CR-0001379-2019, Youmans entered a plea of no contest to theft of

leased property. (See https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/CaseSearch). On March 16, 2022, she was sentenced

in case number CP-54-CR-0001379-2019 to a term of imprisonment of six to twenty-four months. (See id.;