“To show that the defendant acted under color of state law, a litigant must establish that the defendant is a ‘state actor’ under the Fourteenth Amendment.”
How later courts described this case
- “To show that the defendant acted under color of state law, a litigant must establish that the defendant is a ‘state actor’ under the Fourteenth Amendment.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MARIA J. DISEN, :
Plaintiff, :
V. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:21-CV-00521
: (JUDGE MARIANI)
: (Magistrate Judge Carlson)
BAYVIEW LOAN SERVICING, LLC, :
Defendant. :
ORDER
AND NOW, THIS Zi > ay OF APRIL, 2024, upon de novo review of
Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson’s Report & Recommendation (“R&R”) (Doc. 36)’,
Plaintiff Maria J. Disen’s Objections to the R&R (Doc. 37), Defendant Bayview Loan
Servicing, LLC’s response thereto (Doc. 38), and all other relevant documents, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1 A district court may “designate a magistrate judge to conduct hearings, including evidentiary
hearings, and to submit to a judge of the court proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the
disposition” of certain matters pending before the Court. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). If a party timely and
properly files a written objection to a magistrate judge's report and recommendation, the district court “shall
make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or
recommendations to which objection is made.” /d. at § 636(b)(1)(C); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); M.D.
Pa. Local Rule 72.3; Brown v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2011). The de novo standard applies only
to objections which are both timely and specific. Goney v. Clark, 749 F.2d 5, 6-7 (3d Cir. 1984). The Court
first notes that Plaintiff's objections are timely. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Although the Court finds that
Plaintiff's objections are general complaints that lack clarity and specificity, out of an abundance of caution,
the Court has reviewed Plaintiffs Objections de novo. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
1. Plaintiffs Objections are OVERRULED.? Plaintiff first objects to the R&R on the
basis that the R&R “focuses on the Bankruptcy issue. The Bankruptcy is not the
Claim at the present time.” (Doc. 37 at 2.) In his R&R, Magistrate Judge Carlson
determined that there “is a fundamental and overarching flaw in [Plaintiff's]
complaint’ in that “[t]he Rooker-Feldman Doctrine and Res Judicata Principles Bar
These Claims.” (Doc. 36 at 10.) “Rooker-Feldman does not allow a plaintiff to seek
relief that, if granted, would prevent a state court from enforcing its own orders.”
Easley v. New Century Mortg. Corp., No. CIV A 08-4283, 2009 WL 2256692, at *1
(E.D. Pa. July 28, 2009), aff'd, 394 F. App'x 946 (3d Cir. 2010). Magistrate Judge
Carlson correctly determined that “[t]his matter arises out of prior state mortgage
litigation which concluded with the entry of judgment against the plaintiff’ and that
“the complaint contains claims which necessarily invite a federal court to, de novo,
review, re-examine, and reject state court rulings in this prior state mortgage case."
(Doc. 36 at 10.) As Magistrate Judge Carlson concluded, this is exactly what is
forbidden by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Easley, 2009 WL 2256692 at *1,
affd, 394 F. App'x 946. This insurmountable hurdle encapsulates Plaintiff's
2 In her Objections, Plaintiff complains that “The Report and Recommendation’s caption reads my
name as Maria Disen. My name was legally changed in the Federal Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania from Maria Jacqueline Jimenez Disen to MariaJacqueline Dicent a shorter version.” (Doc. 37
at 1.) Plaintiff has not offered any record of Plaintiff's alleged name change. Additionally, Plaintiff's
complaint regarding her alleged name change does not constitute a substantive objection to the Report and
Recommendation issued by Magistrate Judge Carlson. See Goney, 749 F.2d at 6-7. Nonetheless, the
Court will refer to Plaintiff only as “Plaintiff’ in this Order.
arguments contained within her Objections that Defendant failed to apply her
mortgage payments in the amount of $4,900 and $360. (Doc. 37 at 12.) These
contentions were raised in Plaintiff's answer in the foreclosure actions. (See
Answer to Plaintiffs Complaint, Doc. 38-1, Ex. C, J] 16, 17.) The Court therefore
overrules this basis of Plaintiff's Objections.
Plaintiff also contends that Magistrate Judge Carlson’s determination that Plaintiffs
claims are barred by res judicata “does not meet the elements or is applicable for
this case [sic].” (Doc. 37 at 7.) Res Judicata bars claims that were or could have
been raised in a state action. Moncrief v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp., 275 F.
Appx. 149, 153 (3d Cir. 2008). Here, Magistrate Judge Carlson correctly noted that
each of Plaintiff's claims were raised or could have been raised in the state
foreclosure action and bankruptcy proceeding. (Doc. 36 at 14.) Magistrate Judge
Carlson was therefore proper in concluding that dismissal is warranted under the
doctrine of res judicata, and the Court overrules this basis of Plaintiffs Objections.
Plaintiff also argues that her claims arising under the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act (“FDCPA”) were “not addressed” in the state court proceedings and are thus
not barred. (Doc. 37 § 2.)3 As Magistrate Judge Carlson correctly noted (Doc. 36 at
18-49, claims under the FOCPA must be brought “within one year from the date
-3-F9 the extent Plaintiff is asserting in her Objections a new “Fair Credit Collection Act” claim or “New
Matter” that she acknowledges is related to selling of the mortgage to Home Land Financial Services, Inc., (Doc. 37
Santo. U.S. Bank Nat! Ass'n, No. 1 7-CV-1591, 2018 WL 4680090, t*3 (MD. Pa, Sept. 2018) (Fis,
it is axiomatic that pleadings cannot be amended through briefing in opposition to a motion to dismiss.”).
on which the violation occurs.” (Doc. 36 at 18); 15 U.S.C. § 1692k (d). Plaintiff
contends that Defendant violated the FDCPA by not crediting a payment in March
of 2019 and brining this foreclosure action in October of 2019. (Doc. 37 at 10-11.)
Magistrate Judge Carlson accurately explained that Plaintiff did not bring her case
until March of 2021, “well beyond the one-year limitations period prescribed by
statute.” (Doc. 36 at 18.) Therefore, Magistrate Judge Carlson’s determination that
Plaintiffs FDCPA claims should be dismissed was correct, and this basis of
Plaintiff's Objections is overruled.
Finally, Plaintiff generally argues that her Fourteenth Amendment claims do not
warrant dismissal. (Doc. 37 JJ 1, 30.) As Magistrate Judge Carlson explained,
Defendant is not a state actor (Doc. 36 at 19-20), and Plaintiff is thus unable to
make out a Fourteenth Amendment claim against it. See Bailey v. Harleysville Nat'l
Bank & Tr., 188 F. App'x 66, 67 (3d Cir. 2006) (“To show that the defendant acted
under color of state law, a litigant must establish that the defendant is a ‘state
actor’ under the Fourteenth Amendment.”). The Court therefore overrules this basis
of Plaintiffs Objections.
2. The R&R (Doc. 36) is ADOPTED for the reasons discussed therein.
3. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 24) is GRANTED.
4. The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE Case Number 3:21-cv-00521.
bi Mie)
Robert D-“Mariarti
United States District Judge