Walsh v. Curran

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

KEVIN WALSH and AAA

BAILMASTER BAIL BONDS, LLC,,

Plaintiffs, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:22-cv-00513

v. (SAPORITO, C.M.J.)

DEIRDRE CURRAN, JOSEPHINE

CASTELLANO, ABSOLUTE

BONDS, LLC and ABA BAIL

BONDS, LLC,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

This is a contract dispute among professional bail bondsmen. We

may properly exercise jurisdiction over the dispute as it involves citizens

of different states and an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000.

28 U.S.C. § 1332.

I. BACKGROUND

The plaintiffs in this action are: (a) Kevin Walsh, a resident of New

Jersey, and (b) AAA Bailmaster Bail Bonds, LLC (“Bailmaster”), a New

Jersey limited liability company, of which Walsh is the sole owner and

principal. The defendants are (a) Deirdre Curran, a resident of Florida,

(b) Absolute Bail Bonds, LLC (“Absolute”), a Pennsylvania limited

liability company, of which Curran is the sole owner and principal; (c)

Josephine Castellano, a resident of Florida, and (d) A B A Bail Bonds,

LLC (“ABA”), a Pennsylvania limited liability company, of which

Castellano is the sole owner and principal.1

Beginning in 2015, the defendants had provided bail bond service

to criminal defendants in seven northeastern Pennsylvania counties:

Pike, Monroe, Wayne, Wyoming, Lackawanna, Carbon, and Luzerne

Counties. In 2021, Curran and Castellano decided to move from

Pennsylvania to Florida for personal reasons. They negotiated a sale of

their bail bondsman businesses for $150,000 to Walsh, whom Curran and

Castellano had known professionally for years.

On June 18, 2021, the parties entered into a “Contract for Sale of

Advertisement” in which the defendants sold the assets of their bail

bondsman businesses, including advertising assets, to the plaintiffs. The

contract provided for the conveyance to Bailmaster of four phone

numbers and other personal property located at the offices of Absolute

and ABA in exchange for $150,000 paid in installments. The first

1 At the time when the contract between the parties was executed,

Curran and Castellano resided in Pennsylvania.

installment of $30,000 was due at closing, and the remaining $120,000

was to be paid in monthly installments of $10,000 beginning August 1,

2021. The contract also contained a restrictive covenant and an anti-

solicitation clause. The restrictive covenant prohibited Curran or

Castellano from engaging in the bail bondsman business in Pennsylvania

for a period of three or five years from the closing date.2 The anti-

solicitation clause prohibited the defendants from soliciting employees,

customers, clients, lessors, renters, vendors, or property owners who had

done business with them prior to closing without the plaintiffs’ consent.

The contract was drafted by an attorney retained by the plaintiffs,

Alexander J. Rinaldi, Esq.3

At the closing, the plaintiffs remitted payment of the initial $30,000

payment. Beginning August 1, 2021, and continuing for six months,

Walsh remitted the $10,000 monthly installment payments to Curran

and Castellano.

Notwithstanding the restrictive covenant, Castellano continued to

2 The parties have disputed whether the restrictive covenant was

for three years or five years. Two versions of the same contract were

offered into evidence at trial.

3 The defendants were not represented by an attorney in connection

with the agreement.

write bail in Pennsylvania from time to time after the closing with

Walsh’s consent, typically when Walsh was out of town for the weekend

or otherwise unable to write bail himself. In September 2021, however,

Walsh learned from Curran that Castellano had also been writing bail in

Pennsylvania “behind his back” and as a sub-producer for one of his

competitors, a Scranton-based bail bond agency, Cutting Edge Bail Bonds

(“Cutting Edge”).

On January 31, 2022, an attorney representing the plaintiffs,

William H. Pandos, Esq., sent a cease-and-desist letter to the defendants,

advising the defendants that, based on Castellano’s writing of bail in

Pennsylvania on multiple occasions without the plaintiffs’ consent, the

plaintiffs considered the defendants to be in material breach of the non-

compete clause in the asset sale agreement that the parties had executed.

As a consequence, Pandos advised, the plaintiffs would suspend further

payment to the defendants under the contract until such time that this

breach was cured and the plaintiffs were made whole for damages

incurred as a result of the breach.

The plaintiffs ceased payment immediately. The last six monthly

payments due under the contract have not been remitted to the

defendants.

On April 6, 2022, the plaintiffs filed their complaint in this action,

asserting breach of contract claims against the defendants, and seeking

damages and declaratory and injunctive relief. On April 21, 2022, the

defendants filed their answer and affirmative defenses to the complaint,

and they asserted counterclaims for breach of contract against the

plaintiffs, seeking damages and injunctive relief. On April 26, 2022, the

plaintiffs filed their answer and affirmative defenses to the defendants’

counterclaims.

The parties engaged in a period of discovery. On May 15 and 16,

2023, the parties appeared before the undersigned United States

magistrate judge for a bench trial.

II. DISCUSSION

Both sides claim that the other side materially breached the

advertising asset sale agreement between them. For relief, the plaintiffs

request declaratory judgment, and both sides seek compensatory

damages and equitable relief in the form of an injunction or decree of

specific performance. Both sides also seek an award of costs and attorney

fees.

The plaintiffs contend that Castellano’s posting of bail bonds

without their consent—moreover, for a competitor—constitutes a

material breach of the asset sale contract’s five-year non-compete clause.

The plaintiffs further contend that this material breach permitted them

to suspend performance under the contract—i.e., suspend the monthly

installment payments of $10,000 that remained due under the contract.

The defendants contend that, because Walsh consented to

Castellano’s writing bail in Pennsylvania from time to time when he was

unavailable, the non-compete clause had been waived or the plaintiffs

should be estopped from enforcing it. The defendants further contend

that, to the extent Walsh and Bailmaster would not have written smaller

bail amounts, those bails written by Castellano are not material.4

Moreover, the defendants contend that the duration of the non-compete

clause was three years, not five years. Finally, the defendants contend

that it was the plaintiffs who materially breached the asset sale

agreement in failing to make the final six monthly payments.

4 Walsh testified that, as a matter of practice, he would not write

bail for amounts less than $5,000. Some of the bails posted by Castellano

were for $1,000. Most, however, were for $5,000 or more.

A. Evidence Received Into the Record

The plaintiffs presented the testimony of Kevin Walsh, the owner

and principal of AAA Bailmaster Bail Bonds, LLC. Walsh testified about

his professional background in the bail business and the background of

his company, Bailmaster. Walsh explained how the bail business worked,

how he had come to know the defendants professionally, and how he came

to write bail bonds in Pennsylvania after bail reform had been adopted

in New Jersey. He testified about the negotiation of the advertising asset

sale agreement between himself and the defendants. He identified and

authenticated the contract executed by the parties on June 18, 2021, and

he testified that it had been drafted by Attorney Rinaldi based on terms

negotiated directly between Walsh, Curran, and Castellano.

Walsh testified about the events leading to his suspension of

monthly payments under the contract in February 2022. He

acknowledged that he had given Castellano permission to write bail

bonds his company at times when he was unable to do so due to travel

or other reasons, but he testified that he had never consented to her

working him, writing bail bonds without his knowledge and in

competition with his company. Walsh testified that he first learned that

Castellano was writing bail bonds without his knowledge or consent from

Curran in September 2021.5 Walsh testified about his efforts to

investigate, first by carefully worded inquiries to Castellano by text

message, and later by pulling bail management reports from local state

courts after he learned such reports were available.

Walsh testified regarding damages, reviewing the bail management

reports and walking through his calculation of the premium amounts

Castellano collected on those bail bonds.6 Based on the bail management

reports, he testified that Castellano had written $1,134,000 in bail bonds

without his authorization. After deducting surety and BUF account

expenses, he testified that she had earned $90,720 in income on bail

bonds that would otherwise have been written by his company,

Bailmaster. Walsh also testified about attorney fees and litigation costs

5 Curran apparently reached out to Walsh after she and Castellano

had a personal dispute.

6 Walsh testified that the premium collected by the bail bondsman

was 10% of the face amount of the bail bond. From that premium, 1% of

the bond’s face value would be paid to the bail bondsman’s surety

company and 1% of the bond’s face value would be deposited into a “BUF”

account—a reserve account from which any forfeitures of bail bonds

written by the bail bondsman would be paid. The remainder of the

premium was the fee earned by the bail bondsman.

he had incurred as a result of this lawsuit.

On cross-examination, Walsh acknowledged that, although he had

experienced some trouble and confusion regarding transfer of the phone

numbers identified in the contract, ultimately three of the four numbers

were transferred to him, and the fourth—Curran’s personal cell

number—was disconnected. Using an exhibit, defense counsel walked

Walsh through several text messages exchanges between himself and the

defendants, identifying several time periods in which Walsh had

indicated to Castellano that he would be out of town or otherwise unable

to write bail bonds, many of which appeared to overlap with the dates of

bail bonds identified by Walsh as having been written by Castellano

without his authorization. Walsh also acknowledged that some of the bail

bonds included on his list were for amounts below the $5,000 minimum

face value for which he would write bail bonds.

Walsh was called as a rebuttal witness as well. On rebuttal, he

expressly denied that the asset sale agreement had ever included a three-

year non-compete clause.

Based on the demeanor of the witness and the consistency of his

testimony with the record as a whole, we find Walsh’s testimony to be less

than fully credible.

The defendants presented the testimony of Dierdre Curran, the

owner and principal of Absolute Bail Bonds, LLC. Curran testified about

her professional background in the bail business and the background of

her company, Absolute. Curran explained how she had come to know

Walsh professionally and how she had come to write bail bonds in

Pennsylvania after bail reform had been adopted in New Jersey.

Curran testified about the negotiation of the advertising asset sale

agreement between the parties. In particular, she testified that she had

objected to the five-year non-compete period proposed by Walsh and

countered with a three-year non-compete period, which Walsh had

accepted. Curran identified and authenticated a partial copy of what she

said was the asset sale agreement the parties had ultimately executed.

She testified that they had edited the original contract drafted by

Attorney Rinaldi on the computer to shorten the non-compete period to

three years. This contract fragment included the same non-compete

restrictive covenant as when drafted by Rinaldi, but only for a three-year

period.

Curran testified about transitioning the bail agency business to

Walsh after closing. In particular, she discussed troubles Walsh had

experienced with the telephone systems and her efforts to help. She also

testified about the arrangements that had been made for Castellano to

write bail bonds for Walsh when he was unavailable.7

On cross-examination, Curran acknowledged that the pages

following the non-compete clause were missing from the contract

fragment about which she had testified. This includes the signature page

of the purported contract with a three-year non-compete clause. In

addition, she acknowledged that this contract fragment was not produced

in discover, but for the first time at trial, despite requests for its

production by the plaintiffs.

Curran also addressed her own calculation of damages, testifying

that she had concluded that the defendants had suffered damages in the

7 Curran also testified about “fugitive recovery work” she did on

behalf of Walsh and Bailmaster during the transition period, for which

she was never paid. The defendants’ proposed findings of fact and

conclusions of law include a claim for damages in connection with this

work. But the defendants’ did not assert any such claim in their

counterclaim. This ancillary dispute is not properly before this court.

amount of $614,000 as a result of the plaintiffs’ breach of contract.8

Curran testified that she had not told Walsh that Castellano was

writing bail bonds behind his back, but that Walsh had been the one to

bring that up.

Based on the demeanor of the witness and the consistency of her

testimony with the record as a whole, we find Curran’s testimony to be

not credible.

The defendants presented the testimony of Josephine Castellano,

principal of A B A Bail Bonds, LLC. Castellano testified about her

professional background in the bail business, including her work as a

sub-producer for Absolute and Cutting Edge, and the background of her

company, ABA, which she formed in December 2020. Castellano testified

about her conversations with Walsh prior to closing about her ongoing

work writing bail bonds for Cutting Edge. She testified that she told

8 Curran acknowledged on the stand that she had not produced a

written calculation of damages, but she testified that she based this

number on the $30,000 monthly income Walsh had indicated in his

deposition testimony that he had earned writing bail bonds in

Pennsylvania, multiplied by 14 months, plus the remaining $60,000 due

under the asset sale agreement, plus $14,000 he owed her for fugitive

recovery work.

Walsh that she was still writing bail for Cutting Edge, and that he said

that it was not a problem. She further testified that Walsh told her that

any time she was in Pennsylvania, she should continue writing bail bonds

as usual. Castellano testified about the transition in the several months

following the closing, during which time she interacted with Walsh by

phone and text almost daily.

Castellano testified that she continued to write bail bonds in

Pennsylvania after the closing. She testified that she disclosed these bail

bonds to Walsh on multiple occasions, and even offered the bail bond

opportunities to Walsh five or six times. She testified about particular

circumstances in which Walsh was aware of these opportunities and

approved of her writing the bail bonds. With her counsel, Castellano

walked through some of the text messages she and Walsh had exchanged

when he was out of town or otherwise unable to write bail bonds.

On cross-examination, Castellano acknowledged that she continued

to write bail bonds in Pennsylvania on behalf of Cutting Edge after the

June 18, 2021, closing, but she maintained that this did not constitute

competition with Walsh and Bailmaster.

Castellano acknowledged that the asset sale agreement she signed

included a restrictive covenant, but she maintained that it was for a

three-year non-compete period.

Based on the demeanor of the witness and the consistency of her

testimony with the record as a whole, we find Castellano’s testimony to

be not credible.

The plaintiffs presented the rebuttal testimony of Anthony Rinaldi,

Esq., an attorney retained by Walsh and Bailmaster to prepare a sale

agreement between the parties. Rinaldi testified that he prepared the

asset sale agreement, and that the executed version submitted into

evidence by the plaintiffs was the document he had drafted. He expressly

denied that he had drafted the version submitted by the defendants. He

further denied having engaged in any conversation or email exchange

with the defendants. Based on the demeanor of the witness and the

consistency of his testimony with the record as a whole, we find Rinaldi’s

testimony to be fully credible.

B. Exhibits Received Into Evidence9

1. Exhibit J-1: Joint stipulation of facts.

2. Exhibit P-1: Contract for Sale of Advertisement dated June

18, 2021.

3. Exhibit P-2: AAA Bailmaster Bail Bonds, LLC Certificate of

Formation.

4. Exhibit P-3: Kevin Walsh’s Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

Bail/Insurance License.

5. Exhibit P-4: AAA Bailmaster Bail Bonds, LLC Pennsylvania

Bail/Insurance License.

9 Objections for two of the plaintiffs’ exhibits remained outstanding

at the conclusion of the trial: Exhibit P-20 (Letter from Kathleen M.

Ledbetter, Sr. Vice President, Regulatory Affairs of Financial Casualty &

Surety, Inc., dated October 26, 2022) and Exhibit P-24 (Proof of Payments

Made to Build-Up Fund Accounts by Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. to

Absolute Bail Bonds, LLC and to Josephine Castellano.). The defendants

objected to admission of both documents on hearsay grounds. The

plaintiffs responded that both documents were obtained from a non-party

surety company in response to a subpoena duces tecum, arguing that

they fell within the scope of the business records exception to the hearsay

rule, Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). But without foundational testimony by the

custodian of records or another qualified witness, or an appropriate

certification to authenticate the documents, these exhibits are simply not

admissible. Fed. R. Evid. 803(6); Fed. R. Evid. 902(11);

, 964 F.2d 193, 200–02 (3d Cir. 1992). The defendants’ hearsay

objections with respect to Exhibits P-20 and P-24 are SUSTAINED. We

have disregarded these exhibits.

6. Exhibit P-5: Proof of $30,000.00 payment at closing.

7. Exhibit P-6: Proof of monthly installment payments.

8. Exhibit P-7: Sheet with advertising phone numbers.

9. Exhibit P-12: January 31, 2022 letter from William H.

Pandos, Esq., addressed to Josephine Castellano and Deirdre Curran.

10. Exhibit P-14: Itemization of legal fees paid to WWGR law.

11. Exhibit P-17: Itemization of filing and service fees.

12. Exhibit P-18: Itemization of deposition costs.

13. Exhibit P-19: Subpoena to Financial Casualty & Surety Inc.

14. Exhibit P-21: Sub-Producer Bail Bond Agreement between

Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc., Steven W. Krauss, Cutting Edge Bail

Bonds, LLC, Josephine Castellano and Absolute Bail Bonds, LLC dated

September 13, 2017.

15. Exhibit P-22: Addendum Number 1 to the Sub-Producer Bail

Bond Agreement between Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc., Steven W.

Krauss, Cutting Edge Bail Bonds, LLC, Josephine Castellano and

Absolute Bail Bonds, LLC dated May 3, 2019.

16. Exhibit P-23: Sub-Producer Bail Bond Agreement between

Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc., Steven W. Krauss, Cutting Edge Bail

Bonds, LLC, and Josephine Castellano, dated November 1, 2020.

17. Exhibit P-25A: Text messages between Walsh and Curran.

18. Exhibit P-25B: Text messages between Walsh and Curran.

19. Exhibit P-25C: Text messages between Walsh and Curran.

20. Exhibit P-25D: Text messages between Walsh and Curran.

21. Exhibit P-25E: Text messages between Walsh and Castellano.

22. Exhibit P-26: List of 43 bails done by defendants.

23. Exhibit P-27: Plaintiffs’ damages calculation.

24. Exhibit P-28: Text message between Walsh, Curran, and

Castellano, excerpted from Exhibit D-4.

25. Exhibit P-29: Text message between Walsh and Curran,

excerpted from Exhibit D-4.

26. Exhibit P-30: Text messages between Walsh and Curran,

excerpted from Exhibit D-4.

27. Exhibit P-31: Text messages between Walsh and Curran,

excerpted from Exhibit D-4.

28. Exhibit P-32: Text messages between Walsh and Curran,

excerpted from Exhibit D-4.

29. Exhibit P-33: Text message between Walsh and Curran,

excerpted from Exhibit D-4.

30. Exhibit P-34: Text messages between Walsh and Curran,

excerpted from Exhibit D-5.

31. Exhibit P-35: Revised and hand-annotated list of 32 bails done

by defendants, derived from Exhibit P-26.

32. Exhibit P-36: Hand-annotated list of bails referred between

Walsh and Castellano, prepared by Walsh.

33. Exhibit P-37: Hand-written lists of bails referred between

Walsh and Castellano, prepared by Castellano.

34. Exhibit D-1: Fragment of contract between the parties.

35. Exhibit D-2: Email from Dierdre Curran to Kevin Walsh dated

6/1/21.

36. Exhibit D-3: Text exchanges between parties produced by

defendants.

37. Exhibit D-4: Text message exchanges between parties

produced by plaintiffs.

C. Analysis

The parties do not dispute that they entered into an advertising

asset sale agreement on June 18, 2021. For the most part, the key terms

of that agreement are not in dispute. They do not dispute that the

plaintiffs agreed to purchase the advertising assets and other personal

property of the defendants’ bail bondsman businesses for $150,000 in

total, with $30,000 paid at closing and $10,000 paid in monthly

installments over the course of 12 months. They do not dispute that the

contract included a restrictive covenant that prohibited the defendants

from engaging in the bail bondsman business in Pennsylvania for a

period of years after the closing date. They do not dispute that the

plaintiffs made the initial $30,000 payment at closing and the first six

$10,000 monthly installment payments.

The parties, however, dispute which version of the contract itself

represents their actual agreement—in particular, they dispute whether

the restrictive covenant contains a three- or five-year non-compete

period. They dispute whether Castellano’s continued writing of bail bonds

after closing of the sale constituted a material breach of the agreement,

or whether the plaintiffs waived the non-complete provision by

permitting her to write bail bonds on behalf of the plaintiffs from time to

time. And they dispute whether the plaintiffs were privileged to suspend

performance of the monthly payment terms of the agreement because of

the defendants’ material breach, or if the plaintiffs’ failure to make these

monthly payments was itself a material breach of the agreement.

Based on the testimony and evidence presented at trial, we find

that the version of the contract proffered by the plaintiffs, Exhibit P-1,

which contains a non-compete provision, is the actual contract

entered into by the parties on June 18, 2021. We note that this exhibit is

more complete than the version proffered by the defendants, Exhibit D-

1, and it is better supported by the testimony and other evidence of

record. In addition, we note that the plaintiff’s complaint expressly

alleged that the contract contained a non-compete period, and

the defendants’ answer contained an unqualified of this

allegation. Compl. ¶ 13, Doc. 1; Answer ¶ 13, Doc. 4.

The defendants contend that the plaintiffs’ failure to strictly enforce

the non-compete restriction against Castellano should be deemed a

waiver of their rights under this provision of the contract. Lax

enforcement of a restrictive covenant may be held to be a waiver of that

provision. , , 648 F. Supp. 661,

698 (D. Minn. 1986) (“Under the circumstances, it would be inequitable

to permit plaintiff to now rely on a non-compete agreement which it has

so blithely ignored in the past.”). But this is not such a circumstance in

which the plaintiffs “blithely ignored” the provision. ,

, 699 N.E.2d 230, 236 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998)

(distinguishing where evidence that employer had not enforced

non-compete in some circumstances did not support a finding that the

employer had “blithely ignored” the provision). The plaintiffs selectively

invited Castellano to write bail bonds on occasions when Walsh was

unable to do so himself due to travel or other unavailability. These

instances were in support of the plaintiffs’ bail business, not in

competition with it. Based on the testimony and evidence presented at

trial, it is clear that, in addition to these authorized instances, Castellano

undertook on multiple occasions to write bail bonds in Pennsylvania in

competition with the plaintiffs and without the plaintiffs’ knowledge or

consent. Under the circumstances presented, we find no wavier of the

restrictive covenant.

We further find that this unauthorized, competitive bail writing by

Castellano constituted a material breach of the advertising sale

agreement. It is a “settled principle of contract law” that “a material

breach by one party to a contract entitles the non-breaching party to

suspend performance.” , 837 A.2d 459, 467

(Pa. Super. Ct. 2003). Thus, the plaintiffs’ suspension of monthly

payments in response to the defendants’ material breach was privileged

and not itself a breach of contract.

In an effort to quantify damages, the plaintiffs submitted evidence

derived from public records documenting the total amount of bail bonds

written by Castellano after the sale closing date. But they have been

unable to clearly differentiate between particular bail bonds written by

Castellano authorization and those written authorization.

Moreover, any determination of damages arising from the defendants’

competitive behavior in the remaining future years of the non-compete

period would be inherently speculative. Thus, we find that an award of

damages in favor of the plaintiff would be inadequate.

, 436 A.2d 1383, 1385 (Pa. 1981) (“An action for damages is

an inadequate remedy when there is no method by which the amount of

damages can be accurately computed or ascertained.”).

In the alternative, the plaintiffs have requested an injunctive order

in the nature of a decree of specific performance. “[S]pecific performance

is an equitable remedy for breach of contract permitting the court to

compel performance of a contract when there exists in the contract an

agreement between the parties as to the nature of the performance.”

, 977 F. Supp. 2d 462, 472 (E.D.

Pa. 2013); , 606 A.3d 509, 521 (Pa.

Super. Ct. 1992). “A decree of specific performance is a matter of grace

and not right. Specific performance should only be granted where the

facts clearly establish the plaintiff’s right thereto, where no adequate

remedy at law exists, and where justice requires it.” , 436 A.2d at

1385 (citation omitted); , 840 F.2d 173, 178 (3d

Cir. 1988) (“If there is no adequate remedy at law, a court of equity may,

in its discretion, grant specific performance.”); , 892

A.2d 21, 31 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (quoting , 436 A.2d at 1385).

We find the remedy of specific performance appropriate under the

circumstances presented in this case. Thus, we will enter an order or

decree of specific performance directing the defendants to comply with

the terms of the restrictive covenant set forth at paragraph 16(a) of the

advertising sale agreement, the substance of which provides that the

defendants shall not reestablish, reopen, become engaged, employed or

in any other manner whatsoever be interested, directly or indirectly, in

the same or similar business as that sold to the plaintiffs within the state

of Pennsylvania for a period of five years from the date of closing, June

18, 2021.

The plaintiffs’ suspension of performance with respect to their

remaining monthly payment obligations poses a wrinkle, as an obligation

of $60,000 due to the defendants remains unpaid by the non-breaching

plaintiffs. The Restatement of Contracts provides that “[a]n order of

specific performance or an injunction will be so drawn as best to

effectuate the purposes for which the contract was made and on such

terms as justice requires. It need not be absolute in form and the

performance that it requires need not be identical with that due under

the contract.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 358(1) (Am. L. Inst.

1981).

The objective of the court in granting equitable relief is

to do complete justice to the extent that this is

feasible. . . . The form and terms of the order are to a

considerable extent within the discretion of the court.

Its order may be directed at the injured party as well

as at the party in breach. It may be conditional on some

performance to be rendered by the injured party . . . .

§ 358 cmt. a; , 840 F.2d at 178 (“While a court at law

usually issues unconditional judgment, a court of equity may, in its

discretion, condition its decree on some performance by the plaintiff. The

decree will protect the defendant’s substantial rights by making any

order for his performance conditional on concurrent action by the

plaintiff.”) (ellipsis and internal quotation marks omitted);

, 618 F.2d 904, 919 (2d Cir. 1980) (“[T]o ensure that a

decree of specific performance will not work an injustice on the

defendant, the court may well make its decree conditional on certain

actions by the claimant . . . Sometimes it may be necessary to require

money payment by the plaintiff and to make the decree conditional on

such payment.”). Thus, we will condition our order or decree of specific

performance upon the plaintiffs’ payment to the defendants of the

remaining $60,000 balance of monthly installment payments owed to the

defendants under the advertising asset sale agreement.

The plaintiffs have included a demand for an award of attorney fees

as part of their requested relief. “Under Pennsylvania law, ‘there can be

no recovery of attorneys’ fees from an adverse party, absent an express

statutory authorization, a clear agreement by the parties or some other

established exception.’” , 679 Fed. App’x

184, 190 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting , 728 A.2d 949,

951 (Pa. 1999)). The plaintiff has identified no such basis for recovery of

attorney fees, merely suggesting without authority that they should be

recoverable as a component of compensatory damages.10 Thus, the

plaintiffs’ request for an award of attorney fees will be denied.11

III. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

For the foregoing reasons, we make the following findings of fact

and conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. In accordance with these findings of fact and conclusions of

law, the clerk will be directed to enter judgment pursuant to Rule 58 of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

A. Findings of Fact

1. Plaintiff Kevin Walsh is domiciled in New Jersey.

2. Walsh is the sole owner and principal of plaintiff AAA

Bailmaster Bail Bonds, LLC (“Bailmaster”).

10 We note that the advertising asset sale agreement does contain

indemnification provision, which the plaintiffs cite in arguing that they

are entitled to an award of attorney fees. But the indemnification

provision in favor of the plaintiffs applies only to liabilities or expenses

arising out of operation or ownership of the business the closing

date, June 18, 2021.

11 As the prevailing party, the plaintiffs may be entitled to taxation

of costs—other than attorney fees—under 28 U.S.C. § 1920 and Fed. R.

Civ. P. 54(d)(1).

3. Defendant Dierdre Curran is domiciled in Florida.

4. Curran is the sole owner and principal of defendant Absolute

Bail Bonds, LLC (“Absolute”).

5. Defendant Josephine Castellano is domiciled in Florida.

6. Castellano is the sole owner and principal of defendant A B A

Bail Bonds, LLC (“ABA”).

7. On June 18, 2021, the parties executed a “Contract for Sale of

Advertisement” (the “Contract”).

8. A true and correct copy of the Contract was submitted into

evidence as Trial Exhibit P-1.

9. The Contract provided that the plaintiffs, Walsh and

Bailmaster (the “Buyers”), pay $150,000 in total to the defendants,

Curran, Castellano, Absolute, and ABA (collectively, the “Sellers”), in

consideration for conveyance of certain advertising assets and other

personal property of the defendants’ bail bondsman businesses.

10. The Contract provided that this consideration would be paid

in installments, as follows: (a) $30,000 due upon closing; and (b) monthly

installment payments of $10,000 each month for twelve months

beginning August 1, 2021.

11. The Contract included a restrictive covenant, set forth at

paragraph 16(a), which stated as follows:

Seller or any stockholder, director or officer of Seller,

including but not limited to DEIRDRE CURRAN and

JOSEPHINE CASTELLANO, both individually and as

Shareholder of Seller, covenant and agree that they

will not reestablish, reopen, become engaged, employed

or in any other manner whatsoever be interested,

directly or indirectly, in the same or similar business as

being sold to the Buyer within the state of

Pennsylvania for a period of five (5) years from the date

of closing.

12. The plaintiffs remitted payment of $30,000 to the defendants

at closing on June 18, 2021.

13. The plaintiffs timely remitted the first six monthly

installment payments of $10,000 to the defendants on or about: August

1, 2021; September 1, 2021; October 1, 2021; November 1, 2021;

December 1, 2021; and January 1, 2022.

14. On January 31, 2022, an attorney representing the plaintiffs

sent a cease-and-desist letter to notify the defendants that the plaintiffs

had suspended further monthly payments due to an alleged breach of the

Contract’s restrictive covenant, .

15. The plaintiffs have not remitted the final six monthly

installment payments of $10,000 due to be paid on: February 1, 2022;

March 1, 2022; April 1, 2022; May 1, 2022; June 1, 2022; and July 1, 2022.

16. The total balance of the monthly installment payments due

from the plaintiffs to the defendants that have not been paid is $60,000.

17. Notwithstanding the restrictive covenant, Castellano

engaged in the business of writing bail bonds in Pennsylvania on multiple

occasions after the closing date, June 18, 2021.

18. Although the plaintiffs consented to some of this bail business

activity by Castellano when done with the knowledge of and for the

benefit of the plaintiffs, some of this bail business activity by Castellano

was done without the plaintiffs’ knowledge and consent.

19. There is no method by which the amount of damages suffered

by the plaintiffs as a result of the defendants’ alleged breach can be

accurately computed or ascertained.

20. Based on the demeanor of the witness and considering the

record as a whole, the testimony of Kevin Walsh is less than fully credible.

21. Based on the demeanor of the witness and considering the

record as a whole, the testimony of Dierdre Curran is not credible.

22. Based on the demeanor of the witness and considering the

record as a whole, the testimony of Josephine Castellano is not credible.

23. Based on the demeanor of the witness and considering the

record as a whole, the testimony of Anthony Rinaldi, Esq., is fully

credible.

B. Conclusions of Law

1. Plaintiffs Walsh and Bailmaster are citizens of New Jersey.

2. Defendants Curran, Castellano, Absolute, and ABA are

citizens of Florida.

3. The amount in controversy in this case exceeds $75,000.

4. The parties entered into a valid and binding Contract.

5. The plaintiffs did not waive the restrictive covenant set forth

at paragraph 16(a) of the Contract.

6. The bail business activity by Castellano, undertaken after the

closing date, June 18, 2021, and without the plaintiffs’ knowledge or

consent constituted a material breach of the restrictive covenant set forth

at paragraph 16(a) of the Contract.

7. The plaintiffs’ suspension of monthly payments in response to

the defendants’ material breach was privileged and not itself a breach of

contract.

8. An award of damages in favor of the plaintiff would be

inadequate because there is no method by which the amount of damages

can be accurately computed or ascertained.

9. The remedy of specific performance is appropriate under the

circumstances presented in this case.

10. The court will enter a conditional order or decree of specific

performance directing the defendants to comply with the terms of the

restrictive covenant set forth at paragraph 16(a) of the Contract.

11. To protect the substantive rights of the defendants, our order

or decree of specific performance will be conditioned upon the plaintiffs’

payment to the defendants of the remaining $60,000 balance of monthly

installment payments due under the Contract.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we will direct the clerk to enter judgment

in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants on all counts of the

plaintiffs’ complaint and all counts of the defendants’ counterclaim. We

will enter a conditional order or decree of specific performance directing

the defendants to comply with the five-year non-compete provision of the

advertising asset sale agreement. Our order or decree of specific

performance will be conditioned upon the plaintiffs’ payment to the

defendants of the remaining $60,000 in payments due under the

advertising asset sale agreement.

An appropriate order follows.

Dated: March 29, 2024

JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.

Chief United States Magistrate Judge