Rivera v. Ransom

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EDGARDO SOBRADO RIVERA, No. 4:23-CV-00566

Petitioner, (Chief Judge Brann)

v.

JASEN BOHINSKI,1

Respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

MARCH 26, 2024

Petitioner Edgardo Sobrado Rivera filed the instant pro se petition for a writ

of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He seeks to overturn his 2017

state-court convictions and sentence of life imprisonment without parole. Because

Rivera cannot satisfy the stringent requirements for habeas corpus relief, the Court

must deny his Section 2254 petition.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In August 2017, after a three-day jury trial, Rivera was found guilty of first-

degree murder, reckless endangerment, and firearms not to be carried without a

1 Rivera named “Kevin Ransom” as Respondent in this case. However, Rivera is confined at

SCI Dallas and Superintendent Kevin Ransom has been replaced by an acting superintendent,

so the appropriate Respondent in this matter is Acting Superintendent Jasen Bohinski. See 28

U.S.C. § 2242; Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434-35 (2004); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254

Rule 2(a). The Court will therefore substitute the appropriate Respondent in this matter. See

license.2 Following this guilty verdict, he was immediately sentenced to an

aggregate term of life imprisonment without parole.3

Rivera’s convictions stem from the August 20, 2016 shooting of Henry

Liriano-Aquino.4 Rivera and Liriano-Aquino were involved in drug trafficking

together, and Rivera had recently purchased 45 to 50 grams of heroin from

Liriano-Aquino for $5,000, to be repaid over time.5 At trial, the evidence showed

that, five or six days after the purchase, Liriano-Aquino began to press Rivera for

repayment.6 Liriano-Aquino also informed Rivera that he was receiving pressure

about the money from “people in New York.”7

At trial, Rivera did not dispute that he fatally shot an unarmed Liriano-

Aquino.8 His theory of defense was that Liriano-Aquino had threatened the lives

of his wife and stepson and that he “had no choice but to shoot” him to protect his

family.9 Rivera’s wife testified that—on the day of the shooting—she witnessed

Liriano-Aquino drive into their neighborhood and point out her vehicle.10 She

also testified that, later that evening, she saw a text message written in Spanish

2 Commonwealth v. Sobrado-Rivera, No. 414 MDA 2018, 2019 WL 2881486, at *1, 3 (Pa.

Super. Ct. July 3, 2019) (nonprecedential).

3 Id., at *3.

4 Id., at *1.

5 Id., at *2.

6 Id.

7 Id.

8 Id., at *5, 6, 7.

9 Id., at *4, 5.

10 Id., at *2.

from Liriano-Aquino on Rivera’s phone that “stated something to the effect that

four males would be coming to their house.”11 Rivera likewise testified that, when

the two met on the day of the shooting, Liriano-Aquino had told him that he was

“finished giving [Rivera] breaks” and was “going to call his New York people and

send them to” Rivera’s house.12 Rivera claimed that Liriano-Aquino then “looked

at his phone as if to make a call and stated that he was going to make [Rivera] ‘a

believer.’”13 Rivera attested that he “felt he had no choice other than to shoot”

Liriano-Aquino to protect his family, although he conceded that Liriano-Aquino

did not threaten him directly and did not have a gun.14

The jury apparently did not believe Rivera’s proffered justification of

defense of others and instead found him guilty of first-degree murder and other

related charges.15 Rivera appealed, but the Superior Court of Pennsylvania

affirmed his judgment of sentence.16 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

subsequently denied Rivera’s petition for allowance of appeal.17

11 Id.

12 Id.

13 Id.

14 Id.

15 Id., at *1.

16 Id., at *1, 8.

17 Commonwealth v. Sobrado-Rivera, No. 447 MAL 2019, 222 A.3d 384 (Pa. 2019) (table).

In January 2020, Rivera filed a pro se petition under Pennsylvania’s Post

Conviction Relief Act (PCRA),18 the state’s corollary to federal habeas relief.19

PCRA counsel was appointed, who then filed two amended PCRA petitions.20 On

January 11, 2022, the PCRA court dismissed Rivera’s second amended petition

without an evidentiary hearing.21 Rivera obtained new counsel for his PCRA

appeal and asserted four claims sounding in ineffective assistance of counsel.22 On

October 4, 2022, the Superior Court denied Rivera’s PCRA appeal.23 And, once

again, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied Rivera’s petition for allowance

of appeal.24

Rivera lodged his Section 2254 petition and memorandum of law in this

Court in April 2023.25 Respondent filed his response26 and, after an extension of

time, Rivera filed a traverse.27 Rivera’s Section 2254 petition, therefore, is ripe for

disposition.

18 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9541 et seq.

19 See Commonwealth v. Sobrado-Rivera, No. 242 MDA 2022, 2022 WL 4877397, at *3 (Pa.

Super. Ct. Oct. 4, 2022) (nonprecedential).

20 Id.

21 Id.

22 See id., at *3-6.

23 See id., at *1, 7.

24 Commonwealth v. Sobrado-Rivera, No. 519 MAL 2022, 292 A.3d 553 (Pa. 2023) (table).

25 See generally Docs. 1, 2.

26 Doc. 8.

27 Doc. 12. Although Rivera labeled this document as an “application to supplement or amend”

his Section 2254 petition, see id., Rivera does not raise any new or additional claims. Rather,

he merely provides more detailed argument regarding the ineffective-assistance claims

asserted in his original petition and memorandum of law. See generally id. Accordingly, this

document was appropriately docketed as a traverse.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)28

mandates that petitioners demonstrate that they have “exhausted the remedies

available in the courts of the State” before seeking federal habeas relief.29 An

exhausted claim is one that has been “fairly presented” to the state courts “by

invoking one complete round of the State’s established appellate review process,”

and which has been adjudicated on the merits.30

When a claim is properly exhausted and then raised on federal habeas

review, the level of deference afforded to the state court decision is substantial.31

The AEDPA “does not ‘permit federal judges to . . . casually second-guess the

decisions of their state-court colleagues or defense attorneys.’”32 Accordingly,

under Section 2254(d), federal habeas relief is unavailable for exhausted claims

unless the state-court adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law . . . or

resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts

in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”33 An

28 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241–2254.

29 Id. § 2254(b)(1)(A).

30 Carpenter v. Vaughn, 296 F.3d 138, 146 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526

U.S. 838, 844-45 (1999)); see also Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289, 302 (2013).

31 Bey v. Superintendent Greene SCI, 856 F.3d 230, 236 (3d Cir. 2017), cert. denied sub nom.,

Gilmore v. Bey, 138 S. Ct. 740 (2018) (mem.).

32 Collins v. Sec’y of Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 742 F.3d 528, 543 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Burt v. Titlow,

571 U.S. 12, 15 (2013)).

33 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent includes situations where

“the state court identifies the correct governing legal rule . . . but unreasonably

applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner’s case.”34

This is an intentionally difficult standard to meet.35 Section 2254(d)

“preserves authority to issue the writ in cases where there is no possibility

fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court’s decision conflicts with”

clearly established Supreme Court precedent.36 Thus, to obtain federal habeas

relief on an exhausted claim, a state prisoner must demonstrate that the state

court’s ruling on the claim “was so lacking in justification that there was an error

well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility of

fairminded disagreement.”37

Finally, if a state court has ruled on the merits of a claim, a federal habeas

petitioner generally must meet Section 2254(d)’s requirements “on the record that

was before that state court.”38 Absent compelling circumstances,39 district courts

cannot supplement the existing state-court record for claims adjudicated on the

merits.40 “Otherwise, federal habeas petitioners would be able to circumvent the

34 White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 425 (2014) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407

(2000)).

35 Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011).

36 Id.

37 Id. at 103.

38 Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 185 (2011) (footnote omitted).

39 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2).

40 Brown v. Wenerowicz, 663 F.3d 619, 629 (3d Cir. 2011).

finality of state court judgments by establishing a new factual record” on federal

habeas review.41

III. DISCUSSION

Rivera raises two grounds for relief in his Section 2254 petition. His

primary claim is that his trial attorney was constitutionally deficient for failing to

be aware of a Spanish text message sent from Liriano-Aquino to Rivera on the day

of the shooting, which the prosecution’s witness translated during trial and which

Rivera claims contained an imminent threat to his family.42 Rivera also asserts that

his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress certain electronic

messages found on Liriano-Aquino’s cellphone.43

Rivera includes a section “B” in his initial supporting memorandum of

law,44 in which he asserts that there was a “Fourteenth Amendment” violation by

the Superior Court. However, this portion of his memorandum merely argues that

the Superior Court unreasonably determined the facts and unreasonably applied

federal law, which is simply the Section 2254 standard of review for exhausted

habeas claims.45 The Court, therefore, will examine in turn Rivera’s two claims of

ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

41 Id.

42 Doc. 2 at 7-10; see also Doc. 12 at 12-21.

43 Doc. 2 at 11; see also Doc. 12 at 21-24.

44 See Doc. 2 at 12-16.

45 See supra Section II (“Standard of Review”).

A collateral attack based on ineffective assistance of counsel is governed by

the familiar two-pronged test set forth in Strickland v. Washington.46 To prevail on

such a claim, a defendant must demonstrate that (1) counsel’s representation fell

below an objective level of reasonableness based on prevailing professional norms,

and (2) the deficient representation was prejudicial.47 The defendant bears the

burden of proving both prongs.48

In determining whether counsel has satisfied the objective standard of

reasonableness under the first prong, courts must be highly deferential toward

counsel’s conduct.49 There is a strong presumption that counsel’s performance

falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.50 Only a “rare

claim” of ineffectiveness of counsel should succeed “under the properly deferential

standard to be applied in scrutinizing counsel’s performance.”51

To satisfy the prejudice prong, the defendant must establish a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome of the proceeding would

have been different.52 The district court need not conduct its analysis of the two

46 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

47 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88.

48 See id. at 687.

49 Id. at 689.

50 See United States v. Gray, 878 F.2d 702, 710 (3d Cir. 1989).

51 Id. at 711 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90).

52 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

prongs in a particular order or even address both prongs of the inquiry if the

defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.53

When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel has been exhausted in

state court, review of that claim by a federal habeas court is significantly

circumscribed. The federal court does not review the ineffectiveness claim de

novo; rather, “[t]he pivotal question is whether the state court’s application of the

Strickland standard was unreasonable.”54 Under this “doubly” deferential

standard, “so long as fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the

state court’s decision,” a state court’s determination that a Strickland claim lacks

merit precludes federal habeas relief.55

A. Failure to Challenge Interpretation of Text Message

Rivera’s principal claim involves a text message from Liriano-Aquino that

was written in Spanish and translated to English at trial by Harrisburg Police

Detective Libertad Ramos. Detective Ramos, who apparently spoke Spanish,

testified that the message—according to her interpretation of it—was “not

threatening in any manner.”56 Specifically, she translated the message as follows:

“I have four people that I can’t sell to because you have me at a standstill. You

need to come on with it and give me what you need – what you need to do. I’m

53 See id. at 697; United States v. Lilly, 536 F.3d 190, 196 (3d Cir. 2008).

54 Richter, 562 U.S. at 101 (emphasis added); Collins, 742 F.3d at 547-48.

55 Richter, 562 U.S. at 101, 105 (citation omitted).

56 See Doc. 8-1, Aug. 17, 2017 Trial Tr. 220:9-17, 221:6-8 [hereinafter “8/_/17 Trial Tr. __:__”].

not the one that’s the problem. It’s the people that are higher up that are giving me

pressure.”57 Rivera and his wife, to the contrary, testified that the text message

was threatening and that it implied that Liriano-Aquino was going to send “four

men” to Rivera’s home because he was late in paying for the heroin.58

Rivera argues that his trial attorney, George Matangos, performed

deficiently because Matangos failed to properly review the discovery materials

provided by the Commonwealth, was unaware of this critical text message, and did

not confer with Rivera about it. Rivera maintains that this text message was

instrumental to his claim of defense of others, and that if Matangos would have

performed competently there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury would have

believed his theory of defense and found the shooting justified.

Rivera properly exhausted this Strickland claim in state court. On PCRA

appeal, the Superior Court first found that “trial counsel was aware of the text

message in question” because “Detective Ramos, [Rivera], and his wife were all

testifying about the same text message.”59 The panel also appeared to dismiss any

claim of deficient performance because Matangos had brought out the substance of

the text message on direct examination of Rivera and his wife, cross-examined

Detective Ramos about it, and recalled Rivera (in rebuttal to Detective Ramos’s

57 Id. at 220:18-23.

58 See Sobrado-Rivera, No. 242 MDA 2022, 2022 WL 4877397, at *4 & n.5.

59 Id., at *5.

testimony) to attest that the text message was indeed a threat.60 Thus, although not

explicitly stated, it appears that the Superior Court did not find Matangos’s

performance deficient under the first Strickland prong.61

While the Superior Court’s holding on the performance prong may be

somewhat unclear, the court unequivocally held that Rivera had failed to establish

prejudice under Strickland’s second prong. To wit: the panel concluded that

Rivera could not “establish the requisite prejudice merely because the

Commonwealth offered Detective Ramos’s rebuttal testimony” and therefore

Rivera was not “entitled to relief on this claim.”62

The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s determination on this Strickland claim

was not unreasonable. Initially, the Court finds that there is an arguable case to be

made that Matangos performed deficiently by failing to review this specific text

message or discuss it with his client and by allowing the Commonwealth, during

trial, to provide the sole Spanish-to-English translation through a potentially

partisan police officer. In particular, Matangos all but admitted during a side bar at

trial that he likely had been provided this text message during discovery but had

failed to print it out, have it translated, or show it to Rivera.63 Moreover, as Rivera

60 Id.

61 It is also possible that the Superior Court collapsed the two Strickland elements into one

analysis and settled on a conclusion that no prejudice had been shown.

62 Sobrado-Rivera, No. 242 MDA 2022, 2022 WL 4877397, at *5.

63 See 8/17/17 Trial Tr. 282:17-283:5.

notes in his traverse, Matangos likely should not have allowed the only translation

of this critical text message to have been performed extemporaneously at trial by a

police detective testifying for the prosecution.64

However, although a reasonable jurist could conclude that Matangos’s

performance was deficient, a reasonable jurist could also agree with the Superior

Court’s determination that his conduct did not fall below the constitutional

minimum. After all, Matangos brought out the substance of the allegedly

threatening text message during his direct examination of Rivera and Rivera’s

wife; he skillfully cross-examined Detective Ramos about the message and her

translation, getting Ramos to admit that she had never previously transcribed the

text message or provided an English copy to defense counsel as requested during

discovery65; and he even recalled Rivera as a witness to rebut Detective Ramos’s

interpretation. Thus, the Court cannot conclude that the Superior Court’s

determination on the Strickland performance prong was unreasonable.

The Court reaches the same conclusion as to Strickland’s prejudice prong.

The Superior Court found that Rivera had failed to establish prejudice because the

jury had heard his version of the text message (through both Rivera’s and his

wife’s testimony) as well as Detective Ramos’s interpretation and concluded that

“it was within the province of the jury to decide what weight to afford their

64 See Doc. 12 at 20-21.

65 See 8/17/17 Trial Tr. 226:23-229:1.

respective testimonies.”66 Not only was this conclusion a reasonable application of

Strickland, it was also the correct one.

While Rivera maintains that this text message was crucial to his justification

defense, he overlooks the substantial countervailing evidence presented at trial that

undermined this defense. That evidence included that he owed Liriano-Aquino (a

drug dealer) $5,000 and was being pressured to repay that debt; he did not contact

police after receiving the allegedly threatening text message; Rivera himself

scheduled the meeting with Liriano-Aquino where the shooting took place;

Liriano-Aquino was unarmed when Rivera shot him twice; and Liriano-Aquino did

not threaten him during that final face-to-face meeting. In fact, on direct appeal,

the Superior Court laid out in detail how the facts and evidence adduced at trial did

not support the justification of use of force for the protection of others under 18

PA. CONS. STAT. § 506.67

Notably, the Court observes that nowhere in his Section 2254 petition,

memorandum of law, traverse, or other supporting documents does Rivera provide

a copy of the at-issue text message or an alternative translation.68 Nor does it

appear that Rivera ever provided such information to the state court.69 This would

66 See Sobrado-Rivera, No. 242 MDA 2022, 2022 WL 4877397, at *5.

67 See Sobrado-Rivera, No. 414 MDA 2018, 2019 WL 2881486, at *5-6.

68 During closing, the prosecution noted that Rivera “can speak Spanish.” 8/17/17 Trial Tr.

276:6-10.

69 See generally Doc. 8-5 (brief to Superior Court on PCRA appeal).

seem to be an elemental step in establishing the substance and nature of this text

message and the purported prejudicial effect from Matangos’s (allegedly deficient)

performance at trial. If Detective Ramos got the translation correct, it would be

difficult to show any prejudice from Matangos’s alleged error, let alone prejudice

sufficient to meet Strickland’s “reasonable probability of a different outcome”

standard. The Court thus concludes that the Superior Court’s determination on the

Strickland prejudice prong was both reasonable and correct.

In sum, the Superior Court’s application of Strickland to this claim was not

unreasonable. No relief is due on Rivera’s first ineffective-assistance-of-counsel

claim.70

B. Failure to Move to Suppress Cellphone Evidence

In his second ground for relief, Rivera contends that Matangos was

ineffective for failing to move to suppress Liriano-Aquino’s cellphone and the text

and Facebook messages found thereon. This claim was likewise exhausted in state

70 In his memorandum of law, Rivera additionally contends that Matangos’s inability to confer

with him about the at-issue text message resulted in actual or constructive denial of the

assistance of counsel, thus triggering a “presumption of prejudice.” See Doc. 2 at 7-10 (citing,

inter alia, Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976); Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272 (1989)).

First, this claim was never presented to the state courts and thus it is procedurally defaulted.

See generally Doc. 8-5. Second, Rivera’s reliance on Geders and Perry is misplaced. In no

way could Rivera’s trial circumstances surrounding the at-issue text message constitute actual

or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel such that prejudice could be presumed. Cf.

Perry, 488 U.S. at 279-80 (explaining that in Geders, no prejudice analysis was performed

because there had been an actual denial of defendant’s right to “assistance of counsel

altogether” (citation omitted)).

court.71 The Superior Court found that Rivera had failed to satisfy any of the

ineffective-assistance prongs and had failed to show that a suppression motion

would have been successful.72 Rivera has not established how the Superior Court’s

application of Strickland was unreasonable.

In his initial memorandum of law, Rivera provides no evidence or argument

to support this Sixth Amendment claim.73 He simply asserts that the cellphone was

“tainted” because Liriano-Aquino’s wife picked up the phone and then replaced it

before police arrived.74

Rivera provides more support in his traverse, appearing to replicate the

arguments made by his attorney on PCRA appeal.75 None of these arguments,

however, has merit. As the Superior Court noted, the electronic messages in

question were taken from the cellphone of Liriano-Aquino, the murder victim.76

Neither PCRA counsel nor Rivera has provided any legal authority that would

prohibit the search by law enforcement of a deceased victim’s cellphone or

implicate application of the exclusionary rule to its contents. Rivera, in fact, likely

had no Fourth Amendment “standing” to even assert such a pretrial objection to the

71 See Sobrado-Rivera, No. 242 MDA 2022, 2022 WL 4877397, at *6.

72 See id.

73 See Doc. 2 at 11.

74 See id.

75 Compare Doc. 12 at 21-24, with Doc. 8-5 at 33-40.

76 Sobrado-Rivera, No. 242 MDA 2022, 2022 WL 4877397, at *6.

search or seizure of Liriano-Aquino’s cellphone, a device in which Rivera had no

ownership, control, possessory interest, or legitimate expectation of privacy.77

Matangos, therefore, likely could not have even moved to suppress Liriano-

Aquino’s cellphone or its contents because his client—Rivera—had no Fourth

Amendment standing to assert such a claim. Even if Matangos would have filed a

suppression motion, it would have plainly failed on the merits under Pennsylvania

law.78 Consequently, Matangos could not have been ineffective for failing to file a

frivolous motion to suppress, as an attorney cannot be ineffective for failing to

raise a meritless argument.79

The Superior Court’s determination of this second Strickland claim was both

reasonable and correct. Rivera’s second and final habeas claim, therefore, does not

warrant relief.

77 See United States v. Correa, 653 F.3d 187, 190 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted) (explaining

that, to invoke the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule, a defendant must have “standing,”

i.e., “a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place”); United States v. Mosley, 454

F.3d 249, 253 n.5 (3d Cir. 2006) (“The ‘standing’ inquiry, in the Fourth Amendment context,

is shorthand for the determination of whether a litigant’s Fourth Amendment rights have been

implicated.”); Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 718 A.2d 265, 266-70 (Pa. 1998) (providing

thorough explanation of Pennsylvania law concerning Fourth Amendment standing doctrine

and exclusionary rule).

78 See Commonwealth v. Millner, 888 A.2d 680, 691-92 (Pa. 2005) (“[A] defendant cannot

prevail upon a suppression motion unless he demonstrates that the challenged police conduct

violated his own, personal privacy interests.”).

79 Preston v. Superintendent Graterford SCI, 902 F.3d 365, 379 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Ross v.

Dist. Att’y of Cnty. of Allegheny, 672 F.3d 198, 211 n.9 (3d Cir. 2012)).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny Rivera’s petition for a writ of

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Court will likewise deny a certificate

of appealability, as Rivera has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of

a constitutional right.80 An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann

Matthew W. Brann

Chief United States District Judge

80 See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).