Opinion

Holmes v. American Home Patient/Lincare

Court
District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
Filed
Mar 14, 2024
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 29.2%

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

PATRICIA HOLMES, No. 4:21-CV-01683

Plaintiff, (Chief Judge Brann)

v.

AMERICAN HOME

PATIENT/LINCARE,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

MARCH 14, 2024

I. BACKGROUND

In September 2021, Patricia Holmes filed a complaint against American

Home Patient/Lincare (“AHOM”) alleging she was subject to a racially hostile

work environment and retaliation at Defendant’s State College, Pennsylvania

location.1 After partially granting AHOM’s motion for summary judgment in July

2023, all that remains is Holmes’ hostile work environment claim.2 I scheduled

trial for April 2024 and set a briefing deadline of January 2, 2024 for any motions

in limine and supporting briefs.3

1 See Doc. 1 (Compl.).

2 See Doc. 30 (Ord. Granting and Denying Summary Judgment In Part).

In January 2024, Holmes filed one motion in limine and Defendant filed

three motions in limine.4 Plaintiff seeks to exclude a class action and jury trial

waiver, a statement made by her former co-worker Tammy Dunmire, and several

lawsuits she was involved in.5 In its first two motions in limine, AHOM asks the

Court to preclude presentation of evidence that is from the dismissed claims or is

unrelated to the remaining claim.6 Defendant also requests the exclusion of

evidence relevant only to Holmes’ claim for punitive damages or, in the

alternative, to bifurcate the trial in its third motion in limine.7

The motions are now ripe for disposition. For the reasons stated below,

Defendant’s third motion in limine is denied; the remaining motions in limine are

denied in part and granted in part.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Motion in Limine Standard

“Motions in limine are made prior to trial or the presentation of evidence in

order to aid the clear presentation of evidence.”8 “‘[A] motion in limine is designed

4 See Doc. 40 (Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine); Doc. 42 (Motion in Limine to Exclude Dismissed

Claims); Doc. 44 (Motion in Limine to Exclude Unrelated Events); and Doc. 46 (Motion in

Limine to Exclude Plaintiff’s Claim for Punitive Damages or, Alternatively, to Bifurcate the

Trial).

5 See Doc. 40 (Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine).

6 See Doc. 42 (Motion in Limine to Exclude Dismissed Claims); Doc. 44 (Motion in Limine to

Exclude Unrelated Events).

7 See Doc. 46 (Motion in Limine to Exclude Plaintiff’s Claim for Punitive Damages or,

Alternatively, to Bifurcate the Trial).

8 United States v. Ramsey, Crim. A. No. 19-628, 2021 WL 4554642, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

192115, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2021).

to narrow the evidentiary issues for trial and to eliminate unnecessary trial

interruptions.’”9 “‘Evidence should only be excluded on a motion in limine if it is

clearly inadmissible on all potential grounds.’”10 “‘The movant bears the burden of

demonstrating that the evidence is inadmissible on all potential grounds.’”11

B. Relevance and Admissibility of Evidence

Relevant evidence is presumed to be admissible in the Federal Rules of

Evidence.12 Under Federal Rule of Evidence 401, evidence is relevant if it has “any

tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the

evidence” if “the fact is of consequence in determining the action.”13 But even

relevant evidence may be excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 “if its

probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the

following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay,

wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”14 Both parties should

recall that Rule 403 does not exclude evidence simply because it prejudices a

party. It is only unfair prejudice that warrants exclusion.15

9 Id. (quoting Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 913 F.2d 1064, 1069 (1990)).

10 Id. (quoting Hunt v. Drake, No. 16-CV-1729, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108003, 2020 WL

3402343 (M.D. Pa. June 19, 2020)).

11 Id.

12 See FED. R. EVID. 402.

13 FED. R. EVID. 401.

14 FED. R. EVID. 403.

15 See e.g., United States v. Long, No. 22-3033, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 2944, at *14 (3d Cir.

2024) (“Not all prejudice is unfair prejudice, and Rule 403 bars only the latter.”).

C. Analysis

The Court will evaluate each of the motions in turn. Where appropriate,

connected evidence will be discussed together. Since the relevance of much of this

evidence turns on its applicability to a racially hostile work environment claim, I

will briefly review the relevant law.

To establish a prima facie case for a racially hostile work environment

claim, “a plaintiff must show that ‘1) the employee suffered intentional

discrimination because of his/her [race], 2) the discrimination was severe or

pervasive, 3) the discrimination detrimentally affected the plaintiff, 4) the

discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable person in like

circumstances, and 5) the existence of respondeat superior liability [meaning the

employer is responsible].’”16

1. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine

Based on representations made by AHOM, the Court will only evaluate a

statement made by Tammy Dunmire and the lawsuit Plaintiff brought against her

former employer, Sutherland Global Logistics (“Seko Logistics”).17

a. Dunmire’s Statement

During her deposition, Dunmire stated that there are “white [n-words] and

there are Black [n-words], it’s all a matter of attitude.”18 It is currently premature to

16 Castleberry v. STI Grp., 863 F.3d 259, 263 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Mandel v. M&Q

Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 167 (3d Cir. 2013)).

17 See Doc. 55 (Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine) at 1.

preclude this part of Dunmire’s testimony since its relevance will depend on the

context in which it is offered. Consequently, Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine is denied

as to this statement.

b. Seko Logistics Lawsuit

On October 27, 2020, Holmes filed a lawsuit against Seko Logistics alleging

she faced racial discrimination and harassment and was subject to retaliation.19 The

purported harassment occurred between May 2019 and mid-August 2019.20

Plaintiff sought damages for, in part, “embarrassment, humiliation, emotional

distress, pain, suffering, inconvenience and mental anguish….”21 Defendant

contends that these effects lasted through at least October 2020 when she sued

Seko Logistics.22 AHOM then draws the Court’s attention to Holmes’ identical

request for damages in the present case based, in part, on “embarrassment,

humiliation, emotional distress, pain, suffering, inconvenience and mental

anguish….”23

18 Doc. 42 (Brief in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine), Ex. 2 (Dunmire Dep.) at 64:21-

23.

19 See Doc. 55 (Brief in Opposition of Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine) at 2. Plaintiff’s right to sue

in that case was issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on August 12,

2020. See Doc. 55 (Brief in Opposition of Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine), Ex. B (Compl. in

Holmes v. Sutherland Global Logistics) ¶ 7(b).

20 See Doc. 55 (Brief in Opposition of Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine), Ex. B (Compl. in Holmes

v. Sutherland Global Logistics) ¶¶ 8, 12-14.

21 Id. ¶ 21.

22 See Doc. 55 (Brief in Opposition of Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine) at 4.

23 See Doc. 1 (Compl.) ¶ 27.

AHOM requests admission of both the lawsuit itself and the settlement

agreement Holmes reached with Seko Logistics in January 2021.24 Defendant

contends that this evidence “rebut[s]” the claim for emotional distress in this suit

and should be used to offset any award of compensatory damages.25 According to

AHOM, exclusion would force it to compensate Plaintiff for emotional distress

derived from multiple work environments.26 In response, Plaintiff asserts that this

evidence is irrelevant to her remaining claim and would expose her to unfair

prejudice if the jury draws the improper inference that she has a propensity to sue

her employers.27

The Court acknowledges that this is a rather close question but concludes

that narrowly tailoring the use of this lawsuit and issuing a proper limiting

instruction will avoid exposing Plaintiff to unfair prejudice. Further, AHOM will

not be permitted to introduce the pleadings from the Seko Logistics suit. Instead,

Defendant may ask a narrow question targeted at the potential overlap of emotional

distress experienced by Plaintiff. An appropriate limiting instruction will then

ensure that the jury only considers the Seko Logistics case for damages purposes

and not to make an improper character inference.

24 See Doc. 55 (Brief in Opposition of Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine) at 5.

25 Id.

26 Id. at 7-8.

27 See Doc. 57 (Reply Brief in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine) at 3.

“Settlement agreements…are inadmissible regardless of relevance if offered

to establish liability for or the amount of a claim or if introduction thereof would

result in undue prejudice to an opposing party.”28 But settlement agreements may

be offered “‘for purposes not [otherwise] prohibited[,]’ such as to ‘prov[e] a

witness’s bias or prejudice.’”29 “Under this policy, federal courts frequently

exclude evidence of settlements reached between…a plaintiff and a non-defendant

who is responsible for a portion of plaintiff’s damages.”30 The settlement

agreement reached between Holmes and Seko Logistics will therefore be excluded.

2. Defendant’s First Motion in Limine: Plaintiff’s Dismissed

Claims

In its first motion in limine, AHOM seeks to exclude a number of the

allegations Holmes made in support of the now dismissed constructive discharge

and retaliation claims. After removing the events that Plaintiff has indicated she

does not intend to offer, these allegations include: the physical harassment

experienced by Holmes; Timothy McCoy’s31 decision to deny Plaintiff access to an

initial software training session; McCoy’s practice of giving Holmes’ work to

Defendant’s Lewistown location; a confrontation with McCoy connected to the

second software training provided to the State College location; the verbal

28 Trout v. Milton S. Hershey Med. Ctr., 572 F. Supp. 2d 591, 596 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (Conner, J.)

(citing FED. R. EVID. 403, 408(a)).

29 Id. at 599 (citing FED. R. EVID. 408(b)).

30 Id. (citing Young v. Version Allsteel Press Co., 539 F. Supp. 193, 196 (E.D. Pa. 1982)).

31 At all relevant times, Timothy McCoy was Plaintiff’s immediate manager. See Doc. 44

(Motion in Limine to Exclude Unrelated Events), Ex. A (Holmes Dep.) at 15:16-17.

reprimand McCoy gave Holmes for not sitting next to Beverly Hibbert32 at a

morning meeting after Hibbert’s recent use of a racial slur; the hoarding of certain

work by other employees and the connected embarrassment experienced by

Plaintiff; and a comment by McCoy that Holmes’ work was “menial.”33

Although “courts have often excluded evidence of dismissed claims” by

“[r]easoning that evidence regarding dismissed claims that have failed as a matter

of law typically has little relevance,” I will nevertheless review each piece of

evidence Defendant seeks to exclude.34

In evaluating these events, the Court has “wide discretion to exclude

proffered evidence that is collateral, rather than material, to the issues in the

case.”35 It is true that McCoy’s behavior was often “discomforting, demonstrative

of poor leadership, and not conducive to a positive work environment[;]”36

however, it is only relevant to Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim if it was

driven by racial animus or addresses some other live issue.37 “[C]omments that

cannot be reasonably construed as invoking any racial feeling do not support”

32 Hibbert was a fellow customer service representative at the State College location. See Doc.

44 (Motion in Limine to Exclude Unrelated Events), Ex. A (Holmes Dep.) at 32:12-14.

33 See Doc. 43 (Brief in Support of Motion in Limine to Exclude Dismissed Claims) at 6-7, 9-

10.

34 Cooper v. Pa. Human Relations Comm’n, Civ. No. 1:19-CV-2230, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

146708, at *5 (Carlson, M.J.) (collecting cases).

35 Gay v. Petsock, 917 F.2d 768, 773 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing Cowgill v. Raymark Industries, Inc.,

832 F.2d 798, 805 (3d Cir. 1987)).

36 Doc. 29 (Summary Judgment Mem. Op.) at 25.

37 See e.g., Brown v. Petco Animal Supplies Store, Inc., No. 4:21-CV-00330, 2023 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 37155, 2023 WL 2395466 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 2023).

liability and therefore have minimal probative value.38 While AHOM highlights

that the events underlying the dismissed claims lack a blatant racial element,39 “it is

not necessary” to “use words that overtly implicate racial animus to create a hostile

work environment.”40 In fact, Holmes’ experience of “overtly” racial incidents

involving McCoy significantly informs the Court’s evaluation of the racially

neutral events that supported Plaintiff’s dismissed claims.41

a. Admissible Events

Several events underlying the dismissed claims are relevant to the hostile

work environment claim and pose no risk of exposing either party to unfair

prejudice or the jury to unnecessary confusion. Like much of McCoy’s conduct at

issue in this Memorandum Opinion, these incidents are prejudicial to AHOM but

not unfairly so. A juror could infer an ongoing hostile work environment existed

based on McCoy’s previously displayed racial animus despite the facially race

neutral allegations at issue in this motion. Further, these events do not lend

themselves to an improper inference any more than the “overtly” racial incidents

do alone.42 As such, they will not be excluded under Rule 403.

38 Davis v. City of Newark, 285 F. App’x 899, 902 (3d Cir. 2008).

39 See Doc. 43 (Brief in Support of Motion in Limine to Exclude Dismissed Claims) at 4, 10.

40 Davis, 285 F. App’x at 902.

41 Davis, 285 F. App’x at 902; Doc. 44 (Motion in Limine to Exclude Unrelated Events), Ex. A

(Holmes Dep.) at 134:20-135:11. This differs from other cases where the only behavior

presented was facially neutral on race and was insufficient to support a racially hostile work

environment claim. See e.g., Brown, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37155, 2023 WL 2395466, at

*2-3.

42 Id.

If Plaintiff chooses to present this evidence, she may not mention her prior

claims of retaliation and constructive discharge. Doing so would subject AHOM to

unfair prejudice as these claims were found to be deficient as a matter of law.43

1. Physical Incidents

AHOM first challenges the relevance and admissibility of the two instances

where McCoy snatched papers from Holmes on July 7, 2020.44 A jury may believe

that McCoy’s prior, directly racial conduct and the written reprimand he received

influenced his subsequent behavior.45 This hostility is therefore probative of

Plaintiff’s remaining claim, even though on its face it is not “overtly” racial.46

2. Holmes is Denied the Initial Software Training

Plaintiff was “denied” training because she “needed to answer phones[,]” but

McCoy and the other customer service representatives attended this training.47

Missing the training purportedly impacted her ability to perform her work.48 No

“overt[]” racial animus can be identified in McCoy’s alleged insistence that

Holmes not attend the training.49 Despite this, I will not preclude use of this

43 See Doc. 30 (Ord. Granting and Denying Summary Judgment In Part).

44 See Doc. 43 (Brief in Support of Motion in Limine to Exclude Dismissed Claims) at 6.

45 See Doc. 44 (Motion in Limine to Exclude Unrelated Events), Ex. A (Holmes Dep.) at

134:20-135:11; 173:1-177:25; Doc. 22 (Motion for Summary Judgment), Ex. C (Tim McCoy

Dep.) at 15:24-16:4.

46 Davis, 285 F. App’x at 902.

47 Doc. 43 (Brief in Support of Motion in Limine to Exclude Dismissed Claims) at 6; Doc. 44

(Motion in Limine to Exclude Unrelated Events), Ex. A (Holmes Dep.) at 21:1-6.

48 See Doc. 44 (Motion in Limine to Exclude Unrelated Events), Ex. A (Holmes Dep.) at 18:2-

23.

49 Davis, 285 F. App’x at 902.

testimony at this juncture in the litigation. Singling Holmes out may be used by the

jury to support an inference of racial animus and an ongoing hostile environment.

The potential that Holmes would receive a make-up training does not change this

analysis.50 That is instead an explanation AHOM is welcome to offer the jury.51

3. Holmes’ Work is Given to Defendant’s

Lewistown Employees

Holmes also complained that McCoy gave her work to employees at

AHOM’s Lewistown, Pennsylvania location for failing to do “a sufficient job.”52

Again, this allegation lacks an explicitly racial element, but it still supports an

inference that McCoy subjected Holmes to an ongoing hostile work environment

due to racial animus. Defendant is welcome to put forth any arguments, such as a

concern with her performance,53 to counteract the persuasiveness of this evidence.

4. Second Software Training Events

Defendant next challenges events connected to the second software training

all the customer service representatives and McCoy received. AHOM seeks to

exclude McCoy’s reprimand of Holmes for asking questions during the training,

his assertion that Holmes and Dunmire could “call ‘whoever [they] want to, [but]

50 See Doc. 44 (Motion in Limine to Exclude Unrelated Events), Ex. A (Holmes Dep.) at 17:6-

25.

51 Defendant is certainly welcome to make that argument to the jury, and while it does

undermine the persuasiveness of this piece of evidence, it does not completely deprive this

event of its probative value such that it should be excluded.

52 Doc. 44 (Motion in Limine to Exclude Unrelated Events), Ex. A (Holmes Dep.) at 207:9-24.

53 See Doc. 44 (Motion in Limine to Exclude Unrelated Events), Ex. B (Lois Dodson Decl.),

Ex. 2 (Holmes Investigation Notes) at 10.

I’ll never b[e] fired and I’ll never go to jail[,]’” and his comment that they needed

to be “thick-skinned” because he was “‘tired of [their] bitching.’”54

While Dunmire’s presence weakens the relevance of these various

statements,55 they are not so devoid of probative value that exclusion is currently

warranted. Notably, McCoy’s decision to reprimand Holmes could be viewed as

evidence of an ongoing hostile work environment based on racial animus. The

other two statements are probative of McCoy’s awareness of his misconduct and

the impact the written warning had on his management style. These considerations

are relevant to the punitive damages analysis and any good faith argument

Defendant may make.

5. Holmes is Reprimanded for Not Sitting by

Hibbert

Finally, Plaintiff will not be precluded from offering evidence that McCoy

reprimanded her for not sitting next to Hibbert while she wore a piece of tape over

her mouth to protest the final written warning AHOM issued her.56 McCoy’s

response allowed Hibbert’s “antagonistic” behavior to continue and “perpetuated

54 Doc. 44 (Motion in Limine to Exclude Unrelated Events), Ex. A (Holmes Dep.) at 142:18-

143:6; Doc. 43 (Brief in Support of Motion in Limine to Exclude Dismissed Claims) at 9.

55 The Court acknowledges that there is a discrepancy in the record as to whether McCoy

directed this behavior at Dunmire. Plaintiff’s testimony indicates that McCoy made these

statements to herself and Dunmire while Dunmire’s testimony states only that McCoy told

Holmes he is “tired of [her] bitching, [she] need[s] to be thick-skinned” after she complained

about Hibbert. See Doc. 44 (Motion in Limine to Exclude Unrelated Events), Ex. A (Holmes

Dep.) at 142:18-143:6, 209:24-210:5; Doc. 22 (Motion for Summary Judgment), Ex. E

(Dunmire Dep.) at 51:16-21. Since Dunmire’s presentation of the events is clearly relevant

and not unfairly prejudicial, the Court focuses on Holmes’ recollection of these statements.

56 See Doc. 44 (Motion in Limine to Exclude Unrelated Events), Ex. B (Lois Dodson Decl.),

Ex. 2 (Holmes Investigation Notes) at 7-8.

the entire issue.”57 This is relevant to both the racially hostile work environment

claim and the manner in which AHOM implemented its anti-discrimination

program.

b. Excluded Events

Defendant’s first motion in limine is granted as to the two events described

below. These incidents, while certainly unpleasant, are not currently described to

the Court in a way that suggests they are probative of a racially hostile work

environment or Holmes’ claim for punitive damages. If Plaintiff is able, she may

make a “specific and narrowly tailored offer of proof as to the relevance and

admissibility of” these allegations at trial.58

1. Hoarding of Work and Embarrassment in

Meetings

The allegation that “work such as CPAPs [and] Overnight Pulse OX [were]

hoarded by other employees” that “refused” to train or assist her which led “to the

embarrassment in morning meetings” is not relevant to the racially hostile work

environment claim.59 Nothing suggests an inference of racial animus, at least as

currently described to the Court.60

57 Id. at 10.

58 Cooper, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146708, at *5.

59 Doc. 43 (Brief in Support of Motion in Limine to Exclude Dismissed Claims) at 7.

60 Per Plaintiff’s own testimony, McCoy berated all members of the Customer Service team in

State College for failing to perform as well as the Lewistown office. See Doc. 44 (Motion in

Limine to Exclude Unrelated Events), Ex. A (Holmes Dep.) at 207:25-208:19.

2. Menial Work

Holmes also contends that McCoy told her that the work she performed was

“menial” after she complained about not receiving the initial software training.61

The conversation may reveal McCoy’s disdain for customer service work, but it

does not appear that it was motivated by racial animus.62

3. Defendant’s Second Motion in Limine: Unrelated Events

AHOM’s second motion in limine seeks to exclude what it considers

evidence “unrelated” to the racially hostile work environment claim. Based on

Holmes’ representations, the Court must only decide whether to exclude

“Plaintiff’s allegations that McCoy told employees in the office…that he had

pushed his wife off the stairs at their house” and certain parts of Dunmire’s

testimony concerning incidents involving McCoy.63

a. Admissible Events

AHOM seeks to exclude Dunmire’s observation that McCoy’s management

style did not change after Hibbert was terminated and her personal reasons for

resigning.64 No part of this testimony directly implicates racial hostility and its

relevance to Holmes’ racially hostile work environment claim is minimal at best.

61 Doc. 44 (Motion in Limine to Exclude Unrelated Events), Ex. A (Holmes Dep.) at 159:3-19.

62 See id.

63 Doc. 53 (Brief in Opposition to Exclude Unrelated Events) at 1-2.

64 The Court considers AHOM’s request to reference Dumire’s assertion that the State College

location had a “[v]ery hostile environment” that was due to McCoy’s “behavior” and the way

he “allow[ed] other peoples’ behavior to continue.” Doc. 22 (Motion for Summary

Judgment), Ex. E (Dunmire Dep.) at 8:22-23, 62:13-18.

But this testimony is relevant to the effect AHOM’s corrective action had on

McCoy and the jury’s evaluation of whether Defendant acted in good faith in

implementing its anti-discrimination program. Further, this information does not

expose AHOM to unfair prejudice as the adequacy of its response is a contested

fact, and it is unlikely to confuse the jury.

AHOM also seeks to exclude Dunmire’s assertion that McCoy slammed

doors, threw pens, and verbally degraded his employees.65 Based on this testimony,

it appears that this behavior was not solely directed at Holmes. At this juncture, the

Court cannot conclude that it is completely devoid of probative value. When

placed alongside the prior incidents of direct racial harassment that allegedly

occurred, a juror may infer that racial animus motivated this behavior when

McCoy directed it at Holmes. No unfair prejudice would occur from presenting

this evidence, and it is not likely to confuse a jury.

b. Excluded Statements

McCoy’s statement to “everyone in the office” about throwing his wife “off

the stairs” at their home will be excluded.66 This statement is not probative of any

element of Plaintiff’s claim or the inquiry required for punitive damages. Even if it

were relevant, the probative value of this statement is minimal because it was not

65 Id. at 9:2-10.

66 Doc. 44 (Motion in Limine to Exclude Unrelated Events), Ex. A (Holmes Dep.) at 166:17-

19.

directed specifically at Plaintiff.67 Further, Holmes’ suggestion that it is “probative

of McCoy’s personality, his demeanor, and his propensity to ignore company

policy when it suits him or malevolence gets the best of him” is an attempt to

improperly use character evidence in violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 404.68

The Court will also preclude Dunmire’s testimony concerning the chair

throwing incident.69 Events that occurred after Plaintiff resigned are not relevant to

her hostile work environment claim or Defendant’s good faith defense.

4. Defendant’s Third Motion in Limine: Punitive Damages70

Finally, AHOM moves to either preclude evidence that is only relevant to

Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages or, alternatively, to bifurcate the trial.71

Punitive damages are only available when an “employer has engaged in intentional

discrimination and has done so ‘with malice or with reckless indifference to the

federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual.’”72 “Malice” or “reckless

67 Id.

68 Doc. 53 (Brief in Opposition to Motion in Limine to Exclude Unrelated Events) at 5. See also

United States v. Williams, 900 F.3d 486, 490 (“Rule 404 prohibits ‘an attempt to use a

person’s personality or psychological propensity to prove what the person did.’”).

69 Doc. 44 (Brief in Support of Motion in Limine to Exclude Unrelated Events) at 6.

70 “It is well-settled that ‘any case law construing the punitive damages standard set forth in

[Title VII cases] is equally applicable to clarify the common law punitive damages standard

with respect to a § 1981 claim.’” Goodwin v. Fast Food Enters. #3, LLP, C.A. No. 10-23

Erie, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68503, at *15 n.1 (W.D. Pa. May 16, 2012) (quoting Lowery v.

Circuit City Stores, Inc., 206 F.3d 431, 441 (4th Cir. 2000)).

71 See Doc. 46 (Motion in Limine to Exclude Plaintiff’s Claim for Punitive Damages or,

Alternatively, to Bifurcate the Trial).

72 Kolstad v. ADA, 527 U.S. 526, 529-30 (1999) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1)).

indifference” refer to “the employer’s knowledge that it may be acting in violation

of federal law, not its awareness that it is engaging in discrimination.”73

“‘An employer may be vicariously liable for the discrimination of its

employee if the employee was serving in a ‘managerial capacity’ and committed

the wrong while ‘acting in the scope of his employment.’”74 But “an employer may

not be vicariously liable for the discriminatory employment decisions of

managerial agents where these decisions are contrary to the employer’s good-faith

efforts to comply with” the law.75 “This ‘good-faith’ exception ‘shields employers

who make a bona fide effort to institute nondiscrimination policies, from the

prospect of an award of punitive damages when, despite the good faith efforts of

the employer to comply with the law…discrimination has nonetheless occurred.’”76

Defendant notes that it has “comprehensive anti-harassment and anti-

discrimination policies and an effective mechanism for reporting and addressing

employee concerns.”77 Holmes was “informed of these policies from the outset of

her employment” and in fact did complain to both an Area Manager and Human

73 Id. at 535.

74 Middlebrooks v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., Civ. A. No. 17-412, 2019 WL 438092, at

*9 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 2019) (quoting Ridley v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 217 F. App’x 130, 137

(3d Cir. 2007)).

75 Id. (quoting Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 545).

76 Goodwin, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68503, at *16 (quoting Copley v. BAX Global, Inc., 97 F.

Supp. 2d 1164, 1168 (S.D. Fla. 2000)).

77 Doc. 47 (Brief in Support of Motion in Limine to Exclude Plaintiff’s Claim for Punitive

Damages or, Alternatively, to Bifurcate the Trial) at 7.

Resources in March 2020.78 After receiving these complaints, AHOM contends it

“promptly investigated” and then “disciplined the individual’s involved.”79

a. Preclude Punitive Damages

The Court has previously noted that AHOM’s “response to McCoy’s actions

could be viewed by a jury as markedly deficient.”80 He “had a history of making,

to put it generously, racially insensitive remarks to his only black employee and, at

a minimum, condoned racial statements and behavior from Hibbert….”81 AHOM

“only issued a written warning—one of the mildest forms of discipline” it could

impose—“and this was not in response to McCoy’s racially insensitive behavior

but, rather, was in response to McCoy having permitted Hibbert to behave in an

unprofessional manner.”82 “A reasonable juror could…view as disingenuous

[AHOM’s] reasons for issuing such mild discipline.”83 Whether Defendant

sufficiently undertook good faith efforts to comply with the law is consequently a

question for the jury.84

78 Id. at 7-8.

79 Id. at 8.

80 Doc. 29 (Summary Judgment Mem. Op.) at 21.

81 Id.

82 Id. at 22.

83 Id.

84 See e.g., Lazzaro v. Rite Aid Corp., No. 09-CV-1140, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84511, at *24-

26 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 2010) (denying summary judgment despite the defendant

implementing anti-discrimination policies and training due to other evidence suggesting

intentional discrimination occurred with “malice” or “reckless indifference” on the part of the

defendant).

b. Bifurcation of the Trial

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) “provides that the ‘Court, in

furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be

conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any claim,

cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim….’”85 “When deciding whether to

sever claims, the Court is required to balance ‘the convenience of the parties,

avoidance of prejudice to either party, and promotion of the expeditious resolution

of the litigation.’”86 The decision to bifurcate “is completely within [my]

discretion” but must “be based on the particular facts of the case.”87

AHOM “has the burden of showing that bifurcation is proper in light of the

general principles that a single trial tends to lessen the delay, expense and

inconvenience to all parties.”88 In an attempt to meet that burden, Defendant

contends that “[t]he framework for awarding punitive damages is complicated and

[] likely to confuse the jury” given “[a] finding of intentional discrimination…may

be insufficient in itself to satisfy” the showing required to award punitive damages

and AHOM can avoid punitive damages through an acceptable showing of good

85 Johnson v. King Media, Inc., Civ. A. No. 01-2311, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11332, at *16

(E.D. Pa. June 24, 2002) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b)).

86 Id. (quoting Official Comm. Of Unsecured Creditors v. Shapiro, 190 F.R.D. 352, 355 (E.D.

Pa. 2000)).

87 Miller v. New Jersey Transit Auth. Rail Operations, 160 F.R.D. 37, 40 (D.N.J. 1995) (citing

Lowe v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 123, 125 (E.D. Pa. 1984)); Zawicki v.

Armstrong, No. 3:16-CV-453, 2017 WL 6206290, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2017) (Munley, J.)

(citing Lis v. Robert Packer Hosp., 579 F.2d 819, 824 (3d Cir. 1978)).

88 Miller, 160 F.R.D. at 40.

faith efforts.89 Due to this, Defendant suggests the Court follows the procedure

used by the District of New Jersey in Miller v. N.J. Transit Auth.90 in which the

jury first heard the liability case and then proceeded to the damages phase.91 The

damages phase was further divided into an initial section on compensatory

damages and, as needed, a second on punitive damages.92

Plaintiff suggests that she can “present the evidence supporting her claim for

punitive damages in a way that does not prejudice” AHOM.93 “Specifically,

Plaintiff’s counsel can give his opening remarks to the jury without mentioning

punitive damages” and then “present evidence during her case in chief that

supports submission of the issue of punitive damages to the jury, with the

exception of evidence of” Defendant’s wealth.94 After this presentation, AHOM

may then, if it so chooses, “move for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of

punitive damages” and, if resolved in her favor, Plaintiff would then “present

evidence of” AHOM’s wealth.95 Holmes believes “[t]his approach avoids any

unnecessary bifurcation of the trial, prejudice to the parties, []or waste of time.”96

89 Doc. 47 (Brief in Support of Motion in Limine to Exclude Plaintiff’s Claim for Punitive

Damages or, Alternatively, to Bifurcate the Trial) at 9-10.

90 160 F.R.D. 37 (D.N.J. 1995).

91 See Doc. 47 (Brief in Support of Motion in Limine to Exclude Plaintiff’s Claim for Punitive

Damages or, Alternatively, to Bifurcate the Trial) at 10 (citing Miller, 160 F.R.D. at 41).

92 Id.

93 Doc. 52 (Brief in Opposition of Motion in Limine to Exclude Plaintiff’s Claim for Punitive

Damages or, Alternatively, to Bifurcate the Trial) at 1.

94 Id.

95 Id. at 1-2.

96 Id. at 2.

Plaintiff further notes that this approach is similar to that taken by the Eastern

District of Pennsylvania in Thomson v. Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co.,97

a case cited by Defendant.

After considering “the convenience of the parties, avoidance of prejudice to

either party, and promotion of the expeditious resolution of the litigation[,]” the

Court concludes that bifurcation is unnecessary.98 The allegations in this case,

while serious, are not the kind of prejudice inspiring injuries found in the cases

cited by AHOM.99 Further, Defendant “point[s] to no particular issues that are not

present in the typical case.”100 In the words of my late colleague, the Honorable

James M. Munley, writing for this Court:

“The court is confident that it can, with the assistance of counsel,

construct a jury charge and a verdict slip that will prevent prejudice to

[Defendant]. We presume that a jury follows instructions, even in

difficult cases, and finds that proper instructions will prevent any

prejudicial confusion.”101

Consequently, Defendant’s Motion in Limine to Preclude Evidence in

Support of Plaintiff’s Claim for Punitive Damages or, in the Alternative, to

Bifurcate is denied. The Court agrees that Plaintiff’s proposed approach, when

combined with carefully crafted jury instructions, will avoid any prejudice to

AHOM and is in the interest of judicial economy.

97 No. 91-407, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12627 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 1992).

98 Johnson, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11332, at *16.

99 See e.g., Miller, 160 F.R.D. 39 (Plaintiff lost three limbs).

100 Zawicki, 2017 WL 6206290, at *6.

101 Id.

III. CONCLUSION

Defendant’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of Punitive Damages or,

Alternatively, to Bifurcate the Trial is denied. The remaining motions in limine are

denied in part and granted in part. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine is granted as to the

Seko Logistics settlement agreement but is otherwise denied. As to the events

underlying Plaintiff’s dismissed claims, she may not present evidence concerning

the hoarding of work by certain employees and McCoy’s “menial” comment or

mention the dismissed retaliation and constructive discharge claims. That motion is

otherwise denied. For the evidence at issue in Defendant’s Motion in Limine to

Exclude Unrelated Events, Plaintiff is precluded from mentioning McCoy’s

statement concerning his wife and Dunmire’s description of the chair throwing

incident. This motion is similarly otherwise denied.

An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann

Matthew W. Brann

Chief United States District Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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