Welsh v. Garman

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DOUGLAS DEAN WELSH, :

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:20-0329

Petitioner :

(JUDGE MANNION)

v. :

MARK GARMAN, :

Respondent :

MEMORANDUM

Petitioner, Douglas Dean Welsh, an inmate currently confined in the

Rockview State Correctional Institution, Bellefonte, Pennsylvania, files the

above captioned petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§2254. (Doc. 1). He challenges his convictions and sentence imposed in the

Court of Common Pleas of Columbia County. Id. The petition is ripe for

disposition. For the reasons outlined below, the petition will be denied.

I. Background

The procedural and factual background underlying Welsh’s conviction

and sentence is adopted from the November 21, 2019 Memorandum Opinion

of the Pennsylvania Superior Court, addressing Petitioner’s appeal from the

denial of his Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) petition, and is as follows:

In September 2010, a jury convicted Welsh of aggravated

indecent assault, corruption of minors, indecent assault and

criminal conspiracy, arising out of his myriad sexual offenses

several years.1 Prior to sentencing, the Commonwealth provided

Welsh Notice of its intent to seek imposition of a mandatory

minimum sentence of life in prison, pursuant 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§9718.2(a)(2).2 Moreover, due to the nature of the charges, the

trial court ordered Welsh to undergo an assessment by the

Sexual Offenders Assessment Board to determine whether he

should be classified as an SVP under the version of Megan’s Law

then in effect, Megan’s Law III, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9795.1 et seq.

(expired). At the conclusion of the February 22, 2011

sentencing/SVP hearing, the trial court imposed an aggregate

sentence of life in prison.3 Additionally, the court determined that

Welsh met the definition of an SVP, and informed him that he

was required to register and report as a Tier III sexual offender

for his lifetime.

On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Welsh’s judgment of

sentence, after which our Supreme Court denied allowance of

appeal. See Commonwealth v. Welsh, 60 A.3d 562 (Pa. Super.

2012) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 76 A.3d 540

(Pa. 2013).

1 Evidence introduced at trial established that Welsh committed sexual acts

upon the victim, A.D., and conspired with his co-defendant, Eugene S.

Makara, to rape A.D. on several occasions from 2002 to 2007 while she was

between six and twelve years of age. (Doc. 15-1 at 7). Makara was tried

jointly with Welsh and was convicted of several offenses. Id.

2 Because Welsh was a “third strike” sexual offender due to his prior criminal

record, a mandatory minimum sentencing statute applied: 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§9718.2(a)(2) (providing that “[w]here the person had[,] at the time of the

commission of the current offense[,] previously been convicted of two or

more offenses arising from separate criminal transactions set forth in section

9799.14 [(governing sexual offenses and tier system),] or equivalent crimes

under the laws of this Commonwealth in effect at the time of the commission

of the offense …, the person shall be sentenced to a term of life

imprisonment… .”).

3 The court imposed two separate terms of life in prison, one as to each of

the victims.

On August 15, 2014, Welsh filed the instant, timely, pro se PCRA

Petition, his first. In response, the PCRA court appointed Welsh

counsel, who filed a Supplement to the PCRA Petition. Following

a procedural history not relevant to this appeal, the PCRA court

conducted a hearing on December 9, 2016. By an Opinion and

Order entered on February 21, 2017, the PCRA court denied

Welsh’s PCRA petition.

Welsh timely filed a pro se Notice of Appeal, nunc pro tunc.4 The

PCRA court ordered Welsh to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise

statement of errors complained of on appeal, and Welsh timely

complied.

On appeal, Welsh raises the following questions for our review:

I. Whether the PCRA court erred and abused it[]s discretion in

illegally sentencing [Welsh] to two life sentences pursuant to 42

Pa.C.S.A. §9718, and/or failing to correct [Welsh’s] two illegal life

sentences pursuant to [section] 9718, when raised in a timely

PCRA petition?

II. Whether the PCRA court erred and abused it[]s discretion in

dismissing [Welsh’s] PCRA Petition[,] where all prior counsel(s)

rendered ineffective assistance of counsel[,] in violation of the

Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution?

III. Whether the retroactive application of [SORNA] to [Welsh] is

illegal and violates both the state and federal Constitutions[‘] ex

post facto clauses and/or[,] in the alternative[,] whether the

SORNA statute’s requirement that [Welsh] register under a

formal sexual offender registration law of this Commonwealth

4 In response to a per curium Order that this Court issued to the PCRA court,

the court explained that Welsh had requested to represent himself. The court

further stated that it had conducted a hearing pursuant to Commonwealth

v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998), and determined that Welsh was waiving

his right to counsel knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Cf.

Commonwealth v. Padden, 783 A.2d 299, 308 (Pa. Super. 2001) (stating

that, absent a waiver pursuant to Grazier, a first-time pro se PCRA

petitioners is entitled to the benefit of the assistance of counsel on appeal).

(Megan’s Law III) violates [Welsh’s] right to due process and

constitutes an illegal sentence?

(Doc. 15-1 at 46-48). By Memorandum Opinion dated November 21, 2019,

the Superior Court affirmed Welsh’s convictions but remanded for

modification of his sentence, eliminating his designation as a sexually violent

predator under the Pennsylvania’s Sex Offender Registration Notification

Act. Id. On January 23, 2020, the sentencing court issued an order modifying

Welsh’s sentence in accordance with the Superior Court’s directive. (Doc. 15

at 32).

Petitioner filed this timely federal habeas corpus petition in which he

raises various issues for federal habeas review. (Docs. 1, 11).

II. Standard of Review

A habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254 is the proper

mechanism for a prisoner to challenge the “fact or duration” of his

confinement. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 498-99 (1973). 28 U.S.C.

§2254, provides, in pertinent part:

(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a

district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas

corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States

....

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall

not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on

the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of

the claim—

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. §2254. Section 2254 sets limits on the power of a federal court to

grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a state prisoner.

Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011); Glenn v. Wynder, 743 F.3d

402, 406 (3d Cir. 2014). A federal court may consider a habeas petition filed

by a state prisoner only “on the ground that he is in custody in violation of

the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §2254(a).

This limitation places a high threshold on the courts. Typically, habeas relief

will only be granted to state prisoners in those instances where the conduct

of state proceedings resulted in “a fundamental defect which inherently

results in a complete miscarriage of justice [or] an omission inconsistent with

the rudimentary demands of fair procedure.” Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339,

348 (1994) (citations omitted).

Section 2254(d)(1) applies to questions of law and mixed questions of

law and fact. In applying it, this Court’s first task is to ascertain what law falls

within the scope of the “clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States[,]” 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1). It is “‘the

governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the

time the state court renders its decision’.” Dennis v. Sec’y, Pennsylvania

Dep’t of Corr., 834 F.3d 263, 280 (2016) (en banc) (quoting Lockyer v.

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003)).

Once the “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States” is ascertained, this Court must

determine whether the Superior Court’s adjudication of the claim at issue

was “contrary to” that law. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-05 (2000)

(explaining that the “contrary to” and “unreasonable application of” clauses

of §2254(d)(1) have independent meaning). A state-court adjudication is

“contrary to ... clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States” §2254(d)(1), “if the state court applies

a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases,”

Williams, 529 U.S. at 405, or “if the state court confronts a set of facts that

are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and

nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent,”

id. at 406.

A “run-of-the-mill” state-court adjudication applying the correct legal

rule from Supreme Court decisions to the facts of a particular case will not

be “contrary to” Supreme Court precedent. Williams, 529 U.S. at 406.

Therefore, the issue in most federal habeas cases is whether the

adjudication by the state court survives review under §2254(d)(1)’s

“unreasonable application” clause.

“A state court decision is an ‘unreasonable application of federal law’ if

the state court ‘identifies the correct governing legal principle,’ but

‘unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case’.”

Dennis, 834 F.3d at 281 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413). To satisfy his

burden under this provision of AEDPA’s standard of review, Petitioner must

do more than convince this Court that the Superior Court’s decision was

incorrect. Id. He must show that it “‘was objectively unreasonable’.” Id.

(quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 409) (emphasis added by Court of Appeals).

This means that Petitioner must demonstrate that the Superior Court’s

decision “was so lacking in justification that there was an error well

understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for

fairminded disagreement.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 103. As the Supreme Court

noted:

It bears repeating that even a strong case for relief does

not mean the state court’s contrary conclusion was

unreasonable. See Lockyer, supra, at 75, 123 S. Ct. 1166.

If this standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was

meant to be. As amended by AEDPA, §2254(d) stops short

of imposing a complete bar on federal court relitigation of

claims already rejected in state proceedings. Cf. Felker v.

Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664, 116 S. Ct. 2333, 135 L.Ed.2d

827 (1996) (discussing AEDPA’s “modified res judicata

rule” under §2244). It preserves authority to issue the writ

in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists

could disagree that the state court’s decision conflicts with

this Court’s precedents. It goes no further.

Id. at 102.

The standard of review set forth at §2254(d)(2) applies when a

petitioner “challenges the factual basis for” the state court’s “decision

rejecting a claim[.]” Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 18 (2013). “[A] state court

decision is based on an ‘unreasonable determination of the facts’ if the state

court's factual findings are ‘objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence

presented in the state-court proceeding,’ which requires review of whether

there was sufficient evidence to support the state court's factual findings.”

Dennis, 834 F.3d at 281 (quoting §2254(d)(2) and citing Miller-El v. Cockrell,

537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003)). “‘[A] state-court factual determination is not

unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have reached

a different conclusion in the first instance’.” Titlow, 571 U.S. at 18 (quoting

Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010)); see Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333,

342 (2006) (reversing court of appeals’ decision because “[t]he panel

majority’s attempt to use a set of debatable inferences to set aside the

conclusion reached by the state court does not satisfy AEDPA’s

requirements for granting a writ of habeas corpus.”). Thus, “if ‘[r]easonable

minds reviewing the record might disagree’ about the finding in question, ‘on

habeas review that does not suffice to supersede’” the state court’s

adjudication. Wood, 558 U.S at 301 (quoting Collins, 546 U.S. at 341-42).

If the Superior Court did not adjudicate a claim on the merits, the Court

must determine whether that was because Petitioner procedurally defaulted

it. If the claim is not defaulted, or if Petitioner has established grounds to

excuse his default, the standard of review at §2254(d) does not apply and

the Court reviews the claim de novo. See, e.g., Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203,

210 (3d Cir. 2001). However, in all cases and regardless of whether the

standard of review at §2254(d) applies, the state court’s factual

determinations are presumed to be correct under §2254(e)(1) unless

Petitioner rebuts that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. Palmer

v. Hendricks, 592 F.3d 386, 392 (3d Cir. 2010); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187,

201 (3d Cir. 2007) (“the §2254(e)(1) presumption of correctness applies

regardless of whether there has been an ‘adjudication on the merits’ for

purposes of §2254(d).”) (citing Appel, 250 F.3d at 210).

Welsh’s case is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L.No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, April 24, 1996

(“AEDPA”).

III. Discussion

Petitioner raises various allegations of error across his forty-eight page

petition and 100-page memorandum in support. (Docs. 1, 11). The Court

addresses these claims as six separate claims with numerous sub parts.

Claim One – Sixth Amendment

Petitioner argues that his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was

violated when the trial court precluded him from cross-examining one of the

victims, A.D., about prior sexual conduct with persons other than Welsh and

Makara. (Doc. 1 at 9, Doc. 11 at 40-45). He claims that it was his defense

that A.D. was lying and that the Court’ decision denied him the ability to first

and foremost present evidence that would establish his innocence, as well

as “show a pattern and practice by A.D. of alleging that she was sexual[ly]

abused by men to get what she wanted”; specifically, “to stay in foster care

and not returned to her parents care where she had previously lived in

deplorable and unsafe conditions and establish that it would be impossible

for her to have suffered the years of sexual abuse by numerous men as she

claimed.” Id. Respondent contends that the state court properly excluded

this evidence as not relevant because there was no evidence that A.D. had

fabricated these other accusations and that the introduction of evidence of

other allegations risked confusing the issues before the jury.

The aspect of the Sixth Amendment upon which Welsh bases this

claim is the protection of an accused in a criminal prosecution “to be

confronted with the witnesses against him[.]” U.S. Const. Amend. VI. The

United States Supreme Court has recognized that this right “means more

than being allowed to confront the witness physically.” Delaware v. Van

Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678 (1986) (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315

(1974)). Specifically, “[t]he main and essential purpose of confrontation is to

secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross-examination.” Davis, 415

U.S. at 315. However, as is the case with the Compulsory Process right, this

does not mean that trial judges are precluded from imposing limits on the

defense’s cross-examination. It is well-established that “trial judges retain

wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose

reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about,

among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the

witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.”

Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 678. The Court further observed in Van Arsdall that

“the Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-

examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to

whatever extent, the defense might wish.” Id. at 679 (citing Delaware v.

Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985) (emphasis in original)). Thus, the question

here is whether the state court’s denial of Petitioner’s request to cross-

examine A.D. concerning other complaints of sexual assaults that she had

made reflects a reasonable limitation based upon any of the concerns that

the Supreme Court has suggested are legitimate bases.

Welsh initially argued in the trial court, and subsequently on direct

appeal, that the evidence should have been admitted at trial under the

doctrine of law of the case because it had been permitted at a pre-trial

hearing before another judge. (Doc. 1 at 23). The Pennsylvania Superior

Court rejected Petitioner’s argument, pointing out that said doctrine only

applies to issues previously addressed and decided in the litigation, citing

Koppers Company, Inc., by its successor, Beazer East, Inc. v. Certain

Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 993 F.Supp. 358 (W.D. Pa. 1998), and that

the applicability of the Rape Shield Law had not been raised, addressed or

decided at the pre-trial hearing in question. (Doc. 15-1 at 11). The Superior

Court proceeded to address the applicability of the Rape Shield Law to the

proposed evidence offered by Welsh as follows:

“The purpose of the Rape Shield Law is to prevent a sexual

assault trial from denigrating into an attack upon the victim’s

reputation for chastity.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 638 A.2d

940, 942 (Pa. 1994) (citation omitted). Testimony that a victim

had previously been sexually assaulted does not reflect on her

reputation for chastity because being assaulted is not conduct of

the victim. Id. Accordingly, “[it] would be illogical to conclude that

the Rape Shield Law intended to prohibit this kind of testimony.”

Id. Relying on Johnson, Welsh asserts that the trial court erred

by precluding him from introducing testimony regarding previous

sexual assaults suffered by A.D.

A review of the testimony at the pretrial motion hearing indicates

that Welsh did use A.D.’s victimization by her relatives to attack

her reputation for chastity. Counsel repeatedly asked A.D. about

“having intercourse” with her father. N.T. Pretrial Motion Hearing,

9/10/08, at 38, 40-41, 60. Counsel asked her about “having sex”

and “having intercourse” with her cousin, D.H. Id. at 59-61.

Counsel asked A.D. about “having intercourse” with her uncle,

S.D., Id. at 62, and whether she “had sex” or “intercourse,” with

her uncle, B.D. Id. at 61. Although A.D. was under the age of

thirteen when these assaults occurred, and therefore was unable

to consent to sexual activity, counsel questioned her in a way

that implied she had voluntarily participated in these acts. After

questioning A.D. about sexual activity with her father, cousin and

two uncles, he asked, “Anybody else you have had intercourse

with other than who I have talked about so far?” Id. at 62. Such

questioning at the pretrial hearing was an attack on A.D.’s

chastity that Appellant sought to continue at trial. This is the kind

of situation that the Rape Shield Law was designed to prevent.

See Johnson, supra.

Furthermore, “[t]he Rape Shield Law is a bar to admission of prior

sexual conduct involving a victim, whether it is consensual or the

result of nonconsensual or assaultive behavior unless it has

probative value which is exculpatory to the defendant.”

Commonwealth v. Boyles, 595 A.2d 1180, 1186 (Pa. Super.

1991) (citation omitted). Here, the fact that A.D. may have been

a victim of sexual assault by other individuals is not exculpatory

as to Welsh, and therefore is of no probative value.

Welsh asserts that the trial court erred by using the Rape Shield

Law to exclude relevant evidence showing A.D.’s bias. Brief of

Appellant, at 23, The case he relies upon is inapposite. In

Commonwealth v. Black, 587 A.2d 396 (Pa. Super. 1985), the

defendant was charged with sexually assaulting his thirteen-

year-old daughter. The defendant sought to admit evidence that

his daughter was having a sexual relationship with her brother,

which ended when the defendant forced the brother out of the

house. After the defendant removed the brother from the house,

the defendant’s daughter raised the allegations of sexual abuse.

Essentially, the defendant argued that his daughter was

motivated to make false accusations against him in hopes of

getting him out of the house so that she could continue having a

sexual relationship with here brother. The trial court rejected the

defendant’s position that only by showing the sexual relationship

between his daughter and her brother could the true extent of her

bias against the defendant be revealed. On appeal, this Court

reversed and remanded for a hearing to determine, “(1)whether

the proposed evidence is relevant to show bias or motive or to

attack credibility; (2) whether the probative values of the

evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect; and (3) whether there

are alternative means of proving bias or motive or to challenge

credibility.” Id. at 401.

Appellant asserts that A.D. “told a prior counselor on videotape

that she just wanted to get away from her father’s house. A.D.

then appeared before the jury and testified that she wanted to

get away from . . . Welsh. Under the circumstances, the lower

court erred in precluding the testimony.” Brief of Appellant, at 24.

The fact that A.D. wanted to leave a home where she had been

abused by family members simply provides no motive for her to

have later made allegations against Welsh. Accordingly, there is

no link between the past victimization of A.D. and her motivation

to seek retribution against the accused. Therefore, Black does

not support Welsh’s position that evidence of A.D.’s sexual

conduct with other individuals was relevant.

Welsh also asserts that the Rape Shield Law should not be used

to exclude relevant evidence attacking credibility. Brief of

Appellant, at 23. Here, the trial court allowed Welsh to elicit

testimony from A.D. that she had been untruthful with forensic

investigator Sherry Moroz when she told her that no one other

than Welsh and Makara had touched her. N.T. Trial, 9/16/10, at

367-68. The court also permitted Sherry Moroz to confirm this

during her testimony. N.T. Trial, 9/17/10, at 717-8. The jury had

the opportunity to hear that A.D. was the victim of improper

touching by individuals other than Welsh and Makara, and that

she lied about it. Therefore, the trial court did permit Welsh to call

into question A.D.’s credibility based on references to prior

sexual conduct. Accordingly, Welsh is not entitled to relief on this

claim.

(Doc. 15-1 at 13-16).

We do not find the state court’s adjudication of this claim to reflect an

unreasonable application of any United States Supreme Court authorities

regarding the Confrontation Clause. While the “core” of the Confrontation

Clause is the right to test the credibility of witnesses through cross-

examination, see Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315–16, (1974), the

Supreme Court’s decision in Delaware v. Van Arsdall, recognized that “[i]t

does not follow ... that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment

prevents a trial judge from imposing any limits on defense counsel’s inquiry

into the potential bias of a prosecution witness.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall,

475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986). On the contrary, the Court in Van Arsdall also

specifically noted that trial judges “retain wide latitude insofar as the

Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such

cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things,

harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or

interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.” Id.5 Our Court of

Appeals suggests that courts assess whether the trial court’s ruling

“significantly inhibited” the defendant’s right to inquire into the witness’s

“motivation in testifying.” See United States v. Chandler, 326 F.3d 210, 219

5 The Supreme Court in Van Arsdall found that the petitioner’s Sixth

Amendment right to confrontation had been violated and remanded the case

for consideration by the state court of whether the error was harmless. Van

Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684. The case had been before the Court on direct

appeal. At trial, an eyewitness testified to the defendant’s presence at the

crime scene in the time leading up to a murder. During cross-examination,

defense counsel sought to impeach the witness by questioning him about

the dismissal of an unrelated criminal charge that had been pending against

him after he had agreed to speak with the prosecutor about the murder.

Outside the presence of the jury, the witness acknowledged that the pending

charge, for public drunkenness, had been dropped in exchange for his

promise to speak with the prosecutor about the murder. The trial court,

however, barred any cross-examination about that agreement, citing

Delaware’s version of Fed.R.Evid. 403. Id. at 676 & n. 2. The Court agreed

with the defendant that the dismissal of the public drunkenness charge was

a fact “that a jury might reasonably have found furnished the witness a motive

for favoring the prosecution in his testimony,” and that because this fact

concerned bias, it was central to assessing the witness’s reliability. Id. at 677,

679. The Court found that by cutting off all inquiry into the possibility that the

witness had a motive for favoring the prosecution in his testimony and was

thus biased, the trial court violated the defendant’s Confrontation Clause

rights. Id. at 679.

(3d Cir.2003). If so, the court should then decide whether the constraints it

imposed on the scope of the defendant’s cross-examination fell within the

“reasonable limits” that a trial court has the authority to establish in the

exercise of its discretion. See id. Unlike the Black case that Welsh relies

upon in his state court proceeding, there is no similar motivation for the victim

in this case to have made false accusations against Welsh, as there was no

representation by Welsh to A.D. that he was going to take any type of action

against her or that he was going to report any of their sexual actions or

activities.

Welsh was not deprived of the opportunity guaranteed to him by the

Sixth Amendment to confront A.D., his accuser. The state court’s restriction

on the scope of cross-examination concerning unrelated accusations made

by A.D. in other circumstances, which were not shown to relate to her motive

to bring these allegations, was not unreasonable. Rather, the restriction was

within the “wide latitude” permitted by Supreme Court jurisprudence, see Van

Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 678, and warranted in light of the concern of harassment,

prejudice, confusion of the issues, and relevance, as the prior complaints

were not shown to bear upon A.D.’s motive in this case. We do not find Welsh

to have established that the state court’s limitation on the scope of his cross-

examination of A.D. violated his Confrontation Clause rights, nor that the

state courts unreasonably applied Supreme Court case law when they

rejected this claim. Therefore, we do not find this claim to warrant habeas

relief.

Claim Two – Fourth Amendment

Petitioner claims that his conviction was obtained in violation of the

Fourth Amendment “where the information the Commonwealth used to

support its search warrant of Petitioner’s property was stale because it was

based on three year old evidence.” (Doc. 11 at 5). Petitioner’s Fourth

Amendment claim is not cognizable on federal habeas review.

It has long been settled that “where the State has provided an

opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state

prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that

evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced

at his trial.” Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976); see also Wallace v.

Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 395 n.5 (2007). Even “[a]n erroneous or summary

resolution” of a Fourth Amendment claim by the state court “does not

overcome the bar” provided by Stone. Marshall v. Hendricks, 307 F.3d 36,

82 (3d Cir. 2002).

This issue was raised in Welsh’s Rule 1925 Statement and addressed

in the trial court’ Rule 1925 Opinion, following the filing of Welsh’s direct

appeal and subsequently, addressed, in detail, by the Superior Court as

follows:

Welsh next asserts that the trial court erred by not dismissing all

of the charges against him because the information supporting

the search warrant for his property was stale. The trial court

concluded that the issue was waived, and we agree. A review of

the relevant sequence of events is necessary to explain the trial

court’s determination.

In November 2007, Welsh and Makara were arrested after a

search warrant was executed in their home. On January 25,

2008, the Commonwealth provided to counsel a copy of the

application for a search warrant, along with an inventory of items

seized during the search. Welsh filed an omnibus pre-trial motion

on April 1, 2008, which sought, inter alia, permission to file a

supplemental pre-trial motion. The pre-trial motion made no

allegation that the information on which the search warrant was

based was stale.

Judge Naus held a hearing on the omnibus pre-trial motion on

September 10, 2008. The court granted the defense motion to

suppress certain undergarments found in the house, but held that

counsel could object at trial to a bathing suit and other articles of

clothing based on relevance. No objections were made to any

other items obtained from the search.

On September 19, 2008, Welsh filed a supplemental omnibus

pretrial motion in which he raised the issue of staleness for the

first time. At a hearing on October 28, 2008, the Commonwealth

and the defense reached an agreement regarding the items

obtained during the search that the Commonwealth would seek

to admit at trial.

At hearings held on May 6, June 24 and August 25, 2010

regarding outstanding motions and evidence to be presented at

trial, Welsh did not raise the issue of the staleness of the search

warrant. Following the August 25, 2010 hearing, Welsh filed

several motions, none of which raised staleness of the warrant.

Welsh filed a motion in limine on September 3, 2010, which

refers to the agreement between Welsh and the attorney for the

Commonwealth specifying the seized items the Commonwealth

would seek to admit at trial. In the motion, Welsh seeks to confirm

the agreement because Assistant District Attorney Anthony

McDonald, who entered into the agreement on behalf of the

Commonwealth, was no longer involved in the case.

At trial, the only seized evidence that the Commonwealth sought

to admit was “Item No. .10 — Assorted Sexual Items - creams,

condoms, sexual toys.” Motion in limine, 9/3/10, at 6. When the

Commonwealth introduced these items at trial, Welsh objected,

but not on the basis of staleness. The court admitted the items.

In his motion in limine, Welsh sought to “confirm the parties’

agreement and that the Commonwealth will only attempt to offer

testimony or evidence concerning [specified items].” Id. at Exhibit

A. Based on this motion, the trial court determined that Welsh

“abandoned or waived any pending claim that the probable

cause information for the issuance of the Search Warrant was

stale, thereby making the items seized subject to suppression.”

Trial Court Opinion, 6/7/11, at 5.

Based on our extensive review of the record, we conclude that

the trial court neither committed an error of law nor abused its

discretion in determining that the agreement between the

Commonwealth and Welsh waived the issue of staleness.

Accordingly, he is not entitled to relief on this issue.

(Doc. 15-1 at 16-18).

Welsh has not offered any reason why Stone’s holding would not apply

to his case. For example, Welsh has not shown that there was some

“structural defect” in the state criminal process that prevented him from

raising a pretrial Fourth Amendment challenge to the search warrant. See

Marshall, 307 F.3d at 181-82; Boyd v. Mintz, 631 F.2d 247, 250-51 (3d Cir.

1980). He has clearly had a full and fair opportunity to litigate this claim.

Thus, because Welsh had an opportunity to fully and fairly litigate his Fourth

Amendment claim in state court, this Court is barred from considering it on

federal habeas review.

Claim Three – Imposition of two life sentences violates the First,

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments

Welsh was sentenced under 42 Pa.C.S. §9718.2, which imposes a

mandatory sentence when there is a previous conviction of a sexual offense.

(Doc. 15-1 at 29, Commonwealth v. Welsh, 519 MDA 2011 at 29 (Pa. Super.

Aug. 8, 2012) (unpublished memorandum)). Welsh challenges the legality of

his sentence, claiming that since the date of his sentencing, the United Sates

Supreme Court decided Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013),

“declaring mandatory minimum sentencing statues such as §9718,

unconstitutional and void.” (Doc. 11 at 57). Petitioner raised this issue in

both his direct appeal and in his PCRA petition. Id. In affirming the denial of

Petitioner’s PCRA petition, the Superior Court addressed this claim as

follows:

In his first issue, Welsh argues that the trial court’s imposition of

a mandatory minimum sentence of life in prison, pursuant to 42

Pa.C.S.A. §9718.2(a)(2),6 was unconstitutional pursuant to

Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), and the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in

Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 140 A.3d 651 (Pa. 2016). See Brief

for Appellant at 14-18. We disagree.

This Court has explained the holding in Alleyne as follows:

According to the Alleyne Court, a fact that increases the

sentencing floor is an element of the crime. Thus, it ruled

that facts that mandatorily increase the range of penalties

for a defendant must be submitted to a fact-finder and

proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The Alleyne

decision, therefore, renders those Pennsylvania

mandatory minimum sentencing statutes that do not

pertain to prior convictions constitutionally infirm

insofar as they permit a judge to automatically increase a

defendant’s sentence based on a preponderance of the

evidence standard.

Commonwealth v. Watley, 81 A.3d 108, 117 (Pa. Super. 2013)

(en banc) (emphasis added; footnotes omitted); see also

Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 111 n.1 (upholding the Supreme Court’s

prior holding in Almendarez-Torres v. U.S., 523 U.S. 224

(1998), that the fact of a prior conviction does not need to be

submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt); see

also Commonwealth v. Golson, 189 A.3d 994, 1001-02 (Pa.

Super. 2018) (upholding imposition of a 25-year mandatory

minimum sentence pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9718.2, based

upon a prior conviction).

In the instant case, the sentencing court applied mandatory

minimum sentences under subsection 9718.2(a)(2), based upon

Welsh’s prior convictions of qualifying offenses under that

statute. Therefore, Welsh’s sentence is not illegal and does not

6 Welsh does not dispute that he was previously convicted of qualifying

offenses under subsection 9718.2(a)(2), including involuntary deviate sexual

intercourse and indecent assault.

run afoul of Alleyne.7 See Watley, supra. Moreover, the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that Alleyne is not

applicable retroactively to cases on PCRA review.

Commonwealth v. Washington, 142 A.3d 810, 820 (Pa. 2016).

Accordingly, Welsh’s first issue entitles him to no relief.

The Court finds the Superior Court’s decision did not unreasonably

apply Supreme Court case law when they rejected this claim. In Alleyne, the

United States Supreme Court held that facts that increase mandatory

minimum sentences must be submitted to the fact-finder and determined

beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 103. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court

clarified Alleyne’s application to mandatory sentences based on previous

convictions in Commonwealth v. Resto, 179 A.3d 18 (Pa. 2018), when it said,

“[A] conviction returned by a jury to which a mandatory minimum sentence

directly attaches is not the same as an aggravating fact that increases a

mandatory minimum sentence.... [S]uch a conviction is itself a

contemporaneous jury determination, and the concern of Alleyne is with

sentencing enhancements tied to facts to be determined by a judge at

sentencing.” Id. at 21. Furthermore, this Court notes that under prevailing

federal jurisprudence, prior convictions are not treated as a type of fact

implicating Alleyne. See Com. V. Bragg, 133 A.3d 328, 332-33 (Pa. Super.

7 Further, Welsh’s reliance on Wolfe, supra, is misplaced because that case

did not involve the imposition of a mandatory minimum based on a prior

conviction, but rather, the age of the victim.

2016) (citing Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998)), aff’d

169 A.3d 1024 (2017) (per curiam). Thus, this Court finds no merit to

Petitioner’s claim that his sentence is illegal pursuant to Alleyne.

Welsh’s second challenge to his sentence is that his life sentences

violate the ex post facto prohibition of Article I, Section 9 of the U.S.

Constitution. (Doc. 11 at 54-58).

The Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed this claim as follows:

Welsh’s sole argument is that section 9718.2 violates the ex post

facto prohibition set forth in the United States Constitution and

the Pennsylvania Constitution.

The ex post facto prohibition forbids the Congress and the

States from enacting any law “which imposes a

punishment for an act which was not punishable at the

time it was committed; or imposes additional punishment

to that then prescribed.” Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24,

28, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981), citing

Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 71 U.S. 277, 326,

18 L.Ed. 356 (1866).

Cimaszewski v. Bd. Of Probation and Parole, 868 A.2d 416,

422 (Pa. 2005).

Section 9718.2 is a recidivism statute, and it is well settled that

“statutes that punish recidivists more severely than first offenders

have a long tradition in this country that dates back to colonial

times.” Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 26 (1992). Furthermore, the

United States Supreme Court has “repeatedly upheld recidivism

statutes against contentions that they violate constitutional

strictures dealing with ex post facto laws.” Id. at 27. In light of

Parke, we deem Welsh’s argument to have no merit.

(Doc. 15-1 at 36-37).

The Court finds the Superior Court’s decision did not unreasonably

apply Supreme Court case law when they rejected this claim. Any number of

federal or state statutes provide for enhanced sentences for recidivist

offenders. For example, in Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 230, the Court

noted that recidivism is “…as typical a sentencing factor as one might

imagine” which is generally employed in sentencing guidelines for variable

sentences and sometimes used as a triggering mechanism for mandatory

sentences. Regardless of how its employed, recidivism serves as an

enhancement factor for the sentences being imposed for the crime at issue,

not as a supplemental punishment for the prior offense. Consequently,

Welsh’s argument lacks merit and he is not entitled to relief on this claim.

Claim Four - Fourteenth Amendment Claims

a. Motion to Sever

Petitioner claims that the trial court denied him due process in refusing

his motion to sever his case from that of his co-defendant, “especially in light

of the fact that the court allowed into evidence prior bad acts of the co-

defendant in which the defendant did not take part.” (Doc. 1 at 16).

First, as a general rule:

[F]ederal courts ... have held that “[c]onsolidation and severance

of cases is a matter of Pennsylvania state law.” Johnston v.

Mahally, No. 15-CV-4800, 2017 WL 11529681, at *5 (E.D. Pa.

Mar. 30, 2017) (citing Marten v. Sauers, No. 11-2875, 2012 WL

3279247, at *6 (E.D. Pa. July 13, 2012), report and

recommendation adopted, No. 11-2875, 2012 WL 3290402 (E.D.

Pa. Aug. 13, 2012)) report and recommendation adopted, 348 F.

Supp. 3d 417 (E.D. Pa. 2018); see Toussaint v. Klem, No. CIV.A.

03-0927, 2004 WL 727061, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2004)

(finding that where “Petitioner’s only exhausted claim is that the

trial court improperly denied his motion to sever the two cases

against him for trial,” it did not “pass this Court's jurisdictional

requirement that his claim involve a matter of federal

constitutional law,” and “[d]espite the tenuous implication [of the

Due Process Clause] ... consolidation of offenses, and decisions

on motions to sever charges, are state law questions”).

Pratt v. Marsh, No. 2:19-CV-00416, 2021 WL 2188576, at *15 (E.D. Pa. May

28, 2021). Thus, to the extent that Welsh’s claim of trial court error based on

a failure to sever is governed exclusively by state law, this claim simply does

not implicate any federal constitutional or statutory rights. As such, it does

not provide grounds for federal habeas corpus relief, which may be granted

“only on the ground that [a petitioner] is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §2254(a).

Moreover, federal courts have frequently rejected habeas corpus

claims like those presented here which rest upon state trial court rulings

denying motions to sever based upon allegedly antagonistic defenses. In this

regard, it has been noted that:

“There is a preference in the federal system for joint trials of

defendants who are indicted together” because joint trials

“promote efficiency and ‘serve the interest of justice by avoiding

the scandal and inequity of inconsistent verdicts’.” Zafiro v.

United States, 506 U.S. 534, 537, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d

317 (1993). “Joint trials conserve state funds, diminish

inconvenience to witnesses and public authorities, and avoid

delays in bringing those accused of crime to trial.” United States

v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 448, 106 S.Ct. 725, 88 L.Ed.2d 814

(1986). Mutually antagonistic or irreconcilable defenses may be

so prejudicial in some circumstances that severance is

mandated. Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 538, 113 S.Ct. 933. The Supreme

Court has explicitly declined to adopt a bright line rule mandating

severance whenever co-defendants have conflicting defenses.

Id. District courts should grant severance “only if there is a

serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right

of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a

reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.” Id. at 539, 113 S.Ct.

933. Very few convictions have been reversed for failure to grant

a severance because of mutually antagonistic or irreconcilable

defenses.

Hetzel v. Lamas, 630 F. Supp. 2d 563, 573–74 (E.D. Pa. 2009), aff’d, 372 F.

App’x 280 (3d Cir. 2010). The same legal standards favoring joint trials

prevail in state court, where it is well settled that:

In Pennsylvania, the decision to grant a motion for severance is

a matter within the discretion of the trial court and should not be

overruled absent a manifest abuse of discretion. Commonwealth

v. Chester, 526 Pa. 578, 587 A.2d 1367, 1378 (1991). Joint trials

are advisable where conspiracy is charged unless a party can

show that he will be prejudiced by a joint trial. Chester, 587 A.2d

at 1372–73. A defendant must show a real potential for prejudice,

not just mere speculation. Commonwealth v. Jones, 542 Pa. 464,

668 A.2d 491, 501 (1995). The existence of antagonistic

defenses is a factor to be considered, but more than a bare

assertion of antagonism is required. Chester, 587 A.2d at 1372.

“Defenses only become antagonistic when the jury, in order to

believe the testimony offered on behalf of the one defendant,

must disbelieve the testimony offered by his or her co-

defendant.” Jones, 668 A.2d at 501. Mere hostility between

defendants or that one may try to save himself at the expense of

a co-defendant is in itself not sufficient ground to grant a

severance. Id. “In fact, it has been asserted that the fact that

defendants have conflicting versions of what took place, or the

extents to which they participated in it, is a reason for rather than

against a joint trial because the truth may be more easily

determined if all are tried together.” Chester, 587 A.2d at 1372.

Id. at 574.

In the instant case, the Pennsylvania Superior Court thoroughly

considered this severance issue on appeal.

Welsh next argues that trial court erred by denying his motion to

sever his case from that of co-defendant Makara. He specifically

complains that he was prejudiced by testimony regarding acts

committed by Makara against A.D. while they were on vacation

in Florida. He further asserts that “by the testimony of the

Commonwealth’s own witness, A.D., [Appellant] Welsh did

absolutely nothing wrong.’ Brief of Appellant at 42-43.

Our review of the record indicates that the factual underpinnings

of Welsh’s argument are incorrect. At trial, the following

exchange took place between the prosecutor and A.D.

Q: How did you end up in Florida?

A: Vacation.

Q: Who were you on vacation with?

A: Dean and Gene.

Q: And how did you get to Florida?

Q: And what happened in Florida?

A: They touched me there.

Q: When you say they touched me there, I need you to

describe specifically.

A: Gene.

Q: Gene[,] and where did he touch you?

A: My private.

Q: And what did he touch you in his privates with?

A: His private.

Q: Where did you sleep when you were in Florida?

A: In the bed in the camper.

Q: Who else slept in the bed in the camper?

A: Dean and Gene.

Q: Did this happen once in Florida or more than once?

A: More than once.

Q: And where was Dean when Gene put his private in

your private in Florida?

A: In the same room behind Gene or on the bed?

Q: Did Dean do anything?

A: He would help Gene put his private into my private.

N.T. Trial, 9/16/10, at 322-23.

“A motion for severance is addressed to the sound discretion of

the trial court, and . . . its decision will not be disturbed absent a

manifest abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Melendez-

Rodriguez, 865 A.2d 1278, 1282 (Pa. Super. 2004). “The critical

consideration is whether appellant was prejudiced by the trial

court’s decision not to sever.” Commonwealth v. Lopez, 739

A.2d 485, 501 (Pa. 1999). Furthermore, the appellant bears the

burden of establishing prejudice. Melendez-Rodriguez, supra.

As discussed above, evidence regarding activities in Florida was

admissible under the exceptions recognized by Pa.R.E. 404(b).

Accordingly, these acts would have been admissible even if the

court had held a separate trial for Welsh. Therefore, Welsh has

failed to establish that he was prejudiced by the trial court’s

denial of his motion to sever.

(Doc. 15-1 at 33-35).

This conclusion of the Pennsylvania Superior Court is entirely

consistent with both state and federal law, which recognizes a strong

preference for the joint trial of defendants who have been properly joined

together based upon their alleged involvement in the same series of acts or

transactions. It is also completely in accord with federal case law, which has

generally rejected severance denial claims as grounds for federal habeas

corpus relief. Therefore, the state court finding was not (1) “contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” and was not (2)

“based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1)-(2).

Accordingly, this state court decision denying Welsh’s severance claim

provides no grounds for habeas corpus relief for Welsh.

b. Change of Venue

Petitioner claims that the denial of his request for a change of venue

deprived him of a fair trial because of “…sensational, inflammatory and

slanted…” press coverage following his arrest. (Doc. 1 at 6).

On appeal, the Superior Court found that the trial court did not abuse

its discretion in denying Petitioner’s motion for a change of venue or venire

as follows:

Welsh next argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion

for a change of venue. Pa.R.Crim.P. 584(A) provides that “[a]ll

motions for change of venue or for change of venire shall be

made to the court in which the case is currently pending. Venue

or venire may be changed by that court when it is determined

after hearing that a fair and impartial trial cannot otherwise be

had in the county where the case is currently pending.”

“The determination of whether to grant a change of venue rests

within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be

disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion."

Commonwealth v. Weiss, 776 A.2d 958, 964 (Pa. 2001).

Normally, one who claims that he has been denied a fair

trial because of pretrial publicity must show actual

prejudice in the empanelling of the jury. In certain cases

however, pretrial publicity can be so pervasive or

inflammatory that the defendant need not prove actual

prejudice. Pretrial prejudice is presumed if: (1) the

publicity is sensational, inflammatory, and slanted toward

conviction rather than factual and objective; (2) the

publicity reveals the defendant's prior criminal record, or

if it refers to confessions, admissions or reenactments of

crime by the accused; and (3) the publicity is derived from

police and prosecuting officer reports.

Id. (citations omitted).

Welsh argues that the publicity generated by articles in The

Press Enterprise, which is the largest general-circulation

newspaper in Columbia County, was sensational, inflammatory

and slanted toward conviction. Brief of Appellant, at 38-39. In

support of his claim that the trial court erred by not granting a

change of venue, Welsh cites a survey conducted for the defense

by Dr. Neil Sloan, an associate professor of sociology at

Bloomsburg University, Dr. Sloan surveyed 162 adults in

Columbia County, 99 of whom (61.1 percent) were familiar with

the case. N.T. Pretrial Hearing, 6/23/10, at 66-67. Welsh asserts

that 20.9 percent of the people interviewed stated that he was

probably guilty, and that 22 percent of the people stated that he

was definitely guilty. Brief of Appellant, at 38. However, that

percentage is based only on the number of people who were

familiar with the case. Of the total of 162 people surveyed, a

significantly smaller percentage had any opinion regarding

Welsh’s guilt.

In Commonwealth v. Tharp, 830 A.2d 519 (Pa. 2003), our

Supreme Court held that, even where the pretrial publicity that

the defendant complained of was sensational, inflammatory, and

slanted towards conviction, the fact that twenty-two months

elapsed between the last complained of media coverage and jury

selection “was more than sufficient to dissipate any prejudicial

effects of the pretrial media coverage. Id. at 529. Tharp noted

that far shorter periods of time had been recognized as adequate

to dissipate the effects of pretrial publicity. Id.; see, e.g.,

Commonwealth v. Counterman, 719 A.2d 284 (Pa. 1998) (one

year); Commonwealth v. McCullum, 602 A.2d 313 (Pa. 1992)

(nine months); Commonwealth v. Breakiron, 571 A.2d 1035

(Pa. 1990) (one year). In the instant matter, Welsh sought a

change of venue based on the publication of several articles

about the case in The Press Enterprise 2007 and 2008, and three

articles about the recusal of the trial judge in 2010. Jury selection

in this case began on September 13, 2010. Because the articles

regarding the substance of the case were published more than

two years before trial, sufficient time elapsed to prevent the

publicity from negatively affecting the jury selection process.

During the first day of voir dire, the court excused all individuals

who indicated that they had formed an opinion about the case.

N.T. Trial, 9/13/10, at 113. All jurors who were selected to serve

stated during individual voir dire that they had no opinion about

the case. N.T. Trial, 9/14/10, at 23, 46, 56, 126, 196, 214, 260,

268, 278, 289, 316, 361. Because the voir dire confirmed that the

presumptive adverse effects of pretrial publicity had dissipated,

see Tharp, supra, Welsh was not entitled to a change of venue.

(Doc. 15-1 at 26-29).

A criminal defendant has a right to “a fair trial by a panel of impartial,

‘indifferent’ jurors. The failure to accord an accused a fair hearing violates

even the minimal standards of due process.” Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717,

722 (1961). Jurors are not required, however, to be totally unaware of the

facts and issues involved in a case. Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799-

800 (1975). “It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his [or her] impression or

opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.” Id.

(quoting Irvin, 366 U.S. at 723). A defendant can establish actual prejudice

by presenting evidence to show that “those who actually served on his [or

her] jury lacked a capacity to reach a fair and impartial verdict based solely

on the evidence they heard in the courtroom.” Rock v. Zimmerman, 959 F.2d

1237, 1253 (3d Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993).

However, “where media or other community reaction to a crime or a

defendant engenders an atmosphere so hostile and pervasive as to preclude

a rational trial process, a court reviewing for constitutional error will presume

prejudice to the defendant without reference to an examination of the

attitudes of those who served as the defendant's jurors.” Riley v. Taylor, 277

F.3d 261, 299 (3d Cir. 2001). “The community and media reaction, however,

must have been so hostile and so pervasive as to make it apparent that even

the most careful voir dire process would be unable to assure an impartial

jury.... Such cases are exceedingly rare.” Id.

To determine whether trial publicity has prejudiced the jury, courts

must: (1) determine whether the news coverage is prejudicial; (2) if so,

determine whether any jurors were exposed to the coverage; and (3) if

exposure did occur, the court examines the exposed jurors to determine if

this exposure compromised their impartiality. Barry v. Bergen Cnty. Prob.

Dep’t, 128 F.3d 152, 163 (3d Cir. 1997).

Here, the Superior Court did not unreasonably apply federal law in

rejecting this claim. First, the Court addressed the issue of presumed

prejudice, finding that the lapse of two to three years between publication of

the newspaper articles at issue and the trial date were sufficient enough to

prevent contamination of the jury selection process. (Doc. 51-1 at 29). While

Petitioner alleges that the article published about his case was in the “largest

general-circulation newspaper in Columbia County,” the Superior Court

found that the jurors only had a vague recollection of the underlying facts of

the Petitioner’s trial. Id. at 28.

Second, the Court addressed the issue of actual prejudice, finding that

the trial court questioned every juror who indicated they had knowledge of

Petitioner’s case, and excused any potential juror who revealed an inability

to be impartial. Id. The Superior Court addressed both presumed and actual

prejudice and found this claim meritless. Because the state court’s rejection

of this claim does not violate clearly established federal law, nor was it an

unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, this claim is denied.

c. Insufficient specificity of dates of alleged offenses

Petitioner’s third claimed denial of due process under the Fourteenth

Amendment is that “[t]he charges against him should have been dismissed

because the Commonwealth failed to provide the Petitioner the times and

dates when the alleged crimes occurred, with reasonably certainty.” (Doc. 1

at 21).

The Superior Court addressed the trial court’s lack of error as follows:

Pa.R.Crim.P. 504(4) sets forth the requirement of specificity in

criminal complaints:

Rule 504. Contents of Complaint

Every complaint shall contain:

(4) the date when the offense is alleged to have been

committed; provided, however:

(a) if the specific date is unknown, or if the offense is a

continuing one, it shall be sufficient to state that it was

committed on or about any date within the period of

limitations; and

(b) if the date or day of the week is an essential element

of the offense charged, such date or day must be

specifically set forth.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 504.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 560(B)(3) sets forth the requirement for specificity

in a criminal information:

Rule 560 Information: Filing, Contents, Function

(B) The information shall be signed by the attorney for the

Commonwealth and shall be valid and sufficient in law if

it contains:

. . .

(3) the date when the offense is alleged to have been

committed if the precise date is known, and the day of

the week if it is an essential element of the offense

charged, provided that if the precise date is not known or

if the offense is a continuing one, an allegation that it was

committed on or about any date within the period fixed by

the statute of limitations shall be sufficient.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 506(B)(3).

Since the inception of this case, the Commonwealth has alleged

that Welsh engaged in a continuing course of conduct spanning

several years. The allegations are supported by the testimony of

A.D., who stated that the abuse began when she was eight or

nine, occurred most of the time she stayed overnight, and

happened until she left her family and did not see them anymore.

N.T. Trial, 9/16/10, at 316, 321. She testified that she went into

foster care at age twelve. Id. at 332, 335. The Commonwealth

alleged, and the testimony supported a continuing course of

conduct over a minimum of four years. Therefore a specific date

was not required in the criminal complaint pursuant to

Pa.R.Crim.P. 504(4)(a). The information and bill of particulars

stated that the offenses occurred during the period fixed by the

statute of limitations therefore meeting the requirements of Rule

504(4)(a) and Rule 560(B)(3).

In Commonwealth v. Yon, 341 A.2d 169 (Pa. Super. 1975), the

defendant was accused of statutory rape, sodomy and corrupting

the morals of a minor between January 1, 1972 and July 1, 1973.

The victim indicated that the criminal acts occurred twice when

the defendant was at her home. The Commonwealth established

that the defendant first went to the home on or about January 1,

1972 with subsequent visits occurring up to July 1, 1973. This

Court recognized that the relevant question with respect to the

specificity of date and time was whether the defendant was

informed “of that which he must be prepared to meet in the

preparation of his defense.” Id. at 171.

Here, the facts, circumstances and allegations in the criminal

complaint, information, and bill of particulars informed Welsh of

the offenses he was charged with and the period of time during

which he was alleged to have committed the offenses.

Accordingly, he had a sufficient basis on which to prepare a

defense and thus the trial court did not err in denying his request

to dismiss the charges.

(Doc. 15-1 at 37-39).

The state court’s determination that the incidents occurred during a

continuing course of conduct over a minimum of a four-year period, was not

an unreasonable determination of the facts. The record reflects that Welsh

was sufficiently informed of the charges against him in order to prepare an

effective defense. See Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763 (1962)

(recognizing that the sufficiency of an indictment is measured by “whether

the indictment contains the elements of the offense intended to be charged

and sufficiently apprises the defendant of what he must be prepared to

meet”) (internal quotations omitted); see also Real v. Shannon, 600 F.3d

302, 308 (finding variance not unconstitutional, in part, because the

indictment contained language of “on or about” the specific date). As such,

the court will deny habeas relief on this claim.

Claim Five – Challenges to trial Court’s evidentiary rulings

Petitioner raises a series of claims that evidentiary rulings by the trial

court denied him a fair trial based on alleged violations of his rights under

the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that “it is not the province of

a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state law

questions.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 68. As a general rule, the “admissibility of

evidence is a state law issue,”8 and state evidentiary errors are not

cognizable in a federal habeas corpus proceeding unless the error deprived

the petitioner of fundamental fairness in his criminal trial. See Donnelly v.

DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 642-43 (1974). An error of state evidentiary law

8 Wilson v. Vaughn, 533 F.3d 208, 213 (3d Cir. 2008).

deprives a petitioner of fundamental fairness “if the probative value of

evidence, although relevant, was greatly outweighed by the prejudice to the

accused from its admission.” Albrecht v. Horn, 485 F.3d 103, 122 n.6 (3d Cir.

2007). The improper exclusion of evidence is “unconstitutionally arbitrary or

disproportionate only where it has infringed upon a weighty interest of the

accused.” United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998). Thus, the

essential question in addressing Petitioner’s claims is whether any of the

evidentiary rulings in question denied Petitioner fundamental fairness at trial.

a. “Prior Bad Acts” testimony

Petitioner claims a denial of due process under the Fourteenth

Amendment, when evidence of Petitioner’s prior bad acts was introduced at

trial by the Commonwealth pursuant to Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence

404(b). (Doc. 1 at 18). Specifically, Petitioner states that trial court erred in

allowing “the introduction of evidence of prior bad acts of Petitioner

inappropriately touching A.D. in Florida while sleeping when the act was

involuntary” and “as such could not be considered a prior voluntary bad act

when A.D.’s trial testimony establishes that the only inappropriate contact

occurred between herself and Petitioner while both were sleeping and thus

involuntary.” (Doc. 11 at 84). Respondent argues that Petitioner’s challenge

to an evidentiary ruling – based on his contention that the admission of the

evidence violated the federal and state rules of evidence – is not a

cognizable claim for habeas relief. They also assert that there was no error

here under state law, in that evidence of prior bad acts is admissible in

certain circumstances, several of which were established here.

On state direct appeal, Petitioner argued that the trial court erred in

allowing the Commonwealth to introduce evidence of prior bad acts

committed by Welsh against A.D. during trips to Florida in 2002 and 2003.

(Doc. 15-1 at 23). The Superior Court first recognized that the

Commonwealth introduced the prior acts evidence pursuant to Rule 404(b)

of the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence, which provides in relevant part:

Rule 404(b) Other crimes, wrongs or acts.

(1) Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to

prove the character of a person in order to show action in

conformity therewith.

(2) Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be admitted

for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,

preparation, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or

accident.

(3) Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts proffered under

subsection (b)(2) of this rule may be admitted in a criminal case

only upon a showing that the probative value of the evidence

outweighs its potential for prejudice.

(4) In criminal cases, the prosecution shall provide reasonable

notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses

pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any

such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.

Pa. R. Evid. 404(b).

Id.

The Superior Court then provided the following analysis:

Our disposition of this issue relies heavily on our decision in

Commonwealth v. Wattley, 880 A.2d 682 (Pa. Super. 2005).

Wattley involved a defendant who was accused of sexually

abusing his daughter in Pennsylvania. The trial court permitted

the Commonwealth to introduce evidence that the defendant had

committed similar acts against his daughter in Texas. On appeal,

this Court affirmed, relying in part on Commonwealth v.

Knowles, 637 A.2d 331 (Pa. Super. 1994), where we held:

Evidence of prior sexual relations between defendant and

his or her victim is admissible to show a passion or

propensity for illicit sexual relations with a victim. This

exception is limited, however. The evidence is admissible

only when the prior act involves the same victim and the

two acts are sufficiently connected to suggest a

continuing course of conduct.

Id. at 333.

Wattley further noted that “Pennsylvania courts have long

recognized the special significance of evidence which presents

[the factfinder] with the res gestae, or complete history of a

crime.” Wattley, 880 A.2d at 687. The Wattley court concluded

that the evidence proffered by the Commonwealth was relevant

to show that the defendant had a propensity for illicit sexual

contact with the victim and that “the testimony provided res

gestae evidence that was critical to enable the factfinder to

evaluate the totality of the evidence and draw accurate

inferences therefrom.” Id. at 688.

In assessing whether challenged evidence should be

admitted, the trial court must weigh the evidence and its

probative value against its potential prejudicial impact. . .

Our scope of review is limited to an examination of the

trial court's stated reason for its decision.

Id. at 685.

The criminal information in the case before us involves activity

that took place between January 1, 2002 and August 29, 2007.

The trips to Florida when A.D. accompanied Welsh and Makara

took place during this time period in 2002 and 2003. In

determining that the evidence was admissible, the court stated:

[W]e find that it is probative, we find that it established a

common plan and scheme and is, in fact, part of what we

would consider to be the res gestae of the full relationship

between the children and the Defendants.

The time frame is not too remote, particularly given the

ages of the children and the overall relationship that is

alleged by the Commonwealth that would exist between

the Defendants and children. We do not find that it is an

inflammatory or extremely prejudicial nature to the

Defendants. We also believe that there is a commonality

of events that is asserted by the Commonwealth as would

relate to the episode for which the Defendants are now

standing trial.

N.T. Trial, 9/13/12, at 15-16.

The trial court instructed the jury as follows with respect to what

took place in Florida:

I would like to make very clear here at the outset that

you’ve heard evidence in which the Commonwealth

alleges that the Defendants were guilty of improper

conduct in relation to a trip to Florida. The Defendants are

not on trial for any event that occurred in the State of

Florida or on the trip there or the trip back. That would be

outside the jurisdiction of this Court and we would not

have the legal authority to try the Defendants on it. That’s

one thing.

Secondly, you must keep in mind that as to each act that’s

charged, before either of the Defendants could be found

guilty of the act, you must be convinced beyond a

reasonable doubt that the act occurred within Columbia

County. You also need to understand that the evidence of

the Florida trip was entered into evidence for a very

limited purpose. That is for the Commonwealth’s purpose

of tending to show an intent or common plan.

This evidence must not be considered by you in any way

other than the purpose I have just stated. You must not

regard this evidence as showing that either of the

Defendants is a person of bad character or criminal

tendencies from which you might be inclined to infer guilt.

N.T. Trial, 9/20/10, at 1106-07.

The evidence regarding activities in Florida was relevant under

the exceptions recognized by Pa.R.E. 404(b) and was not

submitted to show bad character or propensity to commit crimes.

The court properly exercised its discretion in determining that its

probative value outweighed its potential for prejudice. Especially

in light of the court’s instruction to the jury regarding the limited

purpose for which the evidence was admitted, Welsh has not

established that he is entitled to relief on this issue.

(Doc. 15-1 at 24-26).

We agree with Respondent that habeas relief cannot be granted to

review this as a claim of alleged state error, that is, to assess whether the

state court correctly interpreted state rules of evidence. See Estelle v.

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991). Any such claim may be denied as non-

cognizable.

Additionally, to the extent that Petitioner alleges that the admission of

this evidence violated his Fourteenth Amendment trial rights, we agree with

Respondent that no error appears here under any accepted notion of what

equates to a constitutionally mandated “fair trial.” Petitioner argues that this

evidence “lacked relevance” and that any probative value was outweighed

by its prejudicial effect. But we see nothing fundamentally unfair here, nor

anything that violated notions of federal due process. There was a basis for

this evidence of prior contact between Petitioner and A.D. The trial court

limited the prejudicial effect of this evidence with a proper instruction.

Moreover, a claim of state court trial error on habeas review is subject to the

harmless error standard set out in Brecht v. Abramson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993).

This requires the habeas petitioner to show that the admission of this

evidence “had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the

jury's verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 639. The trial court directed the jury as to

the proper use of this evidence. Accordingly, we see no plausible claim that

Petitioner was deprived of a fair trial or otherwise improperly convicted due

to the admission of this evidence. The state court’s rejection of this claim was

not an unreasonable application of any Supreme Court precedent.

b. Production of video evidence by the Commonwealth

Petitioner claims that the trial court “failed to dismiss the charges or at

least grant the Petitioner a continuance when the Commonwealth turned

over important videotapes which were admitted into evidence four days

before trial when all discovery was requested two years beforehand and

when the said tapes were in the Commonwealth’s possession for

approximately two years prior to disclosure.” (Doc. 1 at 22).

The Superior Court rejected Petitioner’s claim as follows:

Welsh’s final contention is that the trial court should have

dismissed the charges against him or granted him a continuance

due to the Commonwealth’s failure to provide him, in a timely

manner, with DVDs of interviews of A.D. and D.D. that Dennis

Wilson of Clinton County CYS conducted. When counsel for

Welsh received the DVDs on September 2, 2010, he could

understand some of the audio portion but there was no video

portion. Counsel contacted the District Attorney’s Office and was

informed that they had no other DVDs. Approximately five days

later, and about four days before trial, the District Attorney's

Office contacted counsel and informed him that he would need

to download RealPlayer for the DVDs to be operable.

The decision to grant or deny a continuance is within the

discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed on appeal

absent a showing of an abuse of that authority. Commonwealth

v. Chambers, 685 A.2d 96 (Pa. 1996). In light of the fact that in

2008 the Commonwealth provided counsel for Welsh with

discovery, including notes from the interviews at issue, Welsh

has not established that he is entitled to relief on this issue.

(Doc. 15-1 at 39-40).

The Court finds that the Superior Court’s recognition that the

Commonwealth had substantially complied with its discovery obligation in

this regard, by providing notes of the interviews in question in January 2008,

more than two years prior to trial, clearly supports the trial court’s denial of

Petitioner’s request for trial continuance. The Superior Court’s decision

satisfies the fundamental fairness standard applicable to due process

challenges of this kind. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941) (finding

that it is only where an evidentiary ruling “so infuse[s] the trial with unfairness

as to deny due process of law”). Consequently, Petitioner is not entitled to

relief on this claim.

c. Trial Court erred in allowing out-of-court statements made by

victims.

Petitioner claims that the trial court erred when it “allowed the

Commonwealth to present hearsay evidence in regard to the charges

against the Petitioner including but not limited to prior statements of the

alleged victim’s counselors and investigators when said statements were

unreliable.” (Doc. 1 at 24). Petitioner claims that it was error to permit these

statements under the Pennsylvania’s “tender years” exception to the hearsay

rule. Id.

In relevant part, Pennsylvania’s Tender Years Exception provides:

(a) General rule. —An out-of-court statement made by a child

victim or witness, who at the time the statement was made was

12 years of age or younger, describing any of the offenses

enumerated in [selected criminal statues, including sexual

offenses] ..., not otherwise admissible by statute or rule of

evidence, is admissible in evidence in any criminal or civil

proceeding if:

(1) the court finds, in an in camera hearing, that the

evidence is relevant and that the time, content and

circumstances of the statement provide sufficient indicia

of reliability; and

(2) the child either:

(i) testifies at the proceeding; or

(ii) is unavailable as a witness.

42 Pa.C.S.A. §5985.1(a) (2008).

In addressing Petitioner’s claim, the Superior Court found no trial court

error based on the following:

Under the tender years exception, once the court determines that

the statements are relevant and possess the required indicia of

reliability, they will be admissible provided the child testifies at

trial. This exception was created due to the fragile nature of child

victims of sexual abuse. Commonwealth v, Fink, 791 A.2d 1235

(Pa. Super. 2002); Commonwealth v. Bishop, 742 A.2d 178

(Pa. Super. 1999). The standards for determining whether the

statements possess the required indicia of reliability were set

forth in Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990). The factors

include: (1) the spontaneity and consistent repetition of the

statements; (2) the mental state of the declarant; (3) the use of

terminology unexpected in a child of similar age; and (4) the lack

of a motive to fabricate. Commonwealth v. Delbridge, 771 A.2d

1 (Pa. Super. 2001).

Pursuant to section 5985.1, the trial court conducted in camera

hearings on September 15, 2010, where the following individuals

who had interviewed the victims testified: Sherry Moroz from the

Child Advocacy Center; Melissa Magargle from Families United

Network; and Dennis Wilson from Clinton County Children and

Youth Services. After hearing extensive testimony regarding the

techniques and protocols followed by the interviewers, and the

statements made to them by A.D. and D.D., the trial court

determined that the interviews “provided sufficient reliability to

allow their admission.” N.T. Trial, 9/15/10, at 197. The court

further noted that, “[o]verall, there’s no evidence of any unusual

mental state. The children used words and terminology expected

of them and I have seen no evidence that would support that

somehow they have a motive to fabricate testimony against

these two Defendants.” Id. at 198. In light of the extensive

testimony at the in camera hearing and the trial court’s

application of the appropriate standards to determine the

reliability of the victim’s statements, the trial court did not abuse

its discretion in admitting the hearsay evidence presented by the

interviewers.

(Doc. 15-1 at 19-20). Accordingly, we do not find that the state court’s

decision with respect to the admissibility of the victim’s statements was

contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established

Federal law or resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state

proceedings.

d. Denial of videotape evidence

Petitioner claims that the trial court erred in denying Petitioner the

opportunity to “present videotape evidence of the alleged victim A.D., in

which she stated she was afraid to go home because of fear of her father,

especially in light of the fact that A.D. testified at the time of trial she was

afraid of the Defendant.” (Doc. 1 at 25).

The Superior Court found no error, affirming the trial court’s ruling as

follows:

At trial, the following exchange took place between A.D. and the

assistant district attorney:

Q: When did you tell Melissa Magargle [about Welsh

and Makara]?

A: Not when I first came. It was like. . . sometime in

Mill Hall.

Q: Why did you decide to tell Ms. Magargle?

A: Because I was supposed to go home soon and I

didn’t want to go home.

Q: What did going home have to do with Gene and

Dean?

A: ‘Cause I knew if I was going to go home we would

still go there.

Q: You would still go where?

A: To Dean and Gene’s.

N.T. Trial, 9/16/10, at 420-21.

Welsh sought to play for the jury a portion of a videotaped

interview recorded on January 17, 2008, in which A.D. told

Dennis Wilson that she was scared to go home because she was

scared that her father would do something. She then described

the ways in which her father had touched her.

The evidence established that A.D. first told Melissa Magargle

about sexual acts with Welsh and Makara on May 29, 2007. N.T.

Trial, 9/15/10, at 97. It was at that point that she feared returning

home because she did not want to see Welsh and Makara. N.T.

Trial, 9/16/10, at 420-21. It was not until more than seven months

later, on January 17, 2008, that A.D. told Dennis Wilson that she

was scared to go home because of what her father had done.

Welsh asserts that A.D.’s statement at trial that she was afraid to

go home because she would have to see Welsh and Makara “is

completely contrary to her statements on video” in which she

explains that she was afraid of going home because of her father.

Brief of Appellant, at 32. He argues that A.D.’s admission to

Dennis Wilson is a prior inconsistent statement that the court

should have permitted him to use when cross examining A.D. At

trial, the court explained that it would not permit the jury to see

the video clip because it was not exculpatory and did not

impeach the evidence that A.D. gave on the witness stand. N.T.

Trial, 9/17/10, at 802. The court noted that A.D.’s trial testimony

and her statement to Dennis Wilson related to different points in

her life, and therefore were not inconsistent. Id.

“The admissibility of evidence is solely within the discretion of the

trial court and will be reversed only if the trial court has abused

its discretion. An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of

judgment but is rather the overriding or misapplication of the law,

or the exercise of judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or

the result of bias, prejudice, ill-will or partiality, as shown by the

evidence of record.” Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 39 A.3d

406, 411 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted). Here, the trial court

carefully reviewed the evidence and considered the arguments

of counsel before concluding that the videotaped statement was

neither exculpatory of Welsh nor inconsistent with A.D.’s prior

testimony. Accordingly, Welsh is not entitled to relief on this

issue.

(Doc. 15-1 at 21-23). Here, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the

excluded video evidence was crucial to his conviction. As a result, the video

was properly excluded, and the trial court did not commit an error of

constitutional dimension.

e. Denial of Psychological evaluation

Petitioner claims that “the trial court refused to allow the alleged victim

A.D. to be evaluated by the Petitioner’s psychological experts to determine

their competency to testify and their propensity to lie.” (Doc. 1 at 25). In

support of their principal defense that the minor victims, A.D. and D.D. were

fabricating their allegations of sexual abuse, Welsh and, his co-defendant

Makara sought to have the children examined by a psychiatrist or

psychologist in an effort to establish that they had a propensity to lie and/or

lacked sufficient competency to testify at trial. Id. In support of the request,

defense counsel directed the trial court’s attention to the children’s records

from various social service agencies which had evaluated them in the past

as well as their testimony from the pre-trial habeas corpus hearing held in

2008. Id.

The trial court denied Petitioner’s request and the Superior Court

affirmed as follows:

Welsh next asserts that the trial court erred by refusing to allow

his psychological experts to evaluate A.D. and D.D. to determine

their competency to testify and their propensity to lie. In an order

denying Welsh’s motion filed August 12, 2010, the trial court

noted, inter alia:

This Court finds that there is no evidence of a mental

condition of either child that requires an evaluation by a

psychologist or a psychiatrist. We also find that both child

victims are now age 14 or above. Further, upon review of

the testimony of the children at the prior omnibus hearing

held . . . on September 10, 2008, that both child victims

demonstrated appropriate competency in giving

testimony.

Order, 8/12/10, at 2.

The determination of a witness’s competency rests within the

sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent

a clear abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Judd, 897 A.2d

1224, 1228 (Pa. Super. 2006). The general rule in Pennsylvania

is that every witness is presumed to be a competent witness.

Commonwealth v. Delbridge, 855 A.2d 27, 39 (Pa. 2003). The

presumption of competency applies to child witnesses. It is only

when a proposed witness is under the age of fourteen that a

judicial inquiry into his or her mental capacity takes place before

he or she can testify. Commonwealth v. Anderson, 552 A.2d

1064 (Pa. 1998). In the instant matter, A.D. was fifteen at the

time of trial, and D.D. was fourteen. Consistent with the case law

developed by this Court, Welsh was not entitled to a competency

evaluation of the witnesses. See Judd, supra (factors underlying

three-part test for evaluating testimonial competence of minors -

capacity to communicate, observe event and understand

necessity to speak truth are less relevant as witness’s age

increases and rendered totally irrelevant as matter of law by age

fourteen); Commonwealth v. Moore, 980 A.2d 647 (Pa. Super.

2009) (where witness was fourteen at time of trial issues

regarding observation of incident are questions of credibility);

Commonwealth v. Pena, 31 A.3d 704 (Pa. Super. 2011)

(mental health/behavioral problems of fourteen and fifteen year

old witnesses are credibility factors, not legal issues to be

determined via competency hearing). Accordingly, the trial court

did not abuse its discretion in denying Welsh’s request for a

psychological examination of the witnesses.

(Doc. 15-1 at 29-30).

The trial court’s compliance with the appropriate standard in denying

Petitioner’s request for psychological evaluation of his accusers clearly

satisfies the fundamental fairness standard applicable to due process

challenges. Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim lacks merit and relief will be

denied on this claim.

f. Denial of Victims’ prior counseling records

Petitioner claims trial court error in the denial of his request for

permission to disseminate the children’s counseling records, which had been

provided to the defendants pursuant to a prior Order of the trial court, to

prospective expert witnesses for the purpose of providing testimony

regarding the children’s competency, propensity to lie and potential “taint”

from their prior interviews. (Doc. 1 at 27).

The Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Petitioner’s

request as follows:

Welsh next challenges the court’s decision regarding the victims’

counseling records. The court granted Welsh’s attorney access

to the records but precluded the attorney from providing the

records to his experts “to present testimony in regard to the

children’s competency, their propensity to lie and the effect of

taint from the various interviews on the children.”9 Brief of

Appellant, at 41-42. The court conducted an in camera review of

9 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has defined “taint” as “the implantation

of false memories or distortion of actual memories through improper and

suggestive interview techniques.” Delbridge, 855 A.2d at 35 (citation

omitted).

the records and found no basis for a propensity to lie, taint or

incompetence to testify. It is well settled that “[w]here the record

fails to establish there is a question as to the victim’s

competency, we refuse to sanction any intrusion into the victim’s

existing psychological records or any cross-examination as to

psychiatric treatment.” Commonwealth v. Boich, 982 A.2d 102,

110 (Pa. Super. 2009).

We further note that dissemination of the information contained

in the records was precluded by section 7711 of the Mental

Health Procedures Act (MPHA)10 section 5944 of the Judicial

Code11 and section 5945 of the Judicial Code.12 “Information

10 Section 7111 of the MPHA provides in relevant part that, but for exceptions

that do not apply in this case:

§7111 Confidentiality of Records

(a) All documents concerning persons in treatment shall be kept

confidential and, without the person’s written consent, may not

be released or their contents disclosed to anyone[.]

11 Section 5944 of the Judicial Code provides in relevant part:

§5944 Confidential communications to psychiatrists or licensed

psychologists

No psychiatrist or person who has been licensed. . . to practice

psychology shall be, without the written consent of his client,

examined in any civil or criminal matter as to any information

acquired in the course of his professional services in behalf of

such client. The confidential relationship and communications

between a psychologist or psychiatrist and his client shall be on

the same basis as those provided or prescribed by law between

an attorney and client.

12 Section 5945 of the Judicial Code provides in relevant part:

§5945 Confidential communications to school personnel

(footnote continued on next page)

which is protected by an absolute statutory privilege is not

subject to disclosure and denial of access to a criminal defendant

is required.” Commonwealth v. Eck, 605 A.2d 1248, 1252 (Pa.

Super. 1992).

Because the victims’ competence was not at issue, and the

counseling records that Welsh sought to disseminate were

privileged, the trial court did not err in precluding Welsh from

allowing his experts to review the records.

(Doc. 15-1 at 31-33).

Petitioner has once again failed to demonstrate that the excluded

counseling records were crucial to his conviction. The exclusion of such

records was properly determined as unnecessary and statutorily barred. As

such, the trial court did not commit an error of constitutional dimension.

Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim lacks merit and warrants no relief.

Claim Six – Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

(a) General rule. — No guidance counselor, school nurse, school

psychologist or home and school visitor in the public schools or in

private or parochial schools . . . who, while in the course of his

professional or clerical duties. . . has acquired information form a

student in confidence shall be compelled or allowed:

(1) without the consent of the student, if the student is 18 years

of age or over; or

(2) without the consent of his parents or guardian,

if the student is under the ages of 18 years;

to disclose such information in any legal proceeding, trial, or

investigation before any government unit.

Claims of ineffective assistance are governed by the standard set forth

by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

Strickland recognized that a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to the

assistance of counsel for his defense entails the right to be represented by

an attorney who meets at least a minimal standard of competence. 466 U.S.

at 685-87. “[T]he Sixth Amendment does not guarantee the right to perfect

counsel; it promises only the right to effective assistance[.]” Titlow, 571 U.S.

at 24.

Under Strickland, it is Petitioner’s burden to establish that his

“counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness.” 466 U.S. at 688. “This requires showing that counsel made

errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’

guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 687. The Supreme Court has

emphasized that “counsel should be ‘strongly presumed to have rendered

adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of

reasonable professional judgment[.]’” Titlow, 571 U.S. at 22 (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690); Richter, 562 U.S. at 104 (“A court considering

a claim of ineffective assistance must apply a ‘strong presumption’ that

counsel’s representation was within the ‘wide range’ of reasonable

professional assistance.”) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). Counsel

cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim. See, e.g.,

Preston v. Sup’t Graterford SCI, 902 F.3d 365, 379 (3d Cir. 2018).

Strickland also requires that Petitioner demonstrate that he was

prejudiced by trial counsel’s alleged deficient performance. This places the

burden on him to establish “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Counsel’s errors must be so

serious as to have “deprive[d] [Petitioner] of a fair trial, a trial whose result is

reliable.” Id. at 687. Under Strickland, “[t]he likelihood of a different result

must be substantial, not just conceivable.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 112.

The Supreme Court in Strickland noted that although it had discussed

the performance component of an effectiveness claim prior to the prejudice

component, there is no reason for an analysis of an ineffectiveness claim to

proceed in that order. 466 U.S. at 697. If it is more efficient to dispose of an

ineffectiveness claim on the ground that the petitioner failed to meet his

burden of showing prejudice, a court need address only that prong of

Strickland. Id.

At the time the Pennsylvania State Court reviewed the ineffective

assistance claims raised by Welsh, Strickland’s two-pronged test was the

“clearly established federal law” applicable to ineffective assistance of

counsel claims. Under Pennsylvania state law, a three-pronged test is

applied to ineffective assistance of counsel claims. See Commonwealth v.

Pierce, 515 Pa. 153, 527 A.2d 973, 975-977 (Pa. 1987). The Third Circuit

Court of Appeals has held that Pennsylvania’s test for assessing ineffective

assistance of counsel claims is not contrary to Strickland. Jacobs v. Horn,

395 F.3d 92, 107 n.9 (3d Cir. 2000).

Petitioner raises the following six claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel:

1. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to amend the Petition

for Allowance of Appeal Welsh filed in the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court in 2012, to include a challenge to the legality of

Welsh’s life sentence pursuant to Alleyne and its progeny. PCRA

counsel was ineffective for failing to assert trial counsel’s

ineffectiveness in this regard before the PCRA court.

2. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request dismissal of

all the charges against Wels because the information which the

Commonwealth used to support its search warrant of Petitioner’s

property was stale because it was based on evidence which was

over three years old.

3. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for severance

of Welsh’s jury trial from that of his codefendant, where Welsh

was ready to proceed to trial, but his codefendant’s case was

“stalled” due to a pre-trial appeal, which resulted in a violation of

Welsh’s right to a speedy trial.

4. PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate

purported new evidence that the prosecuting attorney had

engaged in misconduct by coaching and permitting the female

victim to lie in her testimony, and by failing to request a court-

appointed private investigator to locate and interview this victim’s

foster father, who also sexually abused the victim.

5. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the

admission of prior bad act evidence that Welsh had

inappropriately touched the female victim during a trip to Florida,

where the victim’s trial testimony belied this evidence.

6. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury

instruction pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. §301 (requirement of

voluntary act) and argue to the jury that Welsh’s act at the time

that he touched the female victim’s genitals was not a voluntary

act, where the victim’s testimony purportedly established that this

touching had occurred while Welsh was sleeping.

(Doc. 1 at 27-33).

Petitioner’s first issue, that counsel failed to advance the claim that his

two life sentences were illegal under Alleyne is completely unfounded, as the

record relied upon herein reveals that the issue was raised by counsel in

both Petitioner’s direct appeal and in his PCRA petition. The underlying

issue, itself, was found to lack merit. Thus, even if counsel failed to raise the

issue, he could not be found ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim.

See United States v. Sanders, 165 F.3d 248, 253 (3d Cir. 1999) (“There can

be no Sixth Amendment deprivation of effective counsel based on an

attorney's failure to raise a meritless argument.”).

Petitioner’s second issue of ineffective assistance of counsel asserts

that trial counsel failed to properly raise or litigate the alleged “staleness” of

the information upon which the search warrant was issued for Welsh’s

residence. Here, trial counsel did, in fact, raise and litigate the staleness

issue and the Superior Court properly affirmed the PCRA court’s conclusion

that trial counsel was not ineffective, based on the following:

Next, concerning the warrant ineffectiveness claim, in its Opinion

and Order, the PCRA court addressed this claim, and set forth

the applicable law, as follows:

“Settled Pennsylvania law establishes that stale

information cannot provide probable cause in support of

a warrant.” Commonwealth v. Janda, 14 A.3d 147, 158

(Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted). In particular:

[A]ge of the information supporting a warrant

application is a factor in determining probable cause.

If too old, the information is stale, [] and probable

[cause] may no longer exist. Age alone, however,

does not determine staleness. The determination of

probable cause is not merely an exercise in counting

the days or even months between the facts relied on

and the issuance of the warrant. Rather, we must

also examine the nature of the crime and the type of

evidence.

Id. at 158-[]59 [(citation omitted)]. Corroborative

information need not be current for it to be properly

considered by the magistrate[,] so long as it relates to

prior conduct sufficiently similar to the acts in question.

Commonwealth v. Weidenmoyer, 539 A.2d 1291, 1295

(Pa. Super. 1988). Additionally, “a showing that criminal

activity is likely to have continued up to the time of the

issuance of a warrant renders otherwise stale information

viable.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 668 A.2d 114, 118

(Pa. 1995).

In the case at bar, the victims reported the alleged abuse

to authorities on June 11, 2007. Both victims alleged the

abuse occurred over a course of years, and the August

29, 2007 search warrant application and affidavit of

probable cause reflect this allegation. One of the victims

alleged [that] the abuse would occur when she stayed

over at [Welsh’s] house, which was at least once a week.

The description of the alleged abuse[,] within the search

warrant application and affidavit of probable cause[,]

sufficiently establishes an alleged course of criminal

conduct by [Welsh]. The fact that some of the alleged

abuse occurred years before the search warrant was

issued is of no moment due to the establishment of an

alleged course of criminal conduct. After receiving the

allegations of abuse from the victims, the authorities

moved expeditiously to secure a search warrant. The

[c]ourt finds [that] the information underlying the issuance

of the search warrant was not stale, and thus[,] the issue

is not of arguable merit. Therefore, [Welsh’s] trial counsel

was not ineffective for failing to f[u]rther develop the

staleness issue during [Welsh’s] case.

PCRA Court Opinion and Order, 2/21/17, at 3-4; see also id. at

1 (finding that “trial counsel raised the search warrant staleness

issue several times during Welsh’s case.”). As the PCRA court’s

cogent rationale is amply supported by the law and record, we

affirm on this basis in rejecting Welsh’s instant ineffectiveness

claim. See id. at 3-4.

(Doc. 15-1 at 52-54). The state court’s determination that the underlying

suppression claim was meritless and, therefore, trial counsel was not

ineffective for failing to pursue it certainly constitutes a “reasonable argument

that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Real v. Shannon,

600 F.3d 302, 309 (3d Cir. 2010) (counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to

raise a meritless claim).

Petitioner’s remaining four claims were determined waived by the

Superior Court as follows:

Concerning Welsh’s remaining claims of ineffectiveness of

counsel (i.e., the severance ineffectiveness claim, prosecutorial

misconduct ineffectiveness claim, prior bad act ineffectiveness

claim, and involuntary act ineffectiveness claim), Welsh waived

these claims for his failure to raise them in his pro se PCRA

Petition, or in PCRA counsel’s Supplement to the Petition. See

Commonwealth v. Washington, 927 A.2d 586, 601 (Pa. 2007)

(stating that “[a]ny claim not raised in the PCRA petition is waived

and not cognizable on appeal.” (citing Pa.R.A.P. 302(a)

(providing that “issues not raised in the lower court are waived

and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”)).13

Nevertheless, even if these claims were not waived, our review

discloses that they would not entitle Welsh to relief, as they lack

arguable merit. See Spotz, supra.

Accordingly, the state courts have not had the opportunity to assess

prior counsel’s effectiveness on Petitioner’s four remaining issues, nor has a

record been created to support any such findings. Accordingly, such claims

are unexhausted and procedurally defaulted. Petitioner argues that he can

overcome the procedural default of these claims under the authority of

Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2010). (Doc. 1).

13 Furthermore, the fact that Welsh raised these claims in his Rule 1925(b)

Concise Statement does not preserve them on appeal. See

Commonwealth v. Melendez-Rodriguez, 856 A.2d 1278, 1288 (Pa. Super.

2004) (en banc) (holding that “[a] party cannot rectify the failure to preserve

an issue by proffering it in response to a Rule 1925(b) order.”) (citation

omitted).

Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2010), recognized a “narrow exception”

to the general rule that attorney errors in collateral proceedings do not

establish cause to excuse a procedural default. Specifically, Martinez holds

that “[i]nadequate assistance of counsel at initial-review collateral

proceedings may establish cause for a prisoner’s procedural default of a

claim of ineffective assistance at trial.” Id. at 9. To successfully invoke the

Martinez exception, a petitioner must satisfy two factors: that the underlying,

otherwise defaulted, claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel is

“substantial,” meaning that it has “some merit,” id. at 14; and that petitioner

had “no counsel” or “ineffective” counsel during the initial phase of the state

collateral review proceeding. Id. at 17; see also Glenn v. Wynder, 743 F.3d

402, 410 (3d Cir. 2014).

A petitioner demonstrates that the underlying ineffective assistance of

trial counsel claim has “some” merit by “show[ing] that reasonable jurists

could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have

been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were

adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Workman v.

Superintendent Albion SCI, 915 F.3d 928, 937-38 (3d Cir. 2019); see also

Martinez, 566 U.S. at 13-14. A petitioner demonstrates that post-conviction

counsel’s ineffectiveness caused the procedural default by showing that

post-conviction counsel’s performance was deficient under the first prong of

the Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) standard. See Preston v.

Sup’t Graterford, SCI, 902 F.3d 365, 376 (3d Cir. 2018); see also Workman,

915 F.3d at 937–38. Satisfaction of the first Strickland prong requires a

petitioner to demonstrate that “counsel’s representation fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness,” with reasonableness being judged

under professional norms prevailing at the time counsel rendered

assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. We now address Respondent’s

argument concerning the exhaustion and procedural default of Petitioner’s

four final claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Petitioner’s third claim of ineffective assistance of counsel asserts that

trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for severance of Welsh’s jury

trial from that of his codefendant, where Welsh was ready to proceed to trial,

but his codefendant’s case was “stalled” due to a pre-trial appeal. (Doc. 1 at

30).

At Welsh’s PCRA hearing, Petitioner’s trial counsel testified to the facts

surrounding this issue as follows:

We raised the staleness of the warrant and tried to get everything

suppressed based on the fact that we felt it was stale. And what

we - - we filed the motions - - and I say we, myself and co-

counsel, Gregory Moro, who was presenting Eugene Makara,

both filed motions attacking the search warrant and we briefed

them. And then the judge who was going to hear that had

something else come up and I think we were trying to get

evidence from various Children and Youth Services in regard to

psychological records of children, there was an organization out

of Allentown by the name of KidsPeace, they objected to us

getting this information, even though we had gotten it from both

Columbia County and Luzerne County, and there was an appeal

to the Superior Court before the court could hold a hearing.

(Doc. 15-1 at 194). The record reflects that the KidsPeace organization filed

its appeal of an Order granting the release of the medical records pursuant

to a motion filed by Makara. (Doc. 15-1 at 202). The mental health records

at issue in that appeal are those same records that both Welsh and Makara

later sought permission to disseminate to prospective expert witnesses for

the purpose of providing testimony during the trial regarding the victims’

competency, propensity to lie and potential ‘taint’ as referenced by Welsh in

his petition. (Doc. 1 at 26-27). Thus, Welsh clearly had an interest in the

appeal which provided a strategic reason for awaiting its outcome rather than

seeking severance at that point and proceeding separately to trial. As such,

counsel’s failure to move for severance was consistent with a sound trial

strategy; accordingly, there was no deficient performance on trial counsel’s

part, and no ineffective assistance under Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

Consequently, the underlying, otherwise defaulted, ineffective assistance of

counsel claim does not meet the “some merit” threshold, and Martinez is

unavailable to excuse Welsh’s procedural default of this claim.

To the extent that Petitioner attempts to establish cause for his default

by claiming that collateral counsel provided ineffective assistance for failing

to raise in the initial collateral review petition that trial counsel was ineffective

for failing to move for severance of Welsh’s jury trial from that of his

codefendant, the narrow exception articulated in Martinez only applies to

allegations concerning trial counsel's ineffectiveness, not claims alleging the

ineffectiveness of appellate counsel or PCRA counsel. Davila v. Davis, 582

U.S. 521, 526 (2017) (declining to extend Martinez to allow a federal court to

hear a substantial, but procedurally defaulted, claim of ineffective assistance

of appellate counsel or PCRA counsel).

Petitioner’s fourth claims is that PCRA counsel was ineffective for

failing to investigate purported new evidence that the prosecuting attorney

had engaged in misconduct by coaching and permitting the female victim to

lie in her testimony, and by failing to request a court-appointed private

investigator to locate and interview this victim’s foster father, who also

sexually abused the victim. (Doc. 1 at 31). Petitioner's claim is without merit.

Petitioner had no right to counsel at his PCRA hearing under the

Constitution or the AEDPA. See Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 189 n.4 (3d

Cir. 2000); 28 U.S.C. §2254(i). The Supreme Court of the United States has

barred habeas relief for ineffective assistance of counsel during collateral

post-conviction proceedings. Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 17 (2012) (citing

§2254(i)). While §2254(i) prohibits a claim based directly on counsel’s

ineffectiveness in a collateral proceeding, Martinez permits a petitioner to

show that ineffectiveness of counsel in the collateral proceeding (“PCRA

counsel”) was the cause of a procedurally defaulted ineffective assistance

claim against trial counsel. Id. at 14.

Here, Petitioner does not claim that his PCRA counsel created a

procedural default for any ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Rather, he

argues that PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate the

possibility of new evidence related to prosecutorial misconduct. In failing to

connect the alleged ineffectiveness to a claim of ineffective trial counsel,

Petitioner has made only a claim of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness, and

Martinez is inapplicable. Because Petitioner’s standalone ineffectiveness of

PCRA counsel claim is not cognizable as a basis for habeas relief, habeas

review will be denied on this claim. This concept is codified by statute at 28

U.S.C. §2254(i), which expressly provides that “[t]he ineffectiveness of

counsel during Federal or State collateral post-conviction proceedings shall

not be ground for relief in a proceeding arising under section 2254.” See also

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752-53 (1991) (“There is no

constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings....

Consequently, a petitioner cannot claim constitutionally ineffective

assistance of counsel in such proceedings.”). Thus, Welsh’s standalone

ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel claim is not cognizable as a basis for

habeas relief.

Welsh’s fifth ineffectiveness claim is that trial counsel was ineffective

for failing to object to the admission of prior bad act evidence that Welsh had

inappropriately touched the female victim during a trip to Florida, where the

victim’s trial testimony belied this evidence. (Doc. 1 at 32).

Petitioner raised this issue as trial court error in his direct appeal. (See

Doc. 15-1 at 23-26). The record reflects that both defense counsel lodged

objections to the proffered evidence and the trial court afforded defense

counsel a period of time to submit briefs addressing the issue. (Doc. 15-1 at

83-92). At a subsequent hearing, the trial court acknowledged having

received briefs from all counsel and issued an Order permitting introduction

of the evidence. Id. Welsh’s counsel then requested the trial court to certify

the Order to permit an immediate interlocutory appeal which the court

declined to do. Id. The trial court determined, in accordance with state rules

of evidence that there was a basis for this evidence of prior contact between

Petitioner and A.D., in that it established a common plan and scheme, or the

res gestae of the full relationship between the children and the Defendants.

(Doc. 15-1 at 25). Additionally, the trial court limited the prejudicial effect of

this evidence with a proper instruction. Id. As this Court has determined,

supra, without a showing that this evidence undermined the fundamental

fairness of his trial, Welsh’s underlying claim is meritless. Accordingly, the

Court finds that Petitioner’s otherwise defaulted claim of ineffective

assistance of trial counsel for failing to object to the introduction of such

evidence, lacks merit, and Martinez does not excuse this procedural default.

Petitioner’s final ineffectiveness claim is that trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A.

§301 (requirement of voluntary act) and argue to the jury that Welsh’s act at

the time that he touched the female victim’s genitals was not a voluntary act,

where the victim’s testimony purportedly established that this touching had

occurred while Welsh was sleeping. (Doc. 1 at 32). Specifically, Petitioner

states that “trial counsel failed to argue to the jury that Petitioner’s actions of

touching A.D.’s vagina while sleeping was involuntary, and without intent,

and as such could not be the basis for the related charges of aggravated

indecent assault, indecent assault, and corruption of minors, and requesting

a jury instruction regarding the involuntariness of Petitioner’s actions, where

A.D. testified that while sleeping at Petitioner’s home in between Welsh and

his co-defendants” and “Petitioner while sleeping moved and touched her

vagina at which time she moved and Petitioner’s hand moved.” Id. This Court

finds no merit to Petitioner’s claim.

As previously noted, the victim, A.D. was fifteen years old at the time

of trial and related incidents of sexual abuse that began when she was eight

years old. Early in her testimony, A.D. related that she was uncomfortable

referring to her body parts by their specific names, so she referred to them

generally as “Private parts” or “privates.” (Doc. 15-1 at 151-167). She also

identified the male “private part” as “Dick.” Id.

A.D. was first asked to describe the circumstances when co-defendant

Gene Makara touched her in ways she didn’t like and she related that Gene

would touch her private with his private, finger and mouth and these acts

usually occurred in the bedroom with both Gene and Welsh (“Dean”) present.

Id. A.D. related that Gene or Dean would get a jar of stuff from a drawer on

Dean’s side of the bed and spread the stuff on Gene’s private and her

private. Id. She then related that she would lie on the bed, Gene would get

on top of her, and Dean would help Gene put his private into A.D.’s private

by holding Gene’s private and putting it into A.D. Id. A.D. related that this

happened an unknown number of times, but most of the times when she

stayed overnight at Dean’s residence. Id. A.D. testified that both Gene and

Dean repeatedly told her not to tell anyone because they would get into

trouble. Id.

When specifically asked if Welsh ever touched her in a way, she didn’t

like other than helping Gene, A.D. related that, on one occasion, as she lay

between Dean and Gene on the bed where she always slept when staying

overnight at Dean’s house, Dean put his hand on her private as she

pretended to sleep. Id. (emphasis added). A.D. related that she moved, and

Welsh then moved his hand. Id. At no time did A.D. testify that Welsh was

asleep when he touched her private. Id.

On direct examination during trial, Welsh’s counsel elicited the

following testimony from Welsh:

Q: You’ve heard testimony that you have at one time touched

[A.D.’s] she called it her private, her vaginal area. Did you

hear that testimony?

A: Yes, I did.

Q: Would you please tell the jury did that happen?

A: No, it did not happen. I did not touch anybody there.

(Doc. 15-1 at 212) (emphasis added). Petitioner’s testimony is a complete

denial of the incident occurring. There is no assertion of involuntary or

unknowing contact. In response to the subsequent series of questions,

Petitioner denies all allegations of sexual abuse of A.D. by himself and

Makara. (Doc. 15-1 at 213-215). As such, the Court finds no evidentiary

foundation for Welsh’s claim that his touching A.D.’s vagina, was involuntary

and that Welsh was asleep when he did so. Thus, there was no good faith

basis for Welsh’s trial counsel to have argued that Welsh’s action was

involuntary, negating the need for a jury instruction. Accordingly, trial counsel

was not ineffective for declining to request a jury instruction pursuant to 18

Pa.C.S.A. §301 (requirement of voluntary act) and Martinez does not excuse

the procedural default of this claim.

IV. Certificate of Appealability

“Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(‘AEDPA’), a ‘circuit justice or judge’ may issue a COA [certificate of

appealability] only if the petitioner ‘has made a substantial showing of the

denial of a constitutional right.’” Tomlin v. Britton, 448 Fed.Appx. 224, 227

(3d Cir. 2011) (citing 28 U.S.C. §2253(c)). “Where a district court has

rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, ... the petitioner must

demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s

assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v.

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

For the reasons set forth herein, Petitioner has not made a substantial

showing of the denial of a constitutional right or that jurists of reason would

find it debatable that Court’s assessment of the claims debatable or wrong.

Accordingly, a COA will not issue.

V. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the Court will deny the petition for writ

of habeas corpus. A separate order shall issue.

s/ Malachy E. Mannion

MALACHY E. MANNION

United States District Judge

DATE: March 1, 2024

20-0329-01