Cummings v. Kramer

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WILLIAM CUMMINGS, :

Plaintiff, :

CIV. NO. 1:22-cv-1118

v. : (JUDGE MANNION)

B. LAWTON, :

Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM

Presently before the court in this pro se prisoner civil rights suit is the

report and recommendation of Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson, (Doc.

73), dated November 8, 2023. Judge Carlson recommends that Defendant’s

motion for judgment on the pleadings, (Doc. 65), be GRANTED. Plaintiff filed

a timely objection to Judge Carlson’s report. (Doc. 77). However, based on

the court’s review of the record that objection will be OVERULED and Judge

Carlson’s report will be ADOPTED IN ITS ENTIRETY.

Since the report correctly states the procedural and factual background

of this case, (Doc. 73, at 1-3), it will not be repeated herein. In short this is

one of several lawsuits brought by Plaintiff prisoner against state correctional

officers. This suit was originally brought against approximately eleven

individual defendants and 100 John Doe Defendants. The court has already

dismissed all claims and Defendants except one surviving Eighth

Amendment claim against Defendant Lawton, who Plaintiff alleges gave him

a moldy mattress and refused to provide adequate bedding after he

complained. Nonetheless Plaintiff’s last remaining claim is unexhausted and

thus barred by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”).

I. Legal Standard

When objections are timely filed to the report and recommendation of

a magistrate judge, the district court must review de novo those portions of

the report to which objections are made. 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1); Brown v.

Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2011). Although the standard of review is

de novo, the district court “may also, in the exercise of sound judicial

discretion, rely on the Magistrate Judge’s proposed findings and

recommendations.” Bynum v. Colvin, 198 F. Supp 3d 434, 437 (E.D. Pa.

2016) (citing United Stated v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980)).

Defendant has moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). A party may move for judgment on the

pleadings “[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay

trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). In ruling on a motion for judgment on the

pleadings, courts are to consider the pleadings and exhibits thereto, matters

of public record and “undisputedly authentic documents attached to the

motion for judgment on the pleadings if plaintiffs' claims are based on the

documents.” Atiyeh v. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford, 742 F. Supp. 2d 591,

595 (E.D. Pa. 2010). Motions filed pursuant to Rule 12(c) are reviewed under

the same standard that applies to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a

claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See Turbe v. Gov't of V.I., 938 F.2d 427,

428 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. Cephalon, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 3d 550,

555 (E.D.Pa. 2016).

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a

complaint should be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In determining whether a complaint

states a claim for relief, a court must accept the factual allegations in the

complaint as true, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007),

and accept “all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them after

construing them in the light most favorable to the non-movant.” Jordan v.

Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994).

However, a court is not required to accept legal conclusions or “a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Id.; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause

of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice”).

When presented with a pro se complaint, the court should construe the

complaint liberally and draw fair inferences from what is not alleged as well

as from what is alleged. Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d

Cir.2003); Youse v. Carlucci, 867 F.Supp. 317, 318 (E.D.Pa.1994). Such a

complaint “must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings

drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200 (quoting

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976)).

However, Rule 8 also plays an important role in pro se litigation, setting

minimal pleading thresholds which must be met in order to initially state a

claim. Therefore, dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 8 is appropriate

when a complaint is “illegible or incomprehensible,” Scibelli v. Lebanon

County, 219 F. App’x 221, 222 (3d Cir. 2007), or when a complaint “is not

only of an unwieldy length, but it is also largely unintelligible.” Stephanatos

v. Cohen, 236 F. App’x 785, 787 (3d Cir. 2007). Thus, a pro se plaintiff’s

complaint must recite factual allegations that are sufficient to raise the

plaintiff’s claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation, set forth

in a “short and plain” statement.

II. Discussion

Plaintiff’s sole remaining claim against Defendant is unexhausted and

barred by the PLRA. The PLRA provides that “[n]o action shall be brought

with respect to prison conditions under . . . [42 U.S.C. §1983], or any other

Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional

facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”

42 U.S.C. §1997e(a). Section 1997e’s exhaustion requirement applies to a

wide range of inmate complaints, including damages complaints like those

made here. See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218 (3d Cir. 2004); Booth v.

Churner, 206 F.3d 289 (3d Cir. 2000). While this exhaustion requirement is

not a jurisdictional bar to litigation, this requirement is strictly enforced by the

courts. See e.g. Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 75-76 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations

omitted). Because of the important policies fostered by this exhaustion

requirement, it has been held that there is no futility exception to section

1997e’s exhaustion requirement. Id.

Moreover, courts have also imposed a procedural default component

on this exhaustion requirement, holding that inmates must fully satisfy the

administrative requirements of the inmate grievance process before

proceeding into federal court. Spruill, 372 F.3d at 218. Applying this

procedural default standard to section 1997e’s exhaustion requirement,

courts have concluded that inmates who fail to fully, or timely, complete the

prison grievance process are barred from subsequently litigating claims in

federal court. See, e.g., Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289 (3d Cir. 2000); Bolla

v. Strickland, 304 F. App’x 22 (3d Cir. 2008); Jetter v. Beard, 183 F. App’x

178 (3d Cir. 2006).

The Pennsylvania Department of Corrections maintains a general

grievance system, DC-ADM 804, that offers a three-phase grievance and

appeals procedure. Judge Carlson found, and the court agrees that Plaintiff

failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under this procedure because

he never filed a grievance complaint about Defendant, or the allegedly moldy

mattress Defendant gave him.

Plaintiff’s original complaint alleged that Defendant gave him a moldy

mattress on March 25th, 2023. A review of the grievance log during this time

period shows that Plaintiff filed six complaints in March 2022, the last being

on March 21, 2022, and three grievances in April 2022. Two of these

grievances were withdrawn, and the other seven are part of the record. Upon

review, it appears none of these seven grievances mention either Defendant

or a complaint about a moldy mattress. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to fully

complete the prison grievance process and is barred from subsequently

litigating this claim in federal court.

In his objections to Judge Carlson’s report Plaintiff restates arguments

that Judge Carlson already found lack merit. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that

he was both prevented from filing a grievance by prison administrators and

he did file a grievance against Defendant, but it was not logged. Based on

its own review the court agrees with Judge Carlson’s initial findings.

The broad rule favoring exhaustion admits one, narrowly defined

exception, where prison officials directly caused an inmate’s procedural

default on a grievance. See Camp v. Brennan, 219 F.3d 279 (3d Cir. 2000).

However, case law recognizes a clear “reluctance to invoke equitable

reasons to excuse [an inmate’s] failure to exhaust as the statute requires.”

Davis v. Warman, 49 Fed.Appx. 365, 368 (3d Cir. 2002). Thus, an inmate’s

failure to exhaust will only be excused “under certain limited circumstances,”

Harris v. Armstrong, 149 Fed.Appx. 58, 59 (3d Cir. 2005).

While barriers such as threats and intimidation by prison officials could

conceivably fit the narrow exception to the exhaustion requirement, “[t]o

defeat a failure-to-exhaust defense, an inmate must show (1) that the threat

was sufficiently serious that it would deter a reasonable inmate of ordinary

firmness and fortitude from lodging a grievance and (2) that the threat

actually did deter this particular inmate.” Rinaldi v. United States, 904 F.3d

257, 269 (3d Cir. 2018). Like the plaintiff in Rinaldi, Plaintiff argues that he is

excused from the exhaustion requirement of the PLRA because prison

officials subjected him to constant verbal harassment including by

threatening to kill him, his family, and others close to him. Notwithstanding

the fact that Plaintiff offers no evidence of these threats other than his own

affidavit, which does not even state when, where, or who threatened him,

Plaintiff has despite these alleged threats continued to file grievances and

litigate multiple lawsuits against prison officials.1 Therefore, Plaintiff has not

shown that alleged threats from prison officials, even if sufficiently serious,

did actually deter him from continuing to pursue grievances, so he is not

exempt from the exhaustion requirement of the PLRA.

Despite Judge Carlson also addressing this issue, Plaintiff further

claims that Judge Carlson failed to take into account the fact that under the

Pennsylvania Department of Correction’s grievance procedure, an inmate

must sign the grievance and Defendant cannot produce a grievance log

showing Plaintiff’s signatures. Plaintiff seems to insinuate, but does not

actually argue, that this is because prison officials refused to log or otherwise

accept his grievance. However, the receipt of eighteen other grievances

during the same time thoroughly negate even this argument. Instead, the

uncontested evidence indicates that prison officials accepted and addressed

1 See e.g. Cummings v. Kramer, No. 1:22-CV-1118, 2022 WL

4594494, at *4-5 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 7, 2022), report and recommendation

adopted, No. CV 1:22-1118, 2022 WL 4585535 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2022);

See Cummings v. Weller, No. 1:22-CV-1119, 2022 WL 4594574 (M.D. Pa.

Sept. 2, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 1:22-1119,

2022 WL 4585534 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2022).

multiple grievances lodged by the plaintiff. The fact that there is not a

particular signature for the grievance against Defendant regarding the

allegedly moldy mattress does not indicate that the grievance was

specifically refused but provides further evidence that it was never filed.

Since Plaintiff did not file a grievance or otherwise exhaust his administrative

remedies regarding his claim against Defendant that claim is barred by

PLRA.

Plaintiff still argues in his objection to Judge Carlson’s report that it is

premature to dismiss this action because it raises questions of fact for a jury.

While the amended complaint as a whole might raise questions of fact,

Defendant’s motion for judgment on pleadings addresses only the issue of

administrative exhaustion on which defendant has submitted only bald (and

baseless) legal conclusions. Moreover, “judges may resolve factual disputes

relevant to the exhaustion issue without the participation of a jury.” Small v.

Camden Cnty., 728 F.3d 265, 271 (3d Cir. 2013) (District Judge did not err

by acting as the fact finder because exhaustion like jurisdiction and venue

constitutes a threshold issue for which no right to a jury trial exists.) Thus,

Plaintiff’s objections do not save his last remaining claim.

Given the numerous deficiencies in Plaintiff’s amended complaint, and his

failure to exhaust this last remaining claim against Defendant, his complaint

in each iteration will be dismissed.

III. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing the Report and Recommendation of Judge

Carlson, (Doc. 73), will be ADOPTED IN ITS ENTIRETY. Plaintiff’s

objections, (Doc. 77), will be OVERRULED. Defendant’s motion for

judgment on the pleadings, (Doc. 65), will be GRANTED. The Clerk of Court

will be directed to close this case. An appropriate order follows.

S/ Malachy E. Mannion

MALACHY E. MANNION

United States District Judge

DATE: December 26, 2023

22-1118-02