Washington v. Weber

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JEROME JUNIOR WASHINGTON, No. 4:21-CV-01746

Plaintiff, (Chief Judge Brann)

v.

SUPERINTENDENT SALAMON, et

al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DECEMBER 15, 2023

Plaintiff Jerome Junior Washington is a serial litigator who is well known in

the Middle District of Pennsylvania. He filed the instant pro se Section 19831

action in 2021, claiming constitutional violations by numerous prison officials at

the State Correctional Institution, Rockview (SCI Rockview), located in

Bellefonte, Pennsylvania. After his initial complaint was dismissed, Washington

filed an amended complaint targeting a single medical provider. Presently pending

is that remaining Defendant’s motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6). The Court will grant Defendant’s motion and dismiss this case

with prejudice.

1 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 creates a private cause of action to redress constitutional

wrongs committed by state officials. The statute is not a source of substantive rights; it serves

as a mechanism for vindicating rights otherwise protected by federal law. See Gonzaga Univ.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Jerome Junior Washington is serial pro se litigant who has filed

dozens of frivolous lawsuits in the federal district courts. He is currently

incarcerated at SCI Forest.2 He has been litigating the instant case against SCI

Rockview officials since October 2021 but has failed to progress past the pleading

stage. This is due, in no small part, to Washington’s overly complicated,

needlessly verbose, and often indecipherable pleadings.3 As the Court noted in its

September 27, 2022 Memorandum Opinion, Washington’s “pleadings are so

hopelessly complicated that he included an appendix to attempt to clarify the

multitudinous sections of his complaint.”4

After expending significant judicial time and resources reviewing the

sufficiency of Washington’s original complaint, the Court determined that

Washington had failed to state a claim for relief against any of the 14 named

Defendants.5 The Court dismissed Washington’s Eighth Amendment claims

concerning conditions of confinement and deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs without prejudice and dismissed his First Amendment retaliation

claim with prejudice.6 The Court also dismissed his official capacity claims for

2 See Doc. 82 at 1.

3 It is also a product of Washington’s numerous blown deadlines and requests for enlargement

of time. See, e.g., Docs. 46, 47 & n.5, 48, 49, 52, 53, 57, 59, 63, 64, 67, 70, 72, 73, 75, 78, 81,

83.

4 Doc. 50 at 2.

5 Id. at 6-16.

6 See Doc. 51 ¶ 1.

prospective injunctive relief because he had failed to state an underlying

constitutional violation.7 Finally, the Court noted that Washington had failed to

allege any unconstitutional conduct by defendant Dr. Weber, and that Dr. Weber

was also raising the defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies.8

Washington was granted leave to amend his Eighth Amendment claims and was

given an opportunity to respond to Dr. Weber’s failure-to-exhaust challenge.9

Washington properly responded to Dr. Weber’s exhaustion defense, providing

documents related to grievance number 882433 and its appeal to final review.10

In its initial dismissal, the Court gave Washington specific instructions

regarding amendment and explicitly warned him that failure to comply with those

instructions would result in the Court striking his amended pleading.11 After

Washington submitted an amended complaint targeting only Dr. Weber,12 the

Court sua sponte gave Washington another opportunity to include all his Eighth

Amendment claims in a comprehensive amended complaint.13

Washington eventually submitted a proposed comprehensive amended

complaint,14 but that filing violated nearly all the guidelines the Court had

7 Doc. 50 at 12-13.

8 Id. at 13-14.

9 Id. at 14-16.

10 See Docs. 54-5, 55.

11 See Doc. 50 at 15-16.

12 See generally Doc. 58.

13 See Doc. 59.

14 Doc. 67.

provided. The proposed amended complaint had somehow increased in size, even

though one of Washington’s claims had been dismissed with prejudice and he was

given specific pleading directions regarding his two remaining Eighth Amendment

claims. Those instructions included that he must adhere to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 8’s requirements of providing “a short and plain statement of the claim”

showing entitlement to relief and that “[e]ach allegation must be simple, concise,

and direct.”15 Washington’s proposed amended complaint, however, spanned 48

single-spaced, handwritten pages—5 more than his original—and contained at

least 218 paragraphs.16

The Court reviewed, in detail, Washington’s numerous drafting errors. First,

and most importantly, Washington’s proposed amended complaint was anything

but “short” and “concise.” Rather, it was 48 pages long, contained at least 218

paragraphs, and was even lengthier than his original filing. Second, Washington

tried to reassert a First Amendment retaliation claim that had been dismissed with

prejudice.17 Third, Washington failed to specify the offending action taken by

particular defendants, and instead again tried to level allegations by generally

claiming that “defendants” took some sort of collective, unconstitutional action.18

15 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2), (d)(1).

16 See generally Doc. 67.

17 See Doc. 51 ¶ 1(b); Doc. 67 at 9-11 (the Court cites to the CM/ECF electronic pagination rather

than the paragraph numbers of the amended complaint).

18 See, e.g., Doc. 67 at 9.

Fourth, Washington included legal argument and lengthy, word-for-word

recitations of prison regulations or policies despite being expressly instructed not

to do so.19 Fifth, Washington once more attempted to base various Section 1983

claims on perceived violations of prison policy,20 which the Court had already

admonished does not state a claim for relief.21 Finally, and quite strangely,

Washington interpreted “short and plain statement” to mean that he should sever

his sentences into multiple fragments rather than to simply clarify his complaint to

make it more concise and intelligible.22

Accordingly, on March 3, 2023, the Court struck the proposed amended

complaint for violating Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and this Court’s explicit

instructions.23 The Court gave Washington one final opportunity (and 21 days) to

file a comprehensive amended complaint that complied with the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure and the Court’s prior orders.24 The Court additionally warned that,

if Washington did not timely file a proper comprehensive amended complaint, his

case would proceed on the amended complaint filed against defendant Dr. Weber

only.25

19 See, e.g., id. at 11, 12-13, 14, 15, 32, 33.

20 See, e.g., id. at 26-27.

21 See Doc. 50 at 9-11.

22 See, e.g., Doc. 67 at 17-19.

23 See Doc. 70 at 6 ¶ 1.

24 See id. ¶¶ 2-3.

25 Id. ¶ 4.

The deadline for an appropriate comprehensive amended pleading came and

went without any action or correspondence from Washington. Accordingly, on

April 6, 2023, the Court issued an Order stating that, as previously warned, the

case would proceed on Washington’s amended complaint (Doc. 58) against Dr.

Weber only.26 The Order also gave Dr. Weber 30 days to respond to the amended

complaint.27

Dr. Weber complied, filing a timely motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)28 and, within the time permitted by Local Rule of

Court 7.5, a supporting brief.29 Washington filed an untimely brief in opposition,30

which the Court treated as timely filed.31 No reply has been filed, and the time in

which to do so has passed, so Dr. Weber’s motion to dismiss is ripe for disposition.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In deciding a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6), courts should not inquire “whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but

whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.”32 The

court must accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint and draw all

26 Doc. 71 at 1 ¶ 1.

27 Id. at 2 ¶ 2.

28 Doc. 74.

29 Doc. 79.

30 Doc. 82.

31 See Doc. 83.

32 Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); see Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 66 (3d Cir.

1996).

reasonable inferences from them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.33 In

addition to the facts alleged on the face of the complaint, the court may also

consider “exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as

undisputedly authentic documents” attached to a defendant’s motion to dismiss if

the plaintiff’s claims are based upon these documents.34

When the sufficiency of a complaint is challenged, the court must conduct a

three-step inquiry.35 At step one, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements [the]

plaintiff must plead to state a claim.”36 Second, the court should distinguish well-

pleaded factual allegations—which must be taken as true—from mere legal

conclusions, which “are not entitled to the assumption of truth” and may be

disregarded.37 Finally, the court must review the presumed-truthful allegations

“and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”38

Deciding plausibility is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to

draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”39

Because Washington proceeds pro se, his pleadings are to be liberally

construed and his amended complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held

33 Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008).

34 Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp.

v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)).

35 Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted).

36 Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009) (alterations in original)).

37 Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

38 Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

39 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681.

to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]”40 This is

particularly true when the pro se litigant, like Washington, is incarcerated.41

III. DISCUSSION

Washington’s amended complaint asserts an Eighth Amendment claim of

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs against Dr. Weber. Although

Washington briefly alleges that his Fourteenth Amendment rights were also

violated,42 it appears that this constitutional amendment is cited only with respect

to applying the Eighth Amendment’s protections against cruel and unusual

punishment to the states.43 No other Fourteenth Amendment violation is plausibly

alleged or discussed.

Dr. Weber contends that Washington’s amended complaint fails to state an

Eighth Amendment medical indifference claim. The Court agrees.

A. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs

In the context of prison medical care, the Eighth Amendment “requires

prison officials to provide basic medical treatment to those whom it has

incarcerated.”44 To state an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim

regarding inadequate medical care, a plaintiff must plausibly plead “(i) a serious

40 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations omitted).

41 Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).

42 See Doc. 58 ¶¶ 10, 34-35.

43 See id. ¶¶ 41-42 (alleging that Dr. Weber “violated Washington’s constitutional rights, under

the Eighth Amendment . . . as applied to the state by the Fourteenth Amendment”).

44 Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).

medical need, and (ii) acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate

indifference to that need.”45 A serious medical need is “one that has been

diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay

person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.”46

Deliberate indifference by prison officials may be evidenced by intentional

refusal to provide care known to be medically necessary, delayed provision of

medical treatment for non-medical reasons, denial of prescribed medical treatment,

or denial of reasonable requests for treatment resulting in suffering or risk of

injury.47 Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs is an exacting standard,

requiring a showing of “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”48 Claims

sounding in mere medical negligence will not suffice.49

Washington alleges that he suffers from schizoaffective disorder with

hallucinations, post-traumatic stress disorder, Bipolar-1 disorder, suicidal

ideations, attention deficit disorder (ADD), and anti-social personality disorder.50

He asserts that, due to his serious mental illnesses,51 he was housed in the Behavior

Management Unit (BMU) at SCI Rockview from 2020 through the time of filing

45 Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003).

46 Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987).

47 See Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 & n.11 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Lanzaro, 834 F.2d

at 346).

48 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (citation omitted).

49 Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197.

50 Doc. 58 ¶¶ 17, 26, 48.

51 Id. ¶¶ 31, 46, 49, 52.

his amended complaint because he “currently presents safety and/or security needs

that cannot be accommodate[d] by a less restrictive housing unit[.]”52

Washington avers that Dr. Weber oversees the BMU and the psychiatric

services provided there.53 He appears to allege that Dr. Weber provided

constitutionally deficient mental health care in the following ways: (1) “second-

guess[ing]” treatment for Washington’s ADD by prescribing different

medication(s) than Washington wanted or previously had been prescribed54; and

(2) failing to comply with department policies “13.1.1, 13.8.1, and 13.2.1”

regarding Washington’s mental health treatment.55 None of these allegations—

alone or together—meet the high bar of plausibly pleading constitutionally

deficient medical care.

In his first claim of medical indifference, Washington appears to disagree

with the ADD medication or treatment that Dr. Weber prescribed. He alleges that

Dr. Weber, instead of providing the ADD medication that Washington wanted and

was previously taking, prescribed medication based on his “own opinion” and

choice of medications.56 He asserts that he wants a “better medical opinion from

[Dr. Weber].”57 These allegations do not implicate a constitutional violation. It is

52 Id. ¶¶ 47, 51.

53 Id. ¶ 5.

54 Id. ¶¶ 19, 35-40.

55 Id. ¶¶ 55-57.

56 See id. ¶¶ 36-39.

57 Id. ¶ 61.

well settled that mere disagreement with a medical provider’s professional

judgment or treatment plan does not state an Eighth Amendment violation.58

Washington’s second claim appears to hinge on prison policy, asserting that

Dr. Weber’s treatment was not in accord with some unspecified aspect of the

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections Policy Statements 13.1.1 (Management

and Administration of Health Care), 13.2.1 (Access to Health Care), and 13.8.1

(Access to Mental Health Care). First, as the Court has previously explained on

multiple occasions,59 violation of a prison policy—a recurrent theme in

Washington’s pleadings—does not, in itself, state a constitutional infringement. It

is axiomatic that “a prison policy manual does not have the force of law and does

not rise to the level of a regulation” and that “a violation of internal policy does not

automatically rise to the level of a Constitutional violation.”60

58 See Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 346 (explaining that “mere disagreement as to the proper medical

treatment” does not “support a claim of an eighth amendment violation”); see also Pearson v.

Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 535 (3d Cir. 2017) (“Because ‘mere disagreement as to the

proper medical treatment’ does not ‘support a claim of an eighth amendment violation,’ when

medical care is provided, we presume that the treatment of a prisoner is proper absent evidence

that it violates professional standards of care.” (internal citation omitted)); Brown v. Borough

of Chambersburg, 903 F.2d 274, 278 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[I]t is well established that as long as a

physician exercises professional judgment his behavior will not violate a prisoner’s

constitutional rights.”).

59 See Doc. 70 at 4 (citing Doc. 1 ¶¶ 26-27); Doc. 50 at 9-11.

60 Atwell v. Lavan, 557 F. Supp. 2d 532, 556 n.24 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (citations omitted); see Bullard

v. Scism, 449 F. App’x 232, 235 (3d Cir. 2011) (nonprecedential) (explaining that, even if

prison officials violated a regulation, such a violation “is not actionable”); Jordan v. Rowley,

No. 1:16-CV-1261, 2017 WL 2813294, at *2 (M.D. Pa. June 29, 2017); Williamson v. Garman,

No. 3:15-CV-1797, 2017 WL 2702539, at *6 (M.D. Pa. June 22, 2017); see also United States

v. Jiles, 658 F.2d 194, 200 (3d Cir. 1981) (noting that even violations of state law will not

automatically have a “constitutional dimension”).

Second, Washington appears to be citing generally to extremely large prison

policies, which span 166 pages, 332 pages, and 309 pages, respectively. Simply

alleging that Dr. Weber’s treatment somehow violated these internal prison

policies does not in any way state a viable medical indifference claim. Although

Washington has been admonished that he is not to quote large portions of prison

policy in his pleadings, he must do more than merely claim that Dr. Weber violated

DOC policy. At the very least, Washington must describe the conduct by Dr.

Weber that he believes rises to the magnitude of a constitutional violation.

Third, Washington never grieved any claim regarding alleged violation of

prison policy by Dr. Weber. The sole subject of his grievance against Dr. Weber,

which he incorporates by reference into his amended complaint,61 is the ADD

medication issue.62 Consequently, even if Washington has plausibly stated a claim

with respect to policy violations, which he has not done, that claim would be

barred for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

At other points in his amended complaint, Washington alleges—in

conclusory or incomplete fashion—that there was an unspecified policy, practice,

or procedure at SCI Rockview that violated his Eighth Amendment rights.63

61 See Doc. 58 ¶ 11.

62 See Doc. 54-5 at 1. Washington’s amended complaint, in fact, contains multiple verbatim

passages from grievance number 882433. Compare Doc. 58, with Doc. 54-5 at 1.

63 See Doc. 58 ¶ 53 (“Such policies, practices and procedures, include without limitation . . .”

(ellipsis in original)); id. ¶ 44 (“Washington seek [sic] relief; [sic] of [Dr. Weber]’s policies,

practices, and procedures systemically; [sic] in violation to [sic] Washington’s Eighth

Amendment rights.”)

Nowhere in his amended complaint, however, does Washington plausibly plead a

policy or procedure imposed by Dr. Weber that violated his constitutional rights.

Washington’s bald allegations of a purported unconstitutional policy or practice,

without providing any supporting facts or even identifying the policy at issue, are

insufficient to state a claim for relief. Accordingly, the Eighth Amendment claim

against Dr. Weber must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

B. Official Capacity Claim

Washington again sues Dr. Weber in his official capacity.64 However, the

Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution prevents federal courts

from entertaining lawsuits—by United States citizens or citizens of foreign

states—brought against a state.65 This immunity from private suit extends to state

agencies as well as state officials acting in their official capacity, because such

lawsuits are essentially civil actions “against the State itself.”66 States may waive

this immunity if they choose, but Pennsylvania has explicitly not waived its

immunity with respect to claims brought under Section 1983.67 There are two

exceptions to the Eleventh Amendment’s bar to private suits against nonconsenting

64 See Doc. 58 ¶ 6.

65 U.S. CONST. amend. XI; Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 267-68 (1997);

Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890).

66 Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).

67 See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8521(b); Downey v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 968 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir.

2020); Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 254 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing 42

PA. CONS. STAT. § 8521(b)).

states: (1) “Congress may abrogate a state’s immunity” and (2) “parties may sue

state officers for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief.”68

From his amended complaint, it appears that Washington seeks prospective

injunctive relief “to stop the constitutional violations described” and “to ensure that

DOC prisoners like Washington receive constitutionally adequate mental health

care.”69 However, as fully explained above, Washington has failed to set forth any

plausible constitutional violations against Dr. Weber. Thus, Washington’s official

capacity claim for prospective injunctive relief likewise fails to state a claim and

must be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

The Court further observes that Washington has been transferred to SCI

Forest and presumably is no longer under the psychiatric care of Dr. Weber. Thus,

any request for prospective injunctive relief is likely moot.70

C. Leave to Amend

Generally, “in forma pauperis plaintiffs who file complaints subject to

dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) should receive leave to amend unless amendment

would be inequitable or futile.”71 Further leave to amend will be denied because

Washington has failed to cure the numerous deficiencies with his complaint even

68 Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Pa., 141 F.3d 88, 91 (3d Cir. 1998)

(citing, inter alia, Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)).

69 Doc. 58 ¶ 65(B).

70 See Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 248 (3d Cir. 2003) (“An inmate’s transfer from the

facility complained of generally moots the equitable and declaratory claims.”); see also Abdul-

Akbar v. Watson, 4 F.3d 195, 197 (3d Cir. 1993).

71 Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).

after “amendments previously allowed.”72 Washington is an experienced pro se

litigant who has been pursuing this case for over two years but has failed to

progress beyond the pleading stage. He has been provided countless opportunities

(and extensions of time) to amend his pleadings but has continually failed to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted. Thus, the Court will dismiss this case

with prejudice.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court will grant Defendant’s motion (Doc. 74)

to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Dismissal will be

with prejudice. An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann

Matthew W. Brann

Chief United States District Judge

72 See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Jones v. Unknown D.O.C. Bus Driver &

Transp. Crew, 944 F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 2019) (concluding that, where inmate plaintiff “has

already had two chances to tell his story,” providing “further leave to amend would be futile”).