The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TYREE TYQUAN MOY,
Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:22-CV-00348
v.
ERIC WILLIAMS, et al., (MEHALCHICK, M.J.)
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM
Presently before the Court is a second amended complaint filed by pro se prisoner-
Plaintiff Tyree Tyquan Moy (“Moy”) on February 28, 2023, against Defendants Eric
Williams, Brandy Koch, Officer Jacob Summers, Marco Randazzo, and Salvatore Randazzo
(collectively, “Defendants”). (Doc. 17, at 1). In the second amended complaint, Moy alleges
claims under the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. (“ADA”). (Doc. 17, at 2-3).
As relief, Moy seeks monetary and punitive damages. (Doc. 17, at 3). At all times relevant to
this action, Moy was incarcerated at the Lycoming County Prison located in Williamsport,
Pennsylvania. (Doc. 1, at 2; Doc. 13, at 6; Doc. 17).
Having conducted its statutorily-mandated screening of the complaint in accordance
with 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court finds that Moy’s second
amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, but grants Moy
one final opportunity to amend his claims. (Doc. 17).
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Moy, proceeding pro se, initiated the instant action by filing a complaint on March 9,
2022. (Doc. 1). On March 21, 2022, Moy filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
and his Prison Trust Fund Account Statement, which the Court granted on August 29, 2022.
(Doc. 6; Doc. 7; Doc. 10). On August 29, 2022, the Court determined that Moy’s original
complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and granted him leave to
file an amended complaint. (Doc. 11; Doc. 12). Moy filed an amended complaint on
September 28, 2022. (Doc. 13). On January 27, 2023, the Court determined that Moy’s second
amended complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and granted
him leave to file a second amended complaint. (Doc. 16).
Moy filed his second amended complaint on February 29, 2023. (Doc. 17). In his
second amended complaint, Moy recounts similar facts as set forth in the original complaint
and first amended complaint. (Doc. 1; Doc. 13; Doc. 17). Moy alleges that Defendants Marco
and Salvatori Randazzo changed the locks of a property and did not provide Moy with a new
key, violating a contract signed by Moy and depriving him of medication that was inside of
his home. (Doc. 17, at 2-3). Moy also claims Defendant Summers conducted a warrantless
search of Moy’s person when he was in his home. (Doc. 17, at 3). Moy avers that Defendant
Koch initiated the series of events by erroneously claiming that he had assaulted her. (Doc.
17, at 3). As a result of these events, Moy brings claims under the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments. (Doc. 17, at 2-3). Moy also makes vague allegations of perjury and
violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. (“ADA”). (Doc. 17, at 2-3). For
relief, Moy seeks monetary and punitive damages. (Doc. 17, at 3).
II. DISCUSSION
A. LEGAL STANDARD
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court is obligated, prior to service of process, to screen
a civil amended complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or
officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a); James v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr.,
230 Fed. App’x 195, 197 (3d Cir. 2007) (not precedential). The Court must dismiss the
amended complaint if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b)(1); Mitchell v. Dodrill, 696 F. Supp. 2d 454, 471 (M.D. Pa. 2010). The Court has a
similar obligation with respect to actions brought in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
In this case, because Moy is a prisoner suing a governmental employee and brings his suit in
forma pauperis, both provisions apply. In performing this mandatory screening function, a
district court applies the same standard applied to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Mitchell, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 471; Banks v. Cty. of Allegheny,
568 F. Supp. 2d 579, 588 (W.D. Pa. 2008).
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a defendant to move
to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). To assess the sufficiency of a complaint on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must first
take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim, then identify mere conclusions
which are not entitled to the assumption of truth, and finally determine whether the
complaint’s factual allegations, taken as true, could plausibly satisfy the elements of the legal
claim. Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011). In deciding a Rule
12(b)(6) motion, the court may consider the facts alleged on the face of the amended
complaint, as well as “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters
of which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S.
308, 322 (2007).
After recognizing the required elements which make up the legal claim, a court should
“begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not
entitled to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). The plaintiff
must provide some factual ground for relief, which “requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of
a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678. Thus, courts “need not credit a complaint’s ‘bald assertions’ or ‘legal
conclusions’ . . . .” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting
In re Burlington Coat Factory Securities Litigation, 114 F.3d 1410, 1429-30 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor
need the court assume that a plaintiff can prove facts that the plaintiff has not alleged.
Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526
(1983).
A court must then determine whether the well-pleaded factual allegations give rise to
a plausible claim for relief. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 219-20 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sheridan v. NGK Metals
Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 262 n.27 (3d Cir. 2010). The court must accept as true all allegations in
the amended complaint, and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be
construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien &
Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). This “presumption of truth attaches only to those
allegations for which there is sufficient factual matter to render them plausible on their face.”
Schuchardt v. President of the United States, 839 F.3d 336, 347 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation
and citation omitted). The plausibility determination is context-specific and does not impose
a heightened pleading requirement. Schuchardt, 839 F.3d at 347.
Additionally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Thus, a well-pleaded
complaint must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed right to relief
beyond the level of mere speculation, set forth in a “short and plain” statement of a cause of
action. There is no requirement that the pleading be specific or probable. Schuchardt, 839 F.3d
at 347 (citing Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d at 224, 233-234 (3d Cir. 2008). Rule 8(a)
requires a “showing that ‘the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair
notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’ ” Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Phillips, 515 F.3d at 233 (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545).
With the aforementioned standards in mind, a document filed pro se is “to be liberally
construed.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A pro se complaint, “however inartfully
pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”
and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972). Further, the Third Circuit has instructed that if
a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the district court must permit
a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v.
Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).
B. THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH
RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED.
Moy’s second amended complaint fails to state a claim under Rule 8(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Each allegation must
be simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1); Scibelli v. Lebanon Cty., 219 F. App’x
221, 222 (3d Cir. 2007). Dismissal under Rule 8 is proper when a complaint “le[aves] the
defendants having to guess what of the many things discussed constituted [a cause of action].”
Binsack v. Lackawanna County Prison, 438 F. App’x 158, 160 (3d Cir. 2011).
While the undersigned must construe the second amended complaint liberally due to
Moy’s status as a pro se litigant, the second amended complaint fails to meet the pleading
requirements of Rule 8. In most of his assertions, Moy claims multiple violations of the Fourth
Amendment and his due process rights. (Doc. 17, at 2-3). For example, Moy states “Officer
Summers and other un[]armed defendant in their official capacities illegal search and seized
Tyree Moy (ADA) in his home without a warrant or probable cause removing cash and cell
phones out or off his person on March 19th, 2021.” (Doc. 17, at 3). Although Moy attempts
to assert constitutional violations, in many instances the second amended complaint itself
contains too little information to understand what he alleges. Moy provides a multitude of
claims taking place over the course of different events and does not explain how the events
are relate in a linear fashion. Specifically, Moy describes a contractual dispute with his
landlord, an illegal search and seizure, his alleged false arrest for burglary, and that his
landlords changed the locks without giving him a key in breach of contract. (Doc. 17, at 1-3).
Due to the lack of specific facts to support his claims, it is unclear how the allegations in
Moy’s second amended complaint are connected.
To the extent that Moy wishes to assert violations of his Fifth Amendment or
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, these claims similarly fail. To state a § 1983 claim,
a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendants, acting under color of state law, deprived the
plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Kach v. Hose, 589
F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir.2009). To show that a defendant acted under color of state law, the
plaintiff must establish that the defendant is a “state actor” under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Benn v. Universal Health Systems, Inc., 371 F.3d 165, 169 n.1 (3d Cir. 2004). Further, “the due
process clause under the Fifth Amendment only protects against federal governmental
action.” Caldwell v. Beard, 324 F. App’x 186, 189 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Riley v. Camp, 130 F.3d
958, 972 n.19 (11th Cir. 1997)); Thomas v. Penn Waste, Inc., No. 1:13-CV-2290, 2013 WL
5522840, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 3, 2013) (“Insofar as Plaintiff states that Defendant is taking
his property in violation of his Fifth Amendment due process rights, he has no Fifth
Amendment claim since there is no alleged involvement by a federal actor.”); Hammond v.
City of Wilkes-Barre, No. 3:09-CV-2310, 2012 WL 3542277, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 2012)
(dismissing Fifth Amendment due process claim against state actors, as “it only applies to
federal actors.”). Here, Defendants Marco and Salvatore Randazzo and Koch are alleged to
be Moy’s landlords and roommate, not state or Federal actors. (Doc. 17, at 1). Since there is
nothing in the second amended complaint to indicate that either Defendant is a state or
Federal actor with respect to Moy’s allegations, Moy’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
claims against Defendants under § 1983 fail as a matter of law.
Second, Moy has failed to state a claim for false arrest or false imprisonment against
Defendants. Moy claims that Defendant Summers and other Defendants conducted an illegal
search and seizure of his home and person. (Doc. 17, at 3). “A claim for unlawful detention
under the Fourth Amendment requires [a p]laintiff to establish that he was subjected to a
Fourth Amendment seizure without probable cause.” Kauffman v. Barbagello, No. 1:13–CV–
00659, 2013 WL 6388487, at *18 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 5, 2013) (citing James v. City of Wilkes—
Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 682 (3d Cir.2012)). An officer has probable cause if, “at the moment the
arrest was made . . . the facts and circumstances within [the officer’s] knowledge and of which
[he] had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in
believing that [the suspect] had committed or was committing an offense.” Beck v. Ohio, 379
U.S. 89, 91 (1964). Here, it appears Moy brings his Fourth Amendment claim against the
proper Defendant, Officer Summers. (Doc. 17, at 3). However, a review of Moy’s second
amended complaint reveals that Moy has not adduced facts sufficient to state a Fourth
Amendment claim, as he has alleged a warrantless search occurred, but has not provided any
facts to support the conclusion that an unlawful search of either the home or Moy’s person
occurred without probable cause. (Doc. 17, at 1-3). Accordingly, Moy’s Fourth Amendment
claims must be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
Similarly, Moy’s claim under the ADA fails. (Doc. 17, at 2-3). “Title II of the ADA
prohibits discrimination against the disabled in public services, programs, and activities.”
Disability Rights N.J., Inc. v. Comm’r, N.J. Dep’t of Human Servs., 796 F.3d 293, 301 (3d Cir.
2015). To state a claim under Title II of the ADA, Moy must plead facts allowing us to
plausibly infer: “(1) he is a qualified individual; (2) with a disability; (3) who was excluded
from participation in or denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public
entity, or was subjected to discrimination by any such entity; (4) by reason of his disability.”
Geness v. Admin. Office of Pennsylvania Courts, 974 F.3d 263, 274-75 (3d Cir. 2020). Moy’s
allegations fall well short of what is required to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Indeed, Moy’s second amended complaint simply recites that he falls under the ADA,
without describing any discriminatory conduct that targeted him because of his disability.
(Doc. 17, at 1-2). Thus, the pleading simply does not allege a civil rights violation that is
causally related to some disability experienced by Moy. Barzyk v. Marsico, No. 1:14-CV-2017,
2015 WL 136622, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 8, 2015) (dismissing pro se plaintiff’s ADA claim for
failing to allege how she met the definition of disabled and failed to describe any
discriminatory conduct that targeted her because of her disability).
Overall, the amended complaint does not provide any meaningful opportunity for the
Defendants to decipher or answer the allegations levied against them. See Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555. The allegations presented in the complaint are not “simple, concise, and direct” to
provide the Defendants with knowledge as to what they are being charged. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(d)(1). In some instances, Moy appears to challenge the conduct surrounding an alleged
breach of contract whereas in others he appears to assert a violation of fundamental rights
and due process. (Doc. 17, at 1-5). Because Moy provides too little information and
improperly combines allegations, it is difficult to discern the basis of the claims he is stating
and against whom the claims are directed. Moy must adhere to Rule 8 by providing in his
complaint concise allegations of specific conduct that he believes violated his constitutional
rights. See Scibelli, 219 F. App’x. at 222 (dismissing a complaint because, among other reasons,
it did not “qualif[y] as a short and plain statement of a federal claim”).
C. LEAVE TO AMEND
The Court recognizes that pro se plaintiffs often should be afforded an opportunity to
amend a complaint before the complaint is dismissed with prejudice, unless granting further
leave to amend would be futile or result in undue delay. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235-
36 (3d Cir. 2004); see Fletcher–Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 253
(3d Cir. 2007). As the second amended complaint in its current form does not clearly set forth
any claims against Defendants, dismissal is warranted. However, so as to preserve Moy’s
rights as a pro se litigant, the Court will allow them to file a single, final, unified, legible third
amended complaint setting forth his factual allegations and legal claims in a manner that can
be reviewed by the Court and, if necessary, answered by Defendants.
Moy is advised that the third amended complaint must be a pleading that stands by
itself without reference to the original or amended complaints. Young v. Keohane, 809 F.
Supp. 1185, 1198 (M.D. Pa. 1992) (emphasis added). The third amended complaint must also
establish the existence of specific actions taken by Defendants which have resulted in
identifiable constitutional violations, to the extent Moy intends to bring a civil rights action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Further, Moy is cautioned that he must comply with Rule 8 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and establish at least a modicum of factual specificity
regarding the claims he intends to assert and the factual grounds upon which they rest. The
third amended complaint should also be limited to those claims that arise out of the same
transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences as averred in the original
complaint. Failure to file a third amended complaint in accordance with the
aforementioned requirements will result in the dismissal of this action in its entirety.
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, Moy’s second amended complaint is DISMISSED
without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1). (Doc. 17).
Moy is GRANTED leave to file a single, final, third amended complaint within 28 days from
today’s date, or on or before Monday, November 27, 2023.
An appropriate Order follows.
s/ Karoline Mehalchick
Dated: October 30, 2023
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK
Chief United States Magistrate Judge