Williams v. Diven

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JAMIEL L. WILLIAMS and

KEVIN WILLIAMS, :

Plaintiffs :

: No. 1:23-cv-00667

v. :

: (Judge Rambo)

C.O. DIVEN, et al., :

Defendants :

MEMORANDUM

Pro se Plaintiff Jamiel L. Williams (“Plaintiff”), who is a state prisoner in the

custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”), is currently

incarcerated at State Correctional Institution Huntingdon (“SCI Huntingdon”) in

Huntingdon, Pennsylvania. He commenced the above-captioned action by filing a

complaint pursuant to the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”), asserting

violations of his constitutional rights while incarcerated there. (Doc. No. 1.) In

accordance with the Prison Litigation Reform Act,1 the Court conducted an initial

review of Plaintiff’s complaint and dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state

a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Court also granted Plaintiff leave

to file an amended complaint. (Doc. Nos. 12, 13.) Currently pending before the

Court is Plaintiff’s amended complaint. (Doc. No. 14.) For the reasons set forth

1 See The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat.

1321 (Apr. 26, 1996).

below, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s amended complaint for failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted, and the Court will direct the Clerk of Court

to close this case.

I. BACKGROUND

On April 21, 2023, Plaintiff filed his original Section 1983 complaint naming

himself and Kevin Williams (“Inmate Williams”), a fellow inmate at SCI

Huntingdon, as Plaintiffs. (Doc. No. 1 at 1.) Plaintiff, however, subsequently filed

a request with the Court, stating that he would like “to proceed [in] the above-

captioned civil rights action without 2nd Plaintiff, [Inmate] Williams[.]” (Doc. Nos.

6; 11 at 1 (explaining to the Court that “[Inmate] Williams, is [the] only witness to

[the] case, although [Plaintiff] put him as a [p]laintiff, it was wrong”).) Thus, the

Court treated Plaintiff’s original complaint as being filed on his behalf only.

In the original complaint, Plaintiff named the following individuals as

defendants, all of whom appear to be employed by the DOC and to have worked at

SCI Huntingdon during the period of time relevant to Plaintiff’s claims: (1)

Corrections Officer Diven; (2) Corrections Officer Plocinik; (3) Corrections Officer

Brindle; (4) Sergeant Weakland; (5) Lieutenant S. Grassmyer; and (6)

Superintendent/Facility Manager J. Rivello. (Doc. No. 1.) In addition, Plaintiff

claimed that these defendants violated his First Amendment rights based upon their

alleged interference with his legal mail at SCI Huntingdon. (Id.)

On July 13, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma

pauperis, deemed his original complaint filed, and dismissed his original complaint

for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). (Doc. Nos. 12, 13.) In addition, the Court granted Plaintiff leave

to amend his Section 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendants

Diven, Plocinik, Brindle, and Weakland. (Id.) And the Court dismissed, without

leave to amend, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against Defendants Rivello and

Grassmyer. (Id.; Doc. No. 13 (directing the Clerk of Court to terminate Defendants

Rivello and Grassmyer from the caption of the docket in this case).) Finally, the

Court granted Plaintiff leave to amend his original complaint and directed Plaintiff

to file his amended complaint within thirty (30) days. (Doc. Nos. 12, 13.)

Plaintiff filed his amended Section 1983 complaint on July 28, 2023. (Doc.

No. 14.) Plaintiff names the surviving defendants (i.e., Diven, Plocinik, Brindle, and

Weakland (collectively, “Defendants”)), and he asserts a First Amendment claim

against these Defendants based upon their alleged interference with his legal mail.

(Id.) In support, Plaintiff sets forth the following allegations against Defendants.2

2 In accordance with the legal standard set forth below, the Court accepts these

allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most

favorable to Plaintiff. See Kedra v. Schroeter, 876 F.3d 424, 434 (3d Cir. 2017). In

addition, the Court heeds the long-standing principle that pro se documents are “to

be liberally construed.” See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Thus,

Plaintiff’s pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded,” will be held to “less

On December 21, 2022, at SCI Huntingdon, Defendant Diven “purposely

gave” Inmate Williams a “pass belonging to Plaintiff” and directed Inmate Williams

to “go off DA-Unit to B-Unit to get legal mail belonging to Plaintiff.” (Doc. No. 14

at 4.) Defendant Diven “never asked for or checked Inmate I.D.” to “mak[e] sure

[the] right person went to legal mail room.” (Id.; id. at 5 (stating that Defendant

Diven “violated Plaintiff by being derlic [sic] of duty on his job post (not checking

inmate I.D[.]”).)

At the legal mail room, Defendants Plocinik and Brindle gave Inmate

Williams mail “belonging to [Plaintiff] that was opened in front of [Inmate]

Williams.” (Id. at 4); see also (id. at 5). Defendant Brindle let Inmate Williams

“sign computerized signature stating his acceptance of legal mail[.]” (Id. at 4, 5.)

Inmate Williams left the legal mail room and returned to DA-Unit. (Id.) It was at

this point that Inmate Williams “realiz[ed]” the legal mail was not his mail, and so

he “gave it to [Plaintiff].” (Id.) Plaintiff “made a big fuss” about the situation, and

Defendant Weakland “lied to supervisors saying legal mail was given to him and it

wasn’t him.” (Id.)

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” See Haines v.

Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).

Defendant Weakland “covered up” the wrongdoing of Defendants Diven,

Plocinik, and Brindle. (Id.) In addition, Defendant Weakland stated that “he

received & checked legal-mail” when Inmate Williams returned to DA-Unit from

the legal mail room, and “personally gave” Plaintiff the legal mail. (Id.) Plaintiff

contends, however, that he received the legal mail from Inmate Williams. (Id.)

In connection with all of these allegations, Plaintiff claims that Defendants

violated his First Amendment rights when they “opened [his] legal mail outside of

presence of addressee.” (Id. at 6.) As for relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages

and injunctive relief in the form of the following: “give Plaintiff evidence from

Misconduct Report #D643241 & D643236 and change prison policy stating outside

agencies reporting wrong doings on inmates, inmates cant have evidence or see it to

prove self innocent.” (Id.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), district courts are required to review

complaints in civil actions where a litigant is proceeding in forma pauperis. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). If the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who

is immune from such relief, then the district court must dismiss the complaint. See

id. In dismissing claims under § 1915(e)(2), district courts apply the standard

governing motions to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999).

To avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a civil complaint must set out “sufficient

factual matter” to show that its claims are facially plausible. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

When evaluating the plausibility of a complaint, the Court is required to

“accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, construe the complaint in the

light favorable to the plaintiff, and ultimately determine whether plaintiff may be

entitled to relief under any reasonable reading of the complaint.” See Mayer v.

Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 2010); Kedra v. Schroeter, 876 F.3d 424, 434

(3d Cir. 2017) (stating that the court “must accept as true all factual allegations in

the complaint and draw all inferences from the facts alleged in the light most

favorable to [the plaintiff]” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Additionally, in the specific context of pro se prisoner litigation, a district

court must be mindful that a document filed pro se “is to be liberally construed.”

See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A pro se complaint, “however

inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings

drafted by lawyers[.]” See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff has filed his amended complaint pursuant to the provisions of Section

1983, which provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or

other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,

shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or

other proper proceeding for redress.

See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, “Section 1983 imposes civil liability upon any person

who, acting under the color of state law, deprives another individual of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.”

See Shuman v. Penn Manor School Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation

omitted). Section 1983 “does not create any new substantive rights but instead

provides a remedy for the violation of a federal constitutional or statutory right.”

See id. (citation omitted).

Although Plaintiff’s original complaint asserted a First Amendment

retaliation claim against Defendants (Doc. No. 1), which was ultimately dismissed

by the Court for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted (Doc.

Nos. 12, 13), Plaintiff’s amended complaint does not assert this same claim. Instead,

it asserts a First Amendment claim based upon allegations of interference with his

mail. Compare (Doc. No. 1) with (Doc. No. 14). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges (a)

an incident of mail tampering, in that Inmate Williams was given Plaintiff’s legal

mail and permitted to open it (Doc. No. 14 at 4–6), and (2) an incident of denial of

access to the Courts, in that this particular piece of legal mail could have helped

Plaintiff file court paperwork in time and prosecute his innocence in connection with

his misconduct report (id. at 5–6). The Court, having carefully reviewed these

allegations, finds that Plaintiff’s amended complaint fails to state a First Amendment

claim upon which relief can be granted.3

“The First Amendment, as incorporated in the Fourteenth, prohibits states

from ‘abridging the freedom of speech.’” See Jones v. Brown, 461 F.3d 353, 358

(3d Cir. 2006) (quoting U.S. Const. Amend. I). The United States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit has recognized that “state prisoners, by virtue of their

incarceration, do not forfeit their First Amendment right to use of the mails, . . . and

that a pattern and practice of opening properly marked incoming [legal] mail outside

an inmate’s presence infringes communication protected by the right to free speech.”

See id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

3 Even if Plaintiff’s amended complaint could be construed as asserting a First

Amendment retaliation claim, his claim fails for the same reasons it failed with

respect to his original complaint—that is, Plaintiff’s amended complaint does not

establish that constitutionally protected conduct was a substantial or motivating

factor in the decision of Defendants to allow Plaintiff’s legal mail to be given to

Inmate Williams. Specifically, Plaintiff has not alleged an unusually suggestive

temporal proximity between asserted protected activity and the allegedly retaliatory

action, or a pattern of antagonism. See Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 422 (3d

Cir. 2016).

However, a single, isolated incident of opening legal mail outside of an

inmate’s presence will generally not be sufficient to establish a violation of the

inmate’s First Amendment rights. See, e.g., Bieregu v. Reno, 59 F.3d 1445, 1452

(3d Cir.1995), abrogated on other grounds by Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996)

(“declin[ing] to hold that a single instance of damaged mail rises to the level of

constitutionally impermissible censorship . . . ”); Gibson v. Erickson, 830 F. App’x

372, 373 (3d Cir. 2020) (unpublished) (stating that “while a pattern or practice of

opening legal mail outside the presence of an inmate is sufficient to state a First

Amendment violation, . . . a single instance is usually not enough” (citation, internal

citation, and internal quotation marks omitted)); Schreane v. Marr, 722 F. App’x

160, 167 (3d Cir. 2018) (unpublished) (recognizing that, “[t]ypically, a violation of

an incarcerated plaintiff’s right of free speech cannot be established through a single

isolated instance of mail interference, as [plaintiff] claims occurred [here]” (citation

omitted))); Edney v. Haliburton, 658 F. App’x 164, 167 (3d Cir. 2016) (unpublished)

(stating that “[a]n isolated incident of mail tampering is generally insufficient to state

a First Amendment violation” (citation omitted)); Iwanicki v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of

Corr., 582 F. App’x 75, 79 (3d Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (explaining that “a single

instance of interference with mail is usually insufficient to constitute a First

Amendment violation . . . ” (citation omitted)); Nixon v. Sec’y Pennsylvania Dep’t

of Corr., 501 F. App’x 176, 178 (3d Cir. 2012) (concluding that the plaintiff’s “claim

alleging a single, isolated interference with his personal mail was insufficient to

constitute a First Amendment violation” (citations omitted)).

Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s amended complaint asserts no allegations

that would require the Court to depart from this general rule. Indeed, Plaintiff does

not allege that any of these Defendants read his legal mail or that they confiscated

or destroyed it. Rather, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants gave his legal mail and/or

allowed it to be given to Inmate Williams, who (coincidentally or not) shares the

same last name as Plaintiff. In addition, Plaintiff alleges that Inmate Williams turned

this mail over to Plaintiff as soon as Inmate Williams recognized that it belonged to

Plaintiff. In other words, Plaintiff appears to have received his legal mail shortly

after Inmate Williams took possession of it, but at the very latest, sometime within

the same day that Inmate Williams was given Plaintiff’s legal mail. Finally, Plaintiff

does not allege any specific factual allegations to plausibly show improper motive

on the part of Defendants when they gave this mail or allowed this mail to be given

to Inmate Williams, specifically.

Thus, for all of these reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s allegations,

which stem from one alleged occasion of mail interference, simply do not give rise

to a violation of the First Amendment. As such, Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim

against Defendants will be dismissed.

B. Leave to Amend

The final issue is whether Plaintiff should be granted leave to amend his

complaint. Due to the applicable liberal pleading standard, a plaintiff should

generally be granted leave to amend before a Court dismisses a claim that is merely

deficient. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow for amendments to be granted liberally

in light of the “principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision

on the merits.” See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted).

However, the Court may deny leave to amend where there is “undue delay,

bad faith[,] or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure

deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing

party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of the amendment[.]”

See id. The Court may also deny leave to amend where the proposed amendment

would be futile—that is, where the pleading, “as amended, would fail to state a claim

upon which relief could be granted.” See In re NAHC, Inc. Sec. Litig., 306 F.3d

1314, 1332 (3d Cir. 2002) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

In accordance with this standard, the Court finds that granting Plaintiff leave

to amend his First Amendment claim against Defendants would be futile since a

single incident of opening legal mail does not demonstrate a pattern or practice of

improper handling of Plaintiff’s legal mail sufficient to state a First Amendment

violation. See Nixon, 501 Fed.Appx. at 178, n.1 (affirming district court’s dismissal

of the state prisoner’s First Amendment legal mail claim without leave to amend

because any amendment would be futile since the prisoner’s underlying claim lacked

merit). Accordingly, Plaintiff will not be granted leave to amend this claim

IV. CONCLUSION

To conclude, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s amended complaint (Doc. No.

14) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The Court will not grant Plaintiff leave to amend his amended

complaint. Finally, the Court will direct the Clerk of Court to close this case. An

appropriate Order follows.

Dated: September 6, 2023 s/ Sylvia H. Rambo

SYLVIA H. RAMBO

United States District Judge