The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JANIS O’CONNOR, : CIV NO. 1:22-CV-1607
:
Plaintiff, :
:
v. : (Magistrate Judge Carlson)
:
ELMER SNYDER, et al., :
:
Defendants. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I. Statement of Facts and of the Case.
This case comes before the court on a motion to strike filed by the plaintiff,
(Doc. 39), a motion which asks this court to strike a reply brief filed by the
defendants in support of their motion to dismiss. For the reasons set forth below, we
will deny this motion.
II. Discussion
A. Rule 12(f), the Legal Standard
Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions to strike
pleadings and provides, in part, that:
(f) Motion to Strike. The court may strike from a pleading an
insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or
scandalous matter.
F. R.Civ. P., Rule 12(f).
While rulings on motions to strike rest in the sound discretion of the court,
Von Bulow v. Von Bulow, 657 F.Supp. 1134, 1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), that discretion
is guided by certain basic principles. Because striking a pleading is viewed as a
drastic remedy, such motions are “generally disfavored.” Kaiser Aluminum &
Chemical Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1057 (C.A.La.,
1982). As one court has aptly observed: “striking a party's pleadings is an extreme
measure, and, as a result, . . . ‘[m]otions to strike under Fed .R.Civ.P. 12(f) are
viewed with disfavor and are infrequently granted.’ Lunsford v. United States, 570
F.2d 221, 229 (8th Cir.1977) (citing 5 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure. Civil 1380 at 783 (1969)). See also, Resolution Trust Corp. v. Gibson,
829 F.Supp. 1103, 1106 (W.D.Mo.1993); 2 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's
Federal Practice 12.37[1] (3d ed. 2000).” Stanbury Law Firm v. I.R.S., 221 F.3d
1059, 1063 (8th Cir. 2000). In practice, courts should exercise this discretion and
strike pleadings only when those pleadings are both “redundant, immaterial,
impertinent, or scandalous” and prejudicial to the opposing party. Ruby v. Davis
Foods, Inc., 269 F.3d 818, 820 (7th Cir. 2001).
Moreover, consistent with this sparing approach urged by the courts with
respect to motions to strike, those “pleadings” that may be subject to a motion to
strike are construed narrowly. Recognizing that briefs are, by their nature,
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argumentative and sometimes contentious filings, it is generally held that a brief as
opposed to other forms of pleadings typically will not be considered a “pleading”
which is properly the subject of a motion to strike. Hrubec v. National R.R.
Passenger Corp., 829 F.Supp. 1502, 1506 (N.D.Ill.,1993), citing Anna Ready Mix,
Inc. v. N.E. Pierson Const. Co., 747 F.Supp. 1299, 1303 (S.D.Ill.1990), and Board of
Education v. Admiral Heating and Ventilation, Inc., 94 F.R.D. 300, 304
(N.D.Ill.1982).
In this case, upon consideration of this motion to strike we find that the object
of the motion, namely, the defendants’ brief, is not the appropriate subject of a
motion to strike. Hrubec v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 829 F.Supp. 1502, 1506
(N.D.Ill.,1993). Furthermore, recognizing that “[m]otions to strike under Fed
.R.Civ.P. 12(f) are viewed with disfavor and are infrequently granted,” Lunsford v.
United States, 570 F.2d 221, 229 (8th Cir.1977), we find that it has not been shown
that the assertions in this brief are both “redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or
scandalous” and unfairly prejudicial. Ruby v. Davis Foods, Inc., 269 F.3d 818, 820
(7th Cir. 2001). Therefore, in the exercise of our discretion, Von Bulow v. Von
Bulow, 657 F.Supp. 1134, 1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), we will deny this motion to strike.
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff s motion to strike (Doc.
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39) is DENIED. We will, however, consider the concerns voiced by the plaintiff
when addressing the underlying merits of the motion to dismiss.
So ordered this 11th day of September2023.
S/Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge
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