Lancaster v. Lackawanna County

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TODD LANCASTER,

Plaintiff :

: No. 1:23-cv-00874

v. :

: (Judge Rambo)

LACKAWANNA COUNTY, :

Defendant :

MEMORANDUM

Pro se Plaintiff Todd Lancaster (“Plaintiff”), a convicted and sentenced state

prisoner, is currently incarcerated at Lackawanna County Prison in Scranton,

Pennsylvania. (Doc. No. 1.) He commenced the above-captioned action by filing a

complaint pursuant to the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) against

Defendant Lackawanna County (“Defendant”). (Id.) In accordance with the Prison

Litigation Reform Act,1 the Court has conducted an initial review of the complaint.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court will dismiss the complaint, but without

prejudice to Plaintiff filing an amended complaint.

1 See The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat.

1321 (Apr. 26, 1996).

I. BACKGROUND

On May 26, 2023, Plaintiff filed his Section 1983 complaint against

Defendant (Doc. No. 1), as well as a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis

(Doc. No. 2), and his prisoner trust fund account statement (Doc. No. 3). The Court,

having reviewed Plaintiff’s motion and trust fund account statement, will grant him

leave to proceed in forma pauperis and will deem his complaint filed.

In his complaint, Plaintiff asserts that the events giving rising to his claims

occurred in Scranton, Pennsylvania on March 5, 2023. (Doc. No. 1 at 4.) In support

of this assertion, he has set forth a number of allegations. Those allegations, at times,

are difficult to read and understand. Nevertheless, the Court has done its best to

recount them here.

Plaintiff alleges that the “Scranton City Police Dept., Lackawanna County

Prison, Probation, and Public Defenders Office all conspired to commit civil

conspiracy . . . to deprive [him of his] constitutional rights.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims

that, on March 5, 2023, he “contacted all entities through administration,

grievances[,] and mail using certified service that was not serviced properly.” (Id.)

Plaintiff further claims that “Keving Gaughlan P.O[.] Lackawanna County Probation

Office and Clerk of Courts Maury Kelly, P.D.S. Doug Vanston, Judy Kalinwski,

Den Lipson, and Donna Pauita L.C.P. Record Dept[.] and Administration, and CO.s

all conspired against [him] for trying to get a writ of habeas corpus” and violated the

“Double Jeopardy Clause[.]” (Id.) Plaintiff further claims that “the County . . .

altered . . . paperwork regrading Double Jeopardy Clause (Iron clad case).” (Id. at

5.)

In addition, Plaintiff alleges that the Scranton Police are investigating his twin

brother’s overdose. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff explains that, at that time, “he was also on

Lackawanna County Prob. [and] was a confidential inform[ant] for the County and

the City.” (Id.) In connection with these specific allegations, Plaintiff asserts that

“[t]hey have been hindering [his] civil rights, using probation violators[,] mainly a

‘Jessica Peoples[,]’” and that they have “terrorized” him and “created a major

conflict of interest [by] not telling [him] he was a C.I.” (Id. (claiming that he could

have been “killed” or “beat”).) Plaintiff also claims that “[t]hey” conducted an

unreasonable search and seizure through the C.I. (Id. at 5.)

Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that “prison guards routinely put [him] in the

hole . . . for seeking Govt. redress[,]” and that he was retaliated against “numerous

times” for requesting lawsuits and habeas corpus petitions. (Id.) Plaintiff also

alleges that he was “intimidated, stripped, and recorded on video.” (Id.)

In connection with these various allegations, Plaintiff contends that he has

suffered “[s]evere psychological damage from numerous false arrests due to Double

Jeopardy Deprivation of Rights[,] depression[,] anxiety from being in hole[,] false

imprisonment[,] and false arrest.” (Id.) He asserts a Monell claim for “failure to

train all[,]” and he seeks monetary damages. (Id.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), district courts are required to review

complaints in civil actions where a litigant is proceeding in forma pauperis. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). If the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who

is immune from such relief, then the district court must dismiss the complaint. See

id. In dismissing claims under § 1915(e)(2), district courts apply the standard

governing motions to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999).

To avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a civil complaint must set out “sufficient

factual matter” to show that its claims are facially plausible. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

When evaluating the plausibility of a complaint, the Court is required to

“accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, construe the complaint in the

light favorable to the plaintiff, and ultimately determine whether plaintiff may be

entitled to relief under any reasonable reading of the complaint.” See Mayer v.

Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 2010); Kedra v. Schroeter, 876 F.3d 424, 434

(3d Cir. 2017) (stating that the court “must accept as true all factual allegations in

the complaint and draw all inferences from the facts alleged in the light most

favorable to [the plaintiff]” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Additionally, in the specific context of pro se prisoner litigation, a district

court must be mindful that a document filed pro se “is to be liberally construed.”

See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A pro se complaint, “however

inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings

drafted by lawyers[.]” See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Monell Liability

Plaintiff has filed his complaint pursuant to the provisions of Section 1983,

asserting violations of his constitutional rights. (Doc. No. 1.) Section 1983 provides,

in pertinent part, as follows:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or

other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,

shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or

other proper proceeding for redress.

See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, “Section 1983 imposes civil liability upon any person

who, acting under the color of state law, deprives another individual of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.”

See Shuman v. Penn Manor School Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation

omitted). Section 1983 “does not create any new substantive rights but instead

provides a remedy for the violation of a federal constitutional or statutory right.”

See id. (citation omitted).

Local governmental entities “can be sued directly under [Section] 1983 for

monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where . . . the action that is alleged to be

unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation,

or decision officially adopted or promulgated by that body’s officers” or where a

“constitutional deprivation[ ]” was caused by a “governmental ‘custom’ even though

such a custom has not received formal approval through the body’s official decision-

making channels.” See Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S.

658, 690–91 (1978). In other words, a local governmental entity is only “liable when

the alleged constitutional transgression implements or executes a policy, regulation

or decision officially adopted by the governing body or informally adopted by

custom.” See Mulholland v. Gov’t Cnty. of Berks, Pa., 706 F.3d 227, 237 (3d Cir.

2013) (citations omitted).

As such, “the [local governmental entity] may not be held liable for

constitutional torts under [Section] 1983 on a vicarious liability theory rooted in

respondeat superior, . . . but it can be held responsible as an entity when the injury

inflicted is permitted under its adopted policy or custom.” See id. (citation and

internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Monell, 436 U.S. at 694

(concluding “that a local government may not be sued under [Section] 1983 for an

injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents[,]” and “[i]nstead, it is when

execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or

by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts

the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under [Section] 1983”).

As explained by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,

“[n]ot all state action rises to the level of a custom or policy.” See Natale v. Camden

Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 584 (3d Cir. 2003). A policy is created “‘when

a decisionmaker possess[ing] final authority to establish municipal policy with

respect to the action issues a final proclamation, policy or edict.’” See id. (quoting

Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1212 (3d Cir. 1996)). And “[a] custom is an act

‘that has not been formally approved by an appropriate decisionmaker,’ but that is

‘so widespread as to have the force of law.’” See id. (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs

of Bryan County, Oklahoma v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997)).

Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege any facts upon

which the Court could reasonably infer that a policy or custom resulted in a violation

of his constitutional rights. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–91; Mulholland, 706 F.3d

at 237. Additionally, while the Court has liberally construed Plaintiff’s complaint

based upon his status as a pro se litigant, it is unclear what constitutional rights

Defendant has, allegedly, violated. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (providing that a

complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1) (explaining that “[e]ach

allegation must be simple, concise, and direct”). Thus, for these reasons, the Court

will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted.

B. Leave to Amend

The final issue is whether Plaintiff should be granted leave to amend his

complaint. Due to the applicable liberal pleading standard, a plaintiff should

generally be granted leave to amend before a Court dismisses a claim that is merely

deficient. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow for amendments to be granted liberally

in light of the “principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision

on the merits.” See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted).

However, the Court may deny leave to amend where there is “undue delay,

bad faith[,] or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure

deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing

party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of the amendment[.]”

See id. The Court may also deny leave to amend where the proposed amendment

would be futile—that is, where the pleading, “as amended, would fail to state a claim

upon which relief could be granted.” See In re NAHC, Inc. Sec. Litig., 306 F.3d

1314, 1332 (3d Cir. 2002) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

In accordance with this standard, the Court cannot say that granting Plaintiff

leave to amend his complaint against Defendant would be futile. As a result,

Plaintiff will be granted leave to file an amended complaint. Plaintiff is advised that

the amended complaint must be complete in all respects. It must be a new pleading

that stands by itself without reference to the original complaint or any other

document already filed. The amended complaint shall set forth Plaintiff’s claims in

short, concise, and plain statements as required by Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. Finally, Plaintiff is cautioned that neither conclusory allegations

nor broad allegations will set forth a cognizable claim.

IV. CONCLUSION

To conclude, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. No. 1) for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2). The Court will grant Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. An

appropriate Order follows.

Dated: July 24, 2023 s/ Sylvia H. Rambo

SYLVIA H. RAMBO

United States District Judge