Figueroa v. Moyer

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CARLOS FIGUEROA, :

Plaintiff, : CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:21-601

v. : (JUDGE MANNION)

WILLIAM MOYER, SR., et al., :

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM

Presently before the court is the report of Judge1 Carlson, (Doc. 51),

which recommends the court grant in part and deny in part the defendants’

motion for summary judgment of Plaintiff’s claims, (Doc. 37). Plaintiff brings

this suit to recover for alleged harm arising out of events surrounding his

arrest in April 2019. Judge Carlson found there are significant disputes of

material fact precluding summary judgment of most of Plaintiff’s claims,

except his Monell and conspiracy claims against the Borough. The court

agrees and will ADOPT the report in its entirety.

1 In his objections, Plaintiff, on several occasions, misidentifies

Magistrate Judge Carlson as “[t]he Magistrate.” (See, e.g., Doc. 53-1 at 14,

15). The title “magistrate” no longer exists in the U.S. Courts, having been

changed from “magistrate” to “magistrate judge” in 1990. Judicial

Improvements Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 5089, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §321 (1990)

(“After the enactment of this Act, each United States magistrate . . . shall be

known as a United States magistrate judge.”). Plaintiff’s counsel is reminded

to use the correct title in the future when referring to Judge Carlson.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When objections are timely filed to the report and recommendation of

a magistrate judge, the district court must review de novo those portions of

the report to which objections are made. 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1); Brown v.

Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2011). Although the standard is de novo,

the extent of review is committed to the sound discretion of the district judge,

and the court may rely on the recommendations of the magistrate judge to

the extent it deems proper. Rieder v. Apfel, 115 F.Supp.2d 496, 499 (M.D.

Pa. 2000) (citing United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980)).

For those sections of the report and recommendation to which no

objection is made, the court should, as a matter of good practice, "satisfy

itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept

the recommendation." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), advisory committee notes; see

also Univac Dental Co. v. Dentsply Intern., Inc., 702 F.Supp.2d 465, 469

(M.D. Pa. 2010) (citing Henderson v. Carlson, 812 F.2d 874, 878 (3d Cir.

1987) (explaining that judges should give some review to every report and

recommendation)). Nevertheless, whether timely objections are made or not,

the district court may accept, not accept, or modify, in whole or in part, the

findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C.

§636(b)(1); Local Rule 72.31. “[A] Report and Recommendation does not

have force of law unless and until the district court enters an order accepting

or [not accepting] it.” Garceran v. Morris County Prosecutors Office, No. 14–

2135 (CCC-MF), 2015 WL 858106, at *1 (D.N.J. Feb. 27, 2015) (citing United

Steelworkers of Am. v. N.J. Zinc Co., Inc., 828 F.2d 1001, 1005 (3d Cir.

1987)).

Lastly, since Judge Carlson states the appropriate standards for

summary judgment motions and for Plaintiff’s constitutional and state law

claims, the court will not repeat them herein. (See Doc. 51).

II. DISCUSSION2

Plaintiff objected to Judge Carlson’s recommendations that the court

grant summary judgment for the Borough of Shenandoah (the “Borough”) as

to Plaintiff’s Monell and §1983 conspiracy claims. (Doc. 53). Those

objections are addressed below in turn. Plaintiff and Defendants also

objected to Judge Carlson’s report based on the fact that it appears he did

not address the Defendants’ summary judgment motion with respect to the

claims against the Municipal Authority. (Docs. 53 & 54). Rather than address

2 Since the full factual background and undisputed material facts of this

case are stated in Judge Carlson’s report, the briefs of the parties, and the

parties’ statements of facts, they will not be fully repeated herein. (See Docs.

37, 38, 39, 40, 46, 47, 50, 51).

the parties’ arguments for and against judgment in favor of the Municipal

Authority on Plaintiff’s claims in this procedural posture, the court will refer

this matter back to Judge Carlson with instructions to file another report

addressing the claims against the Municipal Authority.

A. Monell claim against the Borough

Plaintiff first objects to Judge Carlson’s recommendation that the court

grant Defendants summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s Monell claim against

the Borough. Plaintiff contends Judge Carlson erred by applying the wrong

legal standard and by misapplying the law to the facts. However, a review of

the report reveals no such errors.

First, Judge Carlson applied the appropriate summary judgment

standard to Plaintiff’s Monell claim. Judge Carlson spends just short of four

pages of his report carefully and exhaustively delineating the correct

summary judgment standard under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, along with the controlling Supreme Court and Third Circuit

precedent explicating the standard. (Doc. 51 at 9–12). Judge Carlson then

spends more than two pages explaining, with citation to controlling authority,

how the summary judgment standard is applied in the context of a Monell

claim. (Doc. 51 at 13–15). After providing several quotes from controlling

authority that shed light on the requirements placed on a plaintiff to bring a

Monell claim, Judge Carlson describes the standard as “exacting.” (Doc. 5

at 13). Plaintiff, in his objections, seizes on the descriptor chosen by Judge

Carlson and cries error based on the Judge’s purported adoption of an

“exacting standard.” (Doc. 53-1). But Judge Carlson’s description of the

standard did not change the standard, and a fair reading of the Monell

standard, including the Third Circuit’s description of the same, suggests the

descriptor “exacting” is apt.

In any event, the court has reviewed Judge Carlson’s Monell analysis

and sees no error. That Judge Carlson applied the correct summary

judgment standard can be seen in his conclusion regarding the Monell claim:

“[W]e conclude that [Plaintiff] has not set forth evidence to create a genuine

dispute of fact as to his Monell claim.” (Doc. 51 at 15). This is a near verbatim

recitation of the summary judgment standard, which a review of the report

reveals Judge Carlson faithfully applied.

Second, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate error in Judge Carlson’s

application of the legal standard to the facts of record. In objecting to the

report on this issue, Plaintiff effectively rehashes his arguments that a

genuine dispute of material fact exists as to the municipality’s liability based

predominately on Defendant Moyer Sr.’s 2011 federal conviction for making

false statements to the FBI during an investigation into the murder of a

Hispanic man while he was a police officer. However, Judge Carlson did not

err when he concluded that no reasonable juror could infer that the Borough

had a policy or practice of discriminating against Hispanic individuals, and

that Plaintiff did not demonstrate the absence of a policy or practice was

constitutionally infirm.

Therefore, the court will adopt Judge Carlson’s recommendation with

respect to Plaintiff’s Monell claim against the Borough.

B. §1983 conspiracy claim against the Borough

Plaintiff next objects to Judge Carlson’s recommendation that the court

dismiss the §1983 conspiracy claim against the Borough. Judge Carlson

found “there are no facts from which we can infer that the Borough as an

entity conspired with the individual defendants.” (Doc. 51 at 37). The court

has reviewed the record and finds Judge Carlson did not err in reaching this

conclusion. Plaintiff tries to demonstrate error by arguing in his objections

that since Judge Carlson “agreed that the record established a conspiracy

between [Defendants] Moyer Sr. and Officer Moyer Jr.,” “[t]hat finding . . . is

conclusive on the Borough as well, because Officer Moyer[] Jr. was in

uniform, on duty, and acted in his official capacity in arresting [Plaintiff].”

(Doc. 53-1 at 14). However, to find that the Borough agreed to deprive

Plaintiff of his constitutional rights based on Officer Moyer Jr.’s alleged

agreement with Moyer Sr. would flout Monell’s long-established holding that

a municipality cannot be held liable under §1983 on a theory of respondeat

superior. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658,

691 (1978). Thus, the court will adopt Judge Carlson’s recommendation with

respect to this claim.

III. CONCLUSION

The court has reviewed the report of Judge Carlson recommending the

court grant in part and deny in part the defendant’s motion for summary

judgment, (Doc. 37). Because the court agrees with the sound reasoning that

led Judge Carlson to the conclusions in his report and finds no clear error in

the record, the court will ADOPT the report in its entirety. The court will

GRANT the defendant’s motion with respect to the Monell claim and as to

the Borough on the conspiracy claim. The court will DENY the motion with

respect to Plaintiff’s remaining claims. An appropriate order will issue.

S/ Malachy E. Mannion

MALACHY E. MANNION

United States District Judge

DATE: June 26, 2023

21-601-02