Estrada v. Litz

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ANTONIO ESTRADA, #QN7083, : Civil No. 3:21-cv-1955

:

Plaintiff, :

:

v. :

:

TINA LITZ, Warden, et al., :

:

Defendants. : Judge Sylvia H. Rambo

M E M O R A N D U M

Before the court is a report and recommendation of Magistrate Judge Saporito

(Doc. 11) in which he recommends that the court dismiss this action for failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1). In

response, Petitioner Antonio Estrada filed a Notice of Appeal (Doc. 12), which the

court will construe as objections to the report and recommendation. For the reasons

set forth below, the objections will be overruled, and the report and recommendation

will be adopted.

I. Legal Standard

When objections are timely filed to a magistrate judge’s report and

recommendation, the district court must conduct a de novo review of those portions

of the report to which objections are made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Brown v. Astrue,

649 F.3d 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2011). Although the standard is de novo, the extent of

review is committed to the sound discretion of the district judge, and the court may

rely on the recommendations of the magistrate judge to the extent it deems proper.

Rieder v. Apfel, 115 F. Supp. 2d 496, 499 (M.D. Pa. 2000) (citing United States v.

Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980)).

For those sections of the report and recommendation to which no objection is

made, the court should, as a matter of good practice, “satisfy itself that there is no

clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 72(b), advisory committee notes; see also Univac Dental Co. v. Dentsply

Intern., Inc., 702 F. Supp. 2d 465, 469 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (citation omitted).

Nonetheless, whether timely objections are made or not, the district court may

accept, not accept, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations

made by the magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Local Rule 72.31.

II. Discussion

In his pro se complaint, Estrada alleges that on September 27, 2021, he and

Defendant James McIntyre, a correctional officer at Lebanon County Correctional

Facility, got into a verbal altercation concerning a request by Estrada for access to a

can of disinfectant spray so he could use a set of electric beard trimmers for personal

hygiene. During the altercation, McIntyre allegedly spit in Estrada’s face, and

thereafter, Estrada was charged with a disciplinary infraction for disobeying a direct

order. He was transferred to the prison’s special housing unit (“SHU”) for a

disciplinary lockup, pleaded guilty, and was sanctioned with fifteen days of

confinement in the SHU. Estrada claims that he was infected with COVID-19 as a

result of being spit on by Defendant McIntyre, and that these events exacerbated his

pre-existing mental health conditions. As a result of these events, Estrada filed a

federal civil rights action against Defendant McIntyre, Warden Tina Litz, Deputy

Warden Michael Ott, and Deputy Warden A. Rebecca Davis.

The court has reviewed the report and recommendation and is satisfied that it

contains no clear error. Magistrate Judge Saporito aptly summarized cases to support

his findings that a single instance of a correctional officer spitting in an inmate’s

face does not constitute excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and

further, that mere placement in the SHU for a disciplinary infraction does not

constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment. (See Doc. 11, pp. 3-4.)

In addition, Estrada has not presented any allegations of personal involvement

against the warden or deputy wardens in their individual or official capacities, nor

has he identified an official policy or custom that allegedly supported McIntyre’s

actions. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) (“[I]t is when

execution of a government’s policy or custom . . . inflicts the injury that the

government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.”).

Finally, to the extent Estrada asserts that he did not receive proper medical

treatment for his suspected COVID-19 infection or for the deterioration in his mental

health, these claims also fail. In order to establish an inadequate medical treatment

claim under the Eighth Amendment, "a plaintiff must make (1) a subjective showing

that 'the defendants were deliberately indifferent to [his or her] medical needs' and

(2) an objective showing that 'those needs were serious.'" Pearson v. Prison Health

Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 534 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192,

197 (3d Cir. 1999)). As explained by the Third Circuit, "claims of negligence or

medical malpractice, without some more culpable state of mind, do not constitute

'deliberate indifference.'" Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197. Rather, for "[t]o act with deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs is to recklessly disregard a substantial risk of

serious harm." Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 330 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-105 (1976); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836

(1970)). "Under [this] recklessness standard, ‘prison officials who actually knew of

a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they

responded reasonably to the risk.’” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844).

The Third Circuit has found deliberate indifference to exist in various

scenarios including where a prison official: “(1) knows of a prisoner's need for

medical treatment but intentionally refuses to provide it; (2) delays necessary

medical treatment based on a non-medical reason; (3) prevents a prisoner from

receiving needed or recommended medical treatment. . . . [or (4)] persists in a

particular course of treatment in the face of resultant pain and risk of permanent

injury.” Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197 (citations and quotations marks omitted).

In sum, if alleged inadequate care "was a result of an error in medical

judgment," then Estrada’s claims fail. Durmer v. O'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69 (3d Cir.

1993). If, however, the failure to provide adequate care was deliberate, and

motivated by non-medical factors, then his claims are actionable.

A review of the allegations both within Estrada’s complaint and in his

subsequent objections reflect his dissatisfaction with the medical care provided by

the prison. The allegations, however, do not support an inference that the prison

officials were in any way indifferent to his medical needs. On the contrary, Estrada

acknowledges that he received Ibuprofen to treat his flu-like symptoms, and that he

is being treated with psychiatric medication. Estrada’s mere disagreement with these

courses of treatment is insufficient to plausibly allege a constitutional violation.

Accordingly, for all these reasons, the court agrees with Magistrate Judge

Saporito’s recommendation that the court dismiss this action for failure to state a

claim. The court also agrees that it is clear from the facts alleged in the pro se

complaint and the exhibits attached thereto, as well as from the objections, that any

amendment would be futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114

(3d Cir. 2002). "Under Rule 15(a), futility of amendment is a sufficient basis to deny

leave to amend." Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d

159, 175 (3d Cir. 2010). "Futility 'means that the complaint, as amended, would fail

to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.'" Id. (quoting In re Merck & Co.

Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 493 F.3d 393, 400 (3d Cir. 2007)). Thus, in

determining whether an amendment would be futile, the court applies the same

standard as it applies in determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted under Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(6). Id. "In other

words, '[t]he District Court determines futility by taking all pleaded allegations as

true and viewing them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.'" Id. (quoting Winer

Family Trust v. Queen, 503 F.3d 319, 330-31 (3d Cir. 2007)). Here, Estrada’s

complaint entirely fails to state a claim and any amendment would be futile.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the court will deny Petitioner’s objections and

adopt the report and recommendation. An appropriate order will issue.

s/Sylvia H. Rambo

United States District Judge

Dated: May 30, 2023