Lee v. Golf Transportation, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MICHAEL LEE, et al.,

Plaintiffs, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:21-CV-01948

v.

(MEHALCHICK, M.J.)

GOLF TRANSPORTATION, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

Before the Court is a motion to quash the subpoena duces tecum of Defendant Coyote

Logistics, LLC, filed by Plaintiffs Michael Lee and Anderson Bastone (collectively,

“Plaintiffs”). (Doc. 106). This is a wrongful death, survival action initiated by Plaintiff Lee,

as the Administrator of the Estate of Raven E. Lee (the “decedent”), with the filing of a

complaint on November 16, 2021, as a result of a fatal motor vehicle accident that occurred

on October 7, 2021. (Doc. 1). In the complaint, Lee names as Defendants Golf

Transportation, Inc., O’Connor Trucking, Inc., JP Logistics, Inc., United Natural Foods, Inc.

and UNFI Transport, LLC. (collectively, “Defendants”). (Doc. 1). On April 28, 2022, Lee

filed an amended complaint, adding Defendant Coyote Logistics, LLC.1 (Doc. 29). On June

3, 2022, Anderson Bastone also filed a complaint as a result of the fatal motor vehicle accident

1 On November 29, 2022, Plaintiffs filed a motion to compel the depositions of Coyote

Logistics’ representatives and employees. (Doc. 74). Plaintiffs assert that Coyote Logistics

have refused to produce its representatives and employees for depositions, effectively

thwarting Plaintiffs’ attempts to engage in meaningful discovery. (Doc. 74, at 3-4). There has

been no further briefing on this issue or discussion with the Court as to the status of the

depositions of Coyote Logistics’ representatives and employees. Therefore, Plaintiffs are

directed to notify the Court on or before Friday, May 12, 2023, as to whether this issue has

been resolved or the Court’s intervention is still requested.

that occurred on October 7, 2021, which was consolidated into the instant case on October 4,

2022. (Doc. 42; Doc. 55).2

For the following reasons, the motion to quash shall be DENIED.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rulings regarding the proper scope of discovery are matters consigned to the court's

discretion and judgment. A court's decisions regarding the conduct of discovery will be

disturbed only upon a showing of abuse of that discretion. Marroquin-Manriquez v. I.N.S., 699

F.2d 129, 134 (3d Cir. 1983). This far-reaching discretion also extends to rulings by United

States Magistrate Judges on discovery matters. In this regard:

District courts provide magistrate judges with particularly broad discretion in

resolving discovery disputes. See Farmers & Merchs. Nat'l Bank v. San Clemente

Fin. Group Sec., Inc., 174 F.R.D. 572, 585 (D.N.J. 1997). When a magistrate

judge's decision involves a discretionary [discovery] matter . . . , “courts in this

district have determined that the clearly erroneous standard implicitly becomes

an abuse of discretion standard.” Saldi v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 224 F.R.D.

169, 174 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (citing Scott Paper Co. v. United States, 943 F. Supp.

501, 502 (E.D. Pa. 1996)). Under the standard, a magistrate judge's discovery

ruling “is entitled to great deference and is reversible only for abuse of

discretion.” Kresefky v. Panasonic Commc'ns and Sys. Co., 169 F.R.D. 54, 64

(D.N.J. 1996); see also Hasbrouck v. BankAmerica Hous. Servs., 190 F.R.D. 42, 44-

45 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that discovery rulings are reviewed under abuse

of discretion standard rather than de novo standard); EEOC v. Mr. Gold, Inc.,

223 F.R.D. 100, 102 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that a magistrate judge's

resolution of discovery disputes deserves substantial deference and should be

reversed only if there is an abuse of discretion).

2 On May 8, 2023, counsel for Plaintiffs filed a letter (Doc. 111) requesting a

teleconference regarding what he believed to the production of documents in response to the

subpoena at issue in this matter. On that same day, counsel for Defendant Coyote Logistics

responded to the letter (Doc. 112), clarifying that the documents referenced by Plaintiff were

part of the autopsy report previously produced during discovery. A review of these documents

confirms the same. As such, there is no need for a teleconference on this matter.

Halsey v. Pfeiffer, No. 09-CV-1138, 2010 WL 3735702, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 27,

2010).

The exercise of this discretion is guided, however, by certain basic principles. At the

outset, Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally defines the scope of

discovery permitted in a civil action, prescribes certain limits to that discovery, and provides

as follows:

Scope in General. Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of

discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any

nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and

proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues

at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to

relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in

resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed

discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of

discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

II. DISCUSSION

On April 4, 2023, Plaintiffs were served with a subpoena duces tecum directed to

Northern Tier Research of Dunmore, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 106-1, at 2-3). The subpoena seeks

information from Northern Tier regarding its testing of the decedent, Raven Lee’s, blood post-

crash. (Doc. 106-1, at 1). Specifically, the addendum to the subpoena commands Northern

Tier to produce the following document on or before April 20, 2023:

1. Any and all relevant state and federal laboratory accreditations and

certifications, including but not limited to Accreditation

Certification/Compliance/Proficiency by the College of American

Pathologists and/or Toxicologists – ISO 15189; American National

Accreditation Board, ANSI Standard ISO/IEC 17025; and Proficiency

Testing documentation.

2. Any and all chain-of-custody documentation complete with date and time,

storage and handling of Raven Lee’s actual blood specimen that was tested

at Northern Tier.

Any and all step-by-step protocols, assay conditions, standard curve

calibration data and/or analyte target range calibration; calibration

verification of assay linearity, calibration curves for standard reagents

and internal standard including blanks, internal control(s), percent

variance, and percent confidence intervals; Limit of Detection (LOD)

and Limit of Quantitation (LOQ) values for drugs and analytes

detected; all reagents and standards used with lot number, purchase and

expiration dates, concentrations, and source of purchase; make, model,

serial number, purchase date, service and calibration dates of the

instrumentation used, and all instrumentation validation

documentation.

3. Any and all signed and dated laboratory reports or worksheets, if they exist,

with printed names, signatures and degrees/certifications of the

technician(s) who performed the above analysis and of the supervisor(s)

who reviewed the results of the above analysis.

(Doc. 106-1, at 2).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 “establishes the rules for discovery directed to

individuals and entities that are not parties to the underlying lawsuit.” First Sealord Sur. v.

Durkin & Devries Ins. Agency, 918 F. Supp. 2d 362, 382 (E.D. Pa. 2013). “A subpoena under

Rule 45 ‘must fall within the scope of proper discovery under [Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure] 26(b)(1).’ ” First Sealord Sur., 918 F. Supp. 2d at 382 (quoting OMS Invs., Inc. v.

Lebanon Seaboard Corp., No. 08–2681, 2008 WL 4952445, at *2 (D.N.J. Nov. 18, 2008)).

Under Rule 45, it is within the sound discretion of district courts to “ensure compliance with

subpoenas, while avoiding unfair prejudice to persons who are the subject of a subpoena's

commands.” Audi of Am., Inc. v. Bronsberg & Hughes Pontiac, Inc., No. 3:16-CV-2470, 2017 WL

2212505, at *1 (M.D. Pa. May 17, 2017).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(d)(3)(A) requires a court, upon motion, to quash

or modify a subpoena that, among other things, “requires disclosure of privileged or other

protected matter, if no exception or waiver applies.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3)(A). The party

moving to quash such a subpoena “bears a ‘heavy burden’ of demonstrating that an

enumerated basis for quashing the subpoena exists.” Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, No. 4:15-CV-

2281, 2016 WL 524248, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 10, 2016).

“‘Generally speaking, a party does not have standing to quash a subpoena served on

a third party.’” Thomas v. Marina Assocs., 202 F.R.D. 433, 434 (E.D. Pa. 2001); see also Davis

v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am., No. 98–4736, 1999 WL 228944, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 15, 1999)

(“Ordinarily, only the non-parties whom were served with the subpoenas may move to have

them quashed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45([d])(3)(A).”). An exception to this

rule exists, however, where “the party seeks to quash based on claims of privilege relating to

the documents being sought.” Thomas, 202 F.R.D. at 434; First Sealord, 918 F. Supp. 2d at

382 (“An exception to this rule permits a party to move to quash when it ‘claims some

personal right or privilege in respect to the subject matter of a subpoena . . . directed to a

nonparty.’” (quoting Davis, 1999 WL 228944, at *2)).

A Rule 45 subpoena served in conjunction with discovery must fall within the scope

of proper discovery under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). See, e.g., Roesburg v. Johns-Manville Corp.,

85 F.R.D. 292, 296 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (“[t]o voice a successful objection to an interrogatory, [a

party] cannot simply intone this familiar litany. Rather, [a party] must show specifically

how . . . each interrogatory is not relevant or how each question is overly broad, burdensome

or oppressive”); see also Rivera v. DHL Global Forwarding, 272 F.R.D. 50, 55 (D.P.R. 2011)

(noting that a party must “specifically detail the reasons why” a request is irrelevant). Parties

may obtain discovery regarding “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim

or defense—including . . . the identity and location of persons who know of any discoverable

matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Information sought by the parties need not be admissible at

trial if it is “reasonably calculated” to lead to discoverable information. Fed. R. Civ. P.

26(b)(1). The precise boundaries of the Rule 26 relevance standard depend upon the context

of each particular action, and the determination of relevance is within the discretion of the

District Court. See Barnes Found. v. Twp. of Lower Merion, No. 96-CV-372, 1996 WL 653114,

at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 1, 1996).

Here, as a party to this action, Plaintiffs ordinarily do not have standing to quash the

third-party subpoena directed to Northern Tier, unless they are able to demonstrate some

personal interest in, or privilege with respect to, the subpoena’s subject matter – information

regarding Northern Tier’s testing of Raven Lee’s blood after the October 7, 2021, motor

vehicle crash. (Doc. 106, at 1-2). The Court finds Plaintiffs have personal interest in the

subpoena’s subject matter as it relates to the bloodwork of Raven Lee, the decedent in the

underlying motor vehicle accident.

Plaintiffs assert that the subpoena duces tecum must be quashed as: (1) defective on its

face for failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(a)(1)(A)(iii); (2) unduly

prejudicial; and (3) irrelevant. (Doc. 106). The Court will address each argument in turn.

First, Plaintiffs maintain that the subject subpoena is inconsistent with the addendum

to the subpoena regarding the time specified for production. (Doc. 106, ¶ 16). In relevant part,

the subject subpoena states that the requested information is to be produced by April 20, 2023,

while the addendum to the subpoena states the information is to be produced “within 30

days,” which would make the document production due on or before May 6, 2023. (Doc.

106-1, at 1-2). In opposition, Coyote Logistics assert that the inconsistencies do not invalidate

the subpoena or otherwise prevent the deponent, Northern Tier, from seeking clarification on

the issue. (Doc. 110, ¶ 16). The Court finds that the inconsistencies described above do not

render the subpoena defective on its face. However, Coyote Logistics are directed to serve a

revised subpoena duces tecum clarifying the issue of when the requested information shall be

produced.

Second, Plaintiffs contend “the timing of the subpoena, which seeks the production of

discovery by a non-party on either April 20, 2023 or May 5, 2023, AFTER the discovery

deadline of April 6, 2023, is violative of this Court’s March 9, 2023 Order and unduly

prejudicial on Plaintiffs.” (Doc. 106, ¶ 19). Plaintiffs suggest that service of the subpoena is

contrary to Coyote Logistics’ statements to the Court regarding the need for additional time

for discovery and violates “the spirit of the Court’s fourth discovery end date.” (Doc. 106, ¶¶

20-21). In opposition, Coyote Logistics assert that the subpoena is not untimely because it

was issued before the discovery deadline. (Doc. 110, ¶ 19). Noting that subpoenas to third

parties are not automatically subject to discovery deadlines established by the court for the

conduct of discovery between parties to a case, the Court finds that the subpoena is not

defective on its face as untimely. See City of St. Petersburg v. Total Containment, Inc., No. 06-

20953CIV, 2008 WL 1995298, at *4 n.7 (E.D. Pa. May 5, 2008) (citing O'Boyle v. Jensen, 150

F.R.D. 519, 520 (M.D.Pa.1993) (“The subpoenas at issue are addressed to third parties, not

to the plaintiff. The discovery deadline established by the court precludes parties from

conducting any further discovery addressed to each other or requiring one another's presence

or participation, e.g. discovery in the form of interrogatories or depositions. It was not

intended to preclude, and does not preclude, parties from gathering additional information

on their own case or that of their opponent through independent lines of inquiry not directed

to, or requiring the participation of, the other side.”)).

Third, Plaintiffs argue that the subpoena is unduly prejudicial. (Doc. 106, ¶¶ 19-21).

Plaintiffs maintain that Coyote Logistics has had ample opportunity to obtain the information

by discovery in the action and that the proposed subpoena will lead to further discovery after

the prior deadline of April 6, 2023. (Doc. 106, ¶¶ 20, 22). In response, Coyote Logistics argue

that the subpoena is not unduly prejudicial to Plaintiffs because “additional information came

to light” during witness depositions that took place after the March 9, 2023, which prompted

the subpoena, and “[t]he subpoena was issued in good faith before the discovery deadline and

any documents received will be promptly produced to plaintiffs’ counsel upon receipt.” (Doc.

110, ¶¶ 20-21). Coyote Logistics also maintain that “[w]hile it is admitted that a timely

response to the subpoena will yield documents after the discovery deadline, it will be more

than 90 days before the August 28, 2023 trial date.” (Doc. 110, ¶ 22). Coyote Logistics assert

that Plaintiffs are not prejudiced because they were never precluded from requesting

additional time to produce supplemental expert reports or rebuttal expert reports pursuant to

Rule 26(a)(3)(D)(ii). (Doc. 110, ¶ 23).

The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ arguments are unpersuasive. Plaintiffs’ argument that

the subpoena will only lead to additional discovery is merely speculative at this time. Further,

the Court is persuaded by Coyote Logistics’ argument that the subpoena is not facially

prejudicial to Plaintiffs so long as copies of all responsive documents are promptly provided

to Plaintiffs, and because Plaintiffs’ experts will have the opportunity to consider any

subsequently produced documents received from the subpoena and provide a supplemental

expert report pursuant to Rule 26(a)(3)(D)(ii). Thus, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ are not unduly

prejudiced by the subpoena duces tecum.

Fourth, Plaintiffs argue that “[t]he clear and obvious purpose of this subpoena is to

attempt to inappropriately introduce the highly prejudicial, but irrelevant, issue of marijuana

use by Ms. Lee into this wrongful death action in a desperate attempt to denigrate her

character and to insinuate comparative fault. . . .” (Doc. 106, ¶ 27). In opposition, Coyote

Logistics argues that the discovery is relevant because Plaintiffs’ expert “opened the door on

whether Raven Lee was under the influence” of marijuana. (Doc. 110, ¶ 24). Coyote Logistics

explain that “recent testimony, combined with the autopsy report and plaintiffs’ expert’s claim

that the toxicology was negative, prompted the inquiry to Northern Tier Research for

additional information.” (Doc. 110, ¶ 26). The Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to

establish that the requested information is not relevant to Coyote Logistics’ defense in this

action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). As explained above, information sought by the parties

need not be admissible at trial if it is “reasonably calculated” to lead to discoverable

information. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

Accordingly, the Court will deny Plaintiffs’ motion to quash.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion to quash the subpoena duces tecum is

DENIED. (Doc. 106). An appropriate Order follows.

Date: May 9, 2023 s/ Karoline Mehalchick

KAROLINE MEHALCHICK

Chief United States Magistrate Judge