Molina v. Kauffman

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIGUEL MOLINA, et al.,

Plaintiffs, CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:21-CV-00038

v. (BRANN, J.)

(MEHALCHICK, M.J.)

K. KAUFFMAN, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

Before the Court is a motion to compel discovery, an objection to and request for

reconsideration of the Court’s case management Order dated January 25, 2023, and a motion

for an evidentiary hearing filed by pro se Plaintiff Miguel Molina (“Molina”), an inmate

currently incarcerated at the State Correction Institution – Forest (“SCI-Forest”). (Doc. 224;

Doc. 234; Doc. 238). On January 8, 2021, pro se-prisoner Plaintiffs Vann L. Bailey, Jason

Cisne,1 Angel Irizarry, Alexis Maldanado, and Molina initiated this civil rights action by

filing a complaint against Defendants Kevin Kauffman, Superintendent of SCI-Huntingdon;

Jill Spyker, Deputy Superintendent for Decentralized Services at SCI-Huntingdon; Scott

Walters, former Deputy Superintendent for Centralized Services at SCI-Huntingdon; G.

Ralston, Unit Manager of certain housing units (B and C Blocks) at SCI-Huntingdon; John

E. Wetzel, Secretary of Corrections of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; Tabb Bickell,

Executive Deputy Secretary for Institutional Operations for the Department of Corrections

(“DOC”); and Erin Brown, Director of the Office of Population Management (“OPM”) of

1 On February 16, 2022, Plaintiff Cisne filed a stipulation of voluntary dismissal with

prejudice, informing the Court that matters between Defendants and Cisne have been

adjusted, compromised, and settled. (Doc. 169). On February 24, 2022, the Court dismissed

Cisne’s action with prejudice as to Defendants. (Doc. 177).

the DOC (collectively, the “Defendants”). (Doc. 1). On December 1, 2022, the Court ordered

Molina’s case to proceed in this action and directed the Clerk of Court to open new civil

actions for each of the remaining Plaintiffs. (Doc. 223).

Molina filed the motion to compel discovery on January 9, 2023 (Doc. 224), the

motion for reconsideration on February 6, 2023 (Doc. 234), and the motion for an evidentiary

hearing on February 28, 2023 (Doc. 238).2 For the reasons stated herein, Molina’s motions

will be DENIED. (Doc. 224; Doc. 234; Doc. 238).

I. DISCUSSION

A. MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY

Molina seeks the production of requested discovery documents, asserting that

Defendants have failed to properly respond to his Request for Production of Documents

submitted on November 8, 2022. (Doc. 224, at 1; Doc. 224-1, at 1-5). Molina claims

Defendants’ response to his Request for Production of Documents, dated December 12, 2022,

contained “legally frivolous” boilerplate objections. (Doc. 224, at 1; Doc. 237, at 1). In

opposition, Defendants argue that their responses and objections to Molina’s discovery

requests were proper and that the responsive documents have been made available for

inspection and copying by Molina at SCI-Forest. (Doc. 226, at 1-3; Doc. 224-2). Notably, in

Molina’s motion for an evidentiary hearing, he admits that Defendants provided 527 pages

2 In the motion for an evidentiary hearing, Molina asks that an evidentiary hearing or

an in-camera review be scheduled, claiming that Defendants are allegedly refusing to produce

discovery. (Doc. 238, at 1). The decision of whether to conduct an in-camera review of

documents is generally left to the sound discretion of the district court. See, e.g., ACLU of N.J.

v. FBI, 733 F.3d 526, 534 (3d Cir. 2013); Haines v. Liggett Grp. Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 96 (3d Cir.

1992). Based on the Court’s review of the record, an evidentiary hearing is not required for

the disposition of the pending motion to compel discovery. Accordingly, Molina’s motion for

an evidentiary hearing is DENIED. (Doc. 238).

of discovery documents for review and copying at Molina’s expense. (Doc. 238, at 1).

However, Molina contends the majority of these pages are either blank or completely

irrelevant to his claims set forth in the fourth amended complaint. (Doc. 238, at 1). Molina

asserts that 22 of the 527 are relevant to his claims before the Court. (Doc. 238, at 1).

Rulings regarding the proper scope of discovery are matters consigned to the Court’s

discretion and judgment. A court's decisions regarding the conduct of discovery will be

disturbed only upon a showing of abuse of that discretion. Marroquin-Manriquez v. I.N.S., 699

F.2d 129, 134 (3d Cir. 1983). This far-reaching discretion also extends to rulings by United

States Magistrate Judges on discovery matters. In this regard:

District courts provide magistrate judges with particularly broad discretion in

resolving discovery disputes. See Farmers & Merchs. Nat'l Bank v. San Clemente

Fin. Group Sec., Inc., 174 F.R.D. 572, 585 (D.N.J. 1997). When a magistrate

judge's decision involves a discretionary [discovery] matter . . . , “courts in this

district have determined that the clearly erroneous standard implicitly becomes

an abuse of discretion standard.” Saldi v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 224 F.R.D.

169, 174 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (citing Scott Paper Co. v. United States, 943 F. Supp.

501, 502 (E.D. Pa. 1996)). Under the standard, a magistrate judge's discovery

ruling “is entitled to great deference and is reversible only for abuse of

discretion.” Kresefky v. Panasonic Commc'ns and Sys. Co., 169 F.R.D. 54, 64

(D.N.J. 1996); see also Hasbrouck v. BankAmerica Hous. Servs., 190 F.R.D. 42,

44- 45 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that discovery rulings are reviewed under

abuse of discretion standard rather than de novo standard); EEOC v. Mr. Gold,

Inc., 223 F.R.D. 100, 102 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that a magistrate judge's

resolution of discovery disputes deserves substantial deference and should be

reversed only if there is an abuse of discretion).

Halsey v. Pfeiffer, No. 09-1138, 2010 WL 3735702, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 2010).

The exercise of this discretion is guided, however, by certain basic principles. At the

outset, Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally defines the scope of

discovery permitted in a civil action, prescribes certain limits to that discovery, and provides

as follows:

Scope in General. Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of

discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any

nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and

proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues

at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to

relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in

resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed

discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of

discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)

Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a party to move to compel

a party to comply with discovery obligations and specifically provides that:

On notice to other parties and all affected persons, a party may move for an

order compelling disclosure or discovery. The motion must include a

certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer

with the person or party failing to make disclosure or discovery in an effort to

obtain it without court action.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1).

Under Rule 37, a court may issue an order compelling discovery where “a deponent

fails to answer a question asked under Rule 30 or 31 [governing depositions on oral

examination or written questions].” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B)(i). A party moving to compel

discovery bears the initial burden of proving the relevance of the requested information.

Morrison v. Phila. Housing Auth., 203 F.R.D. 195, 196 (E.D. Pa. 2001). “Once that initial

burden is met, ‘the party resisting the discovery has the burden to establish the lack of

relevance by demonstrating that the requested discovery (1) does not come within the broad

scope of relevance as defined under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), or (2) is of such marginal

relevance that the potential harm occasioned by discovery would outweigh the ordinary

presumption in favor of broad disclosure.’” Prime Energy & Chem., LLC v. Tucker Arensber P.C.,

No. 2:18-CV-0345, 2022 WL 1642394, at *4 (W.D. Pa. May 24, 2022) (quoting In re Urethane

Antitrust Litig., 261 F.R.D. 570, 573 (D. Kan. 2009)). The Court will address each of Molina’s

Requests for Production of Documents in turn.

1. Numbers 1-3

In discovery request numbers 1, 2, and 3, Molina requests “[t]he full name(s),

employment position(s), and business address and phone number(s) of each witness, if

any . . . ;” “[t]he identity of each document, item, or other tangible things, including, a

summary scope of the evidence the Defendants expects to offer . . . ;” and “[a]ny and all

information relevant to the Defendants defense(s), if any, including, the existence description,

nature, custody, condition and location of any documents or items and other tangible things,

and the identity and location of person(s) who know of any discoverable matter whether

exculpatory and/or inculpatory . . . .” (Doc. 224-2, at 4-5). In response, Defendants state that

their “preparations in this matter are ongoing,” and that any supplemental information or

responsive documents will be provided to Molina in accordance with the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. (Doc. 224-2, at 5).

Molina argues the requested information is “relevant to this case and needed for

interrogatories purpose;” “needed to contest the Defendants or witnesses testimony at trial;”

and “needed to prepare Plaintiff’s defense during or before trial.” (Doc. 224, at 2-3). In

opposition, Defendants maintain that their response was proper and emphasize that their

response will be supplemented if the matter proceeds to trial. (Doc. 226, at 3). In response,

Molina maintains that Defendants’ position is “clearly erroneous and simpl[y] untenable,”

asserting that “[n]o explanation is provided as to why such preparations are even necessary

at this point in the litigation.” (Doc. 237, at 6).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 requires parties to make certain disclosures without

a discovery request. The purpose of the rule is to provide information at the start of litigation

that parties can use to prepare for trial or to make informed decisions about settlement. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 26 Advisory Committee Notes (1993). Specifically, a party’s initial disclosures

“must” include:

(i) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each

individual likely to have discoverable information—along with the

subjects of that information—that the disclosing party may use to

support its claims or defenses;

(ii) a copy—or a description by category and location—of all documents,

electronically stored information, and tangible things that the disclosing

party has in its possession, custody, or control and may use to support

its claims or defenses, unless the use would be solely for impeachment;

(iii) a computation of each category of damages claimed by the disclosing

party--who must also make available for inspection and copying as

under Rule 34 the documents or other evidentiary material, unless

privileged or protected from disclosure, on which each computation is

based, including materials bearing on the nature and extent of injuries

suffered; and

(iv) for inspection and copying as under Rule 34, any insurance agreement

under which an insurance business may be liable to satisfy all or part of

a possible judgment in the action or to indemnify or reimburse for

payments made to satisfy the judgment.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A).

A party must make these disclosures based on information reasonably available to it when

the disclosures are made and the party is not excused from making its Rule 26(a)(1)

disclosures simple because it has not fully investigated the case yet, it believes another party’s

disclosures are insufficient, or another party has not made its disclosures yet. Fed. R. Civ. P.

26(a)(1)(E).

In addition, when a party “learns that in some material respect the disclosure or

response is incomplete or incorrect,” and “the additional or corrective information has not

otherwise been made known to the other parties during the discovery process or in writing,”

that party has a continuing obligation to “supplement or correct its disclosures.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 26(e)(1)(A); see Holley v. Port Auth. of N.Y., Civil No. 14-7534 (BRM)(DEA), 2018 WL

11413338, at *2 (D.N.J. May 3, 2018) (“[T]he parties are required to supplement or correct

their initial disclosures, as well as any discovery responses, in accordance with Fed. R. Civ.

P. 26(e)(1)(A).”). “A majority of courts, the leading treatises, and the Advisory Committee

Note to Rule 26 agree that an individual’s existence or knowledge can ‘otherwise be made

known,’ and thus be sufficiently disclosed for Rule 26 purposes, through deposition

testimony.” Eli Lilly & Co. v. Actavis Elizabeth LLC, No. 07-3770, 2010 WL 1849913, at *3

(D.N.J. May 7, 2010) (collecting references). Nevertheless, the disclosure must be “clear and

unambiguous,” i.e., more than “the mere mention of an individual's identity.” Eli Lilly & Co.,

2010 WL 1849913, at *4 (quotation marks omitted).

Here, the Court is satisfied with Defendants’ statement that the necessary disclosures

will be provided to Molina in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure through

supplemental disclosures. However, Defendants are reminded of their ongoing duty to

supplement or correct its discovery responses if it “learns that in some material respect the

disclosure or response is incomplete or incorrect.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1)(A). If

Defendants fail to do so, then Molina may seek to impose sanctions pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.

P. 37. Accordingly, at this time, Defendants’ objections are sustained and Molina’s motion

to compel discovery is denied.

2. Number 4

In discovery request number 4, Molina seeks “[a]ny and all originals or copies of

reports pertaining to the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry inspection

performed at SCI-Huntingdon in 1992 citing 291 violations of the fire and Panic Act, 25 Pa.

Cons. Stat. §§ 1221-1235.1, including but not limited to, the Inspector’s factual findings,

conclusions, and recommendations.” (Doc. 224-2, at 5). In response, Defendants state, “[t]his

request is not reasonably related to the claims presented in the fourth amended complaint,

and as such, is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”

(Doc. 224-2, at 5).

Molina argues that this information is relevant to his claims and “needed to establish

Defendants pattern and practice of deliberate indifference to an inmate’s health or safety

associated with the risk of the conditions of confinement at SCI Huntingdon.” (Doc. 224, at

3). In opposition, Defendants argue that the request is not reasonably related to the claims

presented or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. (Doc. 226,

at 3). In response, Molina asserts that Defendants’ objection is “text-book boilerplated,” and

lacks specificity. (Doc. 237, at 6-7).

Here, Defendants’ objections are properly raised and shall be sustained. First, Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 34 instructs that parties are only bound to produce documents already

in existence or in their “possession, custody, or control.” See generally Harris v. Koenig, 271

F.R.D. 356, 371 (D.D.C. 2010) (“Lack of evidence showing that producing party is in fact in

possession of a document is grounds to deny a motion to compel.”) (citations omitted).

Second, the Court agrees with Defendants that Molina’s request is disproportionate and not

reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Molina’s fourth

amended complaint takes issue with the conditions of his confinement while he was

incarcerated at SCI-Huntingdon, beginning in 2019. (Doc. 212). Molina does not provide an

explanation as to why an inspection completed in 1992 would be relevant to his claims, which

relate to events that took place beginning in 2019, and the Court declines to generate any such

arguments. Accordingly, Molina’s motion to compel discovery is denied.

3. Numbers 5 & 6

In discovery request numbers 5 and 6, Molina seeks any and all originals or copies of

“annual inspection reports, files, records, recordings, data, memos, or any material

information pertaining to citations, penalties, sanctions, or orders issued by the Pennsylvania

Department of Labor and Industry, or other authorized agency for neglect of unsafe

condition(s), or hazardous acts from January 2000 to present date;” and

“Administrative/Industrial work repair request submitted by prison officials for repairs

and/or adjustments to be made throughout the institution from January 2000 to present date,

including, but not limited to, selected prison’s repair maintenance workshops, kitchen, and

common area, non-redacted reports, records, recordings, filed, documents, memos, data and

all material information showing the [ ] person(s) requested to fix the environmental

conditions and thereafter, the finalization of that request.” (Doc. 224-2, at 5-6). In response,

Defendants state that these requests are overly broad, unduly burdensome, and not

proportional to the needs of the case. (Doc. 224-2, at 6). Regarding discovery request number

5, Defendants state, without waiving the above-mentioned objection, that they have provided

the responsive documents from the period during which Molina was incarcerated at SCI-

Huntingdon, for inspection and copying by Molina. (Doc. 224-2, at 6).

Molina argues that the material sought in discovery request number 5 is relevant to his

claims, “needed to establish Defendants actual knowledge of awareness of the risk of the

conditions of confinement to the prisoner,” and “establish that the Defendants have known

about the appalling conditions at SCI Huntingdon for years, but have failed to make

reasonable efforts to remedy those conditions.” (Doc. 224, at 3). Further, Molina avers that

the material sought in discovery request number 6 is relevant to his claims and “needed to

establish the pas[t] and present deplorable conditions in which [he] was subjected while

confined at SCI Huntingdon.” (Doc. 224, at 4). In opposition, Defendants argue that

responsive documents have been produced regarding discovery request number 5, but

maintain that discovery request number 6 is overly broad, unduly burdensome, and not

proportional to the needs of this case. (Doc. 226, at 3-4). Molina does not address this request

in his reply.

Here, Defendants’ objections are properly raised and shall be sustained. First, upon

consideration of Defendants’ responses, the Court concludes that Defendants appear to have

satisfied its burden and produced responsive documents within its possession to Molina’s

discovery request number 5. Therefore, the Court declines to direct it to provide further

responses to Molina’s discovery request number 5. Second, the Court agrees with Defendants

that Molina’s discovery request number 6 is disproportionate and not reasonably calculated

to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Although Molina submits that the information

sought in discovery request number 6--Administrative/Industrial work repair requests

submitted by prison officials for repairs and/or adjustments to be made throughout the

institution from January 2000 to present date—are necessary to establish the conditions of

SCI-Huntingdon, he does not sufficiently explain why those documents are specifically

relevant to the present action and his claims contained within the operative complaint. (Doc.

224-2, at 5-6). The Court notes that Molina’s discovery request appears to be overly broad in

its request of documents over a twenty-year time period. “Even if discovery is proportional to

the needs of the case, courts have the discretion to impose limits where the discovery sought

is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or where the burden or expense of the proposed

discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Schiavone v. Luzerne Cty., 343 F.R.D. 34, 41 (M.D. Pa.

2023) (quoting Occidental Chem. Corp. v. 21st Century Fox Am., Inc., No. 18-11273, 2020 WL

1969898, at *6 (D.N.J. Apr. 24, 2020)). Accordingly, Molina’s motion to compel discovery is

denied.

4. Number 7

In discovery request number 7, Molina seeks “[Molina]’s SCI-Huntingdon “Change

of Query – Cell History” and both work orders submitted by prison officials for cell 156 from

February 26, 2022 to February 28, 2022.” (Doc. 224-2, at 6). In response, Defendants state,

“[n]o records exist for work orders completed for the requested dates for this cell. With respect

to the request for Plaintiff’s cell history, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34,

Defendants have provided this documentation for inspection and copying by Plaintiff.” (Doc.

224-2, at 6).

Molina argues that the requested information is relevant to his claims and “is needed

to establish the duration of [his] confinement in a highly toxic communicable disease carrying

filthy and denigrating environment detrimental to his health and physical well-being while

confined at SCI-Huntingdon.” (Doc. 224, at 4). In opposition, Defendants assert that there

were not any work orders generated for the requested dates for cell number 156. (Doc. 226,

at 4). In response, Molina asserts that work orders were, in fact, submitted in February 2022

in relation to his allegations of mold, rust, asbestos, and corrosion contamination inside cell

number 156 at SCI-Huntingdon. (Doc. 237, at 9).

Here, Defendants’ objections are properly raised and shall be sustained. Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 34 instructs that parties are only bound to produce documents already in

existence or in their “possession, custody, or control.” See generally Harris, 271 F.R.D. at 371.

Given Defendants’ assertion that the information sought in discovery request number 7 does

not exist, the Court concludes that Defendants appear to have satisfied its burden and

produced responsive documents within its possession to discover request number 7.

Nevertheless, Defendants are again reminded of their ongoing duty to supplement or correct

its discovery responses if it “learns that in some material respect the disclosure or response is

incomplete or incorrect.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1)(A). Accordingly, Molina’s motion to

compel discovery is denied.

5. Number 8

In discovery request number 8, Molina seeks “[a]ny and all originals or copies of DC-

121 employees incident reports following fire occurrence at SCI-Huntingdon, including, but

not limited to, the video footage of January 9, 2021, pertaining to fire evacuation.” (Doc. 224-

2, at 6). In response, Defendants state, “[t]his request for all incident reports related to fire

occurrences at SCI-Huntingdon, is overly broad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional

to the needs of the case.” (Doc. 224-2, at 7).

Molina argues that this information is relevant to his claims and “is needed to establish

the cause[s] and pattern of fire occurrence at SCI Huntingdon[, and] to establish that the

Defendants witness ‘John Rivello’ declaration dated February 2, 2022, provided to the

Court’s was fabricated with the Defendants Attorney’s knowledge in reference to fire

occurrence and fire evacuations.” (Doc. 224, at 4). In opposition, Defendants assert:

Defendants appropriately objected, as this request for fire incident reports is

overly broad, unduly burdensome and not proportional to the needs of the case.

Specifically, Molina failed to provide any discernable parameters for the

requested information, such as a timeframe or reference to specific incidents,

from the January 9, 2021 incident, to which Defendants also objected.

It is submitted that information pertaining to the January 9, 2021 incident is

not reasonably related to any claims presented in the fourth amended

complaint. As such, this request is not reasonably calculated to lead to the

discovery of admissible evidence. As Defendants further expounded upon in

their prior response to this request, the incident involved an electrical fire on

CA block that was caused by an inmate improperly charging his e-cigarette. All

inmates on CA and CB unite were evacuated. However, at that time, Molina

was housed on BA unit, which was not evacuated or otherwise impacted by

this event.

Additionally, as Defendants indicated, SCI-Huntingdon Superintendent

Rivello’s prior declaration in this matter included information regarding this

incident. The undersigned denied Molina’s unsubstantiated, baseless assertion

that this declaration contained “fabricated” information that was proffered

with the undersigned’s knowledge.

(Doc. 226, at 4).

In response, Molina argues:

It is respectfully submitted that within Plaintiff’s Request for Production of

Documents and Motion to Compel Discovery he did in fact request[ ] video

footage of the January 9, 2021 fire incident, and that such claims are clearly

relevant to his Eighth Amendment claims before the Court. [T]herefore,

Defendants attorney’s statement in reference to Plaintiff’s failure to state any

discernable parameters for the requested information as to the timeframe or

reference to specific incidents is a complete fabricated statement. Nevertheless,

such discovery is needed to show not only Defendants pattern and practice of

deliberate indifference to an inmate’s health or safety, but also their overall

intentional disregard from human life by their failure to evacuate all inmates

despite their knowledge that the cell blocks were filled with smoke and quickly

spreading to the other cell blocks such as BA unit where Plaintiff was housed

and therefore, Plaintiff was in fact impacted by the January 9, 2021 fire

incident. Furthermore, Exhibit (A) and (B) attached herein clearly establish

that John Rivello was not made Deputy Superintendent for Facilities

Management at SCI Rockview during the January 9, 2021 fire incident.

[T]herefore, it is fair to say that Rivello’s Declaration dated February 2, 2022

provided to the Court is indeed fabricated as it is misleading and secondhand

hearsay knowledge submitted with intent to defraud and should be considered

perjury. Plaintiff will be considering seeking further legal action for this blatant

perjury during this case.

(Doc. 237, at 8).

The Court agrees with Defendants that the request for all incidents relating to fire

evacuation, including footage from the January 9, 2021 fire incident, appears to be overly

broad and unrelated to the claims set forth in the fourth amended complaint, which does not

mention the January 9, 2021 fire incident or allege whether Molina was impacted by that

incident. Because the Court has substantial doubt as to the relevance of the discovery of all

DC-121 employees’ incident reports following fire occurrences at SCI-Huntingdon that may

have been filed at any time, the Court will sustain Defendants’ objections at this time, without

prejudice to Molina seeking a narrower discovery response that more precisely explains the

relevance of this information in his claims, and which further narrows the scope of the

discovery sought to specific incidents. Accordingly, Molina’s motion to compel discovery is

denied.

6. Number 9

In discovery request number 9, Molina seeks “[a]ny and all originals or copies and/pr

non-redacted records, memos, recordings, data, documents, or material information on SCI-

Huntingdon’s Fire and Door Locking System(s) of the four original cell blocks, A, B, C, and

D, including, but not limited to, past and present documents or material information(s).”

(Doc. 224-2, at 7). In response, Defendants contend this request is vague and overly broad,

and state, without waiving such objections, that Defendants have provided Molina with the

following documents for inspection and copying: “fire evacuation procedures for the housing

units; fire alarm inspection reports for the timeframe during which Plaintiff was housed at

SCI-Huntingdon; and the fire drill reports for the units on which Plaintiff was housed while

incarcerated at SCI-Huntingdon.” (Doc. 224-2, at 7).

Molina argues that this information is relevant to his claims and “is needed to establish

the antiquated locking mechanisms of the cells, the use of padlocks to secure[ ] the doors, and

the fire safety hazard[s] associated with said antiquated cell locking mechanisms.” (Doc. 224,

at 5). In opposition, Defendants aver that responsive documents, including explanatory

information about the locking system in place for the cells, have already been produced. (Doc.

226, at 5). In response, Molina states Defendants are making fabricated arguments to

convince the Court that the locking systems are properly functioning and suggests that the

living conditions at SCI-Huntingdon are the same as when it was established in 1889. (Doc.

237, at 8-9).

Upon consideration of Defendants’ responses, the Court concludes that Defendants

appear to have satisfied its burden and produced responsive documents within its possession

to Molina’s discovery request number 9. Notably, Molina does not provide an argument as

to whether the documents Defendants have produced thus far satisfy his discovery request.

Therefore, the Court declines to direct Defendants to provide further responses to Molina’s

discovery request number 9. Accordingly, Molina’s motion to compel discovery is denied.

7. Number 10

In discovery request number 10, Molina seeks “[a]ny and all originals or copies of files,

documents, records, recordings, or material information(s) detailing and describing both SCI-

Huntingdon’s Ventilation and Heating operation(s) pertaining to the four original cell blocks,

A, B, C, and D, including, but not limited to, Air Ducts and its Large Fanning System and

So-Call Attic Function and Operation.” (Doc. 224-2, at 7). In response, Defendants contend

this request is vague and overly broad, and state, without waiving such objections, that

Defendants have provided Molina with the information regarding the annual inspections of

SCI-Huntingdon completed in 2019 and 2022 for inspection and copying by Molina, noting

that an inspection was not completed in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic and a virtual

records review was conducted in 2021. (Doc. 224-2, at 7-8).

Molina argues that this information is relevant to his claims and “is needed to establish

the lack of ventilation and the antiquated and poor heating system at SCI Huntingdon.” (Doc.

224, at 5). In opposition, Defendants assert that the request “is overly broad and lacks any

indication of the timeframe for which the information regarding the institution’s ventilation

system was requested.” (Doc. 226, at 5). Defendants reiterate that they provided the annual

inspection reports for the timeframe during which Molina was housed at SCI-Huntingdon.

(Doc. 226, at 5). In addition, Defendants maintain that they do not possess responsive

documents to illustrate the alleged “lack of ventilation,” because SCI-Huntingdon is properly

ventilated, detailing the following:“[t]he ventilation system is maintained and inspected

frequently to ensure proper operation;” “[v]entilation and heat are provided to the cells by

return air ducts in the rear of the cells, which draw air through the cells, preventing

stratification and stagnation of the air on the housing units;” and “the large windows in the

common areas on A, B, C, and D blocks are frequently opened to allow fresh air to circulate

on the units.” (Doc. 226, at 6). In response, Molina states Defendants are making fabricated

arguments to convince the Court that the ventilation system is properly functioning and

suggests that the living conditions at SCI-Huntingdon are the same as when it was established

in 1889. (Doc. 237, at 8-9).

Here, Defendants’ objections are properly raised and shall be sustained. First, it

appears that Defendants have produced responsive documents to Molina’s request. Second,

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34 instructs that parties are only bound to produce documents

already in existence or in their “possession, custody, or control.” See generally Harris, 271

F.R.D. at 371. Accordingly, Molina’s motion to compel discovery is denied.

8. Numbers 11 & 12

In discovery request numbers 11 and 12, Molina seeks any and all originals or copies

of files, non-redacted reports, records, recordings, data, memos, data, or any material

information related to “the levels of asbestos found throughout the prison, including, but not

limited to, the cells, kitchen, law library, gymnasium, or common areas,” and “person(s)

requested to remove all asbestos materials found at SCI-Huntingdon, including, but not

limited to, air sample friable asbestos results prior to the start of work.” (Doc. 224-2, at 8). In

response, Defendants contend these requests are “overly broad, unduly burdensome, and not

proportional to the needs of this case.” (Doc. 224-2, at 8). Without waiving these objections,

Defendants state that they have provided responsive documentation from the period in which

Molina was housed at SCI-Huntingdon, including semi-annual preventative maintenance

inspection reports, for inspection and copying by Molina. (Doc. 224-2, at 8).

Molina argues that this information is relevant to his claims; “is needed to establish

that the Defendants, with deliberate indifference, exposes [he] to levels of a toxic substance

that pose an unreasonable risk of harm to his further health;” and “is needed to establish that

a substantial risk of serious harm exists associated with the conditions of confinement, and

that the Defendants knew of said substantial risk of serious harm from the very fact that the

risk was obvious, and that the Defendants acted or failed to act with deliberate indifference

to [his] health or safety.” (Doc. 224, at 5-6). In opposition, Defendants assert:

[Discovery request numbers] 11 and 12 suffer from the same flaw as many of

the other requests—namely, these requests are overly broad and devoid of any

indication as to the timeframe or locations for which information is sought

regarding the alleged presence of asbestos. Notably, as Defendants have

previously indicated, contrary to Molina’s baseless assertions, asbestos is not

present and exposed throughout SCI-Huntingdon. Although asbestos may be

present in some of the DOC’s other facilities, it is not left unabated and exposed

when it is discovered. If asbestos i[s] determined to be present, prompt remedial

action is taken pursuant to policy. Without waiving their objection, Defendants

provided what they believed to be responsive documentation for the timeframe

during which Molina was incarcerated at SCI-Huntingdon.

(Doc. 226, at 6-7).

Molina does not address this request in his reply.

Here, Defendants’ objections are properly raised and shall be sustained. Upon

consideration of Defendants’ responses, the Court concludes that Defendants appear to have

satisfied its burden and produced responsive documents within its possession to Molina’s

discovery request numbers 11 and 12. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 34; Harris, 271 F.R.D. at 371.

Therefore, the Court declines to direct it to provide further responses to these discovery

requests. Accordingly, Molina’s motion to compel discovery is denied.

9. Number 13

In discovery request number 13, Molina seeks “[a]ny and all originals or copies of

occupancy permits for double cell from the Pennsylvania Labor and Industry, for inmates on

the general population pertaining to the four original cell blocks, A, B, C, and D.” (Doc. 224-

2, at 9). In response, Defendants state, “Defendants do not possess any responsive

documents.” (Doc. 224-2, at 8).

Molina argues that this information is relevant to his claims and “is needed to establish

that the cells 7 by 8 feet, designed for single occupancy are inhabit[ed] by two inmates despite

the Defendants knowledge of inadequate floor space to walk to stand.” (Doc. 224, at 6). In

opposition, Defendants emphasize that they do not possess any responsive documents and

assert that such information is nevertheless irrelevant to this case because Molina was single-

celled for the duration of his incarceration at SCI-Huntingdon. (Doc. 226, at 7). Molina does

not address this request in his reply.

An “immutable rule defines the court’s discretion when ruling on motions to compel

discovery. It is clear that the court cannot compel the production of things that do not exist.

Nor can the court compel the creation of evidence by parties who attest that they do not

possess the materials sought by an adversary in litigation.” Rosa-Diaz v. Harry, No. 1:17-CV-

2215, 2018 WL 6322967, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 4, 2018) (citing AFSCME District Council 47

Health and Welfare Fund v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 08-5904, 2010 WL

5186088 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 2010); Knauss v. Shannon, No. 08-1698, 2009 WL 975251 (M.D.

Pa. April 9, 2009)); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 34. Because Defendants do not appear to be in

possession of the requested documents, and because Molina has not raised any argument

challenging the adequacy of their effort to search, the request is denied.

10. Number 14

In discovery request number 14, Molina seeks “[a]ny and all originals or copies of SCI-

Huntingdon’s ‘PERMIT OF OPERATION’ from the Pennsylvania Labor and Industry to

function as a State Correctional Institution, pertaining to the four original cell blocks, A, B,

C, and D, from 1992 to present date.” (Doc. 224-2, at 8-9). In response, Defendants contend

this request is overly broad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of this

case. (Doc. 224-2, at 9). Without waiving these objections, Defendants state that they have

provided responsive documentation from the period in which Molina was housed at SCI-

Huntingdon, including the most recent annual permits issued and in effect, for inspection and

copying by Molina. (Doc. 224-2, at 9).

Molina argues that the requested information is relevant to his claims and “is needed

to establish as to whether or not the Defendants meet the standards of adequacy of an

institution’s housing facilities associated with the American Correctional Association

(“ACA”) standards for adult correctional institutions.” (Doc. 224, at 6). In opposition,

Defendants argue that the discovery request is overly broad and not proportional to the needs

of the case. (Doc. 226, at 7). Despite these objections, Defendants aver that they produced the

requested information for the timeframe during which Molina was incarcerated at SCI-

Huntingdon. (Doc. 226, at 7). Molina does not address this request in his reply.

Upon consideration of Defendants’ responses, the Court concludes that Defendants

appear to have satisfied its burden and produced responsive documents within its possession

to Molina’s discovery request number 14. Notably, Molina does not provide an argument as

to whether the documents Defendants have produced thus far satisfy his discovery request.

Therefore, the Court declines to direct Defendants to provide further responses to Molina’s

discovery request number 14. Accordingly, Molina’s motion to compel discovery is denied.

11. Numbers 15 & 16

In discovery request numbers 15 and 16, Molina seeks any and all originals or copies

of files, documents, records, data, recordings, memos, and any material information

regarding Molina’s medical files and treatment for which he received while confined at SCI-

Huntingdon “pertaining to his injuries, such as nose bleeds, and respiratory problems

associated with the conditions of his confinement as stipulated by the Medical Department at

SCI-Huntingdon.” (Doc. 224-2, at 9). In response, Defendants contend these requests are

overly broad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of this case. (Doc. 224-

2, at 9). Without waiving these objections, Defendants state that Molina’s medical records

are available for inspection and copying by Molina through a more convenient source –

namely the institution in which Molina is currently housed. (Doc. 224-2, at 9).

Molina argues that the information is needed to establish his injuries associated with

the conditions while confined at SCI-Huntingdon. (Doc. 224, at 7). In opposition, Defendants

reiterate that the information is available through the institution in which Molina is currently

housed, noting that the inmate handbook, as well as the publicly available version of the

policy DC-ADM 003 to which inmates have access, provides that inmates may submit a DC-

135A request to staff to access information contained within their files. (Doc. 226, at 7-8). In

response, Molina avers that he “has attempted numerous times to obtain his medical files,

and even submitted a Right to Know Request to obtain said documents . . . to no avail. (Doc.

237, at 9). Attached to the reply, Molina provides his Right to Know Request dated December

12, 2022, and the Pennsylvania DOC’s response dated January 24, 2023. (Doc. 237, at 21-

26).

Relevant here, when an inmate initiates a request for the production of his own

medical records, in accordance with the DC–ADM 003, “Release of Information,” the DOC’s

procedure provides a method by which he is given a reasonable amount of time to examine

and inspect the requested documents. See

https://www.cor.pa.gov/About%20Us/Documents/DOC%20Policies/003%20Release%2

0of%20Information.pdf (last accessed Mar. 21, 2023). As part of this procedure, the inmate

must initiate this process by submitting Department Form DC–135A “Inmate Request to

Staff” to the Superintendent’s Assistant or his/her designee at his current institution. The

inmate may then review the documents and obtain copies of any documents at his expense;

however, charges for the photocopies are made in accordance with the DOC’s policies and

procedures. Thus, the Court understands that Defendants do not object to Molina’s access to

his own medical records. Rather, they simply urge the Court to direct Molina to comply with

these procedures when requesting medical records.

The Court concludes that compliance with the DOC regulations is a fitting and proper

procedure for Molina to follow in securing access to his medical records. Indeed, in this

regard, courts have frequently directed or encouraged inmates to comply with reasonable

institutional procedures when securing copies of their own prison medical records for

litigation purposes. See, e.g., Bull v. United States, 143 F. App’x 468 (3d. Cir.2005); Daniels v.

Kelchner, No. 05–1601, 2007 WL 2068631 (M.D. Pa. July 17, 2007).3 Defendants have

represented they are prepared to make the requested discovery available provided Molina

complies with these institutional requirements. Therefore, consistent with Defendants’

recommended approach, Molina shall be able to access his medical records, provided he

3 The Court notes that the DOC policy, in part, calls for Molina to bear the cost of

making copies of his medical records. While Molina has not made a specific request to have

Defendants bear these costs, the noting in 28 U.S.C. § 1915 authorizes federal courts to

finance or pay for a party’s discovery expenses incurred while prosecuting a lawsuit, even if

that party has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). A

review of the case law reveals that, as a general rule, the Court lacks the lawful authority to

help finance, or relieve Molina, who is proceeding in forma pauperis, from the costs associated

with taking pre-trial discovery. See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 159 (3d Cir.1993) (“There is

no provision in [28 U.S.C. § 1915] for the payment by the government of the costs of

deposition transcripts, or any other litigation expenses, and no other statute authorizes courts

to commit federal monies for payment of the necessary expenses in a civil suit brought by an

indigent litigant.”); Victor v. Varano, No. 3:11-CV-891, 2012 WL 1514845, at *8 (M.D. Pa.

May 1, 2012).

complies with DOC procedures for obtaining this information, and that he bears the cost for

this procedure. Accordingly, the motion to compel discovery is DENIED.

B. REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION

In the objection to and request for reconsideration, Molina asserts that the Court’s

Order “favored” Defendants and “prejudiced” Molina “by placing him at an extreme

disadvantage which allows the Defendants to circumvent and/or otherwise manipulate the

Discovery process, inter alia, to its advantage while time is plainly limited and of the essence.”

(Doc. 234, at 2) (emphasis in original). Molina requests that the Court rule on his motion to

compel discovery, reissue a case management Order pending the outcome of the motion to

compel discovery, and direct Defendants to provide him with access to the requested

discovery documents. (Doc. 234, at 3; Doc. 235, at 7-8).

The Court has the inherent power to set case management deadlines in a manner to

promote the goals of speedy and efficient resolutions of all actions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. Rule

16 specifically gives this Court wide latitude to manage discovery and other pretrial matters,

and to set deadlines for amending pleadings, filing motions, and completing discovery. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 16; see also Eichorn v. AT & T Corp., 484 F.3d 644, 650 (3d Cir.2007); Whitney v.

Wetzel, No. 2:12-CV-01623, 2014 WL 5513481, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 31, 2014). Molina’s

motion is liberally construed to be in the nature of an appeal by objections to a non-dispositive

matter that may be decided by the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge. See Houser v.

Beard, No. CIV.A. 10-0416, 2013 WL 4494373, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 2013) (“A United

States Magistrate Judge may hear and determine any non-dispositive pretrial matter pending

before the Court, subject to the aggrieved party's right to appeal the determination to the

District Court, which will only reverse the Magistrate Judge’s decision on such matters if it is

‘clearly erroneous or contrary to law.’”) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a);

W.D. Pa. L.R. 72.1(C)(2)).

Here, the amended case management Order dated January 25, 2023, was entered to

do just that. (Doc. 230). Molina must adhere to the schedules established by the Court.

Accordingly, Molina’s objections to the Court’s Order dated January 25, 2023, are

OVERRULED and his request for reconsideration is DENIED. (Doc. 234). However, given

the deadlines for discovery and dispositive motions have or will shortly expire, the Court will

set new case management deadlines in the Order accompanying this Memorandum.

II. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Molina’s motions to compel discovery, motion for

reconsideration, and motion for an evidentiary hearing (Doc. 224; Doc. 234; Doc. 238) are

DENIED.

An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Karoline Mehalchick

Dated: April 25, 2023

KAROLINE MEHALCHICK

Chief United States Magistrate Judge