The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
YANEL GREENE, :
Petitioner :
: No. 1:22-cv-01726
v. :
: (Judge Kane)
STEPHEN SPAULDING, :
Respondent :
MEMORANDUM
Before the Court is a habeas corpus petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 through which
Petitioner Yanel Greene (“Greene”) seeks earned time credit towards his sentence pursuant to the
First Step Act (“FSA”). For the reasons discussed below, the Court will dismiss the petition
without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
I. BACKGROUND
Greene is currently incarcerated by the United States Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) in
Lewisburg United States Penitentiary (“USP-Lewisburg”). He is serving a 96-month sentence
imposed by the United States District Court for the District of Maine for conspiracy to distribute
controlled substances and possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. (Doc.
No. 6 at 2.)
Greene filed the instant petition on October 8, 2022, and the Court received and docketed
the petition on October 31, 2022. (Doc. No. 1 at 1.) Greene asserts the BOP has failed to credit
him with earned time credit pursuant to the FSA and seeks a writ of habeas corpus compelling
the BOP to provide such credit. (Id.) He argues that exhaustion of administrative remedies is
unnecessary because his claim presents a matter of statutory construction. (Id.)
Respondent, the warden at USP-Lewisburg (“Respondent”), responded to the petition on
November 21, 2022. (Doc. No. 6.) Respondent argues that the petition should be dismissed for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies. (Id.) Greene filed a reply brief on December 8, 2022,
in which he argues that exhaustion should be excused because he would be irreparably harmed if
he were required to complete the administrative exhaustion process. (Doc. No. 8.) The petition
is ripe for review.
II. DISCUSSION
28 U.S.C. § 2241 does not contain an explicit statutory exhaustion requirement, but the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has consistently required a petitioner to
exhaust his administrative remedies before filing a Section 2241 petition. See Moscato v. Fed.
Bureau of Prisons, 98 F.3d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 1996). Exhaustion is required “for three reasons:
(1) allowing the appropriate agency to develop a factual record and apply its expertise facilitates
judicial review; (2) permitting agencies to grant the relief requested conserves judicial resources;
and (3) providing agencies the opportunity to correct their own errors fosters administrative
autonomy.” See id. at 761-62 (citing Bradshaw v. Carlson, 682 F.2d 1050, 1052 (3d Cir. 1981)).
Exhaustion is not required when it would not promote these goals, such as when it would be
futile. See, e.g., Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 239 n.2 (3d Cir. 2005).
The BOP has a multi-step administrative remedy program allowing an inmate “to seek
formal review of an issue relating to any aspect of his/her own confinement.” See 28 C.F.R. §
542.10(a). First, an inmate should attempt informal resolution of the issue with the appropriate
staff member. See id. § 542.13(b). If informal resolution is unsuccessful, the inmate may submit
a formal written grievance, using the BP-9 form, to the warden within 20 calendar days
“following the date on which the basis for the Request occurred.” See id. § 542.14(a). The
warden is to respond to the request within 20 calendar days. See id. § 542.18. An inmate
dissatisfied with the warden’s response may appeal, using the BP-10 form, “to the appropriate
Regional Director within 20 calendar days of the date the warden signed the response.” See id. §
542.15(a). Finally, an inmate may appeal the Regional Director’s response, using the BP-11
form, to the BOP’s General Counsel “within 30 calendar days of the date the Regional Director
signed the response.” See id. The General Counsel’s response is due within 40 calendar days;
however, the time period for response may be extended by 20 days. See id. § 542.18.
In this case, Respondent contends that Greene failed to exhaust administrative remedies
because he has not filed any administrative remedy requests in his time in BOP custody. (Doc.
No. 6.) Respondent attaches a declaration from Joshua Bower, an attorney at USP-Lewisburg,
which corroborates Respondent’s contention that Greene has failed to exhaust administrative
remedies. (Doc. No. 6-1 at 1-2, 11.)
The Court agrees with Respondent that Greene has failed to exhaust administrative
remedies. The record reflects that Greene failed to file any administrative remedy requests to
assert his claim. See (id.). Greene argues to the contrary that exhaustion should be excused
because his claim presents a matter of statutory interpretation and because he will be subjected to
irreparable harm if he is required to complete the administrative program. (Doc. Nos. 1, 8.)
Greene’s arguments are unavailing. First, contrary to his argument, his claim is not a
matter purely of statutory interpretation but rather a request for the BOP to provide a specific
number of earned time credits. Exhaustion is not excused for such a claim. See, e.g., Powell v.
Christensen, No. 3:22-cv-01985, 2023 WL 2060712, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2023); Johnson v.
Spaulding, No. 3:22-cv-01658, 2023 WL 122911, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 6, 2023). Second,
although irreparable harm may be a basis for excusing administrative exhaustion, see Brown v.
Warden Canaan USP, 763 F. App’x 296, 297 (3d Cir. 2019), the only irreparable harm Greene
advances is that denial of his claim at the administrative level would result in him being released
later than the date he would be entitled to release if he were granted FSA credits. (Doc. No. 7.)
Greene has not alleged any facts to show that the BOP’s administrative remedy program would
be inadequate to adjudicate his claim for FSA credits, and a petitioner’s belief that exhaustion
will be unsuccessful is not sufficient to excuse exhaustion. See Powell, 2023 WL 2060712, at
*2; Johnson, 2023 WL 122911, at *2. The Court accordingly finds that Greene has failed to
exhaust administrative remedies.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss Greene’s petition for writ of habeas
corpus without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. An appropriate Order
follows.