“Good butter is not unreasonably dangerous merely because, if such be the case, it deposits cholesterol in the arteries and leads to heart attacks; but bad butter, contaminated with poisonous fish oil, is unreasonably dangerous.”
How later courts described this case
- “Good butter is not unreasonably dangerous merely because, if such be the case, it deposits cholesterol in the arteries and leads to heart attacks; but bad butter, contaminated with poisonous fish oil, is unreasonably dangerous.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ROAMINGWOOD SEWER & WATER : Civil No. 1: 20-CV-00640
ASSOCIATION, :
:
Plaintiff, :
:
v. :
:
NATIONAL DIVERSIFIED SALES, :
INC., :
:
Defendant, :
:
v. :
:
JAMES T. O’HARA, INC. :
:
Third-Party Defendant. : Judge Jennifer P. Wilson
MEMORANDUM
Before the court are the motions filed by Defendant, National Diversified
Sales, Inc. (“NDS”), and Plaintiff, Roamingwood Sewer and Water Association
(“Roamingwood”), on August 31, 2022, for partial summary judgment addressing
certain claims in Roamingwood’s amended complaint. (Docs. 109, 111.) NDS
seeks summary judgment on Counts II and IV, while Roamingwood seeks
summary judgment on Counts I, II, and IV. The motions have been fully briefed
and are ripe. For the reasons that follow, the court will grant NDS’ motion with
respect to the UTPCPL claim and grant Roamingwood’s motion with respect to the
strict liability and breach of implied warranty claims.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
The initial action was brought by Roamingwood to recover damages related
to the failure of allegedly defective check valves which NDS manufactured. (Doc.
9.) As a matter of organizational background, The Hideout, a planned gated
residential community in Wayne County, Pennsylvania, was initially established in
1970. (Doc. 113-1, ¶¶ 2–3.) Ten years later, pursuant to requests from the
residents of The Hideout, the Wayne County Board of Commissioners created the
South Wayne County Water and Sewer Authority (“SWA”). (Id. at ¶ 10.) That
same year, Roamingwood was established as the exclusive operator of sewer and
water services to The Hideout. (Id. at ¶ 2.)
Roamingwood is organized as a Pennsylvania not-for-profit corporation.
(Id. at ¶ 1.) As stated in its bylaws, Roamingwood has members, and those
members possess membership rights. (Doc. 9-1, pp. 7–8.)2 Its members fall into
two classes: (a) owners of one or more lots in The Hideout; and (b) the
homeowners’ association of The Hideout. (See id. at 8–9.)
1 Any additional factual recitation that is necessary for the discussion of each specific issue is
included in the Discussion section of this memorandum. In considering the instant motion for
summary judgment, the court relied on the uncontested facts. Where facts were disputed, the
court viewed the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and has drawn all
inferences in favor of the nonmovant, pursuant to the relevant standard for deciding a motion for
summary judgment. See Doe v. C.A.R.S. Protection Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358, 362 (3d Cir. 2008).
2 For ease of reference, the court utilizes the page number from the CM/ECF header.
Roamingwood is an agent of SWA. (Doc. 113-1, ¶ 10.) According to
Roamingwood, SWA was meant to be “a finance vehicle to issue municipal bonds
for Roamingwood to acquire the water and sewer system of The Hideout.” (Id.)
The Hideout’s protective covenants require that all properties within the
community are connected to the Roamingwood sewage system. (Id. ¶ 3.)
In May 2009, Roamingwood and SWA entered into a sale agreement
“whereby Roamingwood sold to [SWA] the water and sewer collections systems,
the treatment plant, the pumping stations, the rights in any and all easements and
all necessary appurtenant equipment, for a dollar.” (Doc. 113-3, p. 10.) As part of
this agreement, SWA was required to enter into an operating agreement with
Roamingwood, wherein SWA would name Roamingwood the agent of SWA. (Id.)
By August 2017, Roamingwood was undertaking the final stage, Stage III,
of an overhaul of The Hideout’s sewer system.3 (Doc. 113-1, ¶ 15–25.) As part of
Stage III, Roamingwood needed to install 1,111 check valves. (Id. ¶ 71.) The
specific check valve, which NDS designed and manufactured, was known as the
KSC-2000-LC. (Doc. 111-1, ¶ 15.)
In Stages I and II, similar check valves were used. (Doc. 113-1, ¶¶ 33–35.)
None of the check valves used in Stage I has failed and only a single check valve
3 Stages I and II started in 2013 and finished by January 2017. (Doc. 113-1, ¶ 25.) By
November 2018, Stage III was largely completed. (Doc. 111-1, ¶ 12.)
used in Stage II has failed. (Id. ¶ 36.) In May of 2016, NDS decided to change the
design of their check valves. (Id. ¶ 44.) The change related to the structure of the
check valve’s flapper assembly and the way in which the flapper assembly was
attached. (Id.)
NDS sold the KSC-2000-LC check valves exclusively to The Lateral
Connection Corp. (“TLCC”). (Doc. 111-1, ¶ 17.) TLCC purchased the check
valves and incorporated them into a larger component—a curb stop, also called a
shut off valve or lateral connection. (Id. ¶¶ 17, 31; Doc. 122, ¶ 17.) In simplified
terms, the check valve allows for sewage to pass in one direction—away from the
residence but not towards it. (See Doc. 113-1, ¶ 26.) TLCC sold the lateral
connections which were used for Stage III to a distributor, Clay Products. (Doc.
111-1, ¶ 18.) Clay Products, in turn, sold the lateral connections to James T.
O’Hara, Inc. (“O’Hara”). (Id.)
For Stage III of The Hideout’s overhaul, Roamingwood hired James T.
O’Hara, Inc. (“O’Hara”) as general contractor. (Doc. 1, pp. 1–3.) On June 1,
2017, Roamingwood purchased its first order of 375 check valves for Stage III.
(Doc. 113-1, ¶ 49; Doc. 123, ¶ 49; Doc. 113-9, p. 27.)
Roamingwood alleges that NDS had notice of the failures in its check valves
well before they began failing at The Hideout. It alleges that on June 19, 2017,
TLCC notified NDS of 42 defective check valves in a recent batch. (Doc. 113-1,
¶ 50.) In September, TLCC reported to NDS additional issues with its check
valves which could result in or contribute to a sonic weld failure similar to those
that occurred in the failed valves that were installed in The Hideout. (Id. ¶¶ 53–54;
see id. ¶ 103–104.) Roamingwood further alleges that, on November 14, 2017,
TLCC notified NDS of further failures of the sonic weld in the KSC-2000-LC in a
project in Indiana. (Id. ¶ 56.)4 Of an initial 43 valves and 20 replacement valves
installed in the Indiana project, 25 failed. (Id. ¶¶ 57–60.) By December 20, 2017,
NDS told TLCC that it had “a good understanding of what happened” with the
failed check valves. (Id. ¶ 66.)
By January 24, 2018, 230 out of the eventual 1,111 Stage III check valves
had been installed. (Id. ¶ 71.) Then, in March 2018, NDS internally discussed
discontinuing their sale of the KSC-2000-LC. (Id. ¶ 72.) In determining whether
to discontinue the check valve, NDS acknowledged that the flapper assembly was
the “weak link” and that their manufacturing for the flapper assembly required
“tighter controls.” (Id. ¶ 73.) The processes they had in place at the time would
“not produce sufficient repeatable quality parts.” (Id.) NDS recognized that
discontinuing its check valve would increase their “exposure to liability from the
4 NDS disputes that TLCC provided NDS with notice of valve failures “due to a sonic weld
failure prior to November 14, 2017.” (Doc. 123, ¶ 56.) But NDS does not dispute that, on that
date, TLCC provided NDS notice of check valve failures in the Indiana project. (Id.)
claims standpoint.” (Id. ¶ 74.) Roamingwood asserts that NDS, knowing that the
check valves were defective, continued to sell them until the existing claims were
resolved. (Id. ¶ 77.) NDS disputes that, asserting that its last “substantial sale” of
check valves was to TLCC on December 5, 2017. (Doc. 123, ¶ 77.) But NDS
does not explicitly state that it made no further sales beyond December 5, 2017,
only that it made no further substantial sales.
Roamingwood had its first Stage III check valve failure on May 27, 2018.
(Doc. 113-1, ¶ 87.) Roamingwood alleges that such failure can lead to a sewage
backup in the street or a home. (Id. ¶¶ 88–89.) By October 26, 2018, nine check
valves had failed. (Id. ¶ 95.) Roamingwood submitted two of the nine failed
valves to an engineer. (Id. ¶ 96.) NDS issued a Return Merchandise Authorization
(“RMA”) to TLCC for the two valves—the RMA described the valves as
“defective.” (Id. ¶ 97.) By January 2, 2019, a total of 11 Stage III check valves
had failed. (Id. ¶ 98.) And by late-December of 2019, multiple homeowners had
raw sewage back up into their homes, although NDS disputes that the sewage
resulted from check valve failures. (Doc. 113-1, ¶¶ 94, 102; Doc. 123, ¶¶ 94, 102.)
On January 29, 2020, the parties engaged Micron, Inc. to conduct a visual
and microscopic inspection of 10 failed check valves. (Doc. 113-1, ¶ 103.) This
inspection revealed that the ultrasonic weld intended to hold together the two
pieces of the flapper assembly was incomplete. (Id. ¶ 104.)
As of August 31, 2022, 56 of the Stage III check valves had failed and been
replaced. (Doc. 113-1, ¶ 110.) NDS did not dispute the failure of these check
valves. (Doc. 123, ¶ 110.) And, as of October 6, 2022, Roamingwood alleges that
73 check valves had failed. (Doc. 122, ¶ 29.)
Because this memorandum is for the benefit of the parties, the court omits
some procedural developments and most of the history of the third-party claims,
which are not at issue presently. The operative four-count amended complaint in
this action was filed on May 12, 2020. (Doc. 9.) Count I raised a claim for strict
liability, Count II for breach of implied warranty of merchantability and fitness for
a particular purpose, Count III for negligence, and Count IV for violation of the
Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (“UTPCPL”).
(Id. at 14–20.)
NDS filed a motion to dismiss the action under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), which the court denied. (Docs. 11, 29.) In September of
2021, NDS moved to dismiss the action for lack of Article III standing. (Doc. 65.)
The court denied this motion. (Doc. 71.)
On April 27, 2022, two days before the close of discovery, the court entered
a 60-day stay of all deadlines so the parties could pursue mediation. (Doc. 85.)
Mediation was unsuccessful, and NDS and Roamingwood filed the instant motions
for summary judgment on August 31, 2022. (Docs. 111, 113.)
JURISDICTION
Because there is complete diversity between the parties and the amount in
controversy is greater than $75,000, the court has original jurisdiction over this
case under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Venue is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A court may grant a motion for summary judgment when “there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute of fact is material if resolution of
the dispute “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Summary judgment is
not precluded by “[f]actual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary.” Id. “A
dispute is genuine if a reasonable trier-of-fact could find in favor of the
nonmovant’ and ‘material if it could affect the outcome of the case.” Thomas v.
Tice, 943 F.3d 145, 149 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburgh
Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 294, 300 (3d Cir. 2012)).
In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the facts
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable
inferences in that party’s favor. Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 288
(3d Cir. 2018) (citing Scheidemantle v. Slippery Rock Univ. State Sys. of Higher
Educ., 470 F.3d 535, 538 (3d Cir. 2006)). The court may not “weigh the evidence”
or “determine the truth of the matter.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. Instead, the
court’s role in reviewing the facts of the case is “to determine whether there is a
genuine issue for trial.” Id.
The party moving for summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of
informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those
portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). The non-moving party must then
oppose the motion, and in doing so “‘may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of [its] pleadings’ but, instead, ‘must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. Bare assertions, conclusory allegations, or
suspicions will not suffice.’” Jutrowski, 904 F.3d at 288–89 (quoting D.E. v. Cent.
Dauphin Sch. Dist., 765 F.3d 260, 268–69 (3d Cir. 2014)).
Summary judgment is appropriate where the non-moving party “fails to
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that
party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support
of the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the
jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. “Where
the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the
non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.,
Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
DISCUSSION
NDS argues that Roamingwood’s claim for breach of implied warranty fails
because NDS expressly disclaimed all implied warranties. (Doc. 111, p. 1.) It also
argues that Roamingwood’s claim under the UTPCPL fails because (1)
Roamingwood lacks standing to bring a UTPCPL claim, (2) there is no evidence
that NDS knew of the alleged defect in the check valve at the time it sold the
valves to TLCC, (3) NDS had no duty to inform Roamingwood of any defects
because there is no evidence that any such alleged defect was likely to cause
significant bodily harm, and (4) there is no evidence that NDS made any
representations to Roamingwood about the check valves let alone
misrepresentations. (Doc. 112, pp. 7–8.) For its part, Roamingwood argues that it
is entitled to summary judgment on these same two claims and for its strict liability
claim. (Doc. 113, p. 1.)
A. Roamingwood is Entitled to Summary Judgment on its Breach of
Implied Warranty Claim.
Roamingwood argues that it is entitled to summary judgment for its breach
of implied warranty claim based on the undisputed facts. Although it brings the
claim for breach of implied warranty on two grounds—merchantability and fitness
for a particular purpose—its arguments for summary judgment only focus on
merchantability.
Under Pennsylvania law, “to be merchantable, goods must be ‘fit for the
ordinary purposes for which such goods are used.’” Altronics of Bethlehem, Inc. v.
Repco, Inc., 957 F.2d 1102, 1105 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting 13 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.
§ 2314(b)(3)). To bring a claim for breach of implied warranty, a plaintiff must
show that “the equipment they purchased from defendant was defective.” Id. To
do so, it is their burden to show that: “(1) that the product malfunctioned; (2) that
plaintiffs used the product as intended or reasonably expected by the manufacturer;
and (3) the absence of other reasonable secondary causes.” Id.
NDS argues that Roamingwood is not entitled to summary judgment on this
claim because its “entire argument” for this claim “rests on the incorrect assertion”
that the KSC-2000-LC check valves “were not suitable for use in a low-pressure
sewer system.” (Doc. 124, p. 26.) NDS asserts that Roamingwood supports its
implied warranty claim by misreading an NDS document. Roamingwood states
that “NDS concluded the Check valves were not suitable for use in a low-pressure
sewer system due to its ‘poor sonic weld’ that ‘makes [the] part useless’ for its
intended purpose in a pressurized sewer system.” (Doc. 114, p. 39.) NDS points
out that the internal quotations were not NDS’ conclusions, but instead were
customer complaints memorialized in an NDS investigation of systemic problems
with the check valves. (Doc. 124, p. 26.)
Even seen in the light most favorable to the non-movant, NDS has failed to
point to any facts which would allow a reasonable jury to find that Roamingwood’s
breach of implied warranty claim fails. Roamingwood has pointed to evidence to
show that the KSC-2000-LC failed in Roamingwood’s Stage III endeavor. NDS
has not disputed that, as of August 2022, 56 of the Stage III checked valves failed.
(Doc. 113-1, ¶ 110; Doc. 123, ¶ 110.) There is no dispute that such a failure
constitutes a malfunction. There is no dispute that the check valves in Stage III
were used as intended or reasonably expected by the manufacturer. Nor is there
evidence of any other reasonable secondary cause. The fact that Roamingwood
points to an NDS document to explain why or how the malfunction occurred is not
material to the fact that the malfunction occurred. Therefore, NDS’ contention that
Roamingwood has mischaracterized NDS’ document has no bearing on the implied
warranty claim.
NDS argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because it disclaimed all
implied warranties via its public-facing website. (Doc. 112, p. 26; Doc. 111-1,
¶ 35.) Roamingwood counters by arguing that the court in Moscatiello v. Pitt.
Contractors Equip. Co., 595 A.2d 1198, 1204 (Pa. Super. 1991), established that,
under Pennsylvania law, a “warranty exclusion will not bind a remote buyer unless
the term is communicated to him.” (Doc. 121, p. 24 (quoting Amato v. Mapei
Corp., No. 2:03-cv-2130, 2005 WL 3406417, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 12, 2005)).)
NDS does not directly address Moscatiello. Instead, it cites various cases
from the U.S. District Courts in Pennsylvania which address what suffices as
sufficiently conspicuous to disclaim an implied warranty. (Doc. 130, pp. 17–18.)
NDS argues that it “does not control the sale and distribution of check valves once
they have been sold to TLCC and incorporated into a lateral connection.” (Id. at
18.) It argues, therefore, that it has no ability to transmit its warranty and terms of
sale to remote buyers. (Id.) This may be true, but that does not change the law.
The law protects consumers, including remote buyers, and places the burden on
parties, such as NDS, to communicate disclaimers. NDS provides no legal
support, nor substantive argument, to support its assertion that a message on its
website is sufficient to bar a remote buyer from pursuing a cause of action
established under Pennsylvania law for a breach of an implied warranty of
merchantability.
For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that Roamingwood is entitled to
summary judgment for its breach of implied warranty of merchantability claim.
B. NDS is Entitled to Summary Judgment on Roamingwood’s
UTPCPL Claim.
The UTPCPL provides a private cause of action for “[a]ny person who
purchases or leases goods or services primarily for personal, family or household
purposes and thereby suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property, real or
personal, as a result of . . . a method, act or practice declared unlawful by section 3
of this act.” 73 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 201-9.2(a). For purposes of the statute, a person
may be a natural person, corporation, or any other legal entity. § 201-2(2).
NDS argues that Roamingwood’s UTPCPL claim fails because, based on the
undisputed facts, the UTPCPL does not apply to entities like Roamingwood or
products like the KSC-2000-LC. (Doc. 112, pp. 11–14.) NDS argues that
Roamingwood never purchased anything from NDS, even indirectly. Instead,
NDS sold the check valves to TLCC, which sold the valves (now incorporated into
laterals) to a distributor; the distributor sold the laterals to O’Hara; and then
O’Hara installed the laterals for and sold them to SWA. (Id. at 11–12.) Because
Roamingwood does not now, nor did it ever, own the valves, it cannot bring a
claim under the UTPCPL. (Id.) NDS also argues that the UTPCPL does not apply
to the check valves because the statute applies to purchases of products made
“primarily for personal, family, or household use.” (Id. at 11 (quoting Valley
Forge Towers S. Condo. v. Ron-Ike Foam Insulators, Inc., 574 A.2d 641, 645 (Pa.
Super. 1990)).) Nor, NDS argues, can Roamingwood bring claims on behalf of
residents of The Hideout, because it is not a homeowners’ association; instead, it is
an agent of the municipality.5 (Id. at 16–19.)
Roamingwood argues that its status as an agent of SWA has no bearing on
whether it can bring a claim against NDS under the UTPCPL. (Doc. 114,
p. 30 n.3.) Instead, Roamingwood points to Rossi v. Firemen’s Ins. Co. of Newark,
N.J., 165 A. 16, 18 (Pa. 1932), in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
concluded that an agent may simultaneously serve two principals so long as the
duties of the agent to the two are such that there can be no conflict between the
agent’s twin duties of loyalty. (Doc. 131, p. 7 n.1.)
Next, Roamingwood argues that the check valves were purchased primarily
for personal, family, or household residential unit owners. (Doc. 114, p. 28
(quoting Valley Forge, 574 A.2d at 649).) Roamingwood argues that it is similar
to the condo association in Valley Forge. In Valley Forge, the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania noted that, under its precedent, “a condominium association could
represent individual unit owners who had purchased units for residential purposes
by pursuing legal redress acting in a representative capacity on behalf of the
individual unit owners.” 574 A.2d at 648 (citing 1000 Grandview Ass’n v. Mt.
5 NDS also argues that it should be granted summary judgment because there is no evidence that
it knew the check valves were defective. (Doc. 112, p. 22–23.) In the alternative, it argues that,
even if it knew the check valves were defective, it did not have duty to disclose the defect. (Id.
at 24.) Finally, NDS argues that it did not make any misrepresentations to Roamingwood about
the check valves. (Id. at p. 25.) The court does not address these arguments because
Roamingwood’s UTPCPL claim fails as a matter of law for the reasons addressed in this memo.
Wash. Ass’n, 434 A.2d 796 (1981)). The Superior Court concluded that this
representative standing extended to a claim under the UTPCPL because the
association had purchased the building’s roof primarily for the condo dweller’s
residential use, “rather than the condominium association’s putative business
purpose of managing the condominium building.” See id. at 648. The Court
concluded that the roofing materials which the association purchased were covered
under the UTPCPL and the association could raise a UTPCPL claim.
NDS counters that the present instance is dissimilar to Valley Forge, where
the association purchased the roof primarily for household purposes. (Doc. 112,
p. 16–19.) It argues that Roamingwood neither acted “as the legally authorized
representative” of the Hideout’s residents nor “purchased the check valves on
behalf of the owners for their household use.” (Id. at 17 (internal quotation marks
omitted).) Instead, NDS argues that Roamingwood’s conduct was more akin to
Cumberland Valley School District v. Hall-Kimbrell Environmental Services, 443
Pa. Super. 38 (1994). In that case, the court held that the school district—a public
entity—could not bring a claim under the UTPCPL. In purchasing asbestos
abatement services for school buildings, the school district was acting “pursuant to
a public purpose” but not “for the personal, family or household benefit of . . .
taxpayers and students.” (Doc. 112, p. 18 (quoting Cumberland Valley Sch., 443
Pa. Super. at 42–43).)
1. It is immaterial that SWA, not Roamingwood, purchased the
check valves.
The fact that Roamingwood does not own the check valves has no impact on
their ability to bring a UTPCPL claim. The text of the statute, which NDS quotes,
clearly states that it provides a private cause of action for a person who “purchases
or leases” goods. (Doc. 124, p. 10 (emphasis added) (quoting § 201-9.2(a)).) In
its briefing, NDS argues that, because SWA and not Roamingwood owns the check
valves, Roamingwood has no standing to bring this claim. But it is undisputed that
Roamingwood leases the sewer lines from SWA. (Doc. 111-1, ¶ 3.) And NDS
states, as an undisputed fact, that the check valves “were installed in the public use
part of the sewer system” that Roamingwood leased back from SWA and “for
which Roamingwood is responsible.” (Doc. 112, p. 18; Doc. 124, p. 12.)
Therefore, it is clear from the record that, although Roamingwood did not purchase
the check valves, it does lease them.
2. The check valves were not purchased or leased primarily for
household use.
Roamingwood cannot bring a UTPCPL claim for the Stage III check valves,
however, because they were not purchased primarily for household use.6 In this
court’s memorandum opinion at the motion to dismiss phase, it viewed the
6 Because the court concludes that the check valves were not purchased for household use, it will
not address whether Roamingwood can bring its claim in a representative capacity on behalf of
the residents of The Hideout.
pleadings in the light most favorable to NDS. Given the liberal construction that
UTPCPL claims are entitled to receive, the court concluded that Roamingwood
adequately pleaded that the check valves at issue were purchased primarily for
household use. (Doc. 28, p. 16.) Now, having the full suite of facts provided by
discovery, and based upon those undisputed facts, the court comes to the
conclusion that the check valves were not purchased primarily for household use.
As the court has noted, when determining whether a good is used primarily
for household use, the court looks to the purpose of the purchase rather than the
type of product purchased. (Id. at 14 (quoting Valley Forge, 574 A.2d at 648).) In
Valley Forge, the Superior Court noted that “a leak-proof roof is ultimately
essential to the structural integrity of the whole condominium building.” 574 A.2d
at 649. And, in that case, the whole condo building was primarily used for
residential use. Id. at 648.
Reasonably, Roamingwood submits that its “ability to safely remove raw
sewage away from each home in the Hideout and into a sewage treatment system is
essential for the use of the residential property.” (Doc. 114, p. 30.) While this may
be true, Roamingwood’s real argument is that its entire sewer system, included the
check valves, was installed primarily for household purposes and is therefore
covered under the UTPCPL. It argues that “[w]ithout a functioning sewer system,
including the check valve, each Hideout residence would be unlivable.” (Id.)
Therefore, the argument proceeds, the sewer system is like the roof in Valley
Forge, which “was deemed to be essential to the structural integrity of the whole
condominium building.” (Id.) Roamingwood stretches Valley Forge too far. The
court will not conclude that the entire sewer system of The Hideout, and all its
components therein, was primarily for household use and therefore subject to the
UTPCPL. The sewer system was overhauled by a government entity, SWA, or an
agent of that entity, Roamingwood. It was not built by a condo association or
homeowner’s association. And a development-wide sewer system is not the same
as a roof.
More narrowly, the Stage III check valves were purchased by SWA, a
municipal entity. They are managed by Roamingwood, an agent of that entity.
They are located in the portion of the sewage system for which Roamingwood, and
not the homeowner, is responsible. (Doc. 111-1, ¶ 27.) The present instance is not
like Valley Forge. In that case, a condo association acted on behalf of its residents
to purchase a roof, which is a necessity to all residential dwellings. But here,
Roamingwood acted as an agent of SWA to perform the function of a water and
sewage utility. In purchasing the check valves, it was acting as a utility and not as
a representative of consumers. The check valves were not purchased primarily for
household use.7 As a result, NDS is entitled to summary judgment with respect to
the UTPCPL claim that Roamingwood has raised.
B. Roamingwood is Entitled to Summary Judgment on its Strict Liability
Claim.
Under Pennsylvania law, a court may apply one of two tests when assessing
a strict liability claim for a manufacturing or design defect: (1) the risk-utility test
or (2) the consumer expectation test. See Tincher v. Omega Flex, 104 A.3d 328,
387 (Pa. 2014). As NDS notes in its briefing, the consumer expectations test “is
only applicable ‘where the question of how safely the product should have
performed can be answered by the common experience of its users.’” (Doc. 124,
p. 23 (quoting Commonwealth v. Monsanto Co., 269 A.3d 623, 657 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 2021).)
Under the consumer expectation test, a product is “in a defective condition if
the danger is unknowable and unacceptable to the average or ordinary consumer.”
(Id. at 24 (quoting Tincher, 104 A.3d at 387).) The court in Tincher noted, a
7Any residential property that is connected to a sewer system must be structured to not fill a
home with sewage. But that basic point does not answer the question here. The court notes that
residential properties have other functional needs that are not primarily for residential use per se.
For example, many homes are connected to a centralized public water system. The water pipes,
presumably installed and maintained by the municipality or utility, are essential not only for the
supply of water but also for ensuring that the water is safe. But that does not render public utility
water pipes primarily for residential use. Another example comes from the electrical grid to
which most homes are connected. Electrical grids have components, like transformers, which
are essential for a power grid that functions and provides electricity to residences in a usable and
safe form. But that does not make transformers, used by power utilities, primarily purchased for
household use.
product “should be strong enough to perform as the ordinary consumer expects.”
104 A.3d at 388. A product is not defective according to consumer expectation “if
the ordinary consumer would reasonably anticipate and appreciate the dangerous
condition of the product and the attendant risk of injury of which the plaintiff
complains.” Id. at 387 (citation omitted). The court in Tincher gave examples. A
knife would not be subject to strict liability on account of being sharp, nor would
butter for impacting a consumer’s heart health. Id. (“Good butter is not
unreasonably dangerous merely because, if such be the case, it deposits cholesterol
in the arteries and leads to heart attacks; but bad butter, contaminated with
poisonous fish oil, is unreasonably dangerous.”) (quoting Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 402A cmt. i).
Here, NDS asserts that a sewage spill is not an unknowable danger
associated with sewer systems. (Doc. 124, p. 24.) It also asserts that there is no
evidence to suggest that such a spill could cause health risks. (Id.) NDS does not
point to any evidence to support its proposition that an ordinary consumer would
know that upgrading a sewer valve would create a risk that their home or basement
would fill with sewage. Nor does NDS point to any evidence supporting the
proposition that an ordinary consumer would accept such risk.
NDS’s arguments are unconvincing. It conflates the question of whether a
danger is conceivable with whether an ordinary consumer would reasonably
anticipate it. To illustrate, it is conceivable that an automobile, when rear-ended,
could burst into flames. That very thing has happened as in the history of
automobiles. But, in the present era, an ordinary consumer would surely not
expect that an automobile carries that risk.
Nor would an ordinary consumer reasonably anticipate that a new sewer
valve would allow sewage to seep into their home. Indeed, the check valve has
only one purpose: to allow sewage to flow in one direction but not the other. To
say that a reasonable consumer would expect it to allow a sewage leak is to say
that said consumer expects it not to work at all.
NDS asserts that the sewage spills associated with its failed check valves do
not pose any risk to an ordinary consumer.8 Roamingwood counters by pointing
out that the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”) has
determined that the release of sewage is a health hazard. (Doc. 131, p. 22.)
Specifically, the DEP has stated that “[m]alfunctioning sewage disposal systems
. . . pose a serious threat to public health and the environment.” (Id.; Doc. 122-2,
p. 2.) The threat includes “expos[ing] humans and animals to various bacteria,
8 NDS also asserts, without citing any evidence on the record, that no sewage spills have
occurred at The Hideout. (Doc. 124, p. 24.) Because NDS does not support this assertion, the
court does not make it a factual finding.
viruses, and parasites.”9 (Doc. 122, ¶ 117; Doc. 122-2, p. 2.) Accordingly,
Roamingwood has established that sewage leaks cause health risks.
Next, without providing any argument in support, NDS asserts that the court
should apply the risk-utility test and not the consumer expectation test. (Doc. 124,
p. 23.) But in laying out the seven factors of the risk-utility test, NDS only argues
one. (Id. at 24–26.) Regarding the third factor, “the availability of a substitute
product which would meet the same need and not be as unsafe,” NDS argues that
Roamingwood and its two valve design experts have provided no alternative
design. (Id. at 25–26.)
Roamingwood counters by adding an important nuance to the third factor in
the risk-utility test—the availability of a substitute product. It points out that a
plaintiff may either “present this evidence by reference to the products already
available on the market or through expert testimony.” (Doc. 131, p. 23 (emphasis
omitted) (quoting Zollars v. Troy-Built, LLC, No. CV-10-924, 2012 WL 4922689,
at *3 (W.D. Pa. 2012)).) Roamingwood asserts that NDS itself already sold an
9 Indeed, while an ordinary consumer would not expect a sewage valve to fail its sole purpose,
they would surely be aware that there are health issues related to sewage. Prominent national
and international institutions have well-documented such health issues. See Handling Human
Waste or Sewage, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
https://www.cdc.gov/healthywater/emergency/sanitation-
wastewater/workers_handlingwaste.html; Better Sewage Treatment Critical for Human Health
and Ecosystems, UN Environmental Programme, https://www.unep.org/news-and-
stories/story/better-sewage-treatment-critical-human-health-and-ecosystems; Impact of Sewer
Overflow on Public Health: A Comprehensive Scientometric Analysis and Systematic Review,
PubMed, https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/34216613/.
available substitute. (See id.) Once NDS discontinued the KSC-2000-LC, it
immediately began substituting that check valve with another of its models—the
KSC-1500-LC. (Id.; Doc. 132, ¶ 1.) Roamingwood asserts that the KSC-1500-LC
check valve has not had any reported failures either at The Hideout or elsewhere.
(Doc. 131, p. 23.) The court concludes that, if the court were applying the risk-
utility test, Roamingwood would have met its burden with respect to the third
factor.
The court concludes that the consumer expectation test is applicable and that
the KSC-2000-LC that NDS manufactured for Stage III of Roamingwood’s
upgrade fails the test. The court also concludes that, if it had applied the risk-
utility test, NDS would have failed to raise sufficient facts to show that
Roamingwood is not entitled to summary judgment. As a result, the court will
grant Roamingwood summary judgment on its strict liability claim.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons provided above, the court will grant in part and deny in part
NDS’ and Roamingwood’s motions for summary judgment. Specifically, the court
will deny NDS’ motion as it applies to the breach of implied warranty claim but
grant it as it applies to the UTPCPL claim. The court will grant Roamingwood’s
motion as it applies to the breach of implied warranty and strict liability claims but
deny it as it applies to the UTPCPL claim. A corresponding order will follow.
s/Jennifer P. Wilson
JENNIFER P. WILSON
United States District Court Judge
Middle District of Pennsylvania
Dated: April 4, 2023