Opinion

Pinckney v. Mason

Court
District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
Filed
Mar 27, 2023
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 29.2%

holding that individuals are not liable under Title II because it prohibits discrimination in programs of a “public entity” or discrimination “by any such entity” and “public entity” is not defined in Title II to include individuals

How later courts described this case

  • holding that individuals are not liable under Title II because it prohibits discrimination in programs of a “public entity” or discrimination “by any such entity” and “public entity” is not defined in Title II to include individuals
  • noting that to assert a plausible claim, the plaintiff “must identify [the] custom or policy and specify what exactly that custom or policy was”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ALBERT PINCKNEY, :

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:22-0751

:

Plaintiff

: (JUDGE MANNION)

v.

:

BERNADETTE MASON, et al.,

:

Defendants

:

MEMORANDUM

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Albert Pinckney, an inmate currently confined at the Mahanoy

State Correctional Institution, Frackville (“SCI-Mahanoy”), Pennsylvania,

filed the above caption civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. (Doc.

1). The named Defendants are Correct Care Solutions LLC, Wellpath, LLC,

PA Jenna Williams, Dr. Peter Baddick, and Dr. Pinky Bora Saikia, (“Medical

Defendants”) and Department of Corrections (“DOC”) employees:

Superintendent Bernadette Mason and Medical Administrator Christian

Hause, (“Corrections Defendants”). Id.

Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, alleging that he

“suffered from delay of treatment, negligence, malpractice, Eighth

Amendment violation, violation of the ADA, RA and medical code of Ethics”

for the treatment of a shoulder injury.” Id.

Presently before the Court are two separate motions to dismiss filed

on behalf of the Corrections and Medical Defendants. (Docs. 18, 23). The

motions are fully briefed and ripe for disposition. For the reasons set forth

below, the Court will grant both motions to dismiss.

II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT AND SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT

Plaintiff’s complaint and supplement complains of “three claims with

multiple events combined into one claim.” (Doc. 1 at 5). Initially, Plaintiff

alleges that in June, 2021 “Event One”, described as “a shoulder injury

occurred” as follows:

[W]hile working in the Prison’s Food Service Department,

Plaintiff contends while working he was directed by his instructor

to push a food-serve cart out of the inmate dining hall;

subsequently, while pushing said car Plaintiff heard a loud and

painful pop in his left shoulder bade, it literally had felt like

someone had punched Plaintiff in his back.

Plaintiff immediately went to his instructor/Supervisor in the

kitchen one; Mrs. Miller at the time, as since she has retired. After

reporting said injury, Mrs. Miller wrote immediately a work related

injury report and sent Plaintiff to medical for triage. Subsequently,

once at medical’s triage a nurse NOT named at this time had

looked at Plaintiff’s left shoulder, took a photograph of the injury,

i.e., [“Why Plaintiff is not fully aware, because the injury is on the

inside of the shoulder blade area”]; consequently, thereof and

- 2 -

after to date Plaintiff avers he was “NOT” and had “NOT been

adequately, properly and timely treated and cared for, Plaintiff

thereinafter was simply sent back to his Housing Unit in severe

pain and was unable to move his left shoulder without further

extreme pain and sufferings.

Thereafter, Plaintiff avers that he was called to the medical

department, in which was on a Tuesday where he was seen for

Mandatory sick-call for being prior triaged, in which was

performed by an un-named male PA-C medical staff member.

During the sick-call visit this PA-C had asked Plaintiff if he could

lift his left arm; Plaintiff’s response was very, very little without

severe pain.

Thereof this PA-C afforced Plaintiff “ONLY” two Tylenol and three

muscle relaxers, “NO” MRI or MRA was ordered/prescribed or

suggested. Thus, Plaintiff was “NOT” adequately or properly

treated or cared for, in violation of “AMERCIAN’S WITH

DISABILITY’S ACT,” “THE RA ACT, under Title II,” and “EIGHTH

AMENDMENT” violation, “WILFUL NEGLIGENCE” and “A

WANTON ACT TO PREJUDICE” and “DENY TREATMENT,”

thus, also violations of “MEDICAL CODE OF ETHICS”.

This same said PA-C told Plaintiff I’ll prescribe you five days of

muscle relaxers again “NO” MRI or MRA was ordered, no brace

for support, no order to be sent out to an outside hospital, let

alone a prompt X-ray; thereof, Plaintiff was placed on

Acetaminophen for five days, six tablets once a day as needed.

Subsequently, thereafter, Plaintiff suffered in extreme pain, was

and still currently is unable to fully move, let alone lift his left arm

in the air.

Plaintiff argues that simply being medicated with medications

particularly that did “NOT” work was “NOT” an adequate or

proper treatment/care of fix. Thereafter, Plaintiff had filed and

FULLY exhausted DC-804, Prt. 1 in-house Grievance.

Thereafter, the medical department had finally decided after

multiple sick call, medical visits to take “ONLY” at the time an in-

- 3 -

house X-ray, in which obviously will not and did not show

anything torn or ripped in Plaintiff’s left shoulder as an X-ray is

not proper care, let alone treatment. Up until that date again an

MRI was unconstitutionally denied. Consequently, the SAME

said Defendants in the initial CAUSE of ACTION named,

particularly at the Medical Department tried ordering/prescribing

physical therapy, in which was a failed attempt as the pain was

extremely unbearable; i.e. [“physical therapist does NOT fix,

correct or remedy a torn shoulder, only surgery”], in which to

[date] I have been denied clearly adequate and proper treatment

and care of my now work related injury.

Thus, my work related shoulder injuries CAUSED by said named

defendant’ are HEREWITH being Supplemented/Amended as

an actual “ALLEGED” allegation and event for review to

determined by a DEMANDED jury at trial; with the PLEADING

for AMENDED AWARD for punitive and compensatory damages

in the amount NOT less than $150,000.00 dollars with the

promise of adequate and proper pain medications, surgery and

thereafter physical therapy by an outside therapist; with the

promise of ANY future care and surgeries thereafter.

(Doc. 10 at 2-4).

Plaintiff, then describes “Event Two” occurring as follows:

Thereafter, many month(s) past; four month(s) actually and on

the date of November 5, 2021, finally the MRI Imaging test was

performed.

Dr. Bora Pinky Saikis upon review of the MRI Imaging had

determined that my right should is deteriorated and needs

surgery. Dr. Bora Pinky Saikis had placed an order for approval

of such surgery. However, to date no said approval or surgical

procedure done.

(Doc. 1 at 9).

Finally, Plaintiff’s “Event Three” is described as follows:

- 4 -

I had placed a sick-call slip into medical to be seen about a

severe and painful cough, subsequently, thereafter filing said

sick-call slip the medical staff and Officer’s came to retrieve me

and my celly that evening and housed in the RHU quarantine

block for (15)-days for their holding possible COVID-19.

I remained in the RHU quarantine block with NO adequate

housing, punished as if I were in the RHU for behavior infraction.

Medical only checked on me once a day if that and deficiently

DID NOT treat me for the cough let alone any medical ailment,

particularly my severe and painful cough. After the (15) days had

surpassed I was released from the RHU quarantine block on

9/7/21 and re-housed in general population on my old housing

unit FA-Block. I had to place, yet another sick-call slip into

medical and what I had founded was that it was a medical/severe

medical reaction to combination of blood pressure pills that

medical staff here placed me on they had combined two

medications of Lisinopril and HCTZ for one 20mgs and second

one 25 mgs.

(Doc. 1 at 10).

On September 13, 2021, Plaintiff filed Grievance No. 946624,

challenging all three “events”. (Doc. 1-3 at 1). In an Initial Review Response

dated October 25, 2021, Plaintiff’s Grievance No. 946624 was denied as

follows:

Upon reviewing your medical record, I can see that you were

seen by the practitioner on 6/16/2021 with complaints of Right

should pain. The practitioner reviewed the X-ray report with you

and discussed that a consult was placed for an MRI of your Right

shoulder. You were instructed to return to sick call if symptoms

worsened and you verbalized understanding of same.

You were seen again in sick call on 6/30 asking if there is any

news if you were going for your test. You told the practitioner the

- 5 -

pain is constant and the Motrin only helps temporarily and is

starting to hurt your stomach. You also told the practitioner you

are having a hard time sleeping because the pain radiates down

your arm and you are having tingling sensations as well. Upon

assessment the practitioner noted you were awake alert and

oriented, you had full range of motion and strength of left upper

extremity with intact, reflexes, decreased range of motion of right

shoulder to approximately 90-100 degrees lateral abduction until

pain felt. No tenderness to palpation, full grip strength, no

deformity noted. Full range of motion noted of the neck, no

deformity noted, no active spasms, no masses, no skin

discoloration. The practitioner explained to you that a written

consult was previously completed, you declined NSAIDS, she

discussed other medication options including proper use and

side effects and agreed to try Pamelor. PT consult previously

placed as well. Practitioner also discussed stretches and

exercises. Lastly discussed if no improvement or worsening of

symptoms you needed to make medical aware of return to sick

call as needed. Placed sick call to ask if you were approved to

go out for imaging of your shoulder. The practitioner explained it

was approved and all was placed in Sapphire however, we didn’t

have a date yet. You had no further questions at that time.

Saw Dr. Bora in sick call on 8/11/21 with increased shoulder pain

and plantar pain and also had complaints of sinus pressure.

Upon assessment the Dr. Noted no cough, you denied body

aches. You stated you stopped taking Pamelor because it’s not

working. You also admitted that Tylenol not working. Dr. started

you on Augmentin for your sinuses and awaiting MRI.

On 8/22/21 you handed the pill line nurse a sick call slip that

stated you had sinus and chest congestion. Due to symptoms

you were escorted up and requested to do a COVID swab. You

became agitated and initially refused the COVID PCR test.

Security escorted you the RHU C-Pod where they house all

suspected +COVID cases. You were housed in C-Pod from

8/23/21 to 8/27/21 until you were taken to Lehigh Valley Hospital

East for the Monoclonal Antibody infusion and from there you

were admitted to the infirmary when you returned back to the

- 6 -

institution. Upon the Dr.’s assessment the next morning he noted

that you denied shortness of breath and the nurse assisted you

to ambulate in the room without your oxygen and your pulse ox

remained stable at 97-98% on room air. Dr. Baddick then left

orders to hold the o2 at this time and recheck your pulse ox Q15

minutes x 1hour and then Q1hourx3 hours. The Dr. wanted your

oxygen levels to be maintained about 94% and they were. You

were then seen again on 08/31/21 by the Dr. on morning rounds

and denies shortness of breath, your pulse ox on room air

remained 97-98% with activity. You denied any complaints at that

time. Dr. medically cleared you to be discharged back to the C-

Pod RHU quarantine block. You were in C-Pod quarantine block

for 14 days, while there you had no complaints or pain or

discomfort while nursing did their rounds. Dr. Baddick saw you

on 09/07/21 on morning rounds and noted you were

asymptomatic x3 days and medically discharged you to general

population on 09/7/21.

You were then in sick call on 9/10/21 stating you still have pain

in your right shoulder and a chronic cough for more than a year

intermittently that is not from COVID. Dr. notes that it could

possibly be your ACE inhibitor which is your Lisinopril. Dr. did

order and X-ray to r/o any disease and did educate you to return

to sick call if no better or if this continues to get worse.

You were on the call out on 9/15/21 for Md line with Dr. Baddick

and you were a NO SHOW, the block was called for you to make

your appointment and you still were a NO SHOW.

You came up as a triage on 9/18/21 and were sent to the OSH

via ambulance for chest pains and a cough. You rated your chest

pain at an 8. VS were stable -97.4-73-18-120/68-98% on room

air. You were awake alert and oriented x3. You state the chest

pains were sharp and started about 2 hours prior to coming up

for triage and the cough started a week ago. Speech was clear,

respirations easy and unlabored, lungs clear throughout

bilaterally. Abdomen soft non-distended +bs x 4quads. Skin

warm dry and intact. No edema noted, brisk capillary refill noted,

+pedal pulses noted bilaterally. EKG completed. Dr. ordered

- 7 -

ASA to be administered and to be sent to OSH for further

evaluation and Inmate sent via EMS. You returned from the

outside hospital and was admitted the infirmary. You were seen

on 9/19/21 by the practitioner who then told you that the hospital

diagnosed you with pleurisy (which is an inflammation of the thin

layer of tissue that lines the lungs and chest walls). Pleurisy can

be very painful and cause chest pains like you were having.

When the practitioner came in to see you, you were exercising in

the room. You deny chest pains, shortness of breath,

palpitations, or additional complaints at this time. Upon

assessment you were awake alert and oriented, respirations

easy and unlabored, lungs clear throughout on room air. VS

stable 97.0-66-16-124/88-97% on room air. The practitioner did

tell you he wanted you to stay in the infirmary yet to monitor you

and you verbalized understanding of same. You were seen on

shift rounds by the nurses with no complaints. You were then

seen by Dr. Baddick on 9/20/21 on daily morning rounds and he

noted you were awake alert and oriented with no medical distress

noted. You denied shortness of breath or chest pains at present.

He did make you aware that he was discharging you back to the

block to general population on 9/20/21.

You were then seen in MD line on 10/7/21 for chronic right

shoulder pain and you did see Dr. Baddick. Your MRI of your

right shoulder is scheduled but you are awaiting an appointment.

Dr. placed you on a Prednisone taper and will also see you after

your MRI to review your MRI results with you. Dr. noted

Prednisone taper for 9 days. You have been educated by the

practitioners, nurses, and Dr.’s about medication options and the

X-rays that have been done. Continue to utilize sick call as

needed for any symptoms you are experiencing as needed.

The allegations in this grievance are found to be without merit,

therefore the grievance is denied.

- 8 -

(Doc. 1-3 at 3-4). Plaintiff’s medical care was upheld as “reasonable and

appropriate” through the Final Appeal Decision issued on March 17, 2022.

(Doc. 1-3 at 9).

On January 9, 2022, Plaintiff filed Grievance No. 963182 regarding the

care he was receiving for his shoulder injury. (Doc. 10-1 at 5). On January

26, 2022, Plaintiff’s Grievance No. 963182 was denied as follows:

You claim that your left shoulder injury is not being treated

properly and you are requesting an MRI or MRA study to

diagnose an injury. An MRA (magnetic resonance angiogram)

likely would not be ordered for this particular issue due to the

nature of the complaint not being cardia (heart) related. After

reviewing your medical chart, you were seen on 12/28/2021 by

the PA and ordered oral pain medications to help treat

discomfort. After returning to see a provider again on 1/3/2022,

she ordered you more rest and heat to the affected area

combined with pain medication from previous appointment. You

were seen a third time on 1/14/2022 where an x-ray was ordered.

An MRI is used for diagnosing soft tissue injuries and typically

can not and will not be ordered prior to exhausting less invasive

efforts first. Your x-ray was completed on 1/19/2022; results from

this will help determined whether or not the provided deems an

MRI order medical necessary at this point. To date, the providers

have been treating your ailment appropriately and just according

to their professional opinion.

Due to the above stated and your grievance lacking arguable

facts, this grievance is denied.

(Doc. 10-1 at 1). This decision was upheld through Final Appeal to the

Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals. (Doc. 10-1 at 8).

- 9 -

III. MOTION TO DISMISS

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal of a complaint for “failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Under Rule 12(b)(6), we

must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable

reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Fowler v.

UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009)(quoting Phillips v.

County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008)). While a complaint

need only contain “a short and plain statement of the claim,” Fed.R.Civ.P.

8(a)(2), and detailed factual allegations are not required, Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), a complaint must plead “enough facts

to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “The

plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for

more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[L]abels

and conclusions” are not enough, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, and a court “is

not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual

allegation.” Id. (quoted case omitted). Thus, “a judicial conspiracy claim must

include at least a discernible factual basis to survive a Rule

- 10 -

12(b)(6) dismissal.” Capogrosso v. The Supreme Court of New Jersey, 588

F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).

In resolving the motion to dismiss, we thus “conduct a two-part

analysis.” Fowler, supra, 578 F.3d at 210. First, we separate the factual

elements from the legal elements and disregard the legal conclusions. Id. at

210-11. Second, we “determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint

are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief”.” Id. at

211 (quoted case omitted).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Eighth Amendment Medical Claim

In order to establish an Eighth Amendment medical claim, a plaintiff

must show “(i) a serious medical need, and (ii) acts or omissions by prison

officials that indicate deliberate indifference to that need.” Natale v. Camden

Cty. Correctional Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003). See also Rouse

v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). A serious medical need is one

that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment, or one that

is so obvious that a layperson would recognize the need for a doctor’s

attention. Monmouth County Correctional Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro,

834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987). In addition, “if unnecessary and wanton

- 11 -

infliction of pain results as a consequence of denial or delay in the provision

of adequate medical care, the medical need is of the serious nature

contemplated by the eighth amendment.” Id.

A prison official acts with deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious

medical needs when he “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate

health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the

inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and

he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837

(1994). Thus, a complaint that a physician or a medical department “has

been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state

a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment ...”

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). For instance, a “medical decision

not to order an X-ray, or like measures, does not represent cruel and unusual

punishment. At most it is medical malpractice.” Id., 429 U.S. at 107. “[A]s

long as a physician exercises professional judgment his behavior will not

violate a prisoner’s constitutional rights.” Brown v. Borough of

Chambersburg, 903 F.2d 274, 278 (3d Cir. 1990). Further, a doctor’s

disagreement with the professional judgment of another doctor is not

actionable under the Eighth Amendment. See White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d

103, 110 (3d Cir. 1990). In sum, negligence, unsuccessful medical treatment,

- 12 -

or medical malpractice does not give rise to a §1983 cause of action, and an

inmate's disagreement with medical treatment is insufficient to establish

deliberate indifference. See Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69 (3d Cir.

1993).

Further, a prison administrator cannot be found deliberately indifferent

under the Eighth Amendment because he or she fails to respond to the

medical complaints of an inmate being treated by a prison physician, or

because, as non-physicians, they defer to the medical judgment of the

inmate's treating physicians. Id., 991 F.2d at 69. If, however, non-medical

prison personnel had “a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison

doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner,” liability

may be imposed. Spruill, 372 F.3d 236.

A mere difference of opinion between the prison's medical staff and the

inmate regarding the diagnosis or treatment which the inmate receives does

not support a claim of cruel and unusual punishment. Farmer v. Carlson, 685

F. Supp. 1335, 1339 (M.D. Pa. 1988). See McCracken v. Jones, 562 F.2d

22, 24 (10th Cir. 1977); Smart v. Villar, 547 F.2d 112, 113 (10th Cir. 1976).

Additionally, if there is a dispute over the adequacy of the received

treatment, courts have consistently been reluctant to second guess the

medical judgment of the attending physician. Little v. Lycoming County, 912

- 13 -

F. Supp. 809, 815 (M.D. Pa.), aff’d, 101 F.3d 691 (3d Cir. 1996). The key

question is whether the defendant has provided the plaintiff with some type

of treatment, regardless of whether it is what the plaintiff desires. Farmer v.

Carlson, 685 F. Supp. at 1339.

Here, Plaintiff’s own documentation demonstrates that Plaintiff

received substantial medical attention, and that the attention Plaintiff

received lacks that requisite deliberate indifference to support a Section

1983 claim. Specifically, Plaintiff was immediately evaluated and treated

after hurting his shoulder pushing a cart in the Food Service Department.

Additionally, Plaintiff was evaluated at outside hospitals, prescribed X-rays

and an MRI, various pain medications, physical therapy, a medical lay-in and

an approval for surgery. There is no indication, whatsoever, that at any time

medical treatment was denied or intentionally withheld. Plaintiff own exhibits

establish that at all times, Plaintiff was thoroughly examined and immediately

recommended for testing or medication based on his symptoms.

As to his cough, he was also followed by medical. He complained of

sinus pressure and chest congestion for which he was tested for COVID-19.

He was quarantined and taken to the hospital for infusion therapy. Upon

return to the institution, his pulse ox was monitored and after three (3) days

of being asymptomatic, he was discharged back to the block. A few days

- 14 -

later, he was seen on sick call at which time he reported a chronic cough for

more than a year intermittently. The doctor advised that it could possibly be

from his ACE inhibitor, Lisinopril, and an x-ray was ordered to rule out

disease. Shortly thereafter, he was sent to the hospital via ambulance for

chest pains and a cough. He was diagnosed with pleurisy. He was admitted

to the prison infirmary upon his return for continued monitoring.

At best, Plaintiff’s allegations demonstrate Plaintiff’s disagreement with

the type of treatment rendered. However, his mere disagreement with the

course of action that the medical department took based on the symptoms

he presented, is not enough to state a §1983 claim. Sample v. Diecks, 885

F.2d 1099, 1109 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105–06 (in the

medical context, an inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care

cannot be said to constitute an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or

to be repugnant to the conscience of mankind) ). This is particularly so in

light of the fact that there are no facts set forth in Plaintiff’s complaint or

attached exhibits that demonstrate that any named Defendant intentionally

withheld medical treatment from Plaintiff in order to inflict pain or harm upon

Plaintiff. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; Rouse, 12 F.3d at 197. Thus, the

allegations in the Plaintiff’s complaint amount to nothing more than Plaintiff’s

subjective disagreement with the treatment decisions and medical judgment

- 15 -

of the medical staff at the prison. Where, as here, an inmate is provided with

medical care and the dispute is over the adequacy of that care, an Eighth

Amendment claim does not exist. Nottingham v. Peoria, 709 F. Supp. 542,

547 (M.D. Pa. 1988). At most, the allegations in the complaint only rise to

the level of mere negligence. As simple negligence cannot serve as a

predicate to liability under §1983, Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984),

Plaintiff’s civil rights complaint fails to articulate an arguable claim against

any of the named Defendants. See White, 897 F.2d at 108-110. As such,

both the Medical and Corrections Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s

Eighth Amendment medical deliberate indifference claim will be granted.

B. ADA and RA Claims

Plaintiff’s ADA and RA claims will be considered together because “the

substantive standards for determining liability are the same.” Furgess v. Pa.

Dep’t of Corr., 933 F.3d 285, 288 (3d Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). Individual

defendants are not liable under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act. Emerson v.

Thiel College, 296 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir. 2002). To prevail on his claims

under Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the RA, Plaintiff must show: (1)

“he is a qualified individual with a disability”; (2) he “was precluded from

participating in a program, service, or activity, or otherwise was subject to

- 16 -

discrimination”; (3) “by reason of his disability.” Id. at 288–89; 42 U.S.C.

§12133.

Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”) provides that “no

qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be

excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,

programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by

any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. §12132, As used in Title II of the ADA, “public

entity” is defined as: “(A) any State or local government; (B) any department,

agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States

or local government; and (C) the National Railroad Passenger Corporation,

and any commuter authority (as defined in section 103(8) of the Rail

Passenger Service Act [49 U.S.C.S. §24102(4)]).” 42 U.S.C. §12131(a).

State prisons fall squarely within the statutory definition of “public entity” in

Title II of the ADA. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S.

206, 210 (1998). However, the plain language of §12132 applies only to

public entities not individuals. Yeskey v. Commonwealth, 76 F.Supp.2d 572,

575 (M.D. Pa. 1999) (holding that individuals are not liable under Title II

because it prohibits discrimination in programs of a “public entity” or

discrimination “by any such entity” and “public entity” is not defined in Title II

to include individuals). None of the moving Defendants qualify as a public

- 17 -

entity, nor do the facts of Plaintiff’s complaint indicate, in any way, that he is

a qualified individual with a disability that was excluded from participation in

or denied the benefits of some public entity’s services, programs or activities.

Therefore, the ADA and RA are inapplicable, and this claim will be dismissed.

C. Claims against Wellpath and Correct Care Solutions

Wellpath and Correct Care Solutions have contracted with the DOC to

provide medical care to inmates housed at SCI-Mahanoy and other state

institutions. The Third Circuit, however, has held that “a private health care

company providing services to inmates ‘cannot be held responsible for the

acts of its employees under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious

liability.’ ” Sims v. Wexford Health Sources, 635 F. App'x 16, 20 (3d Cir. 2015)

(quoting Natale v. Camden Cty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 583 (3d Cir.

2003)). Rather, a plaintiff must allege that the private healthcare company

had “a relevant ... policy or custom, and that the policy caused the

constitutional violation [he] allege[s].” Natale, 318 F.3d at 584; see also

Lomax v. City of Philadelphia, No. 13-cv-1078, 2017 WL 1177095, at *3 (E.D.

Pa. Mar. 29, 2017) (“Because [defendant] is a private company contracted

by a prison to provide health care for inmates, ... it can only be held liable for

constitutional violations if it has a custom or policy exhibiting deliberate

indifference to a prisoner's serious medical needs.”). Here, Plaintiff fails to

- 18 -

allege any facts demonstrating that the alleged violations of his Eighth

Amendment rights resulted from any policies, practices, or customs set forth

by Defendants Wellpath or Correct Care Solutions. See McTernan v. City of

York, 564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting that to assert a plausible

claim, the plaintiff “must identify [the] custom or policy and specify what

exactly that custom or policy was”). For that reason alone, Plaintiff's claims

against Defendants Wellpath and Correct Care Solutions are subject to

dismissal.

D. State Law Claims

The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state

law claims. When a district court has dismissed all claims over which it had

original jurisdiction, the Court may decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over the pendent state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. §1367(c)(3).

The Court’s decision regarding the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction is

one that should be based on “the values of judicial economy, convenience,

fairness, and comity.” See Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343,

350 (1988). Ordinarily, when all federal claims have been dismissed and only

state law claims remain, the balance of these factors indicates that the

remaining claims properly belong in state court. See id. In the absence of a

viable federal claim and finding nothing to distinguish this matter from the

- 19 -

ordinary case, the Court finds that the balance of factors in this case “point[s]

toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.”

See id. at 350 n.7. Accordingly, the Court having dismissed all federal claims,

will dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claims of profession negligence against

Defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1367(c)(3).

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court will grant both the

Corrections and Medical Defendants’ motions to dismiss and will close the

above captioned action.

A separate Order shall issue.

s/ Malachy E. Mannion

MALACHY E. MANNION

United States District Judge

Dated: March 27, 2023

22-0751-01

- 20 -

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.