Talbert v. Beaver

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CHARLES TALBERT, :

Plaintiff : CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:22-0112

v. : (JUDGE MANNION)

LT. BEAVER, et al., :

Defendants :

MEMORANDUM

I. BACKGROUND

On January 21, 2022, Plaintiff, Charles Talbert, an inmate formerly

confined1 at the State Correctional Institution, Camp Hill (“SCI-Camp Hill”),

Pennsylvania, filed the above caption civil rights action, pursuant to 42

U.S.C. §1983. (Doc. 1). The named Defendants are the following SCI-Camp

Hill employees: Lt. Beaver, Sgt. Johnson and Correctional Officers,

Fontaine, Doyle, Stanbaugh, Sandaval, and Williamson. Id.

Plaintiff complains of an incident which occurred on December 30,

2021, in which Plaintiff claims that his “mental health was triggered, causing

him to feel suicidal and helpless” after “watch[ing] Johnson allow Fontaine to

1 Plaintiff is currently confined in the State Correctional Institution, Coal

Township, Pennsylvania.

throw several articles of property away and to confiscate Plaintiff’s Bible.” Id.

Plaintiff claims that “on his person, [he] possessed over 25 Tylenol and

Ibuprofen pills,” and “threatened to swallow all of his medication and commit

suicide,” should Defendant Johnson “continue to allow Fontaine [to] destroy

and throw away his property.” Id. He states that “instead of seeking a mental

health provider or try to ease Plaintiff’s mental health crisis, Johnson had

carelessly and recklessly and maliciously threatened to come into Plaintiff’s

cell and assault him with other officers.” Id. Defendants then “gathered

outside of Plaintiff’s cell, while another officer grabbed hold of a shield.” Id.

Plaintiff, “having a panic attack and in fear of his life, grabbed his mattress

for protection.” Id. Plaintiff states that “all said Defendants came rushing into

Plaintiff’s cell and despite having knowledge of his asthma and high blood

pressure, these Defendants had used large amounts of pepper spray on

Plaintiff, even while he was on the ground, laying on his stomach,

defenseless.” Id. Plaintiff claims that he was “sprayed in his eyes, nose, ears

and face, causing him to hyperventilate, go temporary blind and his skin to

extremely burn and cause excruciating pain and suffering.” Id. He alleges

that Defendants “participated in punching Plaintiff in the back of his head,

while squeezing metal handcuffs around the bone of his lower wrists, to

which had then pulled him up from the ground by the tether connected to the

handcuffs in an awkward position to which caused the Plaintiff nerve, bone

and muscle injury to a preexisting right thumb, hand and wrist injury from a

prior assault.” Id.

Plaintiff filed the instant action in which he seeks compensatory and

punitive damages for Defendants’ alleged use of force which Plaintiff claims

was “premeditated and done in a malicious, racist, sadistic, arbitrary, cruel

and capricious manner, with intent to savagely cause harm.” Id.

Presently pending are the parties’ cross-motions for summary

judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. For the following

reasons, the Court will grant Defendants’ Rule 56 motion and deny Talbert’s

motion.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Through summary adjudication, the court may dispose of those claims

that do not present a “genuine dispute as to any material fact.” FED. R. CIV.

P. 56(a). A fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the

governing law[.]” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing

the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact. Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once such a showing has been made,

the non-moving party must offer specific facts contradicting those averred by

the movant to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife

Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990). Thus, the non-moving party may not

oppose summary judgment simply on the basis of the pleadings, or on

conclusory statements that a factual dispute exists. Anderson, 477 U.S. at

248. Rather, the nonmovant “must support the assertion by citing to

particular parts of materials in the record . . . or showing that the materials

cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that

an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.”

FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(A)-(B).

In evaluating whether summary judgment should be granted, “[t]he

court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other

materials in the record.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(3). “Inferences should be drawn

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and where the non-

moving party’s evidence contradicts the movant’s, then the non-movant’s

must be taken as true.” Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974

F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992). Courts may resolve cross-motions for

summary judgment concurrently. See Lawrence v. City of Philadelphia, 527

F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir. 2008); 10A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §2720 (3d ed. 2015). When doing so, the court is

bound to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant with

respect to each motion. See Lawrence, 527 F.3d at 310 (citation omitted).

III. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), prisoner plaintiffs

must exhaust all available administrative remedies before they may file suit

in federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Downey v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 968

F.3d 299, 304 (3d Cir. 2020). The statute requires “proper exhaustion,”

meaning the prisoner must complete the administrative review process in

accordance with the procedural rules set by the prison. Downey, 968 F.3d at

305 (citing Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88 (2006)).

Under DC-ADM 804, a prisoner must first submit a timely written

grievance for review by the Superintendent or regional grievance coordinator

within fifteen days from the date of the incident. (Doc. 60-3 at 29, DC-ADM

804). DC-ADM 804 provides that the grievance must include “a statement of

the facts relevant to the claim,” “shall identify individuals directly involved in

the events,” and “shall specifically state any claims [the inmate] wishes to

make concerning violations of Department directives, regulations, court

orders, or other law.” Id. If the inmate wishes to receive compensation or

“other legal relief normally available from a court” as a remedy for his

grievance, he “must request the specific relief sought in his/her initial

grievance.” Id. A response should be received within ten business days. Id.

Next, the prisoner must submit a timely written appeal to an intermediate

review level within ten working days. Id. Again, a response should be

received within ten working days. Id. Finally, the inmate must submit a timely

appeal to the Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals

(“SOIGA”) within fifteen working days, and the inmate should receive a final

determination within thirty days. To fully exhaust an issue or incident in

accordance with DC-ADM 804, “[a]n inmate must exhaust all three levels of

review and comply with all procedural requirements of the grievance review

process.” Id.

On December 27, 2021, Plaintiff filed Grievance Number 961802,

stating that “Officer Fontaine had threatened to have [his] breakfast and

lunch meals contaminated with semen, urine, and feces because of [his]

PREA action against him.” (Doc. 44 at 6). Also on December 27, 2021,

Plaintiff filed Grievance Number 961809, stating that “Officer Fontaine (an

officer with a PREA against him) came to [Plaintiff’s] cell with another officer

to give [Plaintiff, his] lunch meal” and “upon observing [his] tray of food,

[Plaintiff] noticed over 20 staples (metal) inside of [his] potato salad.” (Doc.

44 at 11).

On January 11, 2022, Plaintiff filed Grievance Number 964675,

claiming the following:

On December 30, 2021, after seeing officer Fontaine throw some

of my property away, while on E-D, symptoms of my mental

health became triggered, and I became suicidal. I informed Sgt.

Johnson if he continued to let C/O Fontaine throw my property

away, that I would take several pills that I had on my possession

(i.e. Motrin, Tylenol). Instead of telling Fontaine to stop throwing

away my property, he got a team together. Prior to entered my

cell, Sgt. Johnson stated that him and his boys were going to

“Fuck me up.” At this point, I became afraid and grabbed by

mattress to protect myself from the assault. Sgt. Johnson and

several officers then came into my cell with a shield and pepper

spray. As I went to block the assault, I yelled out that I have

asthma and high blood pressure. Without care, I was then

sprayed in the face, mouth, nose, and ears even after laying

down on the ground while roughly being handcuffed behind my

back. While handcuffed and defenseless, I began to get punched

in the back of my head several times. The handcuffs were

squeezed around my bones of my wrists so tight that lacerations

still exist. Also, with pressure being so tight around my wrists, my

right thumb down to my arm became numb and nerves and bond

damage has occurred. I was unable to breath from the spray for

over an hour as well as unable to see, in violation of DOC Policy.

The force used was excessive and malicious.

(Doc. 60-2 at 5-7).

On January 13, 2022, Plaintiff executed the complaint in the above

captioned action, where it was received and filed in this Court on January

21, 2022. (Doc. 1).

On January 24, 2022, an Initial Level Extension was issued, notifying

Plaintiff that an extension of ten additional working days was necessary in

order to appropriately investigate and respond to Grievance Numbers

961802 and 961809. (Doc. 44 at 7, 12).

On January 25, 2022, an Initial Level Extension was issued, notifying

Plaintiff that an extension of time was necessary in order to appropriately

investigate and respond to Grievance Number 964675. (Doc. 44 at 19).

II. DISCUSSION

Under the PLRA, a prisoner must pursue all available avenues for relief

through the prison’s grievance system before bringing a federal civil rights

action. See 42 U.S.C. §1997e(a); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 n.6

(2001) (“[A]n inmate must exhaust irrespective of the forms of relief sought

and offered through administrative avenues.”). Section 1997(e) provides, in

relevant part “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions

under section 1983 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, or any other

Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional

facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted. 42

U.S.C. §1997(e). The exhaustion requirement is mandatory. Williams v.

Beard, 482 F.3d 637, 639 (3d Cir. 2007); Booth, 532 U.S. at 742 (holding

that the exhaustion requirement of the PLRA applies to grievance

procedures “regardless of the relief offered through administrative

procedures”). Moreover, while Plaintiff was released from prison after filing

the above-captioned case (Doc. No. 10), he is still bound by the exhaustion

requirement because he has raised claims concerning events that occurred

prior to his release. See Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201, 210 (3d Cir.

2002).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has further

provided that there is no futility exception to §1997e’s exhaustion

requirement. Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 75-76 (3d Cir. 2000). Courts have

typically required across-the-board administrative exhaustion by inmates

who seek to pursue claims in federal court. Id. Additionally, courts have

imposed a procedural default component on this exhaustion requirement,

holding that inmates must fully satisfy the administrative requirements of the

inmate grievance process before proceeding into federal court. Spruill v.

Gillis, 372 F.3d 218 (3d Cir. 2004). Courts have concluded that inmates who

fail to fully, or timely, complete the prison grievance process are barred from

subsequently litigating claims in federal court. See e.g., Bolla v. Strickland,

304 F. App’x 22 (3d Cir. 2008); Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289 (3d Cir.

2000).

This broad rule favoring full exhaustion allows for a narrowly defined

exception. If the actions of prison officials directly caused the inmate’s

procedural default on a grievance, the inmate will not be held to strict

compliance with this exhaustion requirement. See Camp v. Brennan, 219

F.3d 279 (3d Cir. 2000). However, case law recognizes a clear “reluctance

to invoke equitable reasons to excuse [an inmate’s] failure to exhaust as the

statute requires.” Davis v. Warman, 49 F. App’x 365, 368 (3d Cir. 2002).

Thus, an inmate’s failure to exhaust will only be excused “under certain

limited circumstances,” Harris v. Armstrong, 149 F. App’x 58, 59 (3d Cir.

2005), and an inmate can defeat a claim of failure to exhaust only by showing

“he was misled or that there was some extraordinary reason he was

prevented from complying with the statutory mandate.” Warman, 49 F. App’x

at 368.

In the absence of competent proof that an inmate was misled by

corrections officials, or some other extraordinary circumstances, inmate

requests to excuse a failure to exhaust are frequently rebuffed by the courts.

Thus, an inmate cannot excuse a failure to timely comply with these

grievance procedures by simply claiming that his efforts constituted

“substantial compliance” with this statutory exhaustion requirement. Harris v.

Armstrong, 149 F. App’x 58, 59 (3d Cir. 2005). Nor can an inmate avoid this

exhaustion requirement by merely alleging that the administrative policies

were not clearly explained to him. Warman, 49 F. App’x at 368. Thus, an

inmate’s confusion regarding these grievances procedures does not,

standing alone, excuse a failure to exhaust. Casey v. Smith, 71 F. App’x 916

(3d Cir. 2003); see also Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir.

2000) (“[I]t is well established that ‘ignorance of the law, even for an

incarcerated pro se petitioner, generally does not excuse prompt filing.’ ”)

(citations omitted).

The Supreme Court has considered what renders administrative

remedies unavailable to an inmate such that a failure to exhaust can be

excused. See Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850 (2016). The Court noted “three

kinds of circumstances in which an administrative remedy, although officially

on the books, is not capable of use to obtain relief.” Id. at 1859. First, an

administrative procedure is not available “when (despite what regulations or

guidance materials may promise) it operates as a simple dead end—with

officers unable or consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved

inmates.” Id. Second, a procedure is not available when it is “so opaque that

it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use.” Id. Finally, a procedure

is unavailable when “prison administrators thwart inmates from taking

advantage of a grievance process through machination, misinterpretation, or

intimidation. Id. at 1860.

The Third Circuit recently joined other circuits to hold “that

administrative remedies are not ‘available’ under the PLRA where a prison

official inhibits an inmate from resorting to them through serious threats of

retaliation and bodily harm.” Rinaldi v. United States, 904 F.3d 257, 267 (3d

Cir. 2018). To defeat a failure-to-exhaust defense based on such threats, “an

inmate must show (1) that the threat was sufficiently serious that it would

deter a reasonable inmate of ordinary firmness and fortitude from lodging a

grievance and (2) that the threat actually did deter this particular inmate.” Id.

at 269.

Finally, failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense that must be pled

by the defendant. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007). “In a motion for

summary judgment, where the movants have the burden of proof at trial,

‘they [have] the burden of supporting their motion for summary judgment with

credible evidence... that would entitle [them] to a directed verdict if not

controverted at trial’.” Foster v. Morris, 208 F. App’x 174, 179 (3d Cir. 2006)

(quoting In re Bressman, 327 F.3d 229, 237 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal

quotations omitted)). If “the motion does not establish the absence of a

genuine factual issue, the district court should deny summary judgment even

if no opposing evidentiary matter is presented.” Id. (quoting Nat’l State Bank

v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 979 F.2d 1579, 1582 (3d Cir. 1992) (internal

quotations omitted)).

The Plaintiff moves for summary judgment based on the Third Circuit’s

holding in Robinson v. Superintendent, 831 F.3d 148 (3d Cir. 2016). (Doc.

40 at 11). In Robinson, the Third Court joined five of its sister courts in finding

that a prison’s failure to timely respond to an inmate’s properly filed grievance

renders its remedies “unavailable” under the PLRA.

Here, Plaintiff argues that he filed Grievance Numbers 961801 and

961809 on December 27, 2021 and “a response was due by January 26,

2022 with a 10 day extension making it February 9, 2022” and “no response

was given.” (Doc. 40 at 11). He also claims that on January 11, 2022, he

submitted Grievance Number 964675 and “a response was due by March

29, 2022, with a 10 day extension making it April 12, 2022” and “no response

was given.” Id. Thus, Plaintiff concludes that the lack of response by SCI-

Camp Hill officials renders Plaintiff’s remedies unavailable, satisfying the

exhaustion requirement. Id.

While Plaintiff has cited the proper holding for Robinson, as it applies

to the filing of his grievances to which no response was received, Plaintiff

fails to recognize that his complaint was filed on January 13, 2022, well

before any response due date ran for any of his grievances. Thus, any

administrative remedy, response, or appeal filed after January 13, 2022 does

not remedy Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust before bringing a civil rights action

concerning prison conditions in federal court. See 42 U.S.C. §1997e(a);

Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632 (2016). (emphasis added). Here, Plaintiff began

the administrative process on December 27, 2021, with Grievance Numbers

961801 and 961809 and then filed Grievance No. 964675 on January 11,

2022, all prior to filing the instant action. Plaintiff, however, failed to wait for

the response time to run, and, instead, filed the instant action on January 13,

2022, prior to fully exhausting any administrative remedy regarding his

claims. Thus, Plaintiff’s own exhibits demonstrate that he failed to exhaust

administrative remedies prior to bringing his federal action. See Ahmed v.

Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201, 209 n.9 (3d Cir. 2002) (“ ‘Congress could have

written a statute making exhaustion a precondition to judgment, but it did not.

The actual statute makes exhaustion a precondition to suit.’ ” (quoting Perez

v. Wis. Dep’t of Corr., 182 F.3d 532, 534-35 (7th Cir. 1999)) (emphasis in

original)); Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 85-86 (3d Cir. 2019)

(observing that substantial compliance with the PLRA’s exhaustion

requirement does not encompass “the filing of a suit before administrative

exhaustion ...” (citing Ahmed, 297 F.3d at 209)). Consequently, the Court

finds that summary judgment is to be entered against Plaintiff and in favor

Defendants.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Defendants’ cross

motion for summary judgment, based on Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust

administrative remedies prior to filing his federal action, and deny Plaintiff’s

motion for summary judgment

A separate Order shall issue.

s/ Malachy E. Mannion

MALACHY E. MANNION

United States District Judge

DATE: March 21, 2023

22-0112-02