Opinion

APR Supply Company v. Avalon Corporate Solutions, Corp.

Court
District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
Filed
Feb 27, 2023
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 29.2%

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

APR SUPPLY COMPANY, : Civil No. 1:22-CV-01887

:

Plaintiff, :

:

v. :

:

AVALON CORPORATE :

SOLUTIONS CORP., :

:

Defendant. : Judge Jennifer P. Wilson

MEMORANDUM

Before the court is a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(2) filed by Defendant

Avalon Corporate Solutions Corp. (Doc. 5.) The court finds that it has specific

personal jurisdiction over Defendant Avalon Corporate Solutions Corporation in

this litigation. For this reason, the court will deny the motion to dismiss.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff APR Supply Company (“APR”) commenced this action in the

Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County on October 28, 2022. (Doc. 1-2.)

Defendant Avalon Corporate Solutions Corporation (“Avalon”) removed the action

to this court on November 30, 2022. (Doc. 1.) APR’s two-count complaint sets

forth claims for breach of contract and declaratory judgment. (Doc. 1-2.)

According to the allegations in the complaint, APR is a Pennsylvania

corporation with its principal place of business in Lebanon, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 1-

2, ¶ 2.) Avalon is a citizen of a foreign state, having been incorporated in Canada

and having a principal place of business in Quebec. (Id. ¶ 3.) The parties entered

into a contract titled “Statement of Work – WMS Software Implementation”

(“SOW”) for software integration on January 28, 2021, after APR sought the

services of Avalon. (Id. ¶¶ 7–8.) The parties anticipated that the software

integration would “go live” and be ready for APR’s use in December 2021. (Id. ¶

11.) After a series of problems launching the software and various rescheduled

“go live” dates, the software system failed to meet APR’s operational needs. (Id.

¶¶ 13–21.) Efforts to continue the launch of the software ceased in February 2022.

(Id. ¶¶ 22–23.)

On December 6, 2022, Avalon filed the instant motion to dismiss pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), along with a brief in support. (Docs. 5,

6.) APR timely filed a brief in opposition on December 20, 2022, and Avalon filed

a reply brief on January 5, 2023. (Docs. 8, 12.) Thus, this motion is ripe for

review.

JURISDICTION

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, this action was properly removed to this court.

This court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 as the

parties have complete diversity of citizenship and the amount in controversy

exceeds $75,000. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Avalon moves for dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction. When a defendant moves to dismiss for

lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the

court’s jurisdiction over the defendant. Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Smith, 384 F.3d

93, 97 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Pinker v. Roche Holdings, Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 368 (3d

Cir. 2002)). “However, when the court does not hold an evidentiary hearing on the

motion to dismiss, the plaintiff need only establish a prima facie case of personal

jurisdiction and the plaintiff is entitled to have its allegations taken as true and all

factual disputes drawn in its favor.” Id.

A federal court sitting in Pennsylvania in a diversity suit exercises

jurisdiction according to the law of Pennsylvania. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A);

O’Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d 312, 316 (3d Cir. 2007). The

Pennsylvania long-arm statute provides for jurisdiction “based on the most

minimum contact with th[e] Commonwealth allowed under the Constitution of the

United States.” 42 PA. CON. STAT. § 5322(b). Accordingly, the court then

considers the Due Process Clause and asks whether the defendant has “certain

minimum contacts with . . . [Pennsylvania] such that the maintenance of the suit

does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”

O’Connor, 496 F.3d at 316 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,

316 (1945)).

DISCUSSION

Avalon argues that it does not have sufficient minimum contacts with the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for this court to exercise personal jurisdiction.

(Doc. 6, p. 8.) Avalon also argues, in the alternative, that even if there are

sufficient minimum contacts, it would not comport with notions of fair play and

substantial justice for this court to exercise jurisdiction. (Id. at 9.) Avalon stresses

that it instituted an action in the Superior Court, Province of Quebec, District of

Montreal, on October 22, 2022. (Id.) Thus, Avalon argues, there should be no

finding of specific personal jurisdiction. (Id.)

In response, APR points to the presence of Avalon personnel on its physical

premises as evidence of activities in Pennsylvania that are sufficient to confer

specific personal jurisdiction. (Doc. 8, p. 3–4.) APR emphasizes that the SOW

contemplated Avalon traveling to APR’s premises on a regular basis to complete

the software implementation, and Avalon personnel did in fact spend time on the

APR campus. (Id. at 3.) Furthermore, multiple Avalon personnel were on-site at

APR’s physical location in Lebanon, Pennsylvania from September 2021 through

January 2022. (Id. at 4.) Finally, between December 2021 and January 2022, at

least ten Avalon personnel worked at the APR location on a near-full-time basis.

(Id.)

Personal jurisdiction may be general or specific. Gen. Elec., Co. v. Deutz

AG, 270 F.3d 144, 150 (3d Cir. 2001). General personal jurisdiction is established

when a defendant has “continuous and systematic” contacts with the forum state.

Id. (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414–

16 (1984)). Specific personal jurisdiction may be established if the defendant has

“purposefully directed his activities at residents of the forum and the litigation

results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities.” Burger

King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985).

In breach of contract cases, “courts should inquire whether the defendant’s

contacts with the forum were instrumental in either the formation of the contract or

its breach.” Gen. Elec., 270 F.3d at 150 (citing Phillips Exeter Acad. v. Howard

Phillips Fund, Inc., 196 F.3d 284, 289 (1st Cir. 1999)). In modern commercial

interactions, contacts may include physical presence in the forum state or

electronic communication with a business that is physically located in the forum

state. Id. at 150–51. It is not significant which party initiated the business

relationship, but rather, “the intention to establish a common venture extending

over a substantial period of time is a more important consideration.” Id. at 151.

A. General Personal Jurisdiction

General personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation is established when

that corporation’s contacts with the forum state are “so ‘continuous and systematic’

as to render them essentially at home in the forum [s]tate.” Goodyear Dunlop

Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (citing Int’l Shoe, 326

U.S. at 317). Here, the court agrees with the parties that Avalon, having been

incorporated in Canada and with its principal place of business in Canada, is not

subject to general personal jurisdiction in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

B. Specific Personal Jurisdiction

The Due Process Clause protects defendants from being subject to

judgments in fora in which that defendant lacks meaningful contacts. Int’l Shoe,

326 U.S. at 319. Specific personal jurisdiction allows for a court to exercise

jurisdiction over a defendant that is “less intimately connected with a State, but

only as to a narrower class of claims.” Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Judicial

Dist. Court, 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1024 (2021). The requirements of specific

jurisdiction aim to afford some predictability for defendants to know when they

may be held liable to suit in a certain jurisdiction. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.

v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).

The specific jurisdiction analysis consists of a three-prong test: (1) whether

the defendant purposely directed its activities at the forum state; (2) whether the

litigation arises out of or directly relates to one of those activities; and (3) whether

the exercise of jurisdiction otherwise comports with notions of fair play and

substantial justice. O’Connor, 496 F.3d at 317. The third prong of fair play and

substantial justice need only be considered if the first two prongs are met. Id. In

this case, Avalon argues that it did not direct sufficient activities to Pennsylvania to

establish specific personal jurisdiction. In the alternative, Avalon submits that

there is no specific personal jurisdiction over it because the third prong of fair play

and substantial justice is not satisfied.

1. Prong One: Whether Avalon purposely directed sufficient

activities at Pennsylvania

The first prong asks whether the defendant purposefully directed sufficient

activities at the forum state. In reviewing this issue, the court should consider

whether the defendant purposefully established “minimum contacts” in the forum

state. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474 (citing Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316). The

minimum contacts must be purposefully directed at the forum state, in such a way

that the defendant deliberately interacted with the forum state or created

“continuing obligations” between itself and residents of the forum state. Id. at

475–76. This is often referred to as the “purposeful availment” requirement. Id. at

475.

In this case, Avalon purposefully established sufficient contacts with APR to

render it subject to jurisdiction in Pennsylvania. In addition to the SOW being

delivered to and executed at APR’s Pennsylvania address, the SOW also

considered the possibility of Avalon employees spending time working in-person

in Pennsylvania at the APR offices. Furthermore, the SOW established a

continuing relationship between Avalon and APR as APR’s software was

developed. Avalon staff members did, in fact, spend a significant amount of time

working at APR’s Pennsylvania offices. These physical and contractual contacts

are sufficient to establish minimum contacts that were purposefully directed

towards Pennsylvania. Therefore, the first prong, requiring purposefully directed

sufficient contacts with the forum state, is met.

2. Prong Two: Whether this litigation arises out of or directly

relates to Avalon’s activities with APR in Pennsylvania

The second prong of the court’s analysis aims to ensure a connection

between the subject litigation and the defendant’s activities in the forum state.

Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1781 (2017). When

there are sufficient contacts with a forum state, courts may consider whether those

contacts caused the litigation in question, though “some relationships will support

jurisdiction without a causal showing.” Ford Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1026.

Courts have established three separate tests to determine whether litigation

arises out of or relates to the contact established by the defendant in the forum

state: (1) the proximate cause/substantive relevance test; (2) the but-for causation

test; and (3) the substantial connection test. O’Connor, 496 F.3d at 319. The

standard for contract cases has effectively been the substantive relevance test, in

which courts ask whether “the defendant’s contacts with the forum were

instrumental in either the formation of the contract or its breach.” Id. at 320

(quoting Gen. Elec., 270 F.3d at 150) (internal quotations omitted). Because

Avalon’s contacts with Pennsylvania were a direct result of its contract with APR,

this standard is easily met under any of these tests. Therefore, the second prong is

satisfied.

C. Prong Three: Whether the exercise of jurisdiction otherwise

comports with notions of fair play and substantial justice

Once the first two prongs have been satisfied, the court will consider

whether traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice are met when the

court exercises personal jurisdiction over the defendant. O’Connor, 496 F.3d at

317. There are a number of factors for the court to consider, specifically, “the

burden on the defendant, the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute, the

plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, [and] the interstate

[and international] judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient

resolution of controversies.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477. When a defendant that

has purposefully directed activities at the forum state seeks to dismiss for lack of

personal jurisdiction, the defendant must present “a compelling case that the

presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable.”

Id. Minimum contacts alone makes jurisdiction “presumptively constitutional.”

O’Connor, 496 F.3d at 324. Thus, when minimum contacts are present, personal

jurisdiction will only be unreasonable in rare cases. Pennzoil Prods. Co. v. Colelli

& Assocs., Inc., 149 F.3d 197, 207 (3d Cir. 1998).

Avalon argues that jurisdiction in Pennsylvania is unreasonable because

litigation is already pending in Canada, and the Canadian litigation was filed

before the litigation in Pennsylvania. (Doc. 6, p. 9.) Although Avalon was the

first to file suit, and it certainly is inconvenient for Avalon to litigate in

Pennsylvania, that is not enough to satisfy the high bar to render jurisdiction in

Pennsylvania unreasonable. Because Avalon established minimum contacts with

Pennsylvania, jurisdiction in Pennsylvania is presumed, and Avalon must show

that more of the factors weigh in its favor as to make it a rare case in which

jurisdiction in Pennsylvania would be unreasonable. Avalon has not shown that

more factors weigh in its favor, and therefore jurisdiction in Pennsylvania is

reasonable. Having found jurisdiction in Pennsylvania to be reasonable, it follows

that such jurisdiction comports with notions of fair play and substantial justice.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the court finds that it has specific personal

jurisdiction over Avalon. Therefore, the court will deny Avalon’s motion to

dismiss. An appropriate order will issue.

s/Jennifer P. Wilson

JENNIFER P. WILSON

United States District Court Judge

Middle District of Pennsylvania

Dated: February 27, 2023

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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