noting that “a section 2255 motion filed in the sentencing court is the presumptive means for a federal prisoner to challenge the validity of a conviction or sentence”
How later courts described this case
- noting that “a section 2255 motion filed in the sentencing court is the presumptive means for a federal prisoner to challenge the validity of a conviction or sentence”
- “It is firmly established that the remedy available to a federal prisoner under 2255 is exclusive in the absence of a showing that such remedy ‘is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [the prisoner’s] detention.’ ”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TYRONE BENTLEY, :
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:22-0960
Petitioner :
(JUDGE MANNION)
v. :
J.L. JAMESON, WARDEN :
Respondent :
MEMORANDUM
Petitioner, Tyrone Bentley, an inmate confined in the Allenwood
Federal Correctional Center, White Deer, Pennsylvania, filed the instant
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2241. (Doc. 1).
He challenges his 2012 conviction in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania for conspiracy to commit armed bank
robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§371 and 2113(d) (Count 1); armed bank
robbery and aiding and abetting in violation of 18 U.S.C. §2113(d) (Count 2);
and using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence
and aiding and abetting in violation of 18 U.S.C. §924(c)(1) (Count 3) Id. A
response (Doc. 9) and traverse (Doc. 10) having been filed, the petition is
ripe for disposition. Specifically, Bentley relies on the Supreme Court’s
recent decision in Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021), and
asserts his §2113(d) conviction can no longer serve as a predicate offense
a mens rea of recklessness and therefore does not constitute a crime of
violence. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will dismiss Petitioner’s
§2241 petition without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.
I. Background
On January 9, 2012, a jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
convicted Bentley on conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery in violation
of 18 U.S.C. §§371 and 2113(d) (Count 1); armed bank robbery and aiding
and abetting in violation of 18 U.S.C. §2113(d) (Count 2); and using and
carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence and aiding and
abetting in violation of 18 U.S.C. §924(c)(1) (Count 3). See United States v.
Bentley, 2:10-CR-00525 (E.D. Pa.), Doc. 86. In August 2012, the district
court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 408 months’ imprisonment
consisting of 60 months for Count 1, 108 months for Count 2 (to be served
concurrently with each other), and 300 months for the §924(c)(1) conviction
in Count 3 (to be served consecutively to Counts 1 and 2). Id.
In June 2013, the Third Circuit affirmed the conviction, rejecting
Bentley’s claims based on the use of evidence recovered in violation of the
Fourth Amendment and insufficient evidence to support his conviction.
United States v. Bentley, 528 F. App’x 247 (2013). The sentencing court
- 2 -
thereafter denied Bentley’s initial §2255 motion for raising the same
sufficiency of evidence claim raised and addressed by the Third Circuit in his
direct appeal, as well as numerous other meritless arguments. United States
v. Bentley, 2015 WL 12743602 (E.D. Pa. June 10, 2015).
Subsequently, the Third Circuit authorized Bentley to file a successive
§2255 motion in which he asserted that his §924(c) conviction was invalid
pursuant to the Supreme Court’s holding in United States v. Davis, 139 S.
Ct. 2319 (2019) which held that the residual clause of §924(c) is
unconstitutionally vague. United States v. Bentley, No. 2:10-CR-00525 (E.D.
Pa.), Docs. 149, 176. The sentencing court, however, rejected Bentley’s
Davis claim, noting that his armed robbery conviction constitutes a violent
predicate offense for purposes of his §924(c) conviction because armed
bank robbery is a crime of violence under §924(c)(3)’s surviving elements
clause. Id., Doc. 176 at 4-5 (citing United States v. Johnson, 899 F.3d 191,
203-04 (3d Cir. 2018)). The Third Circuit denied Bentley a certificate of
appealability. Id. at Doc. 181.
On May 26, 2022, Bentley filed the instant habeas petition in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which, on June
15, transferred the case to this Court as the district of Bentley’s confinement.
(Docs. 1, 4).
- 3 -
On June 3, 2022, Bentley filed a motion with the Third Circuit seeking
leave to file a successive §2255 motion based on the same Borden claim
raised in the instant petition. In re: Tyrone Bentley, No. 22-2047 (3d Cir.).
Bentley’s petition is currently pending. Id.
II. Discussion
It is well settled that to challenge the validity of a sentence, a federal
prisoner must file a motion to vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2255 in the
sentencing court, which is “already familiar with the facts of the case.” See
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 774-75 (2008); see also Russell v.
Martinez, 325 F. App’x 45, 47 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting that “a section 2255
motion filed in the sentencing court is the presumptive means for a federal
prisoner to challenge the validity of a conviction or sentence”). Conversely,
a federal prisoner may challenge the execution of his sentence, such as the
denial or revocation of parole or the loss of good-time credits, by filing a
petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2241 in the district court for the federal
judicial district where he is in custody. See 28 U.S.C.§2241(a); Rumsfeld v.
Padilla, 542 U.S. 443-44 (2004); Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 485 (3d
Cir. 2001). However, if a petitioner shows “that a §2255 motion ‘is inadequate
or ineffective to test the legality of his detention,’ ... [he may] resort to §2241
- 4 -
to challenge the validity of the conviction or sentence.” See Brown v.
Mendez, 167 F. Supp. 2d 723, 726 (M.D. Pa. 2001); see also 28 U.S.C.
§2255(e); Litterio v. Parker, 369 F.2d 395, 395 (3d Cir. 1966) (“It is firmly
established that the remedy available to a federal prisoner under 2255 is
exclusive in the absence of a showing that such remedy ‘is inadequate or
ineffective to test the legality of [the prisoner’s] detention.’ ”).
A motion under §2255 is not “inadequate or ineffective” if the
sentencing court has previously denied relief. See In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d
245, 251 (3d Cir. 1997). Nor is a §2255 motion “inadequate or ineffective”
merely because the inmate “is unable to meet the requirements of [28
U.S.C.] §2244 and §2255(h), which require a federal prisoner to obtain
preauthorization from the appropriate United States Court of Appeals before
filing a second or subsequent §2255 motion in the sentencing court.” See
Miller v. United States, No. 3:19-cv-2159, 2020 WL 820334, at *2 (M.D. Pa.
Jan. 9, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 815777 (M.D.
Pa. Feb. 18, 2020). Moreover, Ҥ2255 is not inadequate or ineffective merely
because the petitioner cannot satisfy §2255’s timeliness or other
gatekeeping requirements.” See Long v. Fairton, 611 F. App'x 53, 55 (3d Cir.
2015) (citing Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251). The Third Circuit:
- 5 -
permits access to §2241 when two conditions are satisfied: First,
a prisoner must assert a “claim of ‘actual innocence’ on the
theory that ‘he is being detained for conduct that has
subsequently been rendered non-criminal by an intervening
Supreme Court decision’ and [Third Circuit] precedent construing
an intervening Supreme Court decision”—in other words, when
there is a change in statutory caselaw that applies retroactively
in cases on collateral review. And second, the prisoner must be
“otherwise barred from challenging the legality of the conviction
under § 2255.” Stated differently, the prisoner has “had no earlier
opportunity to challenge his conviction for a crime that an
intervening change in substantive law may negate.”
Bruce v. Warden Lewisburg USP, 868 F.3d 170, 180 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting
Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251). If a petitioner improperly challenges a federal
conviction or sentence under §2241, the §2241 petition must be dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction. See Cradle v. United States, 290 F.3d 536, 539 (3d
Cir. 2002).
Bentley has unsuccessfully sought relief in the sentencing court
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2255. Thus, he can only bring a challenge under
§2241 if it appears that the 2255 remedy is inadequate or ineffective to test
the legality of his detention. He has failed to meet this burden. The remedy
afforded under §2241 is not an additional, alternative, or supplemental
remedy to that prescribed under §2255.” See Dusenberry v. Oddo, No. 17-
cv-2402, 2018 WL 372164, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2018). Likewise, as noted
above, Ҥ2255 is not inadequate or ineffective merely because the petitioner
- 6 -
cannot satisfy §2255’s timeliness or other gatekeeping requirements.” See
Long, 611 F. App’x at 55.
Moreover, the record before this Court demonstrates that Bentley
currently has a petition to file a second or successive §2255 petition pending
before the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. See In re:
Tyrone Bentley, No. 22-2047 (3d Cir.). Thus, there exists the possibility that
Petitioner will be permitted to file a second or successive petition. As such,
Bentley’s remedy by way of a motion under §2255 has not been foreclosed
as unavailable or inadequate. Therefore, Petitioner may not rely upon §2241
to raise his claims, and the Court will dismiss his §2241 petition for lack of
jurisdiction.
III. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, Bentley’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2241 will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
An appropriate Order follows.
s/ Malachy E. Mannion
MALACHY E. MANNION
United States District Judge
Dated: December 28, 2022
22-0960-01
- 7 -