McCollum v. Pries

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOHNNIE MCCOLLUM, :

Plaintiff :

: No. 1:22-cv-01710

v. :

: (Judge Rambo)

MICHAEL H.W. PRIES, et al., :

Defendants :

MEMORANDUM

Pro se Plaintiff Johnnie McCollum (“Plaintiff”), who is a state prisoner

incarcerated at State Correctional Institution Smithfield in Huntingdon,

Pennsylvania, has commenced the above-captioned action by filing a complaint

pursuant to the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”), asserting violations

of his constitutional rights while incarcerated as a pretrial detainee at Dauphin

County Prison (“DCP”) in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. (Doc. No. 1.) In accordance

with the Prison Litigation Reform Act,1 the Court has conducted an initial review of

Plaintiff’s complaint. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will dismiss

Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

However, the Court will grant Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint.

1 See The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat.

1321 (Apr. 26, 1996).

I. BACKGROUND

On October 28, 2022, while Plaintiff was incarcerated as a pretrial detainee at

DCP, he filed his Section 1983 complaint against the following thirteen (13)

Defendants: Michael H.W. Pries, George P. Hartwick, and Chad Saylor, Dauphin

County Commissioners; John F. Cherry, the President Judge of the Court of

Common Pleas of Dauphin County; William Wenner, a Magisterial District Judge

in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania; Nicholas Chimienti, a Sheriff in Dauphin County;

James Markel, Acting Controller of the Dauphin County Prison Board (“DCP

Board”); Frank Lavery, Jr., Solicitor of the DCP Board; Gregory Briggs, the Warden

of DCP; Lionel Pierre, Deputy Warden of DCP; Roger Lucas, the Major of Security

at DCP; Mike Welker, the Grievance Coordinator at DCP; and Damon Fields, the

Chaplain at DCP. (Doc. No. 1 at 1-6.) In addition to his complaint, Plaintiff also

filed a certified motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and his prisoner trust

fund account statement. (Doc. No. 2.) The Court, having reviewed Plaintiff’s motion

and trust fund account statement, will grant Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma

pauperis and will deem his complaint filed.

In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the events giving rise to his claims

occurred over “the last 26 months” while he was incarcerated as a pretrial detainee

at DCP. (Doc. No. 1 at 7.) These alleged events concern the following two (2)

categories: lockdowns and access to religious material. (Id. at 7-14.)

With respect to the lockdowns, Plaintiff alleges that the inmates at DCP “have

been continuously locked down due to a severe staff shortage[.]” (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff

alleges that these lockdowns last “anywhere from 19-23 days a month[.]” (Id.) As

a result, Plaintiff claims that he is not consistently “getting [his] hour of exercise per

day[,]” and that he is “unable to receive programming” despite the fact that the

“programs serve as a predetermining factor of what [his] outcome will be in [c]ourt.”

(Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that, on numerous occasions, he filed grievances related to

these lockdowns, but that all of his grievances were deemed non-grieveable by

Defendant Welker, who explained to Plaintiff that he, Defendant Briggs, and

Defendant Pierre made this decision “as a team.” (Id.) In addition, Plaintiff alleges

that Defendant Lucas responded to one of his grievances, stating that “prison

schedules are not up for negotiation with inmates[,]” and that Defendant Welker also

stated “the same exact thing” in response to another one of his grievances. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that he subsequently wrote request slips to Defendants Briggs and

Pierre in order to put them on notice and to give them the opportunity “to rectify the

situation,” but that these requests slips were filed “to no avail.” (Id.)

In addition to filing grievances and request slips at DCP, Plaintiff alleges that

the DCP Board2 knew about the lockdowns and being understaffed, but that it failed

to address these problems. (Id. at 10.) Plaintiff alleges that this puts him in a

“[c]ompromising position” because, in addition to not being afforded recreation, he

has “yet to complete a program” and that, “in all reality[,] the amount of

programming [he] participate[s] in serves as a pre-determining factor in the outcome

of [his] legal proceedings.” (Id. at 11.)

Plaintiff also alleges that his right to practice his religion was “[c]onstrained”

while incarcerated at DCP. (Id. at 8.) In support, he alleges that his religion is

Santeria and that the “Administration” failed to upload digital books on the religious

library for his religion, even though “they did [this] for Islam, Catholicism,

Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Moors Nation of Islam etc.” (Id.

(explaining that DCP has “digitized books and [a] law library in order to prevent the

smuggling of contraband into the facility” and that religious books were also

“uploaded” onto the religious library “so inmates can still study and practice their

religion”).) Plaintiff alleges that he had “been waiting over a year for Santeria

2 Plaintiff does not identify who was on the DCP Board at this time or if any

particular member of the DCP Board had such knowledge and, thus, it is unclear

whether Plaintiff is referring to either Defendants Markel or Lavery in connection

with this allegation.

material” to be uploaded to “the religious library, instead of the general library.”

(Id.)

In connection with these allegations, Plaintiff acknowledges that he was

“given one Santeria book” and that “3 books were added on the general library.” (Id.

at 9.) Plaintiff claims, however, that there are several issues with this. (Id.) More

specifically, Plaintiff claims that: “there is a waiting list for the book[;]” inmates

“only get the book for 14 days[;]” and inmates “can only sign the book out 3 times.”

(Id.) Plaintiff also alleges that he should not have had “to wait in order to read books

[on his] faith” (id. at 10) and that this is unlike “all other religions[,]” which have

the books uploaded on the religious library (id. at 9).

Like his complaints concerning the alleged lockdowns at DCP, Plaintiff

alleges that he also filed a grievance “last year” and that Defendant Briggs, instead

of answering it, “kicked it back to [Defendant] Fields” and that this “hindered [him]

from exhausting” his administrative remedies.3 (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he filed

another grievance but that he “was basically [c]oerced by the Grievance Coordinator

to accept the paperback printed book Santeria[,]” and stated to Plaintiff, “this is all

you are going to get you mind [sic] as well leave the situation alone before you piss

3 Apart from these allegations concerning the grievance he filed, Plaintiff asserts no

allegations against Defendants Briggs or Fields in relation to his request for religious

material.

the wrong people off.”4 (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he “felt like [he] was forced to

sign off on the grievance” and that “Santeria was never made accessible on the

religious library[.]” (Id.)

In connection with all of these allegations, Plaintiff asserts that his rights

under the First Amendment were violated because he was denied religious material

while incarcerated at DCP. (Id. at 12.) In addition, Plaintiff appears to assert that

his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were violated because other “religious

adherents don’t have the same problem” at DCP. (Id.) Finally, Plaintiff asserts that

his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were violated because of the

“continuous lockdowns” at DCP while he was incarcerated there. (Id.)

As a result of these alleged violations, Plaintiff claims that he has been injured

because he was not “able to practice [his] religion or order books of [his] choice[.]”

(Id.) Plaintiff also claims that he is suffering from “severe depression, anxiety, panic

depression, bipolar mood swings, difficulties with thinking and with concentration,

agitation [and] irritability” because of the “continuous lockdowns[.]” (Id.) As for

relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary relief, as well as various forms of injunctive relief.

(Id.; id. at 12, 14 (seeking an Order from the Court that would require the DCP Board

to: (1) implement a “Publishers Only Rule” so that DCP inmates can resume

4 Plaintiff does not identify the Grievance Coordinator by name and, thus, it is

unclear whether Plaintiff is referring to Defendant Welker.

ordering books of their choice; (2) increase the hourly pay of DCP employees to

resolve the “staff shortage problem[;]” and (3) explain, “with specificity[,] the chain

of command for the grievance appeal process”).)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), district courts are required to review

complaints in civil actions where a litigant is proceeding in forma pauperis. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). If the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who

is immune from such relief, then the district court must dismiss the complaint. See

id. In dismissing claims under § 1915(e)(2), district courts apply the standard

governing motions to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999).

To avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a civil complaint must set out “sufficient

factual matter” to show that its claims are facially plausible. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

When evaluating the plausibility of a complaint, the Court is required to

“accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, construe the complaint in the

light favorable to the plaintiff, and ultimately determine whether plaintiff may be

entitled to relief under any reasonable reading of the complaint.” See Mayer v.

Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 2010); Kedra v. Schroeter, 876 F.3d 424, 434

(3d Cir. 2017) (stating that the court “must accept as true all factual allegations in

the complaint and draw all inferences from the facts alleged in the light most

favorable to [the plaintiff]” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Additionally, in the specific context of pro se prisoner litigation, a district

court must be mindful that a document filed pro se “is to be liberally construed.”

See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A pro se complaint, “however

inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings

drafted by lawyers[.]” See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Section 1983

Plaintiff has filed his complaint pursuant to the provisions of Section 1983,

asserting violations of his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. (Doc.

No. 1.) Section 1983 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or

other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,

shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or

other proper proceeding for redress.

Id. Thus, “Section 1983 imposes civil liability upon any person who, acting under

the color of state law, deprives another individual of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” See Shuman

v. Penn Manor School Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).

Section 1983 “does not create any new substantive rights but instead provides a

remedy for the violation of a federal constitutional or statutory right.” See id.

(citation omitted).

1. Defendants Pries, Hartwick, Saylor, Cherry, Chimienti,

Markel, Wenner, and Lavery

a. Personal Involvement

In order for liability to attach under Section 1983, Plaintiff must sufficiently

allege that each defendant was personally involved in the act or acts that he claims

violated his federally protected rights. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195,

1207 (3d Cir. 1988). “A plaintiff makes sufficient allegations of a defendant’s

personal involvement by describing the defendant’s participation in or actual

knowledge of and acquiescence in the wrongful conduct.” Chavarriaga v. New

Jersey Dep’t of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 222 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Rode, 845 F.2d at

1207); Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (stating that “[p]ersonal

involvement requires particular ‘allegations of personal direction or of actual

knowledge and acquiescence’” (quoting Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207)).

Here, there is an absence of allegations in the complaint that would give rise

to a plausible inference that Defendants Pries, Hartwick, Saylor, Cherry, Chimienti,

Markel, Wenner, and Lavery were personally involved in any asserted deprivation

of Plaintiff’s federally protected rights. While these individual Defendants have been

named in the caption of the complaint (Doc. No. 1 at 1-2) and have also been listed

as Defendants in the “DEFENDANT(S)” section of the complaint (id. at 3-6), they

have not been mentioned anywhere else in the body of the complaint and/or they

have had no allegations of personal involvement asserted against them. Without

such allegations of personal involvement, however, liability cannot be imposed

against these individual Defendants under Section 1983. Thus, the Court finds that

Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against

Defendants Pries, Hartwick, Saylor, Cherry, Chimienti, Markel, Wenner, and

Lavery. As such, any Section 1983 claims against these Defendants will be

dismissed.

b. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to contain

“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to

relief[.]” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This short and plain statement must give the

defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claims are and the grounds upon which

those claims rest. See Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93. “In other words, a complaint must

do more than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief[; it] “has to show such an

entitlement with its facts.” See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d

Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

As set forth above, Plaintiff’s complaint does not allege how Defendants

Pries, Hartwick, Saylor, Cherry, Chimienti, Markel, Wenner, and Lavery were

personally involved in committing a deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

As a result, the Court has been left—and Defendants, if served, would also be left—

to speculate as to what alleged conduct on their part gives rise to constitutional

infringements. Thus, because Plaintiff’s amended complaint does not provide fair

notice of his claims and/or the grounds upon which those claims rest, as to these

specific Defendants, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint does not satisfy Rule

8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d

69, 93 (3d Cir. 2019) (“Naturally, a pleading that is so vague or ambiguous that a

defendant cannot reasonably be expected to respond to it will not satisfy Rule 8.”

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Binsack v. Lackawanna Cnty.

Prison, 438 F. App’x 158, 160 (3d Cir. 2011) (unpublished) (affirming district

court’s dismissal of a complaint where it “defie[d] any attempt to meaningfully

answer or plead to it, and it left the defendants having to guess what of the many

things discussed constituted [a cause of action]”).

2. Defendants Welker, Briggs, Pierre, and Lucas

The only Defendants that Plaintiff discusses with any sort of specificity in the

complaint are Defendants Welker, Briggs, Pierre, and Lucas. As set forth above,

Plaintiff alleges that he filed grievances at DCP, on numerous occasions, concerning

the “continuous lockdowns[,]” but that all of his grievances were deemed non-

grieveable by Defendant Welker, who explained to Plaintiff that he, Defendant

Briggs, and Defendant Pierre made this decision “as a team.” (Doc. No. 1 at 7.) In

addition, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Lucas also responded to one of his

grievances, stating that “prison schedules are not up for negotiation with inmates[,]”

and that Defendant Welker stated “the same exact thing” in response to another one

of his grievances. (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges that he subsequently wrote request

slips to Defendants Briggs and Pierre in order to put them on notice and to give them

the opportunity “to rectify the situation,” but that his requests slips were filed “to no

avail.” (Id.) Thus, Plaintiff appears to be asserting that these Defendants violated

his Fourteenth Amendment rights in relation to the “continuous lockdowns” at DCP.

(Id. at 12.)5

5 While the mere filing of a grievance is insufficient to impute the actual knowledge

that is necessary to demonstrate a defendant’s personal involvement in an asserted

constitutional violation, see Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207-08, under certain circumstances,

a grievance may be sufficient to place a defendant on notice of continued

wrongdoing and, thus, may show actual knowledge of and acquiescence in the events

that form the basis of the plaintiff’s asserted constitutional claims. See, e.g., Sutton

v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 249-50 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding that prisoner-plaintiffs had

established the personal involvement of a defendant who had played an “active role”

in the continued denial of plaintiffs having access to religious texts and basing this

finding, in part, on the fact that the defendant had issued a written response denying

a final-grievance-appeal letter from one of the plaintiffs, which requested access to

such religious texts); Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 336 n.14 (3d Cir. 2016)

(noting that the Third Circuit’s “oft-cited holding in Rode[, 845 F.2d at 1208] that

the mere filing of a grievance does not show actual knowledge by a supervisor is not

applicable, as [defendant’s] letters show that he actually had reviewed the

“[W]hen pretrial detainees[, such as Plaintiff,] challenge their conditions of

confinement, [courts] must consider whether there has been a violation of the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” E. D. v. Sharkey, 928 F.3d 299, 307

(3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F.3d 229, 231 (3d Cir. 2008)).

The United States Supreme Court has instructed that, when “evaluating the

constitutionality of conditions or restrictions of pretrial detention that implicated

only the protection against deprivation of liberty without due process of law, . . . the

proper inquiry is whether those conditions amount to punishment of the detainee.”

See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). Thus, “[u]nder the Due Process

[C]lause, ‘a detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt.’” See

Sharkey, 928 F.3d at 307 (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 535)).

In determining whether the challenged conditions of confinement amount to

punishment of the pretrial detainee, “[courts] must decide whether [the challenged

condition] is imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether it is but an incident

of some other legitimate governmental purpose.” See Bell, 441 U.S. at 538 (citation

omitted); Hope v. Warden York Cnty. Prison, 972 F.3d 310, 326 (3d Cir. 2020)

(stating that “[t]he touchstone for the constitutionality of detention is whether

grievances[,]” and quoting Sutton, 323 F.3d at 249-50 for the following proposition:

that “an official who wrote back in response to a grievance had ‘played an active

role’ in a constitutional violation”).

conditions of confinement are meant to punish or are but an incident of some other

legitimate governmental purpose” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Thus, this determination requires courts to consider whether the challenged

conditions were imposed “for the express purpose of punishment, and if not, whether

they are rationally connected to a legitimate purpose but excessive in relation to its

purpose.” See id. at 328 (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 538). In making this determination,

courts are to “consider the totality of the circumstances of confinement[.]” See id.

at 326 (explaining that “the totality of the circumstances of confinement” includes

“any genuine privations or hardship over an extended period of time, and whether

[the challenged] conditions are (1) rationally related to their legitimate purpose or

(2) excessive in relation to that purpose” (citations omitted)).

In addition, and importantly, “courts must acknowledge that practical

considerations of detention justify limitations on ‘many privileges and rights.’” See

id. (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 545-46). Thus, even though a pretrial detainee is not

a convicted prisoner, “a detainee ‘simply does not possess the full range of freedoms

of an unincarcerated individual.’” See id. (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 546). In a

similar vein, courts must also acknowledge “the legitimate objectives and difficulties

of managing a detention facility[.]” See id. (citation omitted). Judicial deference is,

therefore, accorded to a prison administrator “not merely because the administrator

ordinarily will, as a matter of fact in a particular case, have a better grasp of his

domain than the reviewing judge, but also because the operation of our correctional

facilities is peculiarly the province of the Legislative and Executive Branches of our

Government, not the Judicial.” See Bell, 441 U.S. at 548 (citations omitted).

Thus, in accordance with this governing legal standard, the Court must

consider whether the challenged conditions, i.e., the lockdowns at DCP, were for the

purpose to punish on the part of Defendants Welker, Briggs, Pierre, and Lucas, and

if not, whether the conditions were rationally related to a legitimate purpose or

excessive in relation to that purpose. See Hope, 972 F.3d at 328 (explaining that

courts are to consider whether the challenged conditions were imposed “for the

express purpose of punishment, and if not, whether they are rationally connected to

a legitimate purpose but excessive in relation to its purpose” (citing Bell, 441 U.S.

at 538)).

In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the inmates had “been continuously

locked down due to a severe staff shortage.” (Doc. No. 1 at 7.) Plaintiff alleges that

these lockdowns last “anywhere from 19-23 days a month[.]” (Id.) As a result,

Plaintiff claims that he was not consistently “getting [his] hour of exercise per

day[,]” and that he was “unable to receive programming” despite the fact that the

“programs serve as a predetermining factor of what [his] outcome will be in court.”

(Id.)

The Court, having carefully reviewed these allegations, finds that Plaintiff’s

complaint fails to plausibly state a Fourteenth Amendment claim upon which relief

can be granted. More specifically, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint does not

allege that the lockdowns at DCP were imposed by Defendants Welker, Briggs,

Pierre, or Lucas for the purpose of punishment. Instead, Plaintiff’s complaint alleges

that these lockdowns were imposed as the result of “a severe staff shortage.” (Id.);

see Bell, 441 U.S. at 538 (explaining that “[a] court must decide whether the

[challenged condition] is imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether it is but

an incident of some other legitimate governmental purpose” (citation omitted)).

In addition, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint does not contain

sufficient factual allegations concerning the nature and duration of these alleged

lockdowns such that the Court could draw an inference that they were excessive in

relation to the issues surrounding the allegedly “severe staff shortage” at DCP. (Doc.

No. 1 at 7); see Hope, 972 F.3d at 326 (explaining that, absent an intent to punish,

courts are to look at “the totality of the circumstances of confinement[,]” which

includes whether the challenged “conditions are (1) rationally related to their

legitimate purpose or (2) excessive in relation to that purpose” (citations omitted));

Chapolini v. City of Philadelphia, No. 22-cv-284, 2022 WL 815444, at *12 (E.D.

Pa. Mar. 17, 2022) (dismissing the pre-trial detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment claim

concerning the lockdown measures ordered by the commissioner of the Philadelphia

prison system and finding that the pretrial detainee’s allegations were insufficient

since he failed to allege, among other things, “any specifics about the size of his

living space, the extent to which inmates were permitted to move about the prison

(if at all) during the lockdown periods, the extent to which recreation or other

activities were permitted, or any other circumstances to clarify the conditions in

which he was held in connection with the lockdowns at issue[,]” including “how

long he was subjected to the challenged conditions”).

Thus, for all of these reasons, the Court finds that the allegations in Plaintiff’s

complaint are insufficient to state plausible claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Court will, therefore, dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim against

Defendants Welker, Briggs, Pierre, and Lucas from the complaint.

3. Requests for Injunctive Relief

Since filing his Section 1983 complaint, Plaintiff has been transferred from

DCP, a county prison, to SCI Huntingdon, a state correctional institution with the

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections. (Doc. No. 4.) Because Plaintiff is no

longer incarcerated at DCP, and because there is no alleged expectation that Plaintiff,

specifically, will be returned to DCP now that he is in the state system, his claims

for injunctive relief are moot. See Sutton, 323 F.3d at 248 (explaining that “[a]n

inmate’s transfer from the facility complained of generally moots the equitable and

declaratory claims”); Parkell, 833 F.3d at 333 (explaining that, in order for the

capable-of-repetition exception to apply, the inmate must establish “a reasonable

expectation that he, specifically, will again be subjected to the unconstitutional

[conditions of confinement]”). As such, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for

injunctive relief from the complaint.

B. Leave to Amend

The only remaining issue is, therefore, whether Plaintiff should be granted

leave to amend his amended complaint. Due to the applicable liberal pleading

standard, a plaintiff should generally be granted leave to amend before a Court

dismisses a claim that is merely deficient. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp.,

293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow for

amendments to be granted liberally in light of the “principle that the purpose of

pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.” See Foman v. Davis, 371

U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

However, the Court may deny leave to amend where there is “undue delay,

bad faith[,] or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure

deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing

party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of the amendment[.]”

See id. The Court may also deny leave to amend where the proposed amendment

would be futile—that is, where the pleading, “as amended, would fail to state a claim

upon which relief could be granted.” See In re NAHC, Inc. Sec. Litig., 306 F.3d

1314, 1332 (3d Cir. 2002) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

In accordance with this standard, the Court cannot say that granting Plaintiff

leave to amend his Section 1983 claims would be futile and, thus, the Court will

grant Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint in order to attempt to cure the

deficiencies identified above. Plaintiff is advised that the amended complaint must

be complete in all respects. It must be a new pleading that stands by itself without

reference to the original complaint or any other document already filed. The

amended complaint shall set forth Plaintiff’s claims in short, concise, and plain

statements as required by Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Finally,

Plaintiff is cautioned that neither conclusory allegations nor broad allegations will

set forth a cognizable claim.

IV. CONCLUSION

To conclude, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. No. 1) for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2). The Court will also grant Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint.

An appropriate Order follows.

Dated: December 14, 2022 s/ Sylvia H. Rambo

SYLVIA H. RAMBO

United States District Judge