explaining judges should give some review to every report and recommendation
How later courts described this case
- explaining judges should give some review to every report and recommendation
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
LUIS NIEVES, :
Plaintiff, : CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:22-16
v. : (JUDGE MANNION)
VITO T. GEROULO, et al., :
Defendants. :
ORDER
Pending before the court are plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma
pauperis (Doc. 7) and motion to appoint counsel (Doc. 19). Also pending
before the court is Magistrate Judge Arbuckle’s report and recommendation,
(Doc. 16), pertaining to plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, (Doc.
7). Plaintiff filed an objection to the report and recommendation of Judge
Arbuckle. (Doc. 18). Plaintiff’s motions are now ripe for disposition.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW1
When objections are timely filed to the report and recommendation of
a magistrate judge, the district court must review de novo those portions of
the report to which objections are made. 28 U.S.C. '636(b)(1); Brown v.
1 The court will not repeat the factual or procedural background as
Judge Arbuckle has already provided a sufficient background in his report
and recommendation.
Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2011). Although the standard is de novo,
the extent of review is committed to the sound discretion of the district judge,
and the court may rely on the recommendations of the magistrate judge to
the extent it deems proper. Rieder v. Apfel, 115 F.Supp.2d 496, 499 (M.D.
Pa. 2000) (citing United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980)).
For those sections of the report and recommendation to which no
objection is made, the court should, as a matter of good practice, Asatisfy
itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept
the recommendation.@ Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), advisory committee notes; see
also Univac Dental Co. v. Dentsply Intern., Inc., 702 F.Supp.2d 465, 469
(M.D. Pa. 2010) (citing Henderson v. Carlson, 812 F.2d 874, 878 (3d Cir.
1987) (explaining judges should give some review to every report and
recommendation)). Nevertheless, whether timely objections are made or not,
the district court may accept, not accept, or modify, in whole or in part, the
findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C.
'636(b)(1); Local Rule 72.31.
II. DISCUSSION
Judge Arbuckle has properly established the pertinent law for the
plaintiff’s current motion. The Prison Litigation Reform Act (hereinafter
“PLRA”) seeks to stem frivolous lawsuits from prisoners. Here, Luis Nieves
(hereinafter “Nieves”) has filed three previous lawsuits that qualify as strikes
under the PLRA: Nieves v. Pennsylvania, No. 3:18-CV-1253, 2020 WL
265556, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 2020) (dismissing case for “failure to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted.”); Luis Nieves v. Warden et al.,
No. 3:19-CV-0507 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 2019) (dismissing case for “failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted.”); Luis Nieves v. Geroulo et
al., No. 4:20-CV-0777 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 2021) (dismissing case for “failure
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.”).
There is an exception to the PLRA’s three strike rule for a plaintiff in
imminent danger of serious physical injury. However, Judge Arbuckle
explained that the plaintiff identifies no imminent danger. Nieves alleges a
conspiracy between judges, police, district attorneys, and defense attorneys.
None of Nieves’ allegations present an imminent danger of serious physical
injury. Therefore, the court agrees with Judge Arbuckle that Nieves fails to
allege he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury as required by the
PLRA.
Nieves objects to Judge Arbuckle’s report and recommendation on the
grounds that a conspiracy exists amongst state police officers, judges,
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and prison officials. While plaintiff presents
a varying array of events throughout his interactions with the state court
system, none of his claims satisfy the imminent danger of serious physical
injury exception to the PLRA. The imminent danger exception is designed
“for genuine emergencies,” when “a threat ... is real and proximate.” Lewis v.
Sullivan, 279 F.3d 526, 531 (7th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff identifies no real and
proximate threat, yet alone an imminent danger of serious physical injury.
Upon review, the court agrees with the sound reasoning which led
Judge Arbuckle to his conclusions. As such, the court will adopt the report
and recommendation as the decision of the court.
In light of the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
(1) Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, (Doc. 7), is
DENIED.
(2) Plaintiff’s case is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(g)
because plaintiff has accrued three “strikes” and has not
demonstrated that he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury.
(3) All pending motions, (Doc. 19), are dismissed as MOOT.
(4) The clerk of the court is directed to CLOSE THE CASE.
s/ Malachy E. Mannion
MALACHY E. MANNION
United States District Judge
DATE: November 14, 2022
22-16-01