Grady v. Rothwell

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ZACHARY GRADY, individually and No. 4:22-CV-00428

as the administrator of the Estate of

ERIN JO BAKER, and L.G., a minor, (Chief Judge Brann)

by ZACHARY GRADY, parent and

guardian,

Plaintiffs,

v.

DANIEL R. ROTHWELL and

LA-Z-BOY LOGISTICS, INC.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

NOVEMBER 8, 2022

Plaintiff Zachary Grady, as the administrator of the estate of his fiancé, Erin

Jo Baker, and as his daughters’ legal guardian brings wrongful death and survival

actions against Defendants Daniel R. Rothwell and La-Z-Boy Logistics, Inc. His

claims are related to an automobile accident in Virginia that caused Baker’s death.

Baker’s Mother, Joan Blackwell, has also moved to intervene in this matter, as she

has filed a similar complaint in the Virginia courts. Defendants and Blackwell

separately move to dismiss Grady’s Complaint. For the following reasons,

Defendants’ motion will be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts

On October 4, 2021, Erin Jo Baker was driving her car in Rockbridge County,

Virginia, with Grady and her two minor children as passengers.1 She was involved

in a car accident, causing her vehicle to come to a stop in the lefthand lane.2 Before

she could leave the vehicle, a tractor-trailer driven by Defendant Daniel Rothwell

struck her vehicle, killing her.3 At the time, Rothwell was driving a truck for

Defendant La-Z-Boy Logistics, Inc.4

B. Procedural History

Defendants move to dismiss Grady’s Complaint on several grounds, including

the absence of personal jurisdiction over Defendants. Baker’s mother, Joan

Blackwell, moves to intervene in this litigation, and has also moved to dismiss

Grady’s Complaint.5 Blackwell explains that she was appointed as the administrator

of Baker’s estate for the limited purpose of bringing a personal injury action on

Baker’s behalf.6 All motions are ripe for disposition.

1 Compl., Doc. 1 ¶¶ 21-23.

2 Id. ¶ 24.

3 Id. ¶¶ 35-42.

4 Id. ¶ 14-16.

5 Doc. 4.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) allows a defendant to dismiss a case

for lack of personal jurisdiction. “When a defendant challenges the court’s personal

jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden ‘to come forward with sufficient facts to

establish that jurisdiction is proper.’”7 Accordingly, once the defense is raised, a

plaintiff must establish “jurisdictional facts through sworn affidavits or other

competent evidence.”8 And “at no point may a plaintiff rely on the bare pleadings

alone in order to withstand a defendant’s Rule 12(b)(2) motion” to dismiss.9

The plaintiff’s burden to establish personal jurisdiction is reduced, however,

where a district court, when presented with a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2),

does not hold an evidentiary hearing. In such circumstances, the plaintiff “need only

establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction.”10 Moreover, before an

evidentiary hearing, “[i]t is well established that in deciding a motion to dismiss for

lack of jurisdiction, a court is required to accept the plaintiff’s allegations as true,

and is to construe disputed facts in favor of the plaintiff.”11

7 Danziger & De Llano, LLP v. Morgan Verkamp LLC, 948 F.3d 124, 129 (3d Cir. 2020)

(quoting Mellon Bank (E.) PSFS, Nat’l Ass’n v. Farino, 960 F.2d 1217, 1223 (3d Cir. 1992)).

8 Clarity Sports Int’l LLC v. Redland Sports, 400 F. Supp. 3d 161, 169 (M.D. Pa. 2019) (Kane,

J.) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Time Share Vacation Club v. Atl. Resorts, 735

F.2d 61, 66 n.9 (3d Cir. 1984)).

9 Patterson by Patterson v. F.B.I., 893 F.2d 595, 604 (3d Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).

10 Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Smith, 384 F.3d 93, 97 (3d Cir. 2004).

11 Metcalfe v. Renaissance Marine, Inc., 566 F.3d 324, 330 (3d Cir. 2009) (alteration in original)

“A federal district court may assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident of

the state in which the court sits to the extent authorized by the law of that state.”12

Pennsylvania’s long-arm statute allows courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over

non-residents “to the fullest extent allowed under the Constitution of the United

States.”13 The proper question before the Court is therefore whether exercising

jurisdiction over the parties would comply with the constitutional requirements of

due process.

To satisfy due process, a court must establish that a defendant has sufficient

“minimum contacts” with the state in which the court sits “such that maintenance of

the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”14

“Minimum contacts can be analyzed in the context of general jurisdiction or specific

jurisdiction.”15

“A court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or

foreign-country) corporations to hear any and all claims against them when their

affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them

12 D’Jamoos ex rel. Estate of Weingeroff v. Pilatus Aircraft Ltd., 566 F.3d 94, 102 (3d Cir. 2009)

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Provident Nat’l Bank v. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan

Ass’n, 819 F.2d 434, 436 (3d Cir. 1987)).

13 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 5322(b).

14 Baker v. LivaNova PLC, 210 F. Supp. 3d 642, 647 (M.D. Pa. 2016) (Jones, J.) (internal

quotation marks omitted) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316

(1945)).

essentially at home in the forum State.”16 For corporate entities, “[t]he paradigm

all-purpose forums for general jurisdiction are a corporation’s place of incorporation

and principal place of business.”17

But “in an exceptional case,” “a corporation’s operations in a forum other than

its formal place of incorporation or principal place of business may be so substantial

and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in that State.”18 Indeed, “it

is ‘incredibly difficult to establish general jurisdiction [over a corporation] in a

forum other than the place of incorporation or principal place of business.’”19

B. Application

Grady acknowledges that Rothwell does not reside in Pennsylvania and that

La-Z-Boy is not incorporated in nor keeps its principal place of business in

Pennsylvania.20 He simply avers that La-Z-Boy “conducts business throughout the

United States, including the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania” and that Rothwell is

16 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (citation

omitted); Hammons v. Ethicon, Inc., 240 A.3d 537, 555 (Pa. 2020) (quoting Daimler AG v.

Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 138 (2014)).

17 Daimler, 571 U.S. at 118.

18 Id. n.19; see Mendel v. Williams, 53 A.3d 810, 817 (Pa. Super. 2012) (quoting Goodyear, 564

U.S. at 919).

19 Chavez v. Dole Food Co., Inc., 836 F.3d 205, 223 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Monkton Ins. Servs.,

Ltd. v. Ritter, 768 F.3d 429, 432 (5th Cir. 2014)); see also BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct.

1549, 1559 (2017) (holding that Montana court did not have general jurisdiction even though

defendant-corporation had “over 2,000 miles of railroad track and more than 2,000 employees

in Montana”).

employed by La-Z-Boy.21 He seeks jurisdictional discovery to determine whether

general jurisdiction is appropriate.

But the mere fact that a corporation does business in Pennsylvania is

insufficient to establish a prima facie case of general jurisdiction.22 The Complaint

contains no allegations that even suggest La-Z-Boy has locations, employees, or

otherwise has any presence in Pennsylvania.23 Even if it did contain such allegations,

Grady fails to support his Complaint with any “actual proofs,” as is required once a

part moves for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(2).24 In any event, it is well-settled that a

corporation can “conduct business” in a state without having the physical or

commercial presence that would subject it to a state’s general jurisdiction.25

Grady does not appear to assert specific personal jurisdiction over either

Defendant. Nor could he. Title 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 5332(c), Pennsylvania’s long-arm

21 Id. 1 ¶ 12.

22 See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 927-28 (noting that the “textbook case” of general jurisdiction is

Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952), in which “[t]he

corporation’s president maintained his office [in Ohio], kept the company files in that office,

and supervised from the Ohio office the . . . activities of the company” (internal quotation

marks omitted).

23 See Mendel, 53 A.3d at 818 (“For instance, the purchasing of products from the forum State,

entering into a limited number of contracts in the forum State and allowing a third party to use

a corporate logo in the forum State have each been held to fall short of the ‘continuous and

systematic’ type of business activity necessary to establish general jurisdiction.” (citing

Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 104 (1984))).

24 Patterson, 893 F.2d at 604 (citation omitted).

25 The Court understands and appreciates the difficulty a plaintiff faces in responding to a motion

to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction before any discovery has taken place. But a simple

Google search reveals over a dozen La-Z-Boy locations in Pennsylvania. The Court does not

suggest that a dozen-or-so locations is sufficient to invoke general jurisdiction, nor does it

suggest that Defendant La-Z-Boy owns those locations, as they may be owned by a different

entity in the overarching corporate structure. But simply averring that a corporation does

statute, provides that “[w]hen jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this

section, only a cause of action or other matter arising from acts enumerated in

subsection (a), or from acts forming the basis of jurisdiction under subsection (b),

may be asserted against him.” As the facts underlying Grady’s claim involve an

automobile accident in Virginia, the Court finds it difficult to understand how his

claim could arise out of Defendants’ contacts with Pennsylvania. Moreover, the

Complaint does not identify any such contacts, so specific jurisdiction is

inappropriate.

Therefore, the Court will grant Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Consequently,

the Court concludes that Blackwell’s motions are moot.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is granted and

Blackwell’s Motion to Intervene and Motion to Dismiss are denied as moot.

An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann

Matthew W. Brann

Chief United States District Judge