Brown v. Glover

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TODD ALAN BROWN, No. 4:22-CV-01154

Plaintiff, (Chief Judge Brann)

v.

WARDEN GLOVER, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

OCTOBER 12, 2022

Plaintiff Todd Alan Brown is currently in pretrial detention in a state

correctional institution. Prior to being transferred into the state prison system, he

was detained at Huntingdon County Prison in Huntingdon, Pennsylvania. Brown

filed the instant pro se Section 19831 action concerning the alleged medical care

(or lack thereof) he received at the prison, asserting constitutional violations

against various prison officials and medical staff. Brown’s first complaint was

dismissed but he was granted leave to amend. Currently pending is Brown’s

amended complaint. The Court will dismiss in part the amended complaint

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted.

1 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 creates a private cause of action to redress constitutional

wrongs committed by state officials. The statute is not a source of substantive rights; it serves

as a mechanism for vindicating rights otherwise protected by federal law. See Gonzaga Univ.

I. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Courts are statutorily obligated to review, “as soon as practicable,” pro se

prisoner complaints targeting governmental entities, officers, or employees.2 One

basis for dismissal at the screening stage is if the complaint “fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted[.]”3 This language closely tracks Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Accordingly, courts apply the same standard to

screening a pro se prisoner complaint for sufficiency under Section 1915A(b)(1) as

they utilize when resolving a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).4

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, courts should not inquire

“whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to

offer evidence to support the claims.”5 The court must accept as true the factual

allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences from them in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff.6 In addition to the facts alleged on the face of

the complaint, the court may also consider “exhibits attached to the complaint,

matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents” attached to

2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Section 1915A screening of amended complaints is likewise

required. See Fields v. Venable, 674 F. App’x 225, 228 (3d Cir. 2016) (nonprecedential)

(noting that district court “fulfill[ed] its duty to screen” pro se prisoner’s amended complaint).

3 Id. § 1915A(b)(1).

4 See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 109-10 & n.11 (3d Cir. 2002); O’Brien

v. U.S. Fed. Gov’t, 763 F. App’x 157, 159 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (nonprecedential);

cf. Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).

5 Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); see Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 66 (3d Cir.

1996).

a defendant’s motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based upon these

documents.7

When the sufficiency of a complaint is challenged, the court must conduct a

three-step inquiry.8 At step one, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements [the]

plaintiff must plead to state a claim.”9 Second, the court should distinguish well-

pleaded factual allegations—which must be taken as true—from mere legal

conclusions, which “are not entitled to the assumption of truth” and may be

disregarded.10 Finally, the court must review the presumed-truthful allegations

“and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”11

Deciding plausibility is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to

draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”12

Because Brown proceeds pro se, his pleadings are to be liberally construed

and his amended complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]”13 This is

particularly true when the pro se litigant, like Brown, is incarcerated.14

7 Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp.

v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)).

8 Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted).

9 Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009) (alterations in original)).

10 Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

11 Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

12 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681.

13 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations omitted).

II. DISCUSSION

In his original complaint, Brown alleged that he was involved in an incident

with police officers and suffered serious injuries from their use of excessive force,

including a hematoma, facial contusion, broken left pinky finger, and concussion.15

He was hospitalized, and after his discharge on December 21, 2021, he was taken

to Huntingdon County Prison and remained there until February 3, 2022.16

Brown appears to be raising a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment17 for

alleged deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. In his original complaint,

he named as defendants Warden Brad Glover, Deputy Warden Daniel Weikert,

grievance coordinator Lieutenant Rhone, nurse “Susan,” and an unidentified

“doctor” at the prison.18 In his amended complaint, he does not set forth the named

defendants, and it appears that he is relying on his initial complaint to provide

Defendants’ names and titles. Accordingly, the Court must determine—through

review of Brown’s amended pleadings—if he has stated a Section 1983 claim

against any identified state actor.

15 Doc. 1 at 5.

16 Id. at 4; Doc. 11 at 1.

17 Because Brown is a pretrial detainee, his claims implicate the Fourteenth Amendment, not the

Eighth. See Jacobs v. Cumberland County, 8 F.4th 187, 193-94 (3d Cir. 2021); Thomas v.

Cumberland County, 749 F.3d 217, 223 n.4 (3d Cir. 2014).

A. Personal Involvement

It is well established that, in Section 1983 actions, liability cannot be

“predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.”19 Rather, a Section

1983 plaintiff must aver facts that demonstrate “the defendants’ personal

involvement in the alleged misconduct.”20 Personal involvement can include direct

wrongful conduct by a defendant, but it can also be demonstrated through

allegations of “personal direction” or of “actual knowledge and acquiescence”;

however, such averments must be made with particularity.21

In his amended complaint, Brown does not include any allegations that

would establish personal involvement by Weikert or Rhone in the purported

constitutional violations. Thus, it appears that Brown has abandoned any claim

against these Defendants and they will be dismissed from the instant action.

As to Glover, Brown alleges that he informed Glover (at some unspecified

point in time) that he had not been taken to his scheduled medical appointments

and Glover responded, “Brown if you start your shit and file grievances and [a]

lawsuit I’ll have your ass transferred to SCI Smithfield where you will get

nothing.”22 Brown further avers that he believes “the Jail is under o[r]ders by the

19 Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted); see also Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556. U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (affirming same principle in Bivens context).

20 Dooley, 957 F.3d at 374 (citing Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207).

21 Id. (quoting Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207).

Warden Glover” and that Glover “tells them what [they can] and can’t do.”23

These allegations are plainly insufficient to establish personal involvement in the

purported medical indifference. Such sparse assertions fail to establish denial of

medical care or deliberate indifference to Brown’s medical conditions. Nor do

they show personal direction or knowledge and acquiescence in a constitutional

violation.

Therefore, the Court will dismiss the claims against Glover, Weikert, and

Rhone. As this is Brown’s second attempt to plead a claim against these

Defendants and he is unable to aver facts that would state a Section 1983 cause of

action, dismissal will be with prejudice.24

B. Alleged Fourteenth Amendment Violation

As previously noted, Brown is a pretrial detainee, so his claims implicate the

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth

Amendment’s cruel-and-unusual-punishment provision. However, it does not

appear that the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has established

or adhered to a different standard with respect to Fourteenth Amendment pretrial

detainee medical indifference claims versus those raised by incarcerated

23 Id. at 7.

24 See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (explaining that leave to amend may be denied

due to “repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed”); Jones v.

individuals under the Eighth Amendment.25 Accordingly, the Court will apply

existing Eighth Amendment jurisprudence to Brown’s Fourteenth Amendment

medical indifference claims.

In the context of prison medical care, the Eighth Amendment “requires

prison officials to provide basic medical treatment to those whom it has

incarcerated.”26 To state an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim

regarding inadequate medical care, a plaintiff must plausibly plead “(i) a serious

medical need, and (ii) acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate

indifference to that need.”27 A serious medical need is “one that has been

diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay

person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.”28

Deliberate indifference by prison officials may be evidenced by intentional

refusal to provide care known to be medically necessary, delayed provision of

25 This remains so even following the Supreme Court of the United States’ decision in Kingsley

v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015), which established a different standard for pretrial

detainee excessive force claims. See Moore v. Luffey, 757 F. App’x 335, 340 & n.2 (3d Cir.

2019) (nonprecedential) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument to apply Kingsley’s holding to

Fourteenth Amendment medical care claim and instead analyzing under Eighth Amendment

jurisprudence); see also Parker v. Butler County, 832 F. App’x 777, 780 & n.1 (3d Cir. 2020)

(nonprecedential) (applying Eighth Amendment standard to pretrial detainee medical care

claim while acknowledging Fourteenth Amendment is source of right); Miller v. Steele-Smith,

713 F. App’x 74, 76 n.1, 78 (3d Cir. 2017) (nonprecedential) (same); Goode v. Giorla, 643 F.

App’x 127, 129 & n.3 (3d Cir. 2016) (nonprecedential) (same); Edwards v. Northampton

County, 663 F. App’x 132, 136-37 (3d Cir. 2016) (nonprecedential) (citing Natale v. Camden

Cnty Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir. 2003)).

26 Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).

27 Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003).

medical treatment for non-medical reasons, denial of prescribed medical treatment,

or denial of reasonable requests for treatment resulting in suffering or risk of

injury.29 Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs is an exacting standard,

requiring a showing of “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”30 Claims

sounding in mere medical negligence will not suffice.31

The only Defendants for which Brown includes allegations involving his

purportedly deficient medical care is “nurse Susan” and an unspecified doctor at

Huntingdon County Prison. In his amended complaint, Brown alleges that it took

these medical providers 33 days to send him to a follow-up otolaryngologist

appointment that these providers knew should have been scheduled within three

days after Brown’s release from the hospital.32 He also claims that, upon

admission to the prison, he underwent an initial health screening by the doctor and

nurse Susan (the only nurse in the jail) and he showed them his broken left pinky

finger.33 Brown asserts that it took nurse Susan 44 days to schedule a follow-up

appointment for this injury, resulting in serious pain, the need for a more

complicated surgery, and loss of function in his finger.34 Brown additionally

alleges that he “fell unconscious” while at the prison but was never seen by

29 See Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 & n.11 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Lanzaro, 834 F.2d

at 346).

30 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (citation omitted).

31 Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197.

32 Doc. 11 at 2.

33 Id.

medical or taken to an outside hospital despite having recently suffered serious

head trauma.35

These allegations, taken as true, are adequate to state a claim of deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs. Brown’s Fourteenth Amendment claims

against nurse Susan and the unidentified prison physician may move forward.

C. Leave to Amend

Generally, “plaintiffs who file complaints subject to dismissal under [the

Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995] should receive leave to amend unless

amendment would be inequitable or futile.”36 As explained above, the claims

against Rhone, Weikert, and Glover will be dismissed with prejudice for failure to

cure deficiencies by previous amendments allowed.

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court will dismiss in part Brown’s amended

complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann

Matthew W. Brann

Chief United States District Judge

35 Id. at 4.