The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
LAMONT ZAMICHIELI :
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:20-0180
Plaintiff :
(JUDGE MANNION)
v. :
J.B. MERRITTS, et al., :
Defendants :
MEMORANDUM
I. Background
Plaintiff, Lamont Zamichieli, an inmate currently confined at the
Phoenix State Correctional Institution, Collegeville, Pennsylvania, filed the
above captioned civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. (Doc. 1,
complaint). He complains of actions which occurred at his former place of
confinement, the State Correctional Institution at Huntingdon (SCI-
Huntingdon), Pennsylvania. (Doc. 1, complaint). The named Defendants are
the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections; Huntingdon County; seventeen
employees of SCI-Huntingdon and four John/Jane Doe Defendants. Id.
Plaintiff’s claims, encompassed in a sixteen-page diatribe, set forth
allegations of unsanitary conditions of confinement, deliberate indifference
to his serious medical and mental health needs, patterns of excessive use of
force, failure to intervene, delay/denial of medical care, sexual
abuse/assault, retaliation, interference with mail, denial of due process, and
unlawful search and seizure. Id.
By Memorandum and Order dated September 28, 2021, the Court
granted Defendants’ three separate motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint
for Plaintiff’s failure to comply with Fed R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2) and afforded
Zamichieli the opportunity to file an amended complaint. (Docs. 62, 63).
On October 12, 2021, Plaintiff filed his amended complaint. (Doc. 68).
II. ALLEGATIONS IN AMENDED COMPLAINT
Plaintiff’s amended complaint is comprised of thirty-four pages,
containing fifty-four factual averments, resulting in alleged violations of
Plaintiff’s First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Doc. 68). The Court
summarizes Plaintiff’s specific allegations below.
In 2015, the DOC recommended that Plaintiff participate in a treatment
program titled “Thinking for a Change” but then additionally recommended
he participate in a “Mod-High Intensity” program after receiving a misconduct
charge. (Doc. 68 ¶23). Plaintiff claims that he has been assigned a “D
stability,” indicating that he is seriously mentally ill, with a diagnosis of
schizoaffective disorder depressive type. (Doc. 68, ¶¶23-24).
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In April 2017, Plaintiff was transferred to SCI Huntingdon, was placed
in the Diversionary Treatment Unit (“DTU”) and remained there until May
2019 without access to his two prescribed treatment programs. (Doc. 68
¶24). The DTU is a unit used to treat seriously mentally ill inmates, such as
himself. (Doc. 68, ¶25). Plaintiff claims that according to DOC policy, he
should have been permitted ten structured hours a week in out of cell
programs such as the above two programs and ten unstructured hours of
time out of their cells, but Defendants denied him those programs. Id. He
believes that since programming affects his eligibility for parole, it should be
facilitated by psychology staff, counselors, and treating physicians. (Doc. 68,
at ¶¶26, 29).
Because he was denied access to the programs, he filed numerous
grievances on the subject between October 2017 and March 2018, which
were ignored or intercepted by staff. Id. at ¶¶30-31. Plaintiff told Defendants
he felt suicidal. Id. at ¶49. Between April and June 2018, Plaintiff was
admitted to a Psychiatric Observation Cell (“POC”) numerous times after
experiencing suicidal thoughts. Id. at ¶35.
Defendants retaliated against him for filing grievances by assaulting
him, and then superior staff were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s safety
concerns. Id. at ¶¶60-62.
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In January 2021, Plaintiff was denied parole based on his misconduct
charges, failure to complete his recommended programming, and poor
behavior. Id. at ¶¶63-64. The parole denial states that he will be reviewed
upon the completing of his programming. Id. at ¶65. But since he is in the
Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”) serving time for misconduct charges, he is
not eligible for programming. Id.
In March 2021, Plaintiff attempted suicide by diving off the second tier
of a housing unit while experiencing hallucinations, which continued after he
was taken to a POC. Id. at ¶34.
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges the following pertaining to the DOC
Defendants:
Deputy Superintendent Brumbaugh
Plaintiff claims that Defendant Brumbaugh is the Deputy Secretary of
Facility Management and that in April 2018, he wrote to Brumbaugh about
“retaliation on inmates who file grievances on [staff] or request to go to POC
on their shift.” (Doc. 68 ¶47). He did not respond. Id.
CO Chilcote
Dunkle told Chilcote and others to destroy evidence of the assault on
Plaintiff on March 21, 2018. (Doc. 68 ¶ 44).
Lt. Dunkle
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On March 21, 2018, Plaintiff was escorted by Dunkle to the DTU
without a handheld camera, contrary to policy. (Doc. 68 ¶¶37-44). Dunkle
sexually harassed him and made threats towards him to retaliate against him
for filings grievances on him and other staff. Id. Then Dunkle sexually
assaulted him. Id. Plaintiff was attacked a second time by Dunkle in the strip
cage and was sprayed with OC spray. Id. Dunkle told Chilcote and others to
destroy evidence of the assault. Id.
C.O. Henry
Plaintiff was attacked by Henry in the strip cage on March 21, 2018.
(Doc. 68, ¶43). Henry was worried about Plaintiff reporting the assault by
Dunkle. (Doc. 68 ¶44). On April 19, 2018, Merritts told Henry to pepper spray
Plaintiff because he was going to file a sexual abuse report. (Doc. 68 ¶48).
Captain House
Plaintiff wrote to House in April 2018 about the alleged retaliation.
(Doc. 68 ¶47). He did not respond. Id.
Unit Manager Kendrick
Plaintiff wrote to Kendrick in April 2018 about the alleged retaliation.
(Doc. 68 ¶47). He did not respond. Id.
Lt. Maxwell
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Maxwell accused Plaintiff of hallucinating a sexual assault, said that
the camera footage showed no assault occurred, and blamed his mental
health. (Doc.68, ¶46). Maxwell told Plaintiff the camera footage of the assault
would be destroyed. Id.
Plaintiff wrote to Maxwell in April 2018 about the alleged retaliation.
(Doc. 68 ¶47). He did not respond. Id.
C.O. Merritts
On April 19, 2018, Merritts told Henry to pepper spray Plaintiff because
he was going to file a sexual abuse report. (Doc. 68 ¶48). Plaintiff was
attacked by Merritts with oleoresin capsicum (“OC”) spray. Id. at ¶49. Plaintiff
was issued a misconduct for this incident that falsely alleged he had been
attempting to assault Merritts. Id.
On August 19, 2018, Parkes reminded Merritts about Plaintiff’s
pending grievances and sexual abuse claim. Id. ¶52. Then Merritts grabbed
his hands and slammed them against the metal food aperture in the cell door.
Id. at ¶53. Merritts wrote a misconduct charge alleging Plaintiff was
attempting to assault him. Id. at ¶55.
C.O. Parkes
Parkes was worried about Plaintiff reporting the assault by Dunkle on
March 21, 2018. (Doc. 68 ¶44). On August 19, 2018, Parkes reminded
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Merritts about Plaintiff’s pending grievances and sexual abuse claim and
placed a shield in front of his cell door. Id. ¶52 & 56.
CCPM Spyker
Plaintiff wrote to Spyker in April 2018 about the alleged retaliation.
(Doc. 68 ¶47). She did not respond. Id.
Deputy Superintendent Walters
Plaintiff wrote to Walters in April 2018 about the alleged retaliation.
(Doc. 68 ¶47). He did not respond. Id.
Secretary Wetzel
Wetzel, who was the secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections, was sued by the Disability Rights Network (“DRN”) of PA. (Doc.
68, ¶27). The case settled in 2015 and was done to benefit seriously mentally
ill inmates such as Plaintiff. (Doc. 68, ¶27). Plaintiff claims that as a seriously
mentally ill prisoner, the settlement should benefit him. Id. DTUs were
created as part of the settlement. Id. at ¶38. Plaintiff wrote to Wetzel in April
2018 about the alleged retaliation. (Doc. 68 ¶47). He did not respond. Id.
CRNP Cousins
Plaintiff claims that CRNP Cousins is a psychiatric mental health nurse,
who is contracted to work at SCI Huntington (Doc. 68, ¶16). Plaintiff alleges
that on March 18 or 19, 2018, CRNP Cousins denied Plaintiff psychiatric
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medications because she believed that he did not need them (Doc. 68, ¶32).
Plaintiff further claims that CRNP Cousins discontinued his medications in
retaliation for filing grievances that he filed against her and other Defendants
in November and December of 2017 and January, February, and March of
2018 (Doc. 68, ¶33). CRNP Cousins also allegedly began the process of
adjusting Plaintiff's D-code status, which was previously approved by Co-
Defendant Wetzel (Doc. 68, ¶36). Plaintiff claims that this denied him the
benefits of programs given to inmates with a D-code (Doc. 68, ¶36).
Huntingdon County
Plaintiff claims that Huntingdon County “is the county that encouraged
a policy upon seriously mentally ill inmates at SCI-Huntingdon as the county
created policy to use patterns of retaliatory excessive force and several
assaults upon inmates. The County knew of policy custom but did not correct
conditions upon being notified repeatedly of the actions.” (Doc. 68, ¶17).
C.O. Spory
Plaintiff claims that he filed multiple grievances against Defendant
Spory over a period of months. (Doc. 68, ¶30). Spory and another officer
were told by Dunkle to pepper spray Plaintiff. (Doc. 68, ¶44).
Presently before the Court are Defendants’ three separate motions to
dismiss Plaintiff’s amended complaint for failure to comply with Federal
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Rules of Civil Procedure 20. (Docs. 72, 73, 94). Also before the Court is
Defendant, Huntingdon County’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
(Doc. 69). For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant Defendants’
motions to dismiss.
III. MOTION TO DISMISS
Federal notice and pleading rules require the complaint to provide the
defendant notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests. See
Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 2008). The plaintiff
must present facts that, accepted as true, demonstrate a plausible right to
relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8(a)(2) requires “only a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief,” a complaint may nevertheless be dismissed
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for its “failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court
accepts as true all factual allegations in the complaint and all reasonable
inferences that can be drawn from them, viewed in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009); In re Ins.
Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 314 (3d Cir. 2010). To prevent
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dismissal, all civil complaints must set out “sufficient factual matter” to show
that their claims are facially plausible. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Fowler v.
UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). The plausibility
standard requires more than a mere possibility that the defendant is liable
for the alleged misconduct: “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the
court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ” See
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
Accordingly, the Third Circuit has identified the following steps that a
district court must take when reviewing a 12(b)(6) motion: (1) identify the
elements that a plaintiff must plead to state a claim; (2) identify any
conclusory allegations contained in the complaint that are “not entitled” to the
assumption of truth; and (3) determine whether any “well-pleaded factual
allegations” contained in the complaint “plausibly give rise to an entitlement
to relief.” See Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The Third Circuit has
specified that in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim, “a court must consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the
complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic
documents if the complainant's claims are based upon these documents.”
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See Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension
Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d
Cir. 1993)).
In the context of pro se prisoner litigation, the court must be mindful
that a document filed pro se is “to be liberally construed.” See Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A pro se complaint, “however inartfully
pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers” and can be dismissed for failure to state a claim only if it
appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support
of his claim that would entitle him to relief. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520-21 (1972).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Motion to Dismiss Huntingdon County
Municipalities and other local government bodies, such as Huntingdon
County, are “persons” within the meaning of §1983. See Sanders v.
Susquehanna County Jail, No. 3:CV-05-2271, 2005 WL 2990697, at *2 (M.D.
Pa. Nov.8, 2005) (holding that Susquehanna County is a person for §1983
purposes); see also Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91
(1978).
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Municipalities and other local government entities may not be held
liable under §1983 for the acts of their employees under a theory of
respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Brown,
520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997); see also Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 946 F.2d
1017, 1027 (3d Cir.1991). However, a municipality may be held liable if the
plaintiff can “identify a municipal ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ that caused the plaintiff's
injury.” Id. (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). A policy is an official proclamation
or edict of a municipality, while a custom is a practice that is “so permanent
and well settled as to virtually constitute law.” Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89
F.3d 966, 971 (3d Cir.1996) (quoting Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895
F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir.1990) (citations omitted).
Plaintiff alleges in his amended complaint that Huntingdon County
encouraged, created, or knew about policies at the State Correctional
Institution at Huntingdon concerning seriously mentally ill inmates. Plaintiff,
however, does not reference any county policy that was put in place
concerning mentally ill inmates. The only specific policy he references is PA
DOC 13.8.1, section 14 (see Doc. 68, ¶¶ 26, 29)), a policy promulgated by
the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC). Moreover, the named
Defendants are state DOC employees, not county employees. Thus,
Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to impute liability on Huntingdon County,
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as Huntingdon County is not responsible for the control and operation of a
Commonwealth institution such as SCI-Huntingdon. See Commonwealth v.
Danysh, 2003 PA Super 348, 833 A.2d at 153 (finding that DOC is an
administrative agency within the Executive Branch, see 71 P.S. §61 (creating
DOC among other executive departments), and possesses authority to
operate the State Correctional Institutions throughout the state, see 71 P.S.
§§310-0, 310-1, and as the operator of the State Correctional Institutions, it
has a wide range of responsibilities relating to the care and treatment of
inmates and management of the state prisons). Thus, Defendant,
Huntingdon County’s motion to dismiss will be granted.
B. Remaining Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss
The remaining Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s amended
complaint for failing to comply with this Court’s September 28, 2021 Order,
(See Doc. 63), directing Plaintiff to file an amended complaint that complies
with Fed.R.Civ.P. 8 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 20(a)(2). Specifically, Defendants
argue that Plaintiff’s amended complaint seeks to combine separate claims
regarding his mental health, excessive force by corrections officers, alleged
sexual assault claims and breach of contract claims against thirteen
Defendants. (Doc. 68). The Court agrees. Plaintiff, again, attempts to
bootstrap several separate and distinct claims for relief against different
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Defendants at different time frames, in violation of Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 8 and 20.
Additionally, Defendants argue that several of Plaintiff’s claims are
barred by the statute of limitations. Specifically, Defendants argue that all
claims based on events prior to February 3, 2018, two years prior to the date
the Plaintiff’s original complaint was filed, are barred as a matter of law.
“A complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim on statute
of limitations grounds only when the statute of limitations defense is apparent
on the face of the complaint.” Wisniewski v. Fisher, 857 F.3d 152, 157 (3d
Cir. 2017). A claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 is subject to the
same statute of limitations that applies to personal injury tort claims in the
state in which such a claim arises. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387
(2007); Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 639 (3d Cir. 2009).
Plaintiff’s claims arose in Pennsylvania; thus, the applicable statute of
limitations is Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury
actions. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §5524(2). The statute of limitations period
accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which
is the basis of the §1983 action. See Garvin v. City of Phila., 354 F.3d 215
(3d Cir. 2003); Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 919 (3d Cir.
1991).
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Plaintiff complains of being recommended to participate in Thinking for
a Change in 2015 and the Mod-High Intensity program in 2016 and being
transferred to SCI Huntingdon in April 2017 and denied his recommended
treatment programs in the DTU from April 2017 until May 2019. (Doc. 68
¶¶23-24). He further claims that CRNP Cousins discontinued his
medications in retaliation for filing grievances that he filed against her and
other Defendants in November and December of 2017 and January,
February, and March of 2018. (Doc. 68, ¶33). Plaintiff filed the instant action
on February 3, 2020. (Doc. 1). Consequently, any claims based on events
prior to February 3, 2018 are barred as a matter of law.
Thus, Plaintiff will be granted one final opportunity to file a second
amended complaint concerning events after February 3, 2018 and
conforming to the dictates of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 20.
Plaintiff, a frequent litigant, is more than familiar with the dictates of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 8(d)(1) states, in pertinent part, that “[e]ach allegation must be
simple, concise, and direct.” Rule 20(a)(2), states that “[p]ersons . . . may be
joined in one action as defendants if: (A) any right to relief is asserted against
them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of
the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences;
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and (B) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the
action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). Although Rule 20 is a flexible rule that allows
fairness and judicial economy, the rule only permits “joinder in a single action
of all persons asserting, or defending against, a joint, several, or alternative
right to relief that arises out of the same transaction or occurrence and
presents a common question of law or fact.” 7 Charles Allen Wright, Arthur
Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure §1652 at 371-72
(1986).
Plaintiff’s failure to file a second amended complaint in accordance
with this Court’s directive herein will result in Plaintiff’s action being
dismissed with prejudice.
IV. Conclusion
For the above stated reasons, the Court will grant Huntingdon County’s
motion to dismiss. Huntingdon County will be terminated as a named
Defendant. The remaining Defendants’ motions to dismiss will be granted
and Plaintiff will be afforded one final opportunity to file a second amended
complaint. Failure to file a second amended complaint in accordance with
the dictates of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 20 will result in the
action being dismissed with prejudice.
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An appropriate Order follows.
s/ Malachy E. Mannion
MALACHY E. MANNION
United States District Judge
Date: September 29, 2022
20-0180-02
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