holding that “Judges are entitled to absolute immunity—thus, immune to civil suits for damages—even when they commit errors of law”, and that “state prosecutors generally enjoy absolute immunity from suit.”
How later courts described this case
- holding that “Judges are entitled to absolute immunity—thus, immune to civil suits for damages—even when they commit errors of law”, and that “state prosecutors generally enjoy absolute immunity from suit.”
- explaining judges should give some review to every Report and Recommendation
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
PHILIP J. VONVILLE, :
Plaintiff : CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:21-1603
v. : (JUDGE MANNION)
POCONO MOUNTAIN REGIONAL :
POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al.,
Defendants :
O R D E R
Pending before the court is the June 21, 2022 report of Magistrate
Judge Arbuckle, (Doc. 24), which recommends that the court dismiss,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the pro se amended civil rights
complaint, under 42 U.S.C. §1983, filed plaintiff Philip J. Vonville, (Doc. 23),
an inmate at the Monroe County Correctional Facility. Specifically, the report
recommends the dismissal of plaintiff’s amended complaint for failure to
state a cognizable 4th Amendment claim, for failing to plead a cognizable
conspiracy claim under §1983, for failure to state a proper municipal lability
claim under Monell, and for failure to state an 8th Amendment claim with
respect to being denied bail by the Monroe County Court. After the County
Court denied plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the charges under double jeopardy
in June 2022, the report notes that plaintiff is presently waiting his second
re-trial on murder charges in Monroe County Court and has not yet been
convicted. See Commonwealth v. Philip J. Vonville, No. CP-45-CR-0001708-
2009. The report also finds that the amended complaint should be dismissed
with prejudice since it would be futile to allow the plaintiff further leave to
amend. After being granted an extension of time, the plaintiff filed objections
to the report, (Doc. 27), on September 6, 2022. Upon review, the report of
Judge Arbuckle will be adopted in its entirety and plaintiff’s amended
complaint will be dismissed with prejudice.
When objections are timely filed to the report and recommendation of
a magistrate judge, the district court must review de novo those portions of
the report to which objections are made. 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1): Brown v.
Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2011). Although the standard is de novo,
the extent of review is committed to the sound discretion of the district judge,
and the court may rely on the recommendations of the magistrate judge to
the extent it deems proper. Rieder v. Apfel, 115 F.Supp.2d 496, 499 (M.D.
Pa. 2000) (citing United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980)).
For those sections of the report and recommendation to which no
objection is made, the court should, as a matter of good practice, “satisfy
itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept
the recommendation.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), advisory committee notes; see
also Univac Dental Co. v. Dentsply Intern., Inc., 702 F.Supp.2d 465, 469
(2010) (citing Henderson v. Carlson, 812 F.2d 874, 878 (3d Cir. 1987)
(explaining judges should give some review to every Report and
Recommendation)). Nevertheless, whether timely objections are made or
not, the district court may accept, not accept or modify, in whole or in part,
the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C.
§636(b)(1); Local Rule 72.31.1
The plaintiff essentially alleges in this case that the state could not refile
the same charges against him in a new criminal complaint and detain him in
prison after the district court previously conditionally granted his habeas
petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 2254, and ordered his release from
prison since he was not re-tried within 120 days. See Vonville v. Kerestes,
Civil No. 14-1582, M.D. PA.
1Since the report states the complete background of this case and the
correct legal standards, as well as the correct case law, regarding the
analysis of the plaintiff’s constitutional claims, they will not be repeated
herein. See also Vonville v. Kerestes, Civil No. 14-1582, M.D. PA.
Also, since the report lists the state court background regarding the
underlying murder charges pending against the plaintiff, it is not repeated
herein. See also Commonwealth v. Philip J. Vonville, No. CP-45-
CR-0001708-2009. The court takes judicial notice of plaintiff’s Monroe
County Court Criminal Docket which is found at
https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/CaseSearch.
Here, the report provides a thorough analysis regarding the allegations
and claims raised by the plaintiff in his amended complaint, and correctly
explains why they should all be dismissed. As such, the court adopts all of
the report’s conclusions and will not repeat them.
Moreover, in Washington v. Beard, 258 F. Supp. 3d 512, 517 (E.D. Pa.
2017), the court stated:
[the] “release or retry” language [in the federal court’s order] did
not prohibit the Commonwealth from re-arresting and retrying
Petitioner after his release on the original [state] charges, and
detaining him pending that retrial, subject to Petitioner’s right to
a pretrial bail hearing and any other rights of the accused under
state and federal law. As the Third Circuit itself has explained,
because it is a victorious habeas petitioner’s “conviction, not his
indictment, which has been declared unconstitutional” by a
federal court, “[n]othing ... prevents [a] State from dealing with a
habeas releasee who will be retried as the State would deal with
any other State prisoner who has yet to stand trial.” Carter, 781
F.2d at 998. Therefore, in this case, the “retry or release” order
prohibited the Commonwealth from detaining Petitioner only on
the basis of the prior judgment against him, from which Petitioner
was released by conditional writ of the court after 120 days had
elapsed. Nothing prevented the Commonwealth from releasing
Petitioner pursuant to this Court’s order, and then subsequently
detaining him pending retrial, subject to the state court
procedures for pretrial detention, including eligibility for bail.
(emphasis original).
See also Freeman v. Capozza, 517 F.Supp.3d 407, 414 n. 8 (E.D. Pa. 2021)
(In the event that [petitioner] is not retried within 120 days, the “release or
retry” language above “d[oes] not prohibit the Commonwealth from re-
arresting and retrying [petitioner] after his release on the original charges,
and detaining him pending that retrial, subject to [petitioner’s] right to a
pretrial bail hearing and any other rights of the accused under state and
federal law.”); Haskell v. Folino, 461 F. Supp. 3d 202 (W.D. Pa. 2020); Lee
v. Cameron, 2017 WL 241326, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 19, 2017) (the state is
generally free to re-arrest and retry the defendant on the original indictment
when the state fails to retry a defendant within the time period specified by
the federal court in conditionally granting defendant’s habeas petition).
Additionally, “[w]hether [plaintiff] should be released on bail if the
Commonwealth choses to retry him pending trial is an issue for the state
court of competent jurisdiction to determine.” Id. In the instant case, the state
court docket indicates that the Commonwealth is not holding the plaintiff
based of his prior conviction and sentence, rather, it indicates that he was
released from incarceration pursuant to his prior conviction, and that the
Commonwealth then re-arrested him. The plaintiff is currently being held
without bail pending his retrial on the underlying murder charges since the
Monroe County Court denied him bail. Further, insofar as the plaintiff claims
that after his re-arrest, he was not given “his right to a proper pretrial bail
hearing and other protections under state law, [plaintiff] can take up those
matters, if at all, in the state courts ….” Washington v. Beard, 258 F.Supp.
3d at 518. In fact, the plaintiff is represented by counsel in the Monroe County
Court and his counsel can protect the plaintiff’s rights in state court and “is in
the best position to advance [his] interests, …, in state court.” Id. at n. 8.
Further, some of plaintiff’s named defendants appear to be immune
from his claims for money damages, namely, the prosecutors with the
Monroe County District Attorney’s Office, and one defendant appears to be
entitled to judicial immunity, namely, Magisterial District Judge Richard
Claypool. See Darby v. Geiger, 441 Fed.Appx. 840 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding
that “Judges are entitled to absolute immunity—thus, immune to civil suits
for damages—even when they commit errors of law”, and that “state
prosecutors generally enjoy absolute immunity from suit.”)(citations omitted).
The court finds that the stated immunities prevent the plaintiff from pursing
his claims for damages against the mentioned defendants.
Finally, the report correctly recognizes that although plaintiff is pro se,
and his allegations are construed liberally see Higgs v. Att’y Gen., 655 F.3d
333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011), he should not be granted leave to again amend his
pleading based on futility.
The court finds no clear error of record with respect to Judge Arbuckle’s
findings regarding the plaintiff’s amended complaint, and the court agrees
with the sound reasoning that led Judge Arbuckle to the conclusions in his
report. As such, the court will adopt the report of Judge Arbuckle, in its
entirety, as the decision of the court.
In light of the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
(1) The plaintiff’s objections to the report and recommendation of Judge
Arbuckle, (Doc. 27), are OVERRULED.
(2) The report and recommendation of Judge Arbuckle, (Doc. 24), is
ADOPTED IN ITS ENTIRETY, as the ruling of the court.
(3) The plaintiff’s amended complaint, (Doc. 23), is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
(4) The clerk of court is directed to CLOSE this case.
s/ Malachy E. Mannion
MALACHY E. MANNION
United States District Judge
Date: September 29, 2022
21-1603-02